Posts Tagged Lis alibi pendens
Thank you very much indeed Sarah Venn and Emma Hynes both for flagging Garcia v BIH, Total Gabon and Sigma,  EWHC 739 (Admlty), and (Emma) for providing me with copy (Bailii are not yet running it). This case is extremely suited to an oral exam of conflict of laws: in a written exam to many issues would have to be discussed. (Mine this term are mostly written. Hence I’ll run this piece early).
Claimant is a French national who worked as a professional diver offshore Gabon, West Africa, and suffered catastrophic brain injury which he blames on poor working practices on the second defendant’s site (Total Gabon), which is where he was working. He was employed by first defendant BIH, a UK based company, with choice of court and governing law made for English courts cq English law. First defendant is clearly domiciled in the UK and the Brussels I Regulation clearly applies to it. The third defendant Sigma, was contracted by Total Gabon. Claimant’s position is that he was deployed by BIH to work under the control of Sigma on the site which was, or should have been, supervised by Total Gabon. Total Gabon claim the contractual relationships between it and Sigma prevent a claim against the former.
BIH is small fish which may even have been struck off the company register. It is clear that plaintiff will not receive from BIH the amounts he needs for his constant medical care.
A default judgment was issued against BIG who did not engage with proceedings – at any rate jurisdiction against BIG per Owusu (with which readers of this blog are now ad nauseam familiar) could not be dismissed; . Total Gabon contest jurisdiction on the basis that England and Wales is not the appropriate forum.
This is not said in so many words in the Judgment however the presence of an anchor defendant per Article 4 Brussels I Recast, is of no relevance where the co-defendants are not domiciled in the EU. The regulation cannot be used to justify such anchor, residual conflicts rules take over.
Jervis Kay QC AR considers many cases which I have reported on before: VTB, Owusu, Lungowe, Spiliada. Lungowe in particular is considered by Mr Kay, including the issue of abuse of the use of anchor defendants and (at 23 in fine) the acknowledgment, implicitly (I wrote it explicitly in my review of the case) that of course EU precedent in this respect is pro inspiratio only. Applying English residual conflicts rules, the judge then reviews whether there is a serious case (‘a real prospect of succeeding’) that could be made against Total Gabon, either one in tort or one in contractual liability. He found there is such real prospect, for both, but especially for tort.
However the case eventually (access to justice issues in Gabon were not flagged neither discussed) stumbles on the question whether the English courts would be the most appropriate forum: it is found they are not. Inspiration is found especially in Erste Group Bank  EWCA Civ 379, a case in which forum non conveniens was applied even against an England-domiciled defendant because there had already been submission to Russian jurisdiction. In Garcia, the Court applies Erste per analogiam: the parallel, Mr Kay suggests, is that the case against the first defendant has effectively been wrapped up. The spectre of competing judgments therefore, Mr Kay holds, does not arise (at 36) and England is therefore not the appropriate forum. If the case is appealed I would imagine this altogether brief consideration of appropriateness and the parallel seen with Erste, I would imagine would be its Achiless heel.
(One of the considerations which defendant, per VTB, considers, is that as a rule of thumb, Gleichlauf is to be preferred (I have often found this a less attractive part of the Supreme Court’s ruling). Which is why defendant considers Rome II: if the English courts were to hear the case, they would have to apply Rome II even if their jurisdiction is a result of residual English conflicts rules).
An alternative action for Mr Garcia, one imagines, would have been (or perhaps it still is) to use Total France SA as anchor in France, to try and have the subsidiary’s actions assigned to it: a more classic CSR case.
Anyways, I think you will agree that one could have a good chinwag on this judgment at oral exam.
This is one for the conflict of laws anoraks. In C-29/16 HanseYachts the Court of Justice held (on 4 May) that an application for proceedings to preserve or establish, prior to any legal proceedings, evidence of facts on which a subsequent action could be based, does not constitute a proceeding within the meaning of (now) Article 32(1) Brussels I. If it had, it would trigger the lis alibi pendens regime of that Article, impacting therefore on any future substantive proceedings.
At 33 the Court defers to the insight into the relevant provisions of French judicial procedure, offered by the French Government: Although there may indeed be a connection between the court seised on the basis of the relevant French Article and the court having jurisdiction to hear the substance of the case with a view to which the measure of inquiry was ordered, the fact remains that such proceedings for the taking of evidence are independent in relation to the substantive procedure which may, if necessary, be brought subsequently. The Court’s ruling however is dependent (at 34) upon the French courts confirming this interpretation of French civil procedure: for the CJEU does not offer final interpretations on internal State law.
Of note is of course also that the Court seized with the substantive procedure, may en parcours de route take measures to preserve evidence etc.: that court would have already been ‘seized’.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 126.96.36.199.
Asymmetric clauses, exclusivity, torpedoes and lis alibi pendens: The High Court in Commerzbank v Liquimar Tankers.
Many of the issues in  EWHC 161 (Comm) Commerzbank v Liquimar Tankers were also raised in Perella v Codere, albeit there, as I reported, obiter. In current case, they were very much dicta, and they amount to the English courts viewing (properly constructed) asymmetric clauses as being exclusive. As such they fall under the new anti-torpedo provisions of Article 31(2).
Applications of defendants Liquimar Tankers (registered in Liberia but with head office in Athens) are being made in the course of proceedings in London by Commerzbank in two separate actions in relation to the repayment of loans which the Bank extended for the building of a number of ships. There are ongoing proceedings taken by the defendants against the Bank in Piraeus, Greece concerning the same and/or related issues.
The Liquimar guarantee contained a governing law and an asymmetric jurisdiction clause, which was essentially similar in the other loan agreements. It provided:
“16 Law and Jurisdiction
16.1 This Guarantee and Indemnity shall in all respects be governed by and interpreted in accordance with English law.
16.2 For the exclusive benefit of the Lender, the Guarantor irrevocably agrees that the courts of England are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which may arise out of or in connection with this Guarantee and Indemnity and that any proceedings may be brought in those courts.
16.3 Nothing contained in this Clause shall limit the right of the Lender to commence any proceedings against the Guarantor in any other court of competent jurisdiction nor shall the commencement of any proceedings against the Guarantor in one or more jurisdictions preclude the commencement of any proceedings in any other jurisdiction, whether concurrently or not.
16.4 The Guarantor irrevocably waives any objection which it may now or in the future have to the laying of the venue of any proceedings in any court referred to in this Clause and any claim that those proceedings have been brought in an inconvenient or inappropriate forum, and irrevocably agrees that a judgment in any proceedings commenced in any such court shall be conclusive and binding on it and may be enforced in the courts of any jurisdiction …”.
Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Recast reads:
‘where a court of a Member State on which an agreement as referred to in Article 25 confers exclusive jurisdiction is seized, any court of another Member State shall stay the proceedings until such time as the court seized on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement.’
Cranston J held that the concept of ‘exclusivity’ should be autonomously interpreted under the Brussels I (Recast) regime. He did not however refer for preliminary reference to the CJEU: as such, the High Court’s finding continues to be vulnerable until we have precedent from Luxembourg. The judgment as a whole is worth a read – readers in for concise summary, please refer to Herbert Smith’s analysis.
Summing up is done in para 70, with justifiable emphasis on parties’ and the Regulation’s intentions (but as noted with considerable reference to precedent and principles of statutory interpretation): Thus with the asymmetric jurisdiction clauses in the present case, the defendants agreed to sue only in the courts of one EU Member State, England. Instead, they have enabled another court, the Greek court, to be seized of the matter. It would undermine the agreements of the parties, and foster abusive tactics, if the jurisdiction clauses in these agreements were to be treated not as exclusive, but as non-exclusive.’
Of note is also the discussion on the role of recitals (eg. at 69; also at 77 ff). Justice Cranston’s arguments are supported by reference to a number of recitals. Defendant in my view has a valid point in principle where they argue at 77 that ‘a recital cannot constitute a rule when it is not reflected in the words of Article 31(2).‘ (Although they were wrong on substance).
A subsidiary argument in the case also merits further attention. Defendants argue that Article 25 requires the parties to have designated the courts of a Member State to enable the law applicable to the substantive validity of a jurisdiction clause to be identified and to provide certainty as to the forum in which a putative defendant can expect to be sued. That, they submit, is not achieved by a clause which designates the courts of all other competent states, including those of non-Member States, outside the territorial competence of the EU, which could mean suits in multiple jurisdictions. Although the argument could be phrased more precisely, I do agree with it: in the absence of a nominatim lex contractus for the choice of court clause specifically, the new lex fori prorogati rule in Article 25 Brussels I Recast, combined with recital 20 (yet again the troublesome habit of EU private international law to include substantive rules in recitals only) does create a vacuum in the case of hybrid, asymmetric or even non-exclusive choice of court.
An important case. Not the last we have heard of the issues.
(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Ch.2, Heading 2.2.9, Heading 188.8.131.52.1, Heading 184.108.40.206.
I have included Article 15 of the Brussels IIa or IIbis Regulation, 2201/2003, in full below. It allows a court to relinquish a case to another court, if that is in the best interest of the child. I once referred to it in an exam, asking students to discuss Zwiefka MEP’s proposal at the time to introduce an Article 15-type exception in what is now the Brussels I Recast Regulation. Those discussions in the meantime have led in particular to Articles 33-34 of the Recast, on lis alibi pendens with courts in third States and the potential for EU courts to relinquish their jurisdiction.
The question I asked students was how they would rate Article 15 (which incidentally does not require the case to be pending in the alternative court to which the case is being deferred) against classic forum non conveniens provisions. The point being that the former puts courts very much in a straightjacket, which the CJEU was bound to have to untangle. That is exactly what is at stake in C-428/15 Child and Family Agency v JD in which Wathelet AG opined Mid June.
Agne Limante has full listing of the AG’s arguments in CJEL, I should like to add that the Irish courts were particularly concerned with forum shopping: at 22:
In that regard, it (the referring court, GAvC) considers that the settling in Ireland of United Kingdom nationals who wish to conceal their children from the competent child protection authorities must not be encouraged and, more broadly, that opportunities for forum shopping must not be created or tolerated. However, it asks to what extent such considerations may be taken into account in the implementation of Article 15 of Regulation No 2201/2003.
Interesting case and ditto Opinion.
Transfer to a court better placed to hear the case
1. By way of exception, the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter may, if they consider that a court of another Member State, with which the child has a particular connection, would be better placed to hear the case, or a specific part thereof, and where this is in the best interests of the child:
(a) stay the case or the part thereof in question and invite the parties to introduce a request before the court of that other Member State in accordance with paragraph 4; or
(b) request a court of another Member State to assume jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 5.
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply:
(a) upon application from a party; or
(b) of the court’s own motion; or
(c) upon application from a court of another Member State with which the child has a particular connection, in accordance with paragraph 3.
A transfer made of the court’s own motion or by application of a court of another Member State must be accepted by at least one of the parties.
3. The child shall be considered to have a particular connection to a Member State as mentioned in paragraph 1, if that Member State:
(a) has become the habitual residence of the child after the court referred to in paragraph 1 was seised; or
(b) is the former habitual residence of the child; or
(c) is the place of the child’s nationality; or
(d) is the habitual residence of a holder of parental responsibility; or
(e) is the place where property of the child is located and the case concerns measures for the protection of the child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of this property.
4. The court of the Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter shall set a time limit by which the courts of that other Member State shall be seised in accordance with paragraph 1.
If the courts are not seised by that time, the court which has been seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14.
5. The courts of that other Member State may, where due to the specific circumstances of the case, this is in the best interests of the child, accept jurisdiction within six weeks of their seisure in accordance with paragraph 1(a) or 1(b). In this case, the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction. Otherwise, the court first seised shall continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14.
6. The courts shall cooperate for the purposes of this Article, either directly or through the central authorities designated pursuant to Article 53.
C-523/14 Aertssen is not a corner piece of the Brussels I jigsaw. Rather, a necessary if unexciting piece of the puzzle’s main body. Aertssen NV, of Belgium, had a gripe with VSB Machineverhuur BV and others, of the Netherlands. Aertssen alleged fraud in VSB’s dealings with the company. It employed a well-known feature of Belgian (and French, among others) civil procedure, which is to file complaint with the investigating magistrate. This launches a criminal investigation, to which civil proceedings are attached.
Aertssen’s subsequent action of attachment of VSB’s accounts in The Netherlands, risked being stalled by the Dutch courts’ insistence that the group launch new legal action in The Netherlands. Aertssen obliged pro forma with this initiation of new proceedings, subsequently to aim to torpedo them. Aertssen would rather the Belgian courts continue with their own, criminal investigation and that action in The Netherlands, other than action in attachment, be put on hold, at least until the Belgian proceedings be finalised.
In essence therefore, the case before the CJEU needs to determine whether the Aertssen action in Belgium is of a ‘civil and commercial’ nature, and if it is, whether the actions in Belgium and The Netherlands meet the requirements of the lis alibi pendens rule of Article 27 (old) of the Brussels I-Regulation. The CJEU replied in the affirmative to both.
Precedent for the ‘civil and commercial’ issue, other than the usual suspects, was available per Sonntag, Case C-172/91, where the Court held that civil matters within the meaning of the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Brussels Convention, cover an action for compensation for damage brought before a criminal court. In Aertssen, The CJEU used the term ‘private law relationship’ to describe the legal relationship between the parties concerned. Even though, other than in Sonntag where the criminal proceedings were launched by the State prosecutor, Aertssen itself had triggered the criminal investigation, its ultimate aim is to obtain monetary compensation.
The subsequent question was whether per Article 27, lis pendens exists. Reference is best made to the judgment itself for the application of the The Tatry criteria (Case C-406/92): the two cases pending need to involve the same parties, pursuing the same cause of action (the facts and the rule of law relied on) and with the same object (meaning the end the action has in view). The CJEU held among others that the question whether the parties are the same cannot depend on the position of one or other of the parties in the two proceedings.
The remainder of the judgment deals with the meaning of the term ‘court first seized’ in Article 30 of the Regulation, and the relevance of national rules of civil procedure in same.
It is not often that a party aims to torpedo its own proceedings and the procedural intricacies of the case are rather complex. However the CJEU keeps a level head, with in the end transparent results.