Posts Tagged applicable law
Update 4 December thank you to his Grace der Graf von Luxemburg for additionally pointing out pending case C-16/18 dealing with workers employed on international trains which also travel through the host Member State.
Thank you MPI’s Veerle Van Den Eeckhout for pointing out a highly relevant reference to the CJEU by the Dutch Supreme Court /Hoge Raad. The link between the posted workers Directive and conflict of laws is clear, as I have also explained here. The most interesting part of the reference for conflicts lawyers, are the questions relating to ‘cabotage’, particularly where a driver carries out work in a country where (s)he is not habitually employed (international trade lawyers will recognise the issue from i.a. NAFTA).
One to keep an eye on.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.5.
Choices, choices. I will continue to follow the GDPR for jurisdictional purposes, including territorial scope. (And I have a paper coming up on conflict of laws issues in the private enforcement of same). But for much of the GDPR enforcement debate, I am handing over to others. Johannes Marosi, for instance, who reviews the CJEU judgment this week in Fansites, over at Verfassungsblog. I reviewed the AG’s Opinion here.
Judgment in Grand Chamber but with small room for cheering.
As Johannes’ post explains, there are many loose ends in the judgment, and little reference to the GDPR (technically correct but from a compliance point of view wanting). (As an aside: have a look at Merlin Gömann’s paper, in CMLREv, on the territorial scope of the GDPR).
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 22.214.171.124.5.
I reported earlier on Sulamerica and the need properly and preferably, expressly to provide for choice of law vis-a-vis arbitration agreements, in particular vis-a-vis three elements: lex arbitri, lex curia, lex contractus. In Shagang the High Court added its view on the possible relevance of a fourth factor: the geographical venue of the arbitration, and its impact in particular on the curial law: the law which determines the procedure which is to be followed.
Atlas Power Ltd -v- National Transmission and Despatch Co Ltd  EWHC 1052 is another good illustration of the relevance (but in practice: rarity) of the proper identification of all four factors.
Bracewell excellently identify the four take away points from Atlas Power:
- It is the seat of arbitration that determines the curial law of the arbitration, not the governing law of the contract.
- (To English Courts) the choice of the seat of arbitration is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of the place designated as the seat of the arbitration having the supervisory role over the arbitration.
- The English courts can and will use their powers to grant anti-suit injunctions to prevent a party from commencing foreign proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement.
- Complex drafting increases the risk of satellite litigation and the accompanying delay and expense.
The core point which Atlas Power illustrates is that specific identification of arbitration venue, curial law, lex contractus and lex arbitri is best done in simple terms. Overcomplication, particularly variance of any of these four points, is a truly bad idea. Specifically: the arbitration clause in the contracts between the parties (text from Bracewell’s overview)
- Started by providing that the “arbitration shall be conducted in Lahore, Pakistan”.
- Then stated that if the value of the dispute was above a certain threshold or fell within a certain category, either party could require that the arbitration be conducted in London.
- Finally, the clause provided that, notwithstanding the previous sentences, either party may require that the arbitration of any dispute be conducted in London, provided that if the dispute did not satisfy the threshold or category requirements set out earlier in the clause the referring party would pay the costs of the arbitration incurred by the other party in excess of the costs that would have been incurred had the arbitration taken place in Pakistan.
Various procedural events led to Phillips J essentially having to decide: whether the parties had validly and lawfully chosen London as the seat of the arbitration (answer: yes); and whether, in light of Pakistani law (which was the law governing the contracts), the choice of London as the seat of arbitration did not result in the English courts having exclusive supervisory jurisdiction with the effect that the courts of Pakistan had at least concurrent jurisdiction (answer: no, for this would result in an unsatisfactory situation where more than one jurisdiction could entertain challenges to an award)
Variation of any litigation relevant articles really does open all sorts of cans of worms.
Heavily loaded. Applicable law in follow-up competition cases: watch the Dutch Supreme court in Air Cargo.
Update March 2018. Quentin’s blog has a link to the SC decision refusing to take the case, considering it was academic given that an appeal against the decision of the European Commission is still pending before the EU courts. It has therefore not irreversibly been decided whether the eleven air carriers had violated European competition law. Most probably the case will be back, one imagines.
Quentin Declève alerted me to the Air Cargo damages compensation case currently making its way through the Dutch courts. (I have previously reported on jurisdictional issues re such cases; searching the tag ‘damages’ should help the reader).
I have difficulty locating the actual judgment addressing the issue in this post: namely applicable law in follow-up competition cases. I have however located one or two previous judgments addressing the damages claims assignment issue in same. This web of litigation seems to be particularly knotty and any help by Dutch or other readers would be appreciated.
At issue is whether Rome II applies to the facts ratione temporis; if it does, how Article 6 should be applied, in particular: locus delicti commissi, locus damni and ‘affected markets”; and if it does not, how the previous Dutch residual connecting factor ought to apply.
A case of great relevance to competition law and fair trading cases.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.6.2.
Apologies for late reporting. Bot AG opined end of October in C‑210/16 Fansites. [The official name of the case is Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH, in the presence of Facebook Ireland Ltd, Vertreter des Bundesinteresses beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht. It’s obvious why one prefers calling it Fansites].
The Advocate-General summarises (para 2-3) the case as involving ‘proceedings between the Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH, a company governed by private law and specialising in the field of education (‘the Wirtschaftsakademie’), and the Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein, a regional data-protection authority in Schleswig-Holstein (‘ULD’) concerning the lawfulness of an order issued by the latter against the Wirtschaftsakademie requiring it to deactivate a ‘fan page’ hosted on the website of Facebook Ireland Ltd. The reason for that order was the alleged infringement of the provisions of German law transposing Directive 95/46. Specifically, visitors to the fan page were not warned that their personal data are collected by the social network Facebook (‘Facebook’) by means of cookies that are placed on the visitor’s hard disk, the purpose of that data collection being to compile viewing statistics for the administrator of the fan page and to enable Facebook to publish targeted advertisements.’
The case ought to clarify the extent of the powers of intervention of supervisory authorities such as ULD with regard to the processing of personal data which involves the participation of several parties (at 13). I had flagged earlier that this case is relevant to the jurisdictional and applicable law issues involving datr cookies.
Whatever the outcome of the case, its precedent value will be limited by the imminent entry into force of the new General Data Protection Regulation – GDPR. The GDPR clearly introduces a ‘one-stop principle’ with only one lead authority (in FB’s case, Ireland’s data protection agency) having the authority to act (see also the AG’s observation of same in para 103).
As prof Lorna Woods in excellent analysis observes, the issue comes down to the interpretation of the phrase from Art. 4(1)(a), ‘in the context of the activities of an establishment’. Dan Svantesson has most superb analysis of Article 4(1)(a) here, anyone interested in the issue will find his insight most helpful.
Now, the Advocate-General leans heavily on Weltimmo however I would suggest its precedent value for the Fanpages case is constrained. Weltimmo concerned a company set up in Slovakia but with no relevant activities at all in that Member State. Indeed as the Court itself observed (at 16-18) , the company was effectively male fide (my words, not the CJEU’s) moving its servers and creating fog as to its exact whereabouts. In other words a case of blatant abuse. There is no suggestion of abuse in Fanpages. Moreover according to the CJEU in C-230/14 Weltimmo the phrase ‘in the context of the activities of an establishment’ cannot be interpreted restrictively (AG’s reference in para 87), yet that CJEU holding in Weltimmo cross-refers to Google Spain in which the crucial issue was whether EU data protection laws apply at all. That is very different in Weltimmo and in Fanpages. That EU authorities have jurisdiction and that EU privacy law applies is not at issue.
There is sufficient argument to find in the Directive, even before its transformation into the GDPR, that in cases such as these the same processing operation ought to be governed by the laws of just one Member State. It would be good for the CJEU to recognise that even before the entry into force of the GDPR.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 126.96.36.199.5.
Comparative conflict of laws is often a useful source for exam (essay) questions. I used People of State of New York v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, No. 3685N (N.Y. App. Div. May 23, 2017) to ask my students to surmise how an EU-base court would judge the issue raised.
Keith Goldberg over at LAw360 has the following great summary:
A New York appellate court [.. ] upheld a decision to force ExxonMobil’s outside auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP to comply with New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s demand for documents in his probe of whether the oil giant lied to investors about the climate change risks to its business.
The Appellate Division backed state Supreme Court Judge Barry Ostrager’s Nov. 26 order that PwC turn over documents related to its audit of Exxon subpoenaed by Schneiderman, saying the judge correctly held that New York law, not the law of Texas, where Exxon is headquartered, applies to questions of evidentiary privilege and that the Empire State doesn’t recognize accountant-client privilege.
Mr Ostrager’s decision is here – it has more choice of law considerations than the appelate court’s order. Eversheds have excellent analysis here of the overall issue of considering applicable law for privilege under the first and second restatement of the law. In the case at issue, ExxonMobil as well as the documents disclosure of which is sought (such as projected carbon costs and their application to Exxon’s capital allocation decisions, as well as documents provided to Exxon by PwC concerning the auditor’s role in compiling Exxon’s submissions about greenhouse gas emissions for the Carbon Disclosure Project, a nonprofit that collects information on greenhouse gas emissions) are based at Texas. But the trial is underway in New York.
Now, to the essay Q: how would an EU-based court hold on the issue? (For the purpose of last week’s exam I had a Belgian court rule on the issue, with the oil company based at Belgium, and the accountant at England, with the agreement between company and accountants subject to English law.
I am marking these exams later this week and hope to read some or all of the following: reference to overall principle that procedure is subject to lex fori; that statement being of little use in a system (like the EU) that thrives on predictability: for what is procedure to one, is substantive law to another; arguments existing both pro this being procedure (closely tied up with evidence, clear links with public policy) as well as substantive (privilege despite its public nature also protecting private, including commercial interest; parties wishing to manage the issue of sensitive information and forum); need for autonomous interpretation and tendency within the EU to define the ‘scope of the law applicable’ (eg both in Rome I and II); no trace in said Regulations of privilege being included in the scope of law applicable.
As always, I am hoping for students to surprise me. Undoubtedly they will.
It does not happen all that often: this is a call for assistance. Following a student’s Q re ‘habitual residence’ in Rome I, I have now noticed something I had not before (I more often than not use the English version of the Regulation in my teaching and practice): Article 6(1) on ‘consumer contracts’ uses the term ‘habitual residence’ ‘gewone verblijfplaats’ (defined, or not, for natural persons, in Article 19) in the introductory para (which identifies applicable law). However in littera a it then uses ‘domicile’ ‘woonplaats’: a term which is not otherwise used in Rome I and which is not defined by it.
A quick scan of other language versions (French, English, German) reveals no such error: they all use the equivalent of ‘habitual residence’ in both instances. Now, evidently the error must be pushed aside given the other language versions however: is any reader of the blog aware of a corrigendum ever published? For if it has, I cannot locate it.
(Handbook of ) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.5.