In competition law there is a strong presumption of attributability of daughter’s action to the mother corporation as I discussed ia in my post on CJEU C-508/11 P ENI (references to further case-law there). In general in competition law there is a strong emphasis on the concept of an ‘economic unit’ which readly looks beyond the legal fiction of separate corporate personality.
In C‑425/22 MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt. v Mercedes-Benz Group AG (let’s shorten that to ‘MOL v Mercedez-Benz) Emiliou AG opined that for the purposes of Article 7(2) Brussels Ia jurisdiction a parent company cannot rely on the competition law concept of an economic unit in order to establish the jurisdiction of the courts where it has its registered seat to hear and determine its claim for damages for the harm suffered by its subsidiaries.
(14) Applicant is a company established in Hungary. It has a controlling interest in companies belonging to the MOL group. It is either the majority shareholder or holds another form of exclusive controlling power over a number of companies, such as MOLTRANS, established in Hungary; INA, established in Croatia; Panta and Nelsa, established in Italy; ROTH, established in Austria; and SLOVNAFT, established in Slovakia. During the infringement period identified by the relevant Commision Decision (the Trucks Cartel)
The AG of course refers to Bier, Dumez France (direct damage in one person rules out an extra A7(2) forum for the third party (mother corporation) victim of indirect damage), and other core cases on A7(2) which this blog frequently refers to and /or has discussed:
C‑352/13 CDC: A7(2) locus delicti commissi for cartels is the court of the place where the cartel was definitively formed, confirmed in flyLAL and criticised by me inter alia here;
C‑352/13 CDC (holding ia that A7(2) locus damni for infringement of cartel is the victim’s registered seat); that solution too as the AG notes (44) was met by criticism both by Bobek AG in his Opinion in flyLAL and by scholarship;
C-30/20 Volvo: more emphasis Emiliou AG suggests on the link between the market affected by the anticompetitive conduct and the place where the claimants allege to have suffered harm; in my post on the case I point out the CJEU’s fuzziness on the issue;
He also distinguishes CJEU Tibor Trans‘ distinct view on (in)direct damage as follows (36-37) – footnotes omitted:
36. It is true, as the applicant notes, that in the judgment in Tibor-Trans (which related to the same collusive behaviour as that established in the Commission Decision at issue in the present case), the Court distinguished that case from the scenario in Dumez. The particularity of the facts in Tibor-Trans was that the applicant in that case, an end user of the trucks, did not purchase any trucks from the defendant directly, but did so through a dealership. However, that did not prevent the Court from finding that the applicant’s claim in that case concerned direct damage, because that damage was found to be the immediate consequence of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU, given that the overcharge resulting from the collusive agreement was passed on to that applicant by the dealers.
37. Such passing-on may occur within a supply chain where the alleged victim acquires the goods (or services) which have been subject to a cartel. That, however, is not claimed to have occurred in the case in the main proceedings. Instead, the applicant appears to present the initial harm suffered by its subsidiaries as its own.
(52) The AG points out that the distinguishing feature here is that the applicant’s registered seat is situated outside the affected market. (57) Applicant seeks to extend the application of the registered seat connecting factor to establish jurisdiction in relation to its claim in which it seeks compensation for harm suffered solely by other members of its economic unit.
Emiliou AG does not believe the competition law concept can simply be extended for jurisdictional services, referring also to Szpunar AG’s Opinion in C‑632/22 (service of documents) on which see prof Matthias Weller here. For his extensive arguments based on A7(2)’s requirement of proximity, predictability of forum, Gleichlauf (less convincing imo), and that BIa’s jurisdictional rules guarantee efficient enforcement (particularly in A4 domicile jurisdiction), see the Opinion.
His final conclusion is that (98)
the term ‘the place where the harmful event occurred’, within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, does not cover the registered office of the parent company that brings an action for damages for the harm caused solely to that parent company’s subsidiaries by the anticompetitive conduct of a third party, and where it is claimed that that parent company and those subsidiaries form part of the same economic unit.
As my colleague Joeri Vananroye summarises the Opinion:
“In corporate law terms: yes to outsider veil piercing, no to insider reverse veil piercing. Outsiders may disregard legal structure and go for economic reality; but not those who set up that structure. See also: rules on derivate damages.”
Blame Bier /Mines de Potasse d’Alsace for this complex set of rules and distinguishing.
Geert.
EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.438 ff.
gavc law - geert van calster 