Posts Tagged Article 7(2)
Inversiones v Cancun. The Dutch Supreme Court on counterclaims and locus damni for diluted shareholdings.
This post can be classified under ‘better late than never’. Thank you Irina Timp for flagging in December, Inversiones v Cancun at the Dutch Hoge Raad. The case concerned alleged dilution of one company’s (Inversiones) shareholding in another as a result of increased emission of shares orchestrated by another shareholder (Cancun). Note that exclusive jurisdiction under Article 24(2), justifiably, was not suggested.
The Hoge Raad focused on the discussion concerning (now) Article 8(3)’s provision for counterclaims: courts even if not the court of domicile of the defendant have jurisdiction ‘on a counter-claim arising from the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based, in the court in which the original claim is pending;’ C-185/15 Kostanjevec is the main reference. Of particular note was the language issue: the Dutch version of the text employs ‘rechtsfeit’: suggestion a narrower interpretation than the English version (‘facts’) just quoted. The Hoge Raad justifiably followed the linguistic implications of the majority of language versions (e.g “facts”, “Sachverhalt”. “fait”) and held in favour of jurisdiction on the basis of a counterclaim.
The result of that finding is that it did not further entertain the consequences of Universal Music on the location of the locus damni for diluted shareholdings: what other factors are needed to have the shareholder’s corporate domicile qualify for same?
IM Skaugen v MAN. Relevance and location of indirect damage in case of misrepresentation, and forum non conveniens in Singapore.
I shall be posting perhaps tomorrow on yesterday’s CJEU judgment in Löber v Barclays (prospectus liability – see my review of Bobek AG’s Opinion here), but as a warming-up for comparative purposes, a note on  SGHC 123 IM Skaugen v MAN. I have not been able to locate copy of the judgment (I am hoping one of my Singaporean followers might be able to send me one) so I am relying entirely on the excellent post by Adeline Chong – indeed in general I am happy largely to refer to Adeline’s post, she has complete analysis.
The case concerns fraudulent misrepresentation of the fuel consumption of an engine model sold and installed into ships owned by claimants (Volkswagen echo alert). Defendants are German and Norwegian incorporated companies: leave to serve out of jurisdiction needs to be granted. Interesting comparative issues are in particular jurisdiction when only indirect damage (specifically: increased fuel consumption and servicing costs with downstream owners who had purchased the ships from the first owners) occurs there; and the relevance of European lis alibi pendens rules for forum non conveniens purposes.
On the former, Singaporean CPR rules would seem to be prima facie clearer on damage not having to be direct for it to establish jurisdiction; a noted difference with EU law and one which also exercised the UK Supreme Court in Brownlie. Note the consideration of locus delicti and the use of lex fori for same (a good example in my view of the kind of difficulties that will arise if when the Hague Judgments project bears fruit).
On forum non conveniens, Spiliada was the main reference. Of interest here is firstly the consideration of transfer to the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC); and the case-specific consideration of availability of forum: the Norwegian courts had been seized but not the German ones; Germany had been identified by the Singaporean High Court as locus delict: not Norway; yet under the Lugano Convention lis alibi pendens rule, the German courts are now no longer available.
In this post I, unusually, offer questions rather than tentative answers. I hope you’ll enjoy the pondering and of course I have ideas of my own on all of these issues. Thank you Michiel Poesen for alerting me to Carles Puigdemont et al’s case in the Belgian civil courts.
The case is not about trying to employ the Belgian courts to have a Spanish Supreme Court judge removed from the case. (Contrary to what De Standaard report in their title – in an otherwise informative piece). Pablo Llarena had commented on the case (specifically: rejecting an argument raised by the defence) at an academic conference. Rather, as I understand the case (public detail is scant), applicants suggest the alleged violation of impartiality infringes their right to such impartiality which in Belgium at least, is a civil right, constitutionally guaranteed.
The case therefore is one in tort. The exact request to the court is as yet unknown: provisional measures? damages? One assumes the very finding by a Belgian court of a finding of partiality and hence infringement of fundamental rights, will be employed in any future trials in Spain.
So far a little context. Here are the questions:
- What kind of law is engaged here?: is this private international law? Is it public international law? (see prof Hess’ contribution to the Recueil, on the private /public divide).
- Are the proceedings ‘international’ enough to trigger the application of private international law; are they simply ‘Spanish’ and what impact does that have on the jurisdiction of the Belgian courts;
- Are such proceedings ‘civil and commercial’ within the meaning of the Brussels regime; specifically, what is the impact of a Supreme Court judge spending much of their time engaging in what has to be considered a ‘public’ function, now speaking at an academic conference. (Think Kuhn, Fahnenbrock etc.).
- If the Brussels I regime is triggered, what type of provisional measures is possible?
- If the Brussels I regime is triggered, how does Article 7(2) apply; where is the locus delicti commissi and where the locus damni; how does e-Date apply if at all;
- Along similar lines: how does applicable law apply given that defamation is exempt from Rome II; (see Belgium’s regime in Articles 99-100 WIPR in particular); and
- What is the impact, if any, of chances of enforcement of the judgment in Spain.
These are the issues I suspect will be of some relevance in the conflicts field. Happy pondering.
Sometimes I post a little late. Rarely outrageously overdue. Yet Four Seasons Holdings Inc v Brownlie  UKSC 80 needs to be reported on the blog for it is rather important, firstly, with respect to the topical interest in pursuing holding companies for actions (or lack fo them) committed by affiliated companies. And secondly, for jurisdiction in tort, to what degree jurisdiction on the basis of injury sustained abroad, can qualify as lasting damage in the UK. Findings on the latter issue were obiter therefore they need to be treated with caution.
All five judges issued a judgment, with a 3 to 2 majority eventually holding (again: obiter) that jurisdiction in tort in England against non-England based defendants, can go ahead on the basis of indirect damage – albeit in such cases it might still falter on forum non conveniens grounds.
Sumption J, outvoted on the indirect damage issue, wrote the most lengthy judgment.
I tweeted the ruling mid December. Students of international law will of course appreciate the personal background to the case, particularly if you have ever had the chance to be taught by prof Sir Ian Brownlie – Philippe Sands’ obituary is here.
Sir Ian died in a car accident while on holiday with his family in Egypt. His wife was also injured. She brought proceedings seeking: (i) damages for her own personal injuries, (ii) damages under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 as Sir Ian’s executrix, and (iii) damages for her bereavement and loss of dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.
The First Defendant, Four Seasons Holdings Inc (“Holdings”), is the holding company of the Four Seasons hotel group. It is incorporated in British Columbia. The Second Defendant, Nova Park SAE (“Nova Park”) is an Egyptian company which was identified by Lady Brownlie’s solicitors as the owner of the hotel building. The case falls outside the Brussels I Recast Regulation therefore. However reference to Brussels and particularly of course to Rome II is made in the various judgments, for even though the English Courts do not decide jurisdiction on the basis of Brussels, they do have to apply Rome I or II if the suit qualifies as one in contract cq tort.
The Court of Appeal [ EWCA Civ 665] had held that the jurisdictional gateways were not satisfied. There was no contract with Four Seasons Holdings, and given that Holdings was not the owner, there could be no claim in tort for vicarious liability.
David Hart QC has excellent (much more swift) analysis here and I am happy largely to refer. A few points of additional interest.
On the issue of suing holding companies, Sumption J writing at 14 ff dismisses service out of jurisdiction for there is no reasonable possibility of a claim succeeding: at 15:
‘there is no realistic prospect that Lady Brownlie will establish that she contracted with Holdings, or that Holdings will be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver of the excursion vehicle.’ That is because (at 14) it is entirely clear ‘that Holdings is a nontrading holding company. It neither owns nor operates the Cairo hotel, which has at all material times been owned by Nova Park, a company with no corporate relationship to any Four Seasons company. A Dutch subsidiary of Holdings called Four Seasons Cairo (Nile Plaza) BV entered into an agreement with Nova Park to operate the hotel on behalf of Nova Park, although at the material times the actual operator was an Egyptian subsidiary of Holdings, FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) LLC, which assumed the contractual obligations of the operator by assignment. Other subsidiaries of Holdings supplied advice and specific services such as sales, marketing, central reservations and procurement, and licensed the use by Nova Park of the Four Seasons Trade Mark’.
Judgment in Brownlie preceded the current cases referred to it on the subject of CSR and jurisdiction (see my previous postings on that, most recently Unilever). Yet it is clear that plaintiffs have to show much more than a corporate bloodline between mother companies and affiliated undertakings, for suits to have any chance of success.
The case could have ended here for all five judges agree on this point. Yet aware of the relevance of direction, discussion was continued obiter on the topic of suing in tort. Firstly it was clear that if a claim in tort could be brought in the English courts, it would be subject to Egyptian law per Article 4(1) Rome II. In the Court of Appeal, Arden LJ had taken analogy with that Article (and the whole Regulation)’s rejection of indirect damage as relevant for deciding lex causae. And of course Rome II’s stance on this point is influenced by the CJEU’s case-law going in the same direction, but then for jurisdiction, in Marinari and the like. Sumption J cites Canadian authority (Stephen Pittel has reference to it here) and is critical of too much emphasis put on a connection between jurisdiction and applicable law, for determining jurisdiction.
Big big pat on his back; readers of the blog know (see eg here) I am not at all enthused by too much analogy between jurisdiction and applicable law).
Sumption at 22
It is undoubtedly convenient for the country of the forum to correspond with that of the proper law. It is also true that both jurisdiction and choice of law can broadly be said to depend on how closely the dispute is connected with a particular country. But there is no necessary connection between the two. The Practice Direction contemplates a wide variety of connecting factors, of which the proper law is only one and that one is relevant only to contractual liabilities. For the purpose of identifying the proper law, “damage” is limited to direct damage because article 4 of Rome II says so in terms. It does this because there can be only one proper law, and the formulation of a common rule for all EU member states necessarily requires a more or less mechanical technique for identifying it. By comparison, indirect damage may be suffered in more than one country and jurisdiction in both English and EU law may subsist in more than one country.
Lady Hale is even more to the point at 49: ‘Applicable law and jurisdiction are two different matters. There is no necessary coincidence between the country with jurisdiction and the country whose law is applicable.‘
Yet for the case at hand ultimately Sumption J does curtail the relevance of indirect damage: at 23:
There is, however, a more fundamental reason for concluding that in the present context “damage” means direct damage. It concerns the nature of the duty broken in a personal injury action and the character of the damage recoverable for the breach. There is a fundamental difference between the damage done to an interest protected by the law, and facts which are merely evidence of the financial value of that damage. Except in limited and carefully circumscribed cases, the law of tort does not protect pecuniary interests as such. It is in general concerned with non-pecuniary interests, such as bodily integrity, physical property and reputation which are inherently entitled to its protection.
At 29 ff follows Sumption’s engagement with relevant CJEU authority, leading him eventually to reject indirect damage as a basis for jurisdiction. That same authority is also discussed by Lady Hale and more succinctly by the others, however they prefer to take the English law on this point in a different direction, particularly taking the CPR (the relevant English civil procedure rules) use of the word ‘damage’ at face value, meaning including indirect damage: residual English PIL therefore not determined by CJEU authority.
As noted in my introduction, even if jurisdiction can be established on the basis of indirect damage in England, forum non conveniens may still scupper jurisdiction eventually.
Pro memoria: the AG’s suggested for locus damni not place of financial loss, rather the place within the markets affected by the competition law infringement where the claimant alleges loss of sales: damage located in a Mozaik fashion in other words; for locus delicti commissi with full jurisdiction, the AG distinguishes between Article 101 TFEU (place of the conclusion of the agreement) and 102 TFEU (place where the predatory prices were offered and applied); finally with respect to (now) Article 7(5), the activities of a branch: offering the fixed prices or otherwise having been instrumental in concluding contracts for services at those prices suffices for that branch to have participated in the tort.
The Court itself,
- for locus damni reminds us of the findings in Marinari (which tempered the implications of Bier), implying that one needs to decide whether loss of income of the kind alleged by flyLAL may be regarded as ‘initial damage’, or whether it constitutes solely consequential financial damage which cannot, in itself, lead to a forum under Article 7(2). The Court, like the AG, opts for Mozaik, referring inter alia to its judgment in Concurrences: each place where the loss of income consisting in loss of sales occurred, that is to say, the place of the market which is affected by that conduct and on which the victim claims to have suffered those losses, opens up partial jurisdiction. As I noted in my review of the Opinion, this interpretation aids the tortfeasor: locus damni leading to shattered jurisdiction facilitates anti-competitive behaviour.
- for locus delicti commissi, under Article 101 TFEU (cartels), with reference to CDC, the CJEU opts for courts for the place in which the agreement was definitively concluded: this truly is extraordinary for it allows for forum shopping by the cartel participants. For Article 102 TFEU (abuse of dominant position)
- Prima facie at 52 there is one consolation for those suffering anti-competitive behaviour: the Court holds that the event giving rise to the damage in the case of abuse of a dominant position is not based on an agreement, but rather on the implementation of that abuse, that is to say, the acts performed by the dominant undertaking to put the abuse into practice, in particular by offering and applying predatory pricing in the market concerned. That would seem to suggest full jurisdiction for each of those places where the pricing is offered and applied. However in that para 52 the Court does not verbatim links this to jurisdiction: this it does do in
- Para 53: ‘If it were to be established that the events giving rise to the main proceedings were part of a common strategy intended to oust flyLAL from the market of flights to and from Vilnius Airport and that those events all contributed to giving rise to the damage alleged, it would be for the referring court to identify the event of most importance in implementing such a strategy out of the chain of events at issue in the main proceedings.‘ Courts holding on jurisdiction must not delve too deep into the substance of the case but still have to employ, without looking too deeply at the merits of the case, the lex causae for the anti-competitive behaviour (per Rome II) to identify that event of most importance. In para 54 too the Court emphasises the need to limit the amount of potential jurisdictions (reference here is also made to Universal Music). I cannot be sure: does the combination of paras 52 and 53 suggest that the Court does not accept jurisdiction for all places where the pricing is offered and applied?
- Finally with respect to Article 7(5), the CJEU at 64 holds that the national courts must in particular review whether the activities carried out by the branch included actual acts of offering and applying the predatory pricing alleged and whether such participation in the alleged abuse of a dominant position was sufficiently significant to be regarded as a close link with the dispute in the main proceedings. Separate accounts are not required to conduct that exercise (at 65).
Essentially therefore the Court firmly pulls the Brussels I Recast’s ‘predictability’ card. This is in the interest of companies behaving anti-competitively. I do not read in this judgment a definitive answer however for as I suggested, the combination of paras 52 ff is simply not clear.
(Handbook of) EU private international law), 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 22.214.171.124
Fly lal: Locus delicti commissi for anticompetitive agreements. And application of Article 7(5)’s extension to branch domicile.
AB flyLAL — Lithuanian Airlines (‘flyLAL’) operated flights from Vilnius airport in Lithuania until it was put into liquidation. According to flyLAL, its demise was caused by predatory (that is, below cost) pricing by the Latvian airline Air Baltic Corporation A/S (‘Air Baltic’). That predatory pricing was, it is alleged, part of an anticompetitive strategy agreed between Air Baltic and the operator of Starptautiskā lidosta Rīga (Riga international airport in Latvia, ‘Riga Airport’). Thus, Riga Airport and Air Baltic agreed to drastically reduce the prices paid by Air Baltic for services at Riga airport. The savings were then used by Air Baltic to finance the predatory pricing that drove flyLAL out of the market in Vilnius, Lithuania.
Can Air Baltic and Riga Airport for damages before the courts in Vilnius? The national court and parties refer to three alleged infringements of competition law: (i) abuse of dominance consisting in the system of reductions implemented by Riga Airport; (ii) an anticompetitive agreement between Riga Airport and Air Baltic; and (iii) abuse of dominance in the form of predatory pricing by Air Baltic. Those infringements, it is argued, were interrelated, forming part of a strategy to oust flyLAL from the market in Vilnius and move passengers to Riga airport to the benefit of both Riga Airport and Air Baltic.
There is a lot in the Opinion – among others because as the AG points out, the referring court’s description of the alleged infringement of competition law is not entirely clear. Bobek therefore sets out a set of variables. The Court itself is bound not to distinguish among quite so many. Of note are the AG’s suggestions
- that locus damni here is not place of financial loss, rather the place within the markets affected by the competition law infringement where the claimant alleges loss of sales.That suggestion in my view is helpful for neither the Regulation’s aim of predictability, nor the protection of those damaged by infringement of competition law (the latter not however a stated aim of the Regulation). Put differently: damage located in a Mozaik fashion assists the tortfeasor. The Advocate General reaches this conclusion after a thorough revisit of the initial Bier judgment (and Capotorti AG’s Opinion in same), ditto Marinari and Dumez France. Yet the continuing need to conceptualise the Court’s Bier rule illustrates again in my view the mistake made in that original judgment, to introduce a forum damni despite the utter lack of textual support for same.
- for locus delicti commissi with full jurisdiction, the AG distinguishes between Article 101 TFEU (as regards the alleged anticompetitive agreement between Air Baltic and Riga Airport, the place of the event giving rise to the harm (that is, the loss of sales by flyLAL), is the place of the conclusion of the agreement) and 102 TFEU (alleged predatory pricing by Air Baltic, the place of the event giving rise to the harm is the place where the predatory prices were offered and applied). With respect to Article 101 TFEU, Bobek AG suggests this is identical to the Court’s judgment in CDC . I am not too sure but I am biased. As I noted above, in my view the Court should steer clear of an application of Article 7(2) which allows those infringing competition law to forum shop by manipulating the place of decision-making. In CDC the Court held that ‘the identification, in the jurisdiction of the court seised of the matter, of a specific event during which either that cartel was definitively concluded or one agreement in particular was made which was the sole causal event giving rise to the loss allegedly inflicted on a buyer’ cannot be ruled out. That implies that in other cases the identification of such singular event can be ruled out and that many places may be consider locus delicti commissi.
- finally with respect to (now) Article 7(5), the activities of a branch. The AG does not specify what must be meant by a ‘branch’ – for the national court has already concluded there is such branch. The Advocate General here is perhaps unusually deferential to the factual finding. Whether there is a sufficient nexus between the activities of the branch and the dispute, in the case of tort-based claims requires the branch participate in at least some of the actions constituting the tort (at 137). Offering the fixed prices or otherwise having been instrumental in concluding contracts for services at those prices suffices. In such cases, the branch has again participated in the commission of an act that constitutes a necessary precondition for the abuse (at 142).
A lengthy opinion. And it all started with the fairly straightforward facts of Bier…
(Handbook of) EU private international law), 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 126.96.36.199
Thank you Andreas Christofides for flagging Aristou v Tesco Personal Finance, a case which engaged Article 7(2) and, I presume, Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast: forum delicti cq forum contractus. I tried to obtain copy of judgment but failed. It might not have helped me much anyway for I assume it was drafted in Greek.
For the facts of the case please refer to the link above. From Andreas’ description of the case I am assuming the Cypriot court firstly must have decided there was a contract between claimant and the UK bank, per Handte; that this was a service contract; and that per 7(1)b second indent, that service was provided in the UK. And that for the application of Article 7(2) both locus delicti commissi and locus damni were also the UK. (The court may in doing so have referred to Universal Music: not just location of the bank account in the UK but other factors, too).
Any Greek readers, in possession of the judgment: please correct if need be.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 188.8.131.52.7; Heading 184.108.40.206.b.