Khalifeh v Blom Bank SAL  EWHC 3399 (QB) is the second High Court judgment in the space of a few weeks to involve Lebanese Banks and the application of the protective regime for consumers in EU private international law. (See earlier Bitar v Banque Libano-Francaise).
Foxton J explains why there is such activity: difficult financial conditions faced by Lebanese banks and their customers at the current time, and the practical impossibility of transferring foreign currency out of Lebanon, caused acute anguish for those with foreign currency accounts in Lebanese banks. Understandably they have explored every avenue open to them in an effort to access their hard-won savings.
Jurisdiction would seem not to be in dispute (presumably given the presence of non-exclusive choice of court in a general agreement), applicable law is. Even in consumer contracts, Article 6 Rome I allows parties to the contract to chose applicable law – except such choice must not deprive the consumer of the protection of the mandatory elements of the law that would apply had no choice been made: that ‘default law’, per Article 6(1) Rome I, is the law of the consumer’s habitual residence.
Whether choice of law has been made is to be determined in accordance with Article 3, which proscribes that choice of law must be either nominatim, or ‘clearly demonstrated’ by the circumstances of the case. The latter is often referred to as ‘implicit’ choice of law although there is nothing truly implicit about it: choice of law cannot be made happenstance, it must have been made clearly (even if not in so many words).  ff the judge considers whether ‘implicit’ choice has been made, referring to Avonwick, and holds  that there was, namely in favour of Lebanese law. He concludes this as a combined effect of
a jurisdiction clause in a related, general agreement which he found to be exclusive  in favour of Beirut; I have to say I do not think the judgment engages satisfactorily with the argument that this hybrid clause itself is questionable under the lex causae (including consumer law) that would have to apply to it;
the express reference to an agreement to comply with and facilitate the enforcement of identified provisions of Lebanese law; and
the express choice of Lebanese law in a closely related and interwoven contract.
Clearly some of this analysis is fact-specific and subjective however in my view the lex causae element of hybrid choice of court has more beef to the bone.
As for the issue of ‘activities directed at’ the UK, this is discussed  ff. First up is an interesting discussion on the relevant time at which the habitual residence of the consumer has to be considered. In light ia of CJEU Commerzbank, which presumably was not available at the time of the discussion, I would suggest the conclusion  that the temporal element needs to be fixed at the very beginning, to avoid see-sawing and dépeçage, may need revisiting.
In terms of the actual directing of activities, Pammer /Alpenhof of course is discussed as is Emrek. Having discussed the evidence, the conclusion  ff is that there was no direction of activities.
As a result, the remainder of the judgment deals with the substantive issues under Lebanese law.
I do not know whether permission to appeal has been sought. There are sections in the judgment that in my view would merit it.
EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 220.127.116.11.7, 2.270 ff; Heading 3.2.4, Heading 3.2.5.
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