Principles, principles everywhere. First test of the ‘energy solidarity’ principle in Poland v EC (Nordstream /Gazprom).
As I continue to dabble in research and talks about the innovation ‘principle’ (not in existence), and find myself in court (an attachment procedure following judgment in Israel) discussing the common law principle that ‘he who comes to equity must approach the court with clean hands’, the CJEU (General Court) yesterday in T-883/16 held Poland v EC a first test of the TFEU Energy title’s ‘principle of energy solidarity’. Note Poland’s litigant friends (Latvia; Lithuania), and the EC’s (Germany). This tells you something about energy security of supply on our Eastern borders.
Article 194 TFEU: ‘1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to:…’
The gas pipeline Ostseepipeline-Anbindungsleitung ﴾OPAL) is the terrestrial section to the west of the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline. Its entry point is located in Germany and its exit point is in the Czech Republic. In 2009, the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA, the German regulatory authority) notified the Commission of two decisions that exempted the capacities for cross-border transmission of the planned OPAL pipeline from the application of the rules on third party access and tariff regulation laid down in Directive 2003/55. Those decisions concerned the shares belonging to the two owners of the OPAL pipeline. The same year, the Commission adopted a decision by which it requested the BNetzA to modify its decisions by adding certain conditions. Under those conditions, in particular, a dominant undertaking, such as Gazprom, could reserve only 50% of the cross-border capacities of the OPAL pipeline, unless it released onto the market a
volume of gas of 3 billion m³/year on that pipeline (‘the gas release programme’). In accordance with those three decisions of 2009, the capacities of the OPAL pipeline were exempted from the application of the rules on regulated third-party access and tariff regulation on the basis of Directive 2003/55. This decision was later (2016) slightly amended albeit not in substance.
Poland argue that the grant of a new exemption relating to the OPAL pipeline threatens the security of gas supply in the European Union, in particular in central Europe. Poland suggests that the 2016 decision breaches the principle of energy solidarity in that it enables Gazprom and undertakings in the Gazprom group to redirect additional volumes of gas onto the EU market by fully exploiting the capacities of the North Stream 1 pipeline. Taking into account the lack of significant growth in demand for natural gas in central Europe, according to Poland, that would, as its only possible consequence, influence the conditions of supply and use of transmission services on the pipelines competing with OPAL.
The General Court yesterday (the case no doubt may be appealed) held that the application of the principle of energy solidarity does not mean that the EU energy policy must never have negative impacts on the particular interests of a Member State in the field of energy. However, the EU institutions and the Member States are required to take into account, in the context of the implementation of that policy, the interests both of the European Union and of the various Member States and to balance those interests where there is a conflict. In neither the preparation of the 2016 decision nor its actual content is there any trace of the EC having considered the principle and its impact: the Decision is therefore annulled.
The case adds to the corpus of judgments where the CJEU is called upon to apply ‘principles’ and clearly emphasises preparatory due diligence, rather than second-guessing the actual application of the principle in substance.
(Handbook of) EU Environmental Law (with Leonie Reins), 2017, Part I Chapter 2.
Salvoni v Fiermonte. CJEU confirms quasi-notarial nature of Brussels Ia’s Article 53 certificate, other than for provisional measures. Consumer protection cannot be raised at that stage. Also rejects interpretative force of substantive consumer law rules for jurisdictional issues.
I reviewed Bobek AG Opinion in Case C-347/18 Salvoni v Fiermonte earlier. The referring court enquires whether the court of origin tasked with issuing the Article 53 Certificate (issued with a view to enabling swift recognition and enforcement) may, of its own motion, seek to ascertain whether the judgment whose enforcement is sought was issued in breach of the rules on jurisdiction over consumer contracts, so that it may, where appropriate, inform the consumer of any such breach and enable her to consider the possibility of opposing enforcement of the judgment in the Member State addressed.
The CJEU has entirely confirmed the AG’s Opinion (no English version at the time of posting): no such second-guessing of jurisdiction.
At 34 ff the Court points out an important distinction with certificates issued with a view to enforcing provisional measures: there, the court issuing the certificate does carry out jurisdictional review (whether the court ordering the measures has jurisdiction as to the substance of the case).
At 40 ff the Court also confirms that substantive consumer protection laws (such as Directive 93/13) do not transfer to the procedural /jurisdictional rules of Brussels Ia: an important conclusion overall.
(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 22.214.171.124, Heading 2.2.16.
Update 11 September 2019 Tobias Lutzi has excellent additional analysis here.
The CJEU today has held in C‑172/18 AMS Neve, confirming Szpunar AG’s Opinion which I briefly reviewed earlier. Eleonora Rosati has excellent analysis here and I am happy to refer entirely. As I note in my handbook, ‘targeting’, ‘directed at’ and ‘business models’ are a variety of jurisdictional triggers across EU law. The lack of uniform terminology does not assist the unsuspected reader or practitioner.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Heading 126.96.36.199.5; Heading 188.8.131.52.4 (quoted by the AG in his Opinion).
Like quite a few of the Opinions and Judgment in my recent blog posts, Szpunar AG’s recent Opinion in C-555/18 KHK v BAC (*mutters his usual rant on the idiocy of the parties’ anonimisation rule*) was issued just before many of us took a short summer break. Carlos Santaló Gorisseemingly did not and I am happy to refer in the main to his analysis.
The Advocate General refers first of all to the infamous decision in 125/79 Denilauler, excluding ex parte provisional or protective measures from enforcement under the then Brussels Convention. The European Account Preservation Order Regulation 655/2014 was intended to fix this particular chink in the European civil procedure armour. Which national decisions fit with its definition of ‘authentic instrument’ is the subject of current proceedings, and Szpunar AG as Carlos reports takes a balanced approach between facilitating free movement without assisting abuse.
Of note is that the EAPO Regulation hitherto has received very little practice. Clarification of its precise scope is crucial.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.15, Heading 184.108.40.206.1.
Update 5 September 2019. The CJEU today has confirmed. See at 44 for the forum non issue.
Szpunar AG Opined in C-468/18 R v P that in the absence of formal provisions to that effect, the Maintenance Regulation 4/2009 cannot be interpreted to include a forum non conveniens rule.
The referring court is asking, in essence, whether Article 3(a) and Article 5 of Regulation 4/2009 must be interpreted as meaning that they preclude a court of a Member State with jurisdiction to hear an action relating to a maintenance obligation brought against a defendant who is habitually resident in that Member State or who has entered an appearance before that court from declining to exercise that jurisdiction on the grounds that such a claim is ancillary to a claim relating to parental responsibility, within the meaning of Article 3(d) of that regulation, and that the court with jurisdiction to hear the latter claim would be better placed, having regard to the best interests of the child, to adjudicate on those claims.
The Court’s first Advocate-General clearly and succinctly lays out the relevant principles and reference is best made to the Opinion. It is particularly at 83, including in relevant footnote, that he points out the consequences of the EU’s approach to distribution of jurisdiction: unless a Regulation (such as in Brussels IIa; or now also Brussels Ia) includes a forum non rule, forum non must not apply.
In C-451/18 Tibor v DAF Trucks the CJEU has confirmed its CDC case-law on locus damni for end-users affected by a cartel. Truck distribution arrangements were such that Tibor (of Hungary) could not buy directly from DAF Trucks NV (of The Netherlands), one of the truck manufacturers held by the EC to have infringed Article 101 TFEU. Rather, it had to go via local Hungarian dealers (and leasing companies).
Tibor-Trans claims that the Hungarian courts derive their international jurisdiction from Article 7(2) Brussels Ia per CDC according to which, in the case of an action for damages brought against defendants domiciled in various Member States as a result of a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 TFEU and of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, which has been established by the Commission, in which the defendants participated in several Member States, at different times and in different places, each alleged victim can choose to bring an action before the courts of the place where its own registered office is located.
DAF Trucks submits, first, that the collusive meetings (hence the locus delicti commissi) took place in Germany, which should entail the jurisdiction of the German courts and, second, that it never entered into a direct contractual relationship with Tibor-Trans, with the result that it could not reasonably expect to be sued in the Hungarian courts.
The Court dismisses the latter argument: those infringing competition law must expect to be sued in markets affected by anti-competitive behaviour (at 34, with reference to fly-LAL). That Tibor did not have a contractual relation with DAF Trucks is irrelevant as the increase in price clearly has been passed on by the frontline victims of the cartel: the dealers (at 31).
The case does leave open the unresolved issue of the CJEU’s identification of registered office as locus damni (see my comments in my review of CDC). Given that Tibor Trans would seem to have purchased all its trucks in Hungary, neither does not the judgment shed light on the distributive impact of locus damni or my suggestion that for competition law, markets where the anti-competitive behaviour is rolled-out should qualify as locus delicti commissi (alongside the place of the meetings where infringement of competition law is decided).
(Handbook of) European Private International Law. 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12, Heading 220.127.116.11