Posts Tagged Rome I

Are proclamations of lois de police an absolute prerogative of the Member States? Italy’s response to Covid19 /Corona and the package travel sector.

Thank you Ennio Piovesani for signalling and reviewing one of the first conflicts-specific developments on the Corona /Covid 19 landscape. Update 28 March 2020 see the comments on and Ennio’s comprehensive response to his own post and comments, for further interesting discussion going beyond the immediate Corona context.

In an effort to safeguard the economic position of the travel sector, the Italian Government by decree has essentially frozen the travel sector’s statutory duty to reimburse travellers whose package travel has become impossible due to the pandemic. Ennio reports that the decree refers specifically to Article 9 Rome I’s overriding mandatory law provisions (earlier applied in Unamar), (in his translation): ‘“The provisions of the present article constitute overriding mandatory provisions within the meaning of Article 17 of Law of 31 May 1995, No. 218 [“Italian PIL Act”] [5, 6] and of Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 17 June 2008 [“Rome 1 Regulation”]”.

Ennio signals and important issue: how much leeway may be given to Member States to push their own definition of the concept of ‘lois de police’ /overriding mandatory law in light of the CJEU definition in Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade. In Brussels Ia of course the CJEU has pushed the concept of ordre public in a limited direction. Lois de police however are different from ordre public and Rome I is not Brussels Ia, and I am therefore not so pessimistic as Ennio when it comes to leaving a lot of discretion to Member States. What to me looks a touch more problematic is the relation with the package travel Directive 2015/2302 which applies to many of the travel arrangements concerned and which is the source of many of the protections for travellers.

No doubt to be continued.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.8.3.

 

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GDE v Anglia Autoflow. Governing law for agency agreements under the Rome Convention.

In GDE LLC & Anor v Anglia Autoflow Ltd [2020] EWHC 105 (Comm) (31) the Rome I Regulation does not apply ratione temporis; the Agency Agreement was concluded on about 9 April 2009 which is a few months before the kick-off date of the Regulation (note there is no default rule for agency in Article 4 Rome I in the event of lack of lex voluntatis). Dias DJ therefore turns to the 1980 Rome Convention.

Parties are in dispute as to the governing law of the Agency Agreement by which the claims should be determined. AAL alleges that the governing law is that of Ontario while the Claimants allege that the Agency Agreement is governed by English law. The point is of critical importance because the Claimants concede that, if AAL is correct, their claim is time-barred under Ontario law: although this, as readers know, assumes statutes of limitation are subject to the governing law – which is far from certain: see Jabir v KIK and Spring v MOD.

Parties’ arguments are at 10 and 11 and of course they reverse engineer. In essence (at 20) claimants say that there was an implied choice of English law. Alternatively, if that is not correct, the presumption in Article 4(2) of the Rome Convention, which would otherwise point to Georgia law, falls to be disapplied in favour of English law. The Defendant says that there was no implied choice and that application of Article 4(2) leads to Ontario law. Alternatively, if (which it denies) the presumption in Article 4(2) leads to any other governing law, the presumption is to be disapplied in favour of Ontario.

At 21 ff follows a rather creative (somewhat linked to the discussion of ex officio Rome Convention application in The Alexandros), certainly unexpected (yet clearly counsel will do what counsel must do) argument that essentially puts forward that under the common law approach of foreign law = fact hence must be proven, any discussion of a law as governing law, not suggested by the parties (here: the laws of (the US State of) Georgia) that is not English law (which clearly the English curia does ‘novit’), cannot go ahead. At 22 Dias DJ already signals that ‘once the wheels of the Convention had been put in motion, they could not be stopped short of their ultimate destination. The idea that the process dictated by the Convention should be hijacked halfway, as it were, on the basis of a pleading point was, to my mind, deeply unattractive.’

At 31 she sinks the argument. I think she is right.

Having at length considered the facts relevant to the contract formation, discussion then turns again to the Rome Convention with at 105 ff a debate on the role to be played by factors intervening after contract formation with a view to establishing [implicit, but certain: see at 117 with reference to the various language versions of the Convention and the Regulation essentially confirming the French version] choice of law or closest connection. (Dias J refers to the Court of Appeal in Lawlor v Sandvik Mining and Construction Mobile Crushers and Screens Ltd, [2013] EWCA Civ 365[2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 98 where, at paragraphs 21-27, it pointed out that the common law approach frequently blurred the distinction between the search for the parties’ inferred intention and the search for the system of law with which the contract had its closest and most real connection).

At 120: the hurdle is high: choice of law implicitly made must have nevertheless been made: ‘The court is not looking for the choice that the parties probably would have made if they had turned their minds to the question.’ at 122: In the present case the evidence established that there was no reference by the parties to the question of governing law at all. Choice of court for England (discussed ia with reference to Rome I and to Brussels Ia Article 25) does not change that. At 160 ff therefore follows the discussion of Article 4 of the Rome Convention, leading to a finding of the laws of Ontario as the lex contractus under Article 4(1). Article 4(5) does not displace it.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.4, Heading 3.2.6.

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Anti-suit and arbitration. Enka Insaat ve Sanayi v OOO “Insurance Company Chubb” et al.

[2019] EWHC 3568 (Comm) Enka Insaat ve Sanayi v OOO “Insurance Company Chubb” et al. is the very swift follow-up to [2019] EWHC 2729 (Comm) which I review here. I flag the case mostly for:

  • at 8, Baker J siding with Males J (and myself) per Nori Holding, that West Tankers is still good authority following Brussels Ia despite Wathelet AG’s suggestions in Gazprom;
  • the brief reference at 9, as to whether under Rome I injunctive relief for threat of contractual breach is covered by lex fori or lex contractus. Baker J concludes that issue simply by reminding us that Rome I does not apply to arbitration agreements;
  • At 47 ff the discussion of choice of law in spite of no express clause having been included to that effect. Specifically, with reference to Sulamerica, whether choice of seat may imply choice of law.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.1. 

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Rahmatullah and Ali v MOD and FCO. The High Court on the law applicable in (allegedly) irregular rendition cases.

In [2019] EWHC 3172 (QB) Rahmatullah and Ali v Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office claimants argue on the basis of the torts of negligence and misfeasance in public office. They are Pakistani nationals both of whom allege that they were captured by British forces in Iraq in February 2004. They contend that they were subsequently handed over to United States’ control and, thereafter, taken to Afghanistan where they were subjected to prolonged detention, torture and mistreatment.

At issue in this civil case is whether the English PIL rule of locus damni (for personal injury cases) needs to be displaced in favour of English law, by virtue of the exceptions to this rule including, all else failing, ordre public. (For the relevant text, see the judgment).

Rome I does not apply given the case clearly is one of acta iure imperii. Note that this does not, in England and Wales, displace the residual rules of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995.

Turner J keeps the discussion very to the point, holding that there is no reason to displace the general rule: the law of Iraq applies to the claims prior to the claimants’ rendition from Iraq to Afghanistan and that of Afghanistan thereafter. His clear application of the precedents is much enjoyable.

One particularly interesting point is raised at 34:

The claimants make the further point that transferring a detainee from one country to another in breach of Article 49 [of the Fourth Geneva Convention, GAVC] would legitimise forum shopping by illegal rendition. The defendants accepted during the course of oral submissions that circumstances could arise in which this was a legitimate concern where, for example, a detainee had been relocated in a rogue state selected for its lack of adequate legal protection for those within its geographical and jurisdictional boundaries. However, in this case there is no evidence to suggest that any consideration of the putative advantages of the application of Afghan jurisprudence lay behind the rendition decision or indeed to the effect that Afghan law would provide, as a matter of fact, a particularly suitable environment within which to achieve any such darker purpose.

Of note is also, at 29, claimants’

‘point that those in senior positions who are to be held accountable for the alleged failures under the return claim were based in England and were acting (or failing to act) in the exercise of state authority.’

An argument which, Turner J finds, has been found to be relevant in the authorities, however not striking with sufficient force in casu to meet the very high burden of proof for displacing the standard rule.

Geert.

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BNP Paribas v TeamBank: the CJEU on third-party effects of an assignment of a claim in the case of multiple assignments.

In C-548/18 BNP Paribas v TeamBank, the CJEU held on the issue whether the Rome I Regulation can be interpreted as determining the applicable law with regard to the third-party effects of an assignment of a claim in the case of multiple assignments, for the purpose of determining the holder of that claim.

The factual matrix is very recognisable: a debtor gets into debt with multiple creditors, and assigns each of them the attachable share of current and future claims to wages and salary, including in particular claims to pension benefits. One of the creditors, first to have been assigned, is a German bank (TeamBank). The employer was not told of the assignment. The second creditor is a Luxembourg bank that does inform the employer as they are bound to under Luxembourg law.

The Amtsgericht Saarbrücken (Germany) opens insolvency proceedings against the debtor. The appointed trustee in insolvency received, from the debtor’s employer in Luxembourg, a share of her salary, in the amount of EUR 13 901.64, and deposited that amount with the District Court. The trustee was uncertain as to the identity of the creditor of the said amount, each of the two parties to the main proceedings asserting preferential rights relating, in the case of TeamBank, to a claim of EUR 71 091.54 and, in the case of BNP, EUR 31 942.95. TeamBank and BNP brought, respectively, an action and a counterclaim before the Landgericht Saarbrücken, requesting the lifting of the lodgement in respect of the entire amount of EUR 13 901.64. That court upheld TeamBank’s action and dismissed BNP’s counterclaim.

Jurisdiction is not at issue, Article 26 Bru Ia applies.

Can Article 14 Rome I Regulation (see text below) be interpreted as determining the applicable law with regard to the third-party effects of an assignment of a claim in the case of multiple assignments, for the purpose of determining the holder of that claim? Or should its silence on same be interpreted as having been intentional (excluding such cover, leaving it to residual national conflicts rules).

The CJEU first of all observes that the wording of Article 14 of the Rome I Regulation does not refer to the third-party effects of an assignment of a claim.

Further, at 32, it reviews the context in which Article 14 Rome I is set. It refers to recital 38 which states that ‘matters prior to’ an assignment of a claim, such as a prior assignment of the same claim in the context of multiple assignments, despite the fact that they may represent a ‘property aspect’ of the assignment of the claim, do not fall within the concept of a ‘relationship’ between the assignor and the assignee within the meaning of Article 14(1) of that regulation. That recital specifies that the term ‘relationship’ should be strictly limited to those aspects which are directly relevant to the assignment in question.

(Note that recitals are qualified merely as context, therefore. Readers are aware that I often take issue with material conflict of laws rules being included in recitals of EU Regulations).

At 33, the CJEU further refers to the legislative history: the EC had proposed a rule re third-party effect however that rule did not make it into the final text, indeed the Commission per Article 27(2) Rome I was required to submit ‘a report on the question of the effectiveness of an assignment or subrogation of a claim against third parties’ and, if appropriate, ‘a proposal to amend the [Rome I Regulation] and an assessment of the impact of the provisions to be introduced’. That proposal materialised in 2018.

In conclusion, under EU law as it currently stands, the absence of rules of conflict expressly governing the third-party effects of assignments of claims is a choice of the EU legislature. Residual rules take over.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed 2016. Chapter 3.

 

Article 14

Voluntary assignment and contractual subrogation

1.   The relationship between assignor and assignee under a voluntary assignment or contractual subrogation of a claim against another person (the debtor) shall be governed by the law that applies to the contract between the assignor and assignee under this Regulation.

2.   The law governing the assigned or subrogated claim shall determine its assignability, the relationship between the assignee and the debtor, the conditions under which the assignment or subrogation can be invoked against the debtor and whether the debtor’s obligations have been discharged.

3.   The concept of assignment in this Article includes outright transfers of claims, transfers of claims by way of security and pledges or other security rights over claims.

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Saugmandsgaard ØE on Rome I’s lex societatis exception applied to trusts /’Treuhand’ in Verein für Konsumenteninformation v TVP Treuhand.

Update 20 October 2019 on 3 October the CJEU agreed.

Advocate General Saugmandsgaard ØE in C-272/18 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v TVP Treuhand opined early September (I have been busy) that the Rome Convention’s and Rome I’s lex societatis exception does not apply to ‘Treuhand’ (a trust-like construction) contracts between investors and the corporation they entrust to manage investment in real estate companies located in Germany. The relevant choice of court rule follows the standard Rome I (cq Convention) rules.

At the time of adoption of the Rome Convention, the Giuliano Lagarde Report went into a bit more detail as to what is and is not excluded:

Confirming this exclusion, the Group stated that it affects all the complex acts (contractual administrative, registration) which are necessary to the creation of a company or firm and to the regulation of its internal organization and winding up, i. e. acts which fall within the scope of company law. On the other hand, acts or preliminary contracts whose sole purpose is to create obligations between interested parties (promoters) with a view to forming a company or firm are not covered by the exclusion.

The subject may be a body with or without legal personality, profit-making or non-profit-making. Having regard to the differences which exist, it may be that certain relationships will be regarded as within the scope of company law or might be treated as being governed by that law (for example, societe de droit civil nicht-rechtsfahiger Verein, partnership, Vennootschap onder firma, etc.) in some countries but not in others. The rule has been made flexible in order to take account of the diversity of national laws.

Examples of ‘internal organization’ are: the calling of meetings, the right to vote, the necessary quorum, the appointment of officers of the company or firm, etc. ‘Winding-up’ would cover either the termination of the company or firm as provided by its constitution or by operation of law, or its disappearance by merger or other similar process.

At the request of the German delegation the Group extended the subparagraph (e) exclusion to the personal liability of members and organs, and also to the legal capacity of companies or firms. On the other hand the Group did not adopt the proposal that mergers and groupings should also be expressly mentioned, most of the delegations being of the opinion that mergers and groupings were already covered by the present wording.

Particularly in KA Finanz, the Court could have done a lot to clarify the scope of the Convention, but did not. Current case however offered a lot less beef to that particular bone for only with a stretch in my view could the issue be considered to fall under the corporate exception. The argument made was that given that the contracts instruct the Treuhand to manage the companies, and that there was ‘alignment’ (‘imbrication’ is the word used in the French version of the Opinion at 36; no English version yet exists) between the contacts and the by-laws of the companies concerned: these were geared in part specifically to facilitate the investment in the companies by the Treuhand.

The AG points out that there is no European code for company law hence no possibility to use harmonised substantive law to help interpret private international law. He relies therefore on the general interpretative rules, including predictability, and sides in my view justifiably with the issue, in essence, being about contractual obligations: not life and death of companies. A link alone with questions relating to corporate law (at 53) is not enough.

Geert.

 

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Back to the 80s. Arthur Scargill, submission (voluntary appearance) under Brussels Ia and applicable law for statutes of limitation.

In [2019] EWHC 1359 (Comm) National Union of Mineworkers v Organisation Internationale de l’energie et des mines defendant is French-domiciled and represented by its chair, Arthur Scargill. That’s right, many of us whether Brits or not will remember him from the 1970s and 1980 mine strikes. (Unlike what some think, he did not though feature in the Tracey Ullman cover of Madness’ ‘my girl’: that was Neil Kinnock.

Of more immediate relevance for the blog is the discussion at 19 ff on jurisdiction and applicable law.

Defendant is an international body to which a number of trade unions are affiliated. Those unions operate in different countries but all represent workers engaged in the fields of mining and/or energy supply. The name the Defendant uses in English is the International Energy and Mineworkers’ Organisation (“the IEMO”) and it is the successor to the International Mineworkers’ Organisation (“the IMO”) following a merger in 1994.

The proceedings relate to the parties’ respective rights in relation to sums recovered by the Defendant from Mr. Roger Windsor in August 2012 after prolonged legal proceedings in the French Republic and in England. Those proceedings were undertaken in the name of the Defendant but funded in part by the Claimant. There is a shortfall between the sums recovered and the amounts of the principal debt and the legal costs of the proceedings. The parties are in dispute as to the distribution of the sums recovered from Mr. Windsor; as to which should bear any shortfall between the sums recovered and the costs incurred in the proceedings; and as to the amounts which each has paid by way of costs in those proceedings.

The underlying indebtedness which resulted in recovery being made against Mr. Windsor derived from a loan of £29,500 which the Claimant made to him in 1984. He was then the Claimant’s Chief Executive Officer and the loan was made by way of assistance with house purchase following the relocation of the Claimant’s headquarters from London to Sheffield in 1983. There was a repayment of that loan in November 1984 but it is common ground that to the extent that there was such a repayment it came from funds which had been lent to Mr. Windsor. In 1986 the right to recover payment from Mr. Windsor (either of the original loan or of the subsequent loan) was assigned to the IMO.

Claimant argues the courts of England and Wales have jurisdiction by reason of Articles 7(1) and 25(1)(b) Brussels Ia (by virtue of an agreement made in 1990), and that in any event defendant is to be treated as having accepted that the court has jurisdiction to try this matter (an Article 26 ‘prorogation’, ‘submission’ or ‘voluntary appearance’ in other words).

Eyre J at 24 agrees that submission has taken place: CPR rules (Pt11) provide the details the procedure to be followed by a defendant contesting jurisdiction. Defendant did make an application to the court within 14 days of filing the acknowledgement of service, as requested by CPR 11. However, it expressly accepted that the application was to be regarded as relating to the questions of limitation and of the effect of the Release Agreement. In its application it made extensive reference to Brussels Ia but did so in that context. In particular that material was put forward in support of the contention that the claim was statute-barred either by reference to the Limitation Act 1980 or by reference to the French limitation provisions. There was in other words no wider or more fundamental challenge to the court’s jurisdiction and the realisation probably in hindsight that jurisdiction may not be that straightforward, cannot impact on that original application.

Had there not been submission, interesting discussions could have ensued I suspect on the place of performance of the agreement (unless clear choice of court had been made), England as a forum contractus, and I for one shall be using the case in my classes as a good illustration of the ‘conflicts method’ (looking over the fence)

Attention then turns to the issue of applicable law for the time-barred argument: at 26: ‘Defendant also argued that the proceedings were to be regarded as subject to French law and in particular the French limitation provisions which impose a time limit of three years for claims. The Defendant made reference to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 and the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984. The contention was that French law was applicable because the judgments against Mr. Windsor were obtained in France and then registered in England and Wales. That argument was misconceived. Such an argument might have relevance if the issue were one of the enforcement of the judgments against Mr. Windsor though I make no finding on that question. The current proceedings are not concerned with the enforcement of the judgments against Mr. Windsor but with the distribution of the sums which have been received by the Defendant as a result of the litigation against Mr. Windsor. It follows that the provisions to which the Defendant made reference can have no relevance to the current proceedings. The Defendant made passing reference to the fact that it is domiciled in France but this was not the principal basis of the contention that French law was applicable and without more it would not cause the parties’ dealings to be governed by French law. In those circumstances the parties’ rights and liabilities are to be determined by reference to the law of England and Wales and any questions of limitation are governed by the Limitation Act 1980.

I am not privy to the submissions on applicable law, but I am assuming that there must have been some discussion of the impact of the 1980 Rome Convention. Not the Rome I Regulation which would not have applied ratione temporis. That Regulation like Rome II has not altogether straightforward provisions (as I have noted on other occasions) on procedure being covered by the lex contractus. Whether Eyre J classifies the limitation issue as being covered by English law per lex fori or alternatively as lex causae (lex contractus of the 1990 agreement) is not clear.

Back in the 80s I would have never dreamed of bumping into Mr Scargill again in the context of an interesting conflict of laws issue.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 1, Heading 1.3.1, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.7.

 

 

 

 

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