Posts Tagged Article 7(2)
In C-451/18 Tibor v DAF Trucks the CJEU has confirmed its CDC case-law on locus damni for end-users affected by a cartel. Truck distribution arrangements were such that Tibor (of Hungary) could not buy directly from DAF Trucks NV (of The Netherlands), one of the truck manufacturers held by the EC to have infringed Article 101 TFEU. Rather, it had to go via local Hungarian dealers (and leasing companies).
Tibor-Trans claims that the Hungarian courts derive their international jurisdiction from Article 7(2) Brussels Ia per CDC according to which, in the case of an action for damages brought against defendants domiciled in various Member States as a result of a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 TFEU and of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, which has been established by the Commission, in which the defendants participated in several Member States, at different times and in different places, each alleged victim can choose to bring an action before the courts of the place where its own registered office is located.
DAF Trucks submits, first, that the collusive meetings (hence the locus delicti commissi) took place in Germany, which should entail the jurisdiction of the German courts and, second, that it never entered into a direct contractual relationship with Tibor-Trans, with the result that it could not reasonably expect to be sued in the Hungarian courts.
The Court dismisses the latter argument: those infringing competition law must expect to be sued in markets affected by anti-competitive behaviour (at 34, with reference to fly-LAL). That Tibor did not have a contractual relation with DAF Trucks is irrelevant as the increase in price clearly has been passed on by the frontline victims of the cartel: the dealers (at 31).
The case does leave open the unresolved issue of the CJEU’s identification of registered office as locus damni (see my comments in my review of CDC). Given that Tibor Trans would seem to have purchased all its trucks in Hungary, neither does not the judgment shed light on the distributive impact of locus damni or my suggestion that for competition law, markets where the anti-competitive behaviour is rolled-out should qualify as locus delicti commissi (alongside the place of the meetings where infringement of competition law is decided).
(Handbook of) European Private International Law. 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12, Heading 220.127.116.11
LIC Telecommunications et al v VTB Capital et al. High Court suggests autonomous EU approach to asymmetric choice of court. Also discusses contract and tort distinction, and abuse of process.
In  EWHC 1747 (Comm) LIC Telecommunications et al v VTB Capital et al Moulder J suggests an unorthodox interpretations of Article 25 of the Brussels Ia Regulation. (Note also her very critical view at 22 of one of the experts, whom she found having confused his role as expert with a role as advocate). Much of the lengthy judgment is devoted to intricate discussions of Luxembourgish corporate law (hence the need for expert evidence) and the jurisdictional issues are, somewhat illogically, discussed towards the end of the judgment, at 245 ff.
Maze, one of the defendants, acts as a manager of V2 pursuant to a directorship agreement dated 26 May 2015 (the “Directorship Agreement”). It relies on the effect of clause 19 of the Directorship Agreement and submitted that claims against it are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Luxembourg pursuant to Article 25 Brussels Ia. Clause 19 provides:
“for the benefit of the Manager, the Shareholder and the Company hereby irrevocably, specially and expressly agree that the courts of Luxembourg city have jurisdiction to settle any disputes in connection with this Agreement and accordingly submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of Luxembourg city. Nothing in this clause limits however the rights of the Manager to bring proceedings against the Company in connection with this Agreement in any other court of competent jurisdiction or concurrently in more than one jurisdiction.”
The clause is asymmetric aka hybrid aka unilateral. (See e.g. my discussion of Rothschild etc.). These clauses as I have noted elsewhere highlight the clear insufficiency of Brussels Ia’s new lex fori prorogati (including renvoi) rule for choice of court. Which court has been prorogated, hence also lex fori prorogati, is not clear when the clause is asymmetric.
Moulder J discusses  EWHC 161 (Comm) Commerzbank v Liquimar Tankers as precedent: I reviewed it here and signalled at the time that it would not be the last we would hear of the issue. In that case Cranston J held ‘There is nothing in Article 25 that a valid jurisdiction agreement has to exclude any courts, in particular non EU Courts. Article 17, penultimate paragraph, of the Brussels Convention recognised asymmetric jurisdiction clauses. To my mind it would need a strong indication that Brussels 1 Recast somehow renders what is a regular feature of financial documentation in the EU ineffective.‘ I was never taken by that conclusion viz the Brussels Convention: its Article 17 reference to a party having ‘benefit’ from choice of court does not relate entirely to the same discussion on asymmetric clauses (Peralla v Codere  EWHC 1182 (Comm) which I discussed here illustrates that difference).
At any rate I disagree with Moulder J’s statement at 254 that
It is now common ground that it is a question of autonomous EU law and not a question of national law. (It was I believe accepted that the proviso “unless the agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity” refers to issues such as capacity, fraud and mistake, not whether particular kinds of “choice of court” agreements are permitted under the Regulation).
Asymmetric clauses are the first example often given when highlighting the limited cover of Article 25 Brussels I a (and the need for certainty on the lex causae for choice of court). There is no autonomous interpretation there at all. I do agree however with the conclusion at 261: that Luxembourg courts, applying EU law, would not uphold such clauses was not made out on the evidence. Luxembourgish courts at least when they apply Luxembourgish law, generally uphold the validity of asymmetric choice of court.
At 263 ff then follows discussion of Article 7(1) and 7(2). Much of the authority discussed has been reviewed on this blog. (Including Bosworth (Arcadia) which in the meantime has been held by the CJEU but without the contract /tort element – the CJEU found against a contract of employment). Moulder J holds that Article 7(2) is engaged, not 7(1), and on the former discusses locus delicti commissi with reference to JSC BTA Bank v Khrapunov. At 295: it is not sufficient that there are meetings in England to implement the conspiracy, it is the making of the agreement in England which is to be regarded as the harmful event. Claimants have not supplied a plausible evidential basis that the agreement was made in England. Their evidence is consistent with a case that the conspiracy was implemented in England but that is not sufficient.
As for locus damni, at 298: Even though the share purchase agreement was under English law, it is the loss of the shares in the Luxembourg company which is the pleaded damage not the agreement to sell or the auction. The Vivacom group consists of Bulgarian telecommunications companies which were held by InterV through Viva Luxembourg Bulgaria EOOD (paragraph 3 of the Agreed List of Agreed Issues). Locus damni is Bulgaria, perhaps Luxembourg. But not England.
Finally, abuse of process considerations are linked to English procedural law (whether claims should have been brought sooner).
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9, Heading 18.104.22.168, Heading 22.214.171.124 .
Stand alone cartel damages suits: The High Court in Media Saturn Holding v Toshiba on anchoring jurisdiction.
In  EWHC 1095 (Ch) Media Saturn Holding v Toshiba et al, Barling J is concerned with stand-alone damages suits following the European Commission decision in COMP/39437 – TV and Monitor Tubes. None of the Defendants was an addressee of the Decision (some of their parent companies were). The claims are, therefore, “standalone” rather than “follow-on” actions, and the Decision is not binding on the court so far as the claims against the Defendants are concerned, as it would have been had the Defendants been addressees. Nevertheless, Claimants place considerable reliance upon the evidential effect of the Decision.
Claims are strike out and summary judgment application, intertwined with challenges to jurisdiction. These essentially relate to there being no arguable claim against the “anchor” defendants, particularly Toshiba Information Systems UK ltd – TIS.
At 114: Claimants refute the suggestion that the claim has been brought against TIS on a speculative basis in the hope that something may turn up on disclosure and/or simply to provide an anchor defendant for jurisdictional purposes. They point to the Commission’s finding, at Recital 595, that the cartel was implemented in the EEA through sales of cartelised CPTs that had been integrated into the finished products.
The substantive law issue of implementation of the cartel therefore is brought in not just to argue (or refute) summary dismissal, but also to shore (or reject) the jurisdictional claim under Article 8(1) Brussels 1a.
Barling J establishes as common ground (at 90) that ‘as a matter of law an entity can infringe Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 53 EEA if it participates in relevant cartel activity, in the sense of being a party to an agreement or concerted practice which falls within that Article, or if it knowingly implements a cartel to which it may not have been a party in that sense. [counsel for defendants] submitted that there is no arguable case that TIS had the requisite knowledge. However, what is sufficient knowledge for this purpose is not common ground’.
At 300 ff the most recent CJEU authority is discussed: C-724/17 Vantaan kaupunki v Skanska of March 2019.
This leads to a relevant discussion on ‘implementation’ of the cartel, which mutatis mutandis is also relevant to Article 7(2) (locus delicti commissi). At 117-118:
‘TIS [similar arguments are discussed viz other defendants, GAVC] was involved in activities which were important to the operation of the cartel from the Toshiba perspective. These included the manufacture of CTVs using the cartelised product acquired from an associated company which itself was one of the established cartelists, and the onward sale of the transformed product. TIS also had direct commercial dealings with the Claimants relating to bonuses on sales of, inter alia, the transformed products. In my judgment there is an arguable case that those activities amounted to the actus reus of participation in and/or implementation of the cartel. The available material is sufficient to preclude the summary disposal of that issue.’
At 139 ff much CJEU and national authority is discussed, viz a variety of the defendants, on the issue of ‘implementation’ for summary dismissal on substantive grounds, a discussion which then at 259 ff is applied to the jurisdiction issue. Reference is made to Brownlie v Four Seasons, to C-103/05 Reisch Montage and of course to C-352/13 CDC. At 273 Barling J distinguishes excellently in my view between predictability as part of the DNA of CJEU Brussels Ia case-law on the one hand, and its treatment (and rejection) as a stand-alone criterion on the other hand:
‘[argument of counsel] is in danger of treating the statement of the CJEU in Reisch Montage as adding a free-standing and distinct criterion of foreseeability to the preconditions of application expressly set out in Article 8(1). If that criterion were to be applied generally, and without reference to those express pre-conditions, there would be a risk of the EU law principle of legal certainty being compromised, instead of respected as Reisch Montage expressly requires. That case states that the special rule in Article 8(1) must be interpreted so as to ensure legal certainty. The special rule’s express precondition is that “the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments…” Therefore, by virtue of Reisch Montage, it is those words that must be interpreted strictly so as to respect legal certainty and thereby ensure foreseeability. In other words, foreseeability is inextricably linked to the closeness of the connection between the two sets of claims, and the criterion will be satisfied if a sufficiently close connection of the kind described in Article 8(1) exists.’
And at 276
‘It is correct that the anchor defendants were not addressees of the Decision and that there were no UK addressees. However, there is no reason why this should be significant. Article 8(1) is capable of applying in a competition claim regardless of whether a Commission infringement decision exists. What matters is that there is a claim that the anchor defendant is guilty of an infringement, and that the case against the non-anchor defendant is sufficiently “closely connected” to that claim within the meaning and for the purposes of Article 8(1). The fact that neither entity is an addressee of a Commission decision (if there is one) and that neither is the subject of any other regulatory process or civil claim relating to the cartel, is, if not immaterial, then of marginal relevance.’
For all anchor defendants the conclusion is that there is an arguable claim that they participated in and/or knowingly implemented the cartel. That strongly militates against the sole purpose of the (two sets of) proceedings being to oust the jurisdiction of the other EU courts. No abuse has occurred.
At 316 a final postscript is added suggesting summarily that the Supreme Court’s Vedanta might have an impact on the ‘abuse’ issue. The judgment concerned inter alia an alleged abuse of EU law in the context of the predecessor provision to Article 8(1). The Court gave consideration to the test for the “sole purpose” issue. At 317: Barling J: ‘I can see no basis on which my conclusions in that regard are affected by this decision.’
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 126.96.36.199.
Ashley v Jimenez: Jurisdiction upheld despite choice of court ex-EU. No locus damni, locus delicti commissi or trust jurisdiction viz EU defendant.
In  EWHC 17 (Ch) Ashley et anon v Jimenez et anon service out of jurisdiction was granted against a Dubai-based defendant, despite choice of court pro the UEA. That clause was found by Marsh CM not to apply to the agreement at issue. Jurisdiction was found on residual English PIL, which are of less relevance to this post. Forum non conveniens was rejected.
Service out of jurisdiction was however denied against the Cyprus-based (corporate) defendant in the case. Claimants had argued jurisdiction on the basis of Brussels I Recast Articles 7(2) (tort) or (6) (trust). Note Marsh CM using the acronym BRR: Brussels Recast Regulation. As I noted earlier in the week Brussels Ia is now more likely to win the day.
Claimants (“Mr Ashley” and “St James”) allege that £3 million has been misappropriated by the defendants (“Mr Jimenez” and “South Horizon”). In summary the claimants say that: (1) Mr Ashley and Mr Jimenez orally agreed in early 2008 that upon payment of the euro equivalent of £3 million, Mr Ashley would acquire, via a shareholding in Les Bordes (Cyprus) Limited, a holding of approximately 5% in the ownership of a golf course in France called Les Bordes and that the shares would be registered in the name of St James. (2) On 13 May 2008, Mr Ashley instructed his bank to transfer the requisite sum to the bank account specified by Mr Jimenez and the transfer was made. In breach of the agreement, the shares were never registered in the name of St James. (3) The agreement and/or the payment were induced by fraudulent misrepresentations made by Mr Jimenez. The claimants say that Mr Jimenez knew South Horizon did not hold the shares and was not in a position to transfer, or procure transfer, upon payment of the agreed sum and that, in representing that South Horizon held the shares, or could procure transfer, Mr Jimenez acted dishonestly. (4) In the alternative, the payment of £3 million gave rise to a Quistclose trust (on that notion, see below) because the payment was made for an agreed purpose that only permitted use of the money for securing transfer of the shares.
(At 82) qualifying strands relevant to the jurisdictional issues, are (1) representations were made by Mr Jimenez to Mr Ashley to induce him to invest in Les Bordes which he relied on; (2) an oral contract was made between Mr Jimenez and Mr Ashley in early 2008 under which Mr Ashley invested £3 million in Les Bordes; and (3) the creation of a Quistclose trust relating to the investment. Note a Quistclose trust goes back to Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd  UKHL 4, and is a trust created where a creditor has lent money to a debtor for a particular purpose. Should the debtor use the money for any other purpose, it is held on trust for the creditor.
On Article 7(2), the High Court held that a breach of trust is properly seen as a tortious claim for the purposes of Brussels Ia. As for locus delicti commissi, the Court notes the question of where the harmful event occurred is less straightforward. Claimants rely on the Cypriot defendant, South Horizon, having paid away the investment money it received in breach of the relevant trust. That event took place in Cyprus where the bank account is based. There might be an obligation to restore the money in England, yet that does not make England the locus delicti commissi: at 128: ‘It seems to me, however, that the claimants in this case are seeking to conflate the remedy they seek with the tortious act which was paying away the investment. The obligation to make good the loss is the result of the wrong, not a separate wrong.‘
The High Court does not properly consider the locus damni strand of the claim against South Horizon. Given the test following from Universal Music, England’s qualification as locus damni given the location of the bank accounts is not straightforward yet not entirely mad, either. The Court did consider England to be the locus damni in its application of English residual rules for the claim between Ashley and Jimenez (who is domiciled in Dubai): at 101: ‘the dealings between Mr Ashley and Mr Jimenez concerning an investment of £3 million in Les Bordes took place in England in the early part of 2008. Loss was sustained in England because the payment was made by Mr Ashley from an account held in England’ (reference made to VTB capital).
On (a rare application of) Article 7(6): are any of the claims relating to the Quistclose trust claims brought against “… the trustee … of a trust … created orally and evidenced in writing” and which is domiciled in England and Wales?: Marsh CM at 129-130:
‘Article 7(6) does not assist the claimants. They need to show that there is (a) a dispute brought against a trustee of a trust (b) the trust was created orally and was evidenced in writing and (c) the claim is made in the place where the trust is domiciled. The difficulty for the claimants concerns the manner in which the trust came into being. As I have indicated previously, although the oral agreement between Mr Ashley and Mr Jimenez gives rise to the circumstances in which the Quistclose trust could come into being, there was (i) no express agreement that the investment would be held on trust and (ii) South Horizon was not a party to the agreement. The trust came into being only upon the payment being made by Mr Ashley to South Horizon at which point, and assuming South Horizon was fixed with knowledge of the agreement, the investment was held upon a restricted basis.
I also have real difficulty with the notion of the Quistclose trust having a domicile in England. It seems to me more likely that the domicile is the place of receipt of the money, because that is where the trust came into being, rather than the place from which the funds were despatched.’
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 188.8.131.52.
Griffin v Varouxakis: (obiter) rejection of jurisdiction on the basis of indirect damage, ditto discussion of Brussels I’s insurance title.
In  EWHC 3259 (Comm) Griffin v Varouxakis, Males J gives an obiter masterclass in the (ir)relevance of indirect damage for the establishment of jurisdiction.
Objections to jurisdiction where formally dismissed on the basis that they were made late according to the relevant CPR rules. Yet Males J went on to discuss at length and obiter whether, if such objection had been made timely, it would have been successful. He suggest it would partially have been successful, for those parts of the claim based on indirect damage, and directed against a Greece domiciled defendant.
(Of immediate note is the contrast with Four Seasons v Brownlie: here indirect damage was not immediately dismissed as a jurisdictional trigger however in that case jurisdiction was to be assessed on the basis of residual English rules; Brussels I did not apply).
Claimant insurance company (“Griffin”) contends that as a result of the defendant’s conduct it has lost the right to claim general average contributions which were payable and would have been paid in London, so that the damage it has suffered was suffered in the London jurisdiction. The defendant disputes this analysis, contending that the damage in question was suffered either in the place where the underlying contract was broken or alternatively in Guernsey where Griffin is domiciled and where it would ultimately have received any general average payments. Alternatively he contends that Griffin’s claim is a “matter relating to insurance” within the meaning of Section 3 of Chapter II of the Regulation so that, in accordance with Article 14, he can only be sued in the courts of Greece where he is domiciled.
The Court reviews relevant case-law on Article 7(2) and applies it to two separate claims (particulars of which are in para 28 and para 29): for one of them only, direct damage would have been suffered in England; for the other, in Oman.
Finally at 92 ff and equally obiter Males J concludes that the litigation is not a “matter relating to insurance” within the meaning of Section 3 of Chapter II of the Recast Brussels Regulation. At 96: ‘Not all claims brought by a claimant who happens to be an insurer comprise matters relating to insurance.’ at 98: ‘neither of Griffin’s claims are matters relating to insurance. The fact that Griffin is an insurer forms part of the background to the claim and explains why the harm which Griffin has suffered is the loss of an ability to enforce a subrogated right (although insurers are not the only people who sometimes have the benefit of rights of subrogation), but that is all. In all other respects the nexus between the claim in tort and the policy is tenuous. Determination of the claim requires no consideration of the terms of the policy, which was scarcely looked at during the hearing.’ This latter suggestion goes along the Granarolo etc. judgments on the distinction between contract and tort.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2 Heading 184.108.40.206, Chapter 4, Heading 4.4 .
Inversiones v Cancun. The Dutch Supreme Court on counterclaims and locus damni for diluted shareholdings.
This post can be classified under ‘better late than never’. Thank you Irina Timp for flagging in December, Inversiones v Cancun at the Dutch Hoge Raad. The case concerned alleged dilution of one company’s (Inversiones) shareholding in another as a result of increased emission of shares orchestrated by another shareholder (Cancun). Note that exclusive jurisdiction under Article 24(2), justifiably, was not suggested.
The Hoge Raad focused on the discussion concerning (now) Article 8(3)’s provision for counterclaims: courts even if not the court of domicile of the defendant have jurisdiction ‘on a counter-claim arising from the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based, in the court in which the original claim is pending;’ C-185/15 Kostanjevec is the main reference. Of particular note was the language issue: the Dutch version of the text employs ‘rechtsfeit’: suggestion a narrower interpretation than the English version (‘facts’) just quoted. The Hoge Raad justifiably followed the linguistic implications of the majority of language versions (e.g “facts”, “Sachverhalt”. “fait”) and held in favour of jurisdiction on the basis of a counterclaim.
The result of that finding is that it did not further entertain the consequences of Universal Music on the location of the locus damni for diluted shareholdings: what other factors are needed to have the shareholder’s corporate domicile qualify for same?
IM Skaugen v MAN. Relevance and location of indirect damage in case of misrepresentation, and forum non conveniens in Singapore.
I shall be posting perhaps tomorrow on yesterday’s CJEU judgment in Löber v Barclays (prospectus liability – see my review of Bobek AG’s Opinion here), but as a warming-up for comparative purposes, a note on  SGHC 123 IM Skaugen v MAN. I have not been able to locate copy of the judgment (I am hoping one of my Singaporean followers might be able to send me one) so I am relying entirely on the excellent post by Adeline Chong – indeed in general I am happy largely to refer to Adeline’s post, she has complete analysis.
The case concerns fraudulent misrepresentation of the fuel consumption of an engine model sold and installed into ships owned by claimants (Volkswagen echo alert). Defendants are German and Norwegian incorporated companies: leave to serve out of jurisdiction needs to be granted. Interesting comparative issues are in particular jurisdiction when only indirect damage (specifically: increased fuel consumption and servicing costs with downstream owners who had purchased the ships from the first owners) occurs there; and the relevance of European lis alibi pendens rules for forum non conveniens purposes.
On the former, Singaporean CPR rules would seem to be prima facie clearer on damage not having to be direct for it to establish jurisdiction; a noted difference with EU law and one which also exercised the UK Supreme Court in Brownlie. Note the consideration of locus delicti and the use of lex fori for same (a good example in my view of the kind of difficulties that will arise if when the Hague Judgments project bears fruit).
On forum non conveniens, Spiliada was the main reference. Of interest here is firstly the consideration of transfer to the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC); and the case-specific consideration of availability of forum: the Norwegian courts had been seized but not the German ones; Germany had been identified by the Singaporean High Court as locus delict: not Norway; yet under the Lugano Convention lis alibi pendens rule, the German courts are now no longer available.