Infrastructure Services Luxembourg SARL ea v Kingdom of Spain  EWHC 1226 (Comm) adds to the Smorgasbord of ECT ICSID (and other) award enforcement issues which I also signalled here, and links of course to CJEU Achmea, Komstroy and the like. (Note this point does not discuss the disclosure issues raised).
The Spanish Government is of course duty bound to fight all these awards (around 60 cases have been brought against it), and it is fighting the awards on many fronts (first by advocating for a different interpretation of the FET – Fair and Equitable Treatment standard in the ECT, further by trying internal ICSID or other review processes; subsequently by trying to have the awards annulled on a variety of grounds in the courts in ordinary of the curial seat; finally by resisting enforcement in the many jurisdictions where investors try to have the awards enforced.
The case at issue, in which Spain argues against registration of the relevant ICSID award,  deals with adjudicative jurisdiction: not jurisdiction for enforcement (compare the Australian decision in  HCA 11, were recognition and enforcement were granted, but not execution). Fraser J first discusses Spain’s sovereign immunity argument, aptly summaring  ff the CJEU authority in Achmea and Komstroy.  he holds
Spain argued before me the questions of EU law set out above in a manner that elevated the status of these decisions of the CJEU, almost as though they were decisions of an over-arching international court that must bind all nations. For example, Spain referred to what it called “the international law aspects of the EU legal order” and also stated in its supporting documents for the application that “EU law is an inextricable part of international law.” There is no doubt that the law of the EU is correctly described as being international law, as self-evidently it governs relations between Member States which have collectively entered into international treaty obligations under the EU Treaties including the TFEU. Those treaty obligations have international effect and the institutions of the EU have primacy over domestic organs in certain important respects. However, as the claimants point out, this argument ignores the other aspects of international law that requires observance of existing express treaty obligations, and it also ignores the effect of Spain having pre-existing treaty obligations under other treaties such as the ICSID Convention and the ECT. The EU treaties do not trump these, nor do they override the relevant domestic law mechanism in the United Kingdom.
That is different for the UKSC authority in Micula. The judge here  concludes his recollection of the Micula principle with the observation that
The availability of defences to a foreign state faced with an application to register an arbitral award under the ICSID Convention is far narrower than those that would be available if an award were being enforced under the New York Convention.
 ff he further explains that the narrow set of grounds for refusal (immunity and, although he does not think these actually qualify as exception, lack of a written agreement to arbitrate and the validity of the Award itself) of an ICSID award, left open by the Supreme Court in Micula, and rejects them all. He does in my view considers this set too narrowly.
His conclusion :
with the greatest of respect to the CJEU, it is not the ultimate arbiter under the ICSID Convention, nor under the ECT, and the difficulties in which Spain finds itself does not assist it here, given the United Kingdom’s own treaty obligations under the ICSID Convention, which are owed to all signatories of the ICSID Convention. The domestic mechanism established under the 1966 Act was enacted specifically in order to comply with these.
Obiter  ff he suggests the VCLT would lead to the same result, concluding on that point 
I consider that there is a clear conflict between the EU Treaties, as their application to international arbitration involving Member States has been decided by the CJEU and explained by Mr Baloch, and each (or more accurately both) of the ECT or the ICSID Convention. If intra-EU arbitration is contrary to EU law principles governing either primacy of the CJEU or EU principles generally, then this must (and can only) arise from the EU Treaties themselves. I cannot see how it can arise in any other way. Therefore, if that is the case, there must be a conflict. That conflict does not mean that the latter EU law principles as enunciated by the CJEU remove Spain from the ambit and scope of the ECT, or from the ICSID Convention. Spain’s arguments, as either amplified or further explained in submissions (including a letter to the court after distribution of the draft judgment) was that there was a conflict between articles 267 and 344 of the TFEU on the one hand, and article 26 of the ECT on the other. In those circumstances, Spain maintained that this conflict should be resolved in favour of the articles of the TFEU by what it called “the treaty conflict rule of EU primacy”. However, in my judgment that is simply a different way of Spain maintaining that both the ECT and the ICSID Convention – both of which clearly have signatories who are not Member States of the EU – should be interpreted by ignoring their clear terms regarding dispute resolution, in preference to granting the decisions of the CJEU complete primacy over those pre-existing treaty obligations of all states. I do not accept that is the correct approach, and I do not consider that such a result can be achieved by applying international law principles to conflicting treaty provisions.
His ‘overall conclusions’ on the EU law questions, are 
Question 1. Achmea arose out of the BIT between the Slovak Republic and Netherlands. Does Achmea‘s reasoning also apply to the ECT?
Answer: The reasoning in Achmea probably does also apply to the ECT, in terms of the applicability of EU law, as considered by the CJEU. This means that the CJEU would be most likely to reach the same conclusion on any EU law question referred to it under the ECT as it did under the BIT in the Achmea case. However, these are matters of EU law only. The conclusion does not “apply to the ECT” in the sense contended for by Spain. That conclusion is a purely EU law issue.
Question 2. Do TFEU Articles 267 and 344, as interpreted by the CJEU, have primacy over Article 26 of the ECT as a matter of international law?
Answer: No, they do not. Even if they did, this would go to the jurisdiction of the ICSID arbitral tribunal, and the ICSID Convention makes clear that this is a matter that is reserved to, and can only be resolved by, the procedure set down in the Convention, and not domestic law. This is helpfully stated in the commentary by Professor Schreuer on Article 54 which stated that “A domestic court or authority before which recognition and enforcement is sought is restricted to ascertaining the award’s authenticity. It may not re-examine the ICSID tribunal’s jurisdiction. It may not re-examine the award on the merits. Nor may it examine the fairness and propriety of the proceedings before the ICSID tribunal.” This passage was expressly approved by the Supreme Court in Micula at  which definitively states the approach under English law to this issue.
The answers to the series of questions that followed at sub-issues 2(a) to (e) are therefore of academic interest only and need not be addressed on this application.
 ff upon claimant’s appeal to these cases, the judge considers many of the cases I refer to here, and finds them largely to plea in claimant’s favour.
A stinging rebuke follows [122-123]
What Spain’s main EU law argument amounts to is this, at its heart. Spain accepts that it is a party to the ICSID Convention; it accepts that it is a party to the ECT. It freely acceded to both of those treaties. There is no doubt that the ECT expressly incorporates the ICSID arbitration provisions within it, adopting international arbitration to resolve disputes between Contracting Parties (which includes Spain) and private international investors, who are resident or domiciled in other countries. Yet Spain relies upon its membership of the EU, the EU Treaties that created that union, and the strictures imposed on those Member States by the CJEU’s rulings on the EU Treaties. These rulings have determined – again, outlined here only in summary – that there can be no valid arbitration provision adopted by Member States which grants jurisdiction to any arbitral tribunal that may touch upon matters of EU law. This is due to the primacy of the CJEU to determine all such EU law matters. Therefore Spain argues that there can be no jurisdiction, even for a properly constituted ICSID arbitral tribunal, to determine any dispute under the ECT between Spain and an investor from any other state. This is the case regardless of whether that investor is within, or without, another Member State, although it runs both lines of argument in the alternative. It also argues that any ICSID award, such as the Award in this case, must therefore have been reached without jurisdiction and so cannot be a valid award; and/or that it has immunity from recognition in the courts of the United Kingdom for what may broadly be described as the same, or similar, reasons.
The logical consequence (or extension) of this argument for it to be correct is that these decisions of the CJEU must be taken as binding all the parties to the ECT and to the ICSID Convention – whether Member States of the EU or otherwise – and take priority over all other treaty obligations entered into by any other state, even those obligations assumed by treaty prior to the creation of the EU. What this would mean, were Spain to be correct (and I am confident that it is not correct) is that by reason of the terms of the EU Treaties, and by reason of the rulings of the CJEU and its supremacy over EU law matters, the EU and the CJEU would have unilaterally changed – if not removed – all the existing treaty obligations of all the Contracting Parties to the ICSID Convention. I know of no framework of international law in which such a position could be correct. I would go further and observe that it simply cannot be correct. It would mean that the existing treaty obligations of any Contracting Party to the ICSID Convention would have been changed, without any intention or involvement on the part of that Contracting Party, a sovereign nation, as a result of rulings by the CJEU. That is not a conventional analysis of how international obligations work, and I reject Spain’s arguments. This completes my consideration of what I consider is the longer route.
I myself have argued, based on the ECT’s travaux, that the applicable law clause of Article 26 ECT includes the application of EU (State Aid) law and must be so applied by arbitration Panels applying the ECT. However we are yet to hear from the Panel in that particular case. I would suggest that is a neater way to go about the issue.