Posts Tagged Brussels Ia

Vestel v HEVC Advance (Delaware) and Philips (NL). High Court denies stand-alone competition law damage both on the basis of Article 7(2) BRU Ia and residual CPR rules.

In [2019] EWHC 2766 (Ch) Vestel Elektronik v HEVC Advance and Koninklijke Philips NV, Hacon J found no jurisdiction in a stand-alone competition law damages case (no finding of infringement yet; claim is one of abuse of dominant position). He rejected the existence of jurisdiction against Philips NV (of The Netherlands) on the basis that no damage existing or potential could be shown grounding Article 7(2) Brussels Ia tortious Jurisdiction. Against the Delaware defendant, the relevant CPR rules applied per Four Seasons v Brownlie did not lead to jurisdiction either.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12.1

 

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Central Santa Lucia L.C. v. Meliá Hotels International S.A.: Spanish court obiter applying Article 24 Brussels Ia reflexively ex-EU (Cuba).

Thank you Antonio Pastor for signalling Central Santa Lucia L.C. v. Meliá Hotels International S.A., litigation on which also more background here. The Spanish courts at MAllorca (appeal expected)  have declined jurisdiction concerning confiscated property in Cuba after the end of suspension of Title III of the Libertad Act (the “Helms-Burton Act”, well known to trade and international lawyers alike) on the basis of sovereign immunity, as Antonio explains.

However as I understand Antonio’s summary (I fear I do not have Spanish to consult the judgment myself), the Court obiter also applied Article 24(1) Brussels Ia reflexively: if Brussels Ia grants exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the Member State in which the property is situated in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property, then EU Courts should decline jurisdiction if that real estate happens to be located ex-EU. Readers will remember the discussions on this issue in one or two earlier postings on this blog.

Interesting, to say the least.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.

 

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Fasten your seatbelts. Etihad v Flöther (Air Berlin) puts limits of EU law in applying Article 25 in the spotlight. On ‘particular legal relationship’ in choice of court, and asymmetric jurisdiction clauses in applications for stay.

[2019] EWHC 3107 (Comm) Etihad v Air Berlin (officially: Etihad Airways v Prof Dr Lucas Flöther, who is the insolvency practitioner for Air Berlin) raises the issues of whether the relevant dispute arises in connection with the “particular legal relationship” between the parties, as required by Article 25 Brussels Ia, and the question whether so-called “asymmetric” jurisdiction clauses fall within Article 31 of Brussels Recast, an issue which I reviewed at the time of Commerzbank v Liquimar. (This in the very week that Michiel Poesen and I received copy of Mary Footer’s edited volume on optional choice of court, with our Chapter on Belgium).

Those reading this post and the judgment had better hold on – for this is more than just a quick safety briefing – the required ‘good arguable case’ standard is responsible for the extensive discussion of the issues, perhaps not entirely in line with the instruction for conciseness per the Supreme Court in Vedanta.

Etihad acquired a 2.99% stake in Air Berlin in August 2011 and, in December 2011, increased its shareholding to 29.21% pursuant to an agreement governed by English law and contained an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the English courts. Between 28 and 30 April 2017, Etihad entered into a number of agreements for the purposes of providing Air Berlin with financial support. One of these was a facility agreement which contains the discussed jurisdiction clause:

33.1 JURISDICTION 

33.1.1 The courts of England have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any disputes arising out of or in connection with this Agreement (including a dispute relating to non-contractual obligations arising from or in connection with this Agreement, or a dispute regarding the existence, validity or termination of this Agreement) (a “Dispute“).

33.2.2 The Parties agree that the courts of England are the most appropriate and convenient courts to settle Disputes and accordingly no Party will argue to the contrary.

33.1.3 This Clause 33 is for the benefit of the Lender only. As a result, the Lender shall not be prevented from taking proceedings relating to a Dispute in any other courts with jurisdiction. To the extent allowed by law, the Lender may take concurrent proceedings in any number of jurisdictions.

In a letter dated 28 April 2017 from Mr James Hogan, the then President and CEO of Etihad Aviation Group PJSC, to the directors of Air Berlin (the “Comfort Letter”), which provided as follows: 

“For the purposes of the finalisation of the financial statements of Air Berlin plc for the year ended 31 December 2016, having had sight of your forecasts for the two years ending 31 December 2018, we confirm our intention to continue to provide the necessary support to Air Berlin to enable it to meet its financial obligations as they fall due for payment for the foreseeable future and in any event for 18 months from the date of this letter. Our commitment is evidenced by our historic support through loans and obtaining financing for Air Berlin”.

In German proceedings, started first, Air Berlin advances two alternative claims against Etihad under German Law: i) A claim for breach of the Comfort Letter on the basis that the Comfort Letter is legally binding. ii) Alternatively, if the Comfort Letter is not legally binding, a pre contractual claim in culpa in contrahendo, on the basis that Etihad used its negotiating power during the negotiations between the parties to avoid providing a clearly binding statement whilst, at the same time, inspiring the trust of Air Berlin that it would adhere to the commitment in the Comfort Letter.

Clearly Air Berlin considers the comfort letter a separate ‘agreement’ or ‘contract’ to which the widely formulated choice of court and law provisions of the Facility Agreement do not apply.

In the English proceedings, Etihad seeks the following declarations:

a) The claims made and declarations sought in the German Proceedings are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English court within Article 25 of the Judgments Regulation, because, on its true construction, they are within the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction clause contained in the 2017 €350m Facility Agreement (the one with the jurisdiction clause discussed above);

b) The claims made and declarations sought in the German Proceedings are governed by English Law on the true construction of the governing law clause in the Facility Agreement, an implied agreement between the same parties and/or the application of Rome I and/or Rome II;

c) The Claimant is not liable for breach of the Comfort Letter, as alleged in the German Proceedings, because that letter, on its true construction, did not create a legally binding promise to provide financial support to Air Berlin;

d) The Claimant is not liable on the basis of culpa in contrahendo, as alleged in the German Proceedings, because the facts and matters relied on in the German Proceedings do not give rise to a cause of action known to English law; and

e) Further, and in any event, the Claimant is not liable to the Defendant as alleged by the Defendant in the German Proceedings.

On Article 25 the list of authority was of course very long. On Article 31, reference was made for background in particular to Commerzbank AG v Liquimar Tankers Management Inc. in which Cranston J supported as I discussed at the time, the cover of asymmetric choice of court by Article 31.

On Article 25, the

I. first point to discuss

was whether the choice of court agreement in the facilities agreement extended to the comfort letter. Etihad puts forward adopting the broad, purposive and commercial approach to interpreting such clauses which it suggests has been mandated by the English authorities, concluding the dispute arises out of or in connection with that agreement. Air Berlin emphasises that application of the standard of proof must take into account the EU law requirement that an exclusive jurisdiction clause under Article 25 must be “clearly and precisely” demonstrated.

At 56 ff Jacobs J first reiterates the jurisdiction clause relied upon, contained in the Facility Agreement, which is expressly governed by English law. Clause 32 of that agreement provides: “This Agreement and all non-contractual obligations arising from or connected with it are governed by English law”. The question of whether, as a matter of contractual interpretation, the clause conferring jurisdiction extends to claims in respect of the Comfort Letter and the related claims advanced in the German proceedings is to be determined by reference to English law. This may surprise uninitiated readers first reading Article 25 and relevant recitals, however to those with conflicts insight it will be well known that Article 25 merely scratches on the surface of the contractual depth of choice of court. 

At 69 he sums up the principles (with reference to Fiona Trust), discusses them at length, and summarises at 102:

(i) the width of the jurisdiction clause in the Facility Agreement, (ii) the fact that the Comfort Letter was part of the overall support package where all relevant agreements between Etihad and Air Berlin were governed by English law with English jurisdiction clauses, (iii) the close connection between the Comfort Letter and the Facility Agreement in terms of the genesis of the Comfort Letter, (iv) Etihad’s good arguable case that the Comfort Letter did not create contractually binding obligations and was ancillary to the Facility Agreement, (v) the absence of any competing jurisdiction clause in any of the agreements within the support package, and the existence of English law and jurisdiction clauses in the relevant agreements as part of that package, and (vi) the reasonable foreseeability of disputes which required consideration of the Comfort Letter in conjunction with the Facility Agreement – all lead to the conclusion that the parties intended disputes arising in relation to the Comfort Letter to fall within the jurisdiction clause of the Facility Agreement.

Conclusion on this issue, at 109: ‘interpreting the jurisdiction agreement in the Facility Agreement as a matter of English law, there is a good arguable case that (i) the jurisdiction clause in the Facility Agreement is applicable to the Comfort Letter and any non-contractual claim in connection therewith, and (ii) the claim commenced by Air Berlin in Germany falls within the scope of that clause.’

On Article 25, the

I. second point to discuss at 110 ff was the requirement in Article 25 for the dispute to arise “in connection with a particular legal relationship” – a condition which Etihad must meet separately from the above conclusion that as a matter of English law, the claims made in Germany fell within the scope of the jurisdiction agreement in the Facility Agreement. Arguments here to some extent overlap with the strength or otherwise of the connection between the Facility Agreement and the Comfort Letter, discussed above. Reference here clearly was made to Airbus and the CJEU in Powell Duffryn. In the latter the CJEU held ‘”This requirement aims to limit the effect of an agreement conferring jurisdiction to disputes originating from the legal relationship in connection with which the agreement was concluded. It seeks to prevent a party from being surprised by the referral to a specified court of all disputes which arise in the relationships which it has with the other party and which may originate in relationships other than that in connection with which the agreement conferring jurisdiction was concluded”. The principles of Powel Duffryn were also followed in the equally seminal CDC case.

At 134 ff Jacobs J dismisses the argument that the way in which a particular claim is formulated in the foreign proceedings is determinative of the issue of whether the dispute arises in relation to a particular relationship. Rather: ‘it is obviously necessary to look at the nature of the claim made in those foreign proceedings. It is clear that what is then required is for the court to consider the substance of the claim that is made.’ At 136 ff he lists the arguments leading him to the conclusion that there is ‘no doubt that the dispute concerning the Comfort Letter can fairly (and certainly to a good arguable case standard) be said to originate from [the borrower /lender] relationship.’

 

The final issue to consider then was Article 31(2): “2. Without prejudice to Article 26, where a court of a Member State on which an agreement as referred to in Article 25 confers exclusive jurisdiction is seised, any court of another Member State shall stay the proceedings until such time as the court seised on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement.”

The issue is therefore whether the jurisdiction clause in the present case is a clause which “confers exclusive jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 31(2). A related question is whether the English court can properly be described as being “seised on the basis of” such exclusive jurisdiction agreement within the meaning of Article 31 (2). Air Berlin says “no” to both questions (on the first, purely on the basis of the clause being asymmetric), and Etihad says “yes”.

Reference is made to Codere, Commerzbank, leading to a firm finding that the clause is exclusive in casu, for it is (in prof Fentimann’s words) ‘exclusive against a counterparty’ and in Louise Mellett’s words (ICLQ, referenced in the judgment)

‘”In an asymmetric agreement, the borrower has promised not to sue anywhere other than the chosen jurisdiction. The question of whether the other party did or did not agree to do the same does not arise when the bank is seeking to enforce the agreement and should be irrelevant. Thus, the point is not so much that “considered as a whole” [asymmetric agreements] are agreements conferring exclusive jurisdiction, as the judge put it in Commerzbank. Rather, each obligation can be considered on its own; the clause includes a promise by the borrower not to sue in any jurisdiction and that promise is capable of being protected by Article 31(2). Each different obligation necessarily falls to be considered separately and the fact that the bank is not under a similar obligation is neither here nor there.”

(Further scholarship discussed includes Dickinson and Lein, and Ahmed; the Hague Convention is also discussed obiter, with reference to Clearlake and update 28 November 2019 as Sarah McKibbin notes Jacobs J suggesting obiter ‘Like Cranston J and Merrett, I consider that there are good arguments that the rules in the Hague Convention are engaged by an asymmetric clause.’ [217].

Reference to the CJEU on the Article 31 issue, requested by Air Berlin, is dismissed, something which may have to be reconsidered by the Court of Appeal. But even on the Article 25 discussion (I am thinking in particular of the relevance or not of the formulation of the claim), more CJEU authority in my view would be welcome.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Ch.2, Heading 2.2.9, Heading 2.2.9.4.1, Heading 2.2.9.5.

 

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Air transport. The CJEU in Adriano Guaitoli v Easyjet. The not always clear delineation between the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels and Montreal regimes.

C-213/18 Adriano Guaitoli et al v Easyjet concerns the clearly complex relationship between the Brussels Ia jurisdictional regime, the 1999 Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, and the EU’s flight compensation Regulation 261/2004.

Montreal Article 33 determines which court has jurisdiction to hear an action for damages against an air carrier falling within the scope of that instrument. The reference has been made in the context of a cross-border dispute between an airline and a number of passengers, in relation to sums claimed by those passengers both by way of standardised compensation under Regulation 261/2004 and by way of individualised compensation for damage caused to them by the cancellation of an outward and a return flight, both operated by that airline.

Saugmandsgaard ØE had advised that the two instruments should be applied distributively, according to the nature of the relevant head of claim. The Court has followed: the court of a Member State hearing an action seeking to obtain both compliance with the flat-rate and standardised rights provided for in Regulation No 261/2004, and compensation for further damage falling within the scope of the Montreal Convention, must assess its jurisdiction, on the first head of claim, in the light of Article 7(1) BIa and, on the second head of claim, having regard to Article 33 Montreal.

This is also the result of Articles 67 and Article 71(1) BIa which allow the application of rules of jurisdiction relating to specific matters which are contained respectively in Union acts or in conventions to which the Member States are parties. Since air transport is such a specific matter, the rules of jurisdiction provided for by the Montreal Convention must be applicable within the regulatory framework laid down by it.

Note that per Article 17(3) BIa the consumer section ‘shall not apply to a contract of transport other than a contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel and accommodation’ (see also C‑464/18 Ryanair). The rule of special jurisdiction for the supply of services, A7(1)(b) BIa, designates as the court having jurisdiction to deal with a claim for compensation based on air transport contract of persons, at the applicant’s choice, that court which has territorial jurisdiction over the place of departure or place of arrival of the aircraft, as those places are agreed in that transport contract; see also C-88/17 Zurich Insurance.

The Court further held that Article 33 Montreal, like A7BIa, leads to the direct appointment of the territorially competent court within a Montreal State: it does not just just identify a State with jurisdiction as such.

The combined application of these rules inevitable means that unless claimants are happy to sue in Mozaik fashion, consolidation of the case will most likely take place in the domicile of the airline. In the Venn diagram of options, that is in most cases the only likely overlap.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2, Heading 2.2.11.1.

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Saugmandsgaard ØE in Libuše Králová v Primera Air Scandinavia: the Feniks ‘contractual relation’ train thunders on, yet restraint is shown on the consumer section, even for package travel.

In C-215/18 Libuše Králová v Primera Air Scandinavia, Saugmandsgaard ØE AG now unsurprisingly (following the CJEU predecent of Feniks and Flightright), advised that in a package of services acquired from a travel agent, where there is no direct agreement with the airline carrying out the flight part of the package, there is a ‘contract’ between the individual and the airline within the meaning of Article 7(1) BIa.

At 37 the AG emphasises the element of predictability on the part of the airline, who should not be surprised to be sued by the individual whom they agree with the travel agency to transport, both in the place of take-off and landing, per Zurich Insurance.

However unlike the Commission, the AG supports a less extensive interpretation of the consumer section. Package travel as defined in Directive 90/314, unlike simple tickets for transport only, are covered by the protective provisions of Article 17 ff BIa. Yet the AG proposes to extend that regime only to the direct relationship between the travel agent and the consumer, not the airline who merely carries out the transport side of the arrangement. At 48 ff the AG sets out his reasons for the limitation: the emphasis in the consumer section on the very consumer and professional party who concluded the contract (48-49); the distinction with Maletic since in the case at issue claimant is after the airline company only, not an in solidum finding against the agency and the airline (5-52); and of course the need for strict interpretation.

Note of course the different balance struck by the AG as opposed to e.g. the High Court in Bonnie Lackey.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.2.

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Sadik v Sadik. Domicile, libel tourism and the absence of party autonomy in the Defamation Act 2013.

Update 7 November 2019 for a second What’sApp defamation case under the common law see 5 November Tallha Abdulrazaq v Nibras Hassan [2019] EWHC 2930 (QB) – where jurisdiction was not an issue. 

In [2019] EWHC 2717 (QB) Sadik v Sadik, the claim is one in libel. Claimant is a businessman and philanthropist who lives in Dubai and spends 30 to 35 days in London each year. Claimant and Defendant are brother and sister in law. Defendant has a house in Kuwait with her husband. Until at least 19 September 2017 she lived in London, whilst also maintaining a house in Kuwait.

Defendant is prepared to accept for the purposes of this application that the relevant date for determining domicile is the date proceedings were commenced, ie 26 September 2017: see inter alia JSC BTA Bank v Mukhtar Ablyazov. (Upheld on Appeal). Should no domicile in the UK (or another EU /Lugano State) be upheld, forum non conveniens kicks in.

The UK Defamation Act 2013 (the DA 2013) was entered precisely to address libel tourism in the UK. It reads in relevant part (Section 9)

 Action against a person not domiciled in the UK or a Member State etc 

(1) This section applies to an action for defamation against a person who is not domiciled 

(a) in the United Kingdom; (b) in another Member State; or (c) in a state which is for the time being a contracting party to the Lugano Convention.

(2) A court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action to which this section applies unless the court is satisfied that, of all the places in which the statement complained of has been published, England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place in which to bring an action in respect of the statement.

(3) The references in subsection (2) to the statement complained of include references to any statement which conveys the same, or substantially the same, imputation as the statement complained of.

(4) For the purposes of this section –(a) a person is domiciled in the United Kingdom or in another Member State if the person is domiciled there for the purposes of the Brussels Regulation; (b) a person is domiciled in a state which is a contracting party to the Lugano Convention if the person is domiciled in the state for the purposes of that Convention.”

Defendant says that the Claimant cannot possibly satisfy the test in s 9(2). That is because Claimant in her view does not complain of any publication within this jurisdiction. She submits that s 9 implicitly requires the words complained of to have been published in England and Wales: ‘of all the places in which the statement complained of has been published…’. In effect, she says that s 9 means that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear a claim against a defendant not domiciled in the jurisdiction (or within a Brussels/Lugano state) for a claim in respect of solely foreign publication. In the alternative, if is necessary for the court to compare jurisdictions to determine which is the most appropriate forum for trial Defendant submits that the burden is on the Claimant to demonstrate that England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate forum, and there is no realistic prospect of him being able to discharge that burden. She points in particular to the fact that both of the parties are based in the Middle East, as are all of the publishees of the What’sApp Messages concerned, save for one, who is based in the United States.

Claimant submits that Defendant has submitted to the jurisdiction and so can no longer dispute the Court’s jurisdiction under s 9 of the DA 2013, or otherwise. Further or alternatively, he submits that provision is of no assistance because she was domiciled within the jurisdiction at the relevant time.

At 55 Knowles J holds that failure by a defamation defendant to follow the procedure in Part 11 of the civil procedure rules, for contesting jurisdiction under s 9 does not mean that her right to make a jurisdictional challenge under that section has been waived. ‘Section 9(2) is in mandatory form. Where the defendant is not domiciled within one of the specified jurisdictions then s 9(2) provides (emphasis added), ‘A court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action to which this section applies unless …’. In my judgment jurisdiction under s 9 cannot be conferred by waiver, submission or consent. It is concerned with the subject matter of the suit and not with personal jurisdiction over the defendant.’ In the DA 2013 Parliament in other words inserted mandatory rules on jurisdiction which are not within the remit of party autonomy.

At 60 ff then follows the analysis of ‘domicile’ for natural persons under English law (following Article 62 Brussels Ia’s deference to national law), leading to a conclusion of domicile in the UK at the relevant time.

The remainder of the case discusses grounds for summary dismissal on the grounds of substantive English libel law.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.10

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Elena Tsareva et al v Dimitri Ananyev et al. Cypriot passports, forum shopping and anchor defendants in England.

Parties’ names alone in Elena Tsareva et al v Dimitri Ananyev et al [2019] EWHC 2414 (Comm) clearly indicate the attraction of England in international forum shopping. As Baker J notes at 5:

‘I infer that the choice of this jurisdiction as a venue for the claimants’ claims has been led by the lawyers (Russian and English) who have engaged themselves in assisting the claimants as disappointed investors. Indeed, I think it unlikely it would have occurred to the claimants, unless so led, to try to sue here. The most natural targets for any claim are PSB and (possibly) the first defendant, so the most natural venues for any litigation (all things being equal) are Russia and (perhaps) Cyprus. But none of that means that this court does not have jurisdiction.’

One, as always, wonders where these cases might go should following Brexit (if any) the English courts will regain full authority to apply forum non conveniens.

The Ananyevs are Russian nationals who were domiciled and resident in Russia in 2017. One of them, when the Claims were commenced in 2018, was domiciled and resident in Cyprus, where he has had a dual citizenship since June 2017. They are, or at all events they were in 2017, well-known in Russia as successful and very wealthy businessmen. They were the ultimate beneficial owners together of a number of businesses and assets, including Promsvyaz Bank – PSB, of whom claimants were clients. The core allegation underlying the claimants’ claims is that they were induced to invest in Notes by mis-selling on the part of PSB employees to the effect that the Notes were personally guaranteed by the Ananyevs and/or that they were safe investments. It is alleged that PSB was in a parlous financial condition rendering it highly likely the Notes would default, as in due course they did; and that the misselling was directed by the Ananyevs in a conspiracy to enrich themselves and/or their businesses at the expense of the claimants.

Some of the corporate defendants are English companies, although ‘tax-resident’ in Ireland in 2017, in Cyprus from some time later (and still now). The English companies cannot and do not challenge jurisdiction (but the claims against them are struck out nevertheless given the absence of foundation to the claims). Promsvyaz is a Dutch company, the Issuer is a Cayman Islands company, and Peters International is a Dutch Antilles company. Other defendants are Cypriot companies.

There are a great many claimants with varying suggested gateways for jurisdiction, and one best read the judgment to get the full picture. In short, however, the gateways relevant to the Brussels regime (this blogpost does not focus on the English rules) are Article 4, 7(2), and 8(1). At 29, Baker J emphasises that for the anchor claim under Article 8(1), unlike in the English CPR rules, there cannot be a merits claim. But there can be abuse, per CJEU Reisch Montage, and CDC, as recently also applied in Privatbank v Kolomoisky. Unlike in the latter case, Article 34 is not engaged here. Baker J concludes after considerate yet concise analysis that there is no good arguable case against the English defendants, the claim against them is hopeless, and therefore the anchor mechanism is abused. As always in these cases, walking the rope between merits analysis and ‘good arguable case’ is not straightforward yet the judgment shows again how the English courts deploy creativity to ensure the anchor mechanism of Article 8(1) is not abused.

At 51, the tort gateway of Article 7(2) against the non-English EU defendants is dismissed with reference to Lober. Claimants suffered loss by parting with their funds deposited with PSB in Russia (or, perhaps, by contracting with PSB in Russia to do so); there is no indication of links to England, as required by Lober (applying Universal Music).

The above only narrates the essence of the Brussels Ia analysis. There is quite a bit more in the judgment of relevance to the CPR rules.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2.

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