Jonathan Hutchinson v MAPFRE and Ice Mountain (OBeach) Ibiza  EWHC 178 (QB) like all cases involving serious accidents, cannot be written about without the greatest sympathy for claimants having suffered serious physical damage. The case concerns the horror scenario of either a fall or a dive in a pool leading to head and spinal injury. Mr Hutchinson (represented by Sarah Crowter QC) is a former Birmingham City football player who visited an Ibiza club owned by a fellow Brit – those interested in the background see here.
Defendants are the club (ICE Mountain, Spain registered) and their insurers, MAPFRE (ditto). Clearly to sue in England the case needs to involve either a protected category (consumers; insureds) or a special jurisdictional rule (contract; tort).
Andrews J is right in calling jurisdiction on the consumer title against ICE Mountain straightforward. The Pammer /Alpenhof criteria are fulfilled; that claimant’s purchase of a ticket was not the result of the directed activities is irrelevant per CJEU Emrek; (at 21 she dismisses an argument to try and distinguish Emrek on the facts, which argued that claimant had entered the pool via the VIP area to which his ‘standard’ ticket did not actually give access).
The further discussion involves the insurance title of Brussels Ia, which reads in relevant part (Article 13):
(1). In respect of liability insurance, the insurer may also, if the law of the court permits it, be joined in proceedings which the injured party has brought against the insured. (2). Articles 10, 11 and 12 shall apply to actions brought by the injured party directly against the insurer, where such direct actions are permitted. (3). If the law governing such direct actions provides that the policyholder or the insured may be joined as a party to the action, the same court shall have jurisdiction over them.
The claims against Ice Mountain in tort or for breach of statutory duty are halted by Andrews J. The question here is whether the ‘parasitic’ claim under A13(3) requires the issue to ‘relate to insurance’ (recently also discussed obiter in Griffin v Varouxakis), an issue already discussed in Keefe, Hoteles Pinero Canarias SL v Keefe  EWCA Civ 598 (referred to in Bonnie Lackey), sent to the CJEU but settled before either Opinion of judgment. The same issue is now before the CJEU as Cole and Others v IVI Madrid SL and Zurich Insurance Plc, pending in anonymised fashion before the CJEU it would seem as C-814/19, AC et al v ABC Sl (a wrongful birth case).
At any rate, the non-contractual claims against Ice Mountain were stayed until the CJEU has answered the questions referred to it by Judge Rawlings in Cole.
A late [but that in itself does not matter: lis alibi pendens needs to be assessed ex officio (at 36)] challenge on the basis of A29-30 lis alibi pendens rules was raised and dismissed. The other proceedings are criminal proceedings in Ibiza. The argument goes (at 37) that there are ongoing criminal proceedings in Spain arising out of the accident which led to Mr Hutchinson’s injuries, and because Mr Hutchinson has failed to expressly reserve his right to bring separate civil proceedings, the Public Prosecutor is obliged to bring civil proceedings on his behalf within the ambit of those criminal proceedings. For that reason, Ice Mountain contend that the Spanish court is seised of any civil claim arising from the same facts as are under investigation in the Spanish criminal proceedings, and has been since 2016, long before these proceedings were commenced.
This line of argument fails to convince Andrews J: ‘Through no fault of his own, Mr Hutchinson has never been in a position knowingly to take any formal steps to reserve his position in Spain to commence separate civil proceedings against anyone he alleges to be legally liable for his injuries. Yet, if Ice Mountain is right, he will have been deprived of any choice in the matter of where to bring his civil claim merely because, without his knowledge or consent, a doctor in the hospital filed a report which triggered a criminal investigation into the accident, of which he was never told.’ Quite apart from this unacceptable suggestion, the criminal proceedings in Ibiza have been closed, and (at 59) ‘there is no ongoing criminal action leading to trial, to which any civil action would attach.’
For the claims against Mapfre, Mrs Justice Andrews held that the court has jurisdiction on two alternative basis:
Firstly, the provision in the contract of insurance upon which Mapfre seeks to rely as demonstrating that there is no good arguable case against it on the merits cannot be relied on, as that would substantially undermine the protection to the weaker party specifically provided for in the insurance provisions of Recast Brussels 1.
In essence, Mapfre accepts that under Spanish law, there would be a direct right of action against it as Ice Mountain’s liability insurer if it were liable to indemnify Ice Mountain under the policy, but it contends that Mr Hutchinson does not have a good arguable case that Mapfre’s policy of insurance covers Ice Mountain’s liability to him under a judgment given by an English court. The policy would, however, cover Ice Mountain’s liability to him for the same accident, based on the identical cause (or causes) of action, under a judgment given by a Spanish court. (ICE Mountain agree, therefore also acknowledging it is uninsured in respect of any claims which the English consumers who are its targeted customers might bring in the courts of their own domicile pursuant to A17-18 BIa). If this were right, this would mean a massive disincentive for the consumer to sue in his jurisdiction: at 66 (a devilish suggestion): If he wins and the uninsured defendant is not good for the money, he would be left without a remedy, whereas if he sued in Spain, the same defendant would be insured in respect of the same liability, and he would recover from the insurer up to the policy limits.
At 67: if a party who owes contractual duties to consumers ‘does insure, and a direct of action exists against the insurer under the law which governs the insurance contract, then ‘Recast Brussels I does not contemplate that he should be permitted to contract with the insurer on a basis that acts as a disincentive to consumers to exercise their rights to sue him (and his insurer) in the courts of their own domicile or which renders any rights of suit against the insurer in that jurisdiction completely worthless by using the exercise of those rights as grounds for avoiding the insurer’s obligation to indemnify him.‘
The Spanish law experts called upon to interpret the provisions of the territorial scope title in the insurance policy, differed as to exact meaning. However the issue was settled on the basis of EU law, with most interesting arguments (and reference ia to Assens Havn): summarising the discussion: a substantial policy clause limiting liability to awards issued by Spanish judgments, in practice would have the same third party effect as a choice of court clause which B1A does not allow (see A15: The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an agreement… (3) Which is concluded between a policyholder and an insurer, both of whom are at the time of conclusion of the contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same member state, and which has the effect of conferring jurisdiction on the courts of that state even if the harmful event were to occur abroad, provided that such agreement is not contrary to the law of that Member State….”
‘If a clause which has that effect can be relied on against a person such as Mr Hutchinson it would drive a coach and horses through the special rules on insurance laid down under Section 3 of Chapter II. It would provide every liability insurer (not just Spanish insurers) with the simplest means of depriving the injured party of the choice of additional jurisdictions conferred upon him by Articles 11 to 13 of Recast Brussels 1. It would be the easiest thing in the world for an insurer, as the economically strongest party, to include a standard term in the policy that he is only liable for claims that have been brought against the policyholder in the courts of the policyholder’s and/or the insurer’s own domicile.’
This part of the judgment is most interesting and shows the impact jurisdictional rules and their effet utile may have on substantive law (at the least, third party effect of same).
Alternatively, even if the analysis above is wrong, ‘on the basis of the expert evidence on Spanish law that is currently before the Court, at this stage of the proceedings the Claimant has established at the very least a plausible evidential basis for finding that the clause in question (the one which effectively limits pay-outs to judgments issued in Spain) is not binding upon him as a third party to the contract, and therefore is ineffective to prevent MAPFRE from being directly liable if his claim is otherwise well-founded on the merits. He has therefore established a good arguable case that the jurisdictional gateway under Article 13(2) of Recast Brussels 1 applies.’
Most relevant and interesting.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2 Heading 126.96.36.199