AB v EM  EWHC 549 (Fam) concerns for a large part the application of Brussels IIa’s traditional jurisdictional rules (habitual residence etc.) and I shall not comment on those.
Of interest to the blog are, first, at 37 ff the application of the Regulation’s forum non conveniens rules: in that respect, compare with my posts on V v M and W v L. Further, the question whether the order made by the Sunnite Sharia Court of Beirut on 6 February 2019 in proceedings commenced by the mother in Lebanon in November 2018, incorporating and approving an agreement between the parties to these proceedings regarding custody and access with respect to M, capable of recognition in the UK and, if so, what impact should this have on the UK courts’ welfare determination? The 2019 agreement established that the father would have custody of M and would reside with M in either the United Kingdom, Egypt or some other location of his choosing.
MacDonald J at 71-73, having referred to the spirit of comity, does not hold on what at 73 are briefly refered to as ‘wider criticisms’ of the February 2019 Order, or the allegations of durress in the coming to be of that order. He notes more as a matter of fact that circumstances in the child’s welfare have changed since the Order, and that the father did not at any rate honour elements of the agreement which the Order had confirmed.
No grand statement of principle, therefore. Rather, a measured practical approach.
Update 26 May 2020 Michael Douglas has abnalysis here.
Update 20 MAy 2020 see in the meantime also review by Jie (Jeanne) Huang, here.
Thank you Michael Douglas for alerting me to Bao v Qu; Tian (No 2)  NSWSC 588 at the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The judgment does not require an extensive post. I report it because it is a solid application of the recognition and enforcement principles of foreign judgments under the common law of Australia. Hence good material for the comparative conflicts folder.
Suing the EU in The Netherlands. Stichting Human Rights for Eritreans v the European Union and its jurisdictional challenges.
Many thanks Russell Hopkins for alerting me to Stichting Human Rights for Eritreans v the European Union, demanding a halt to EU aid worth 80 million EUR being sent to Eritrea. The Foundation Human Rights for Eritreans argues the aid project financed by the EU aid relies on forced labour. Claimants have a portal with both the Dutch and English versions of the suit.
Of note to the blog is the jurisdictional section of the suit, p.32 ff. Claimants first of all put forward that the CJEU’s Plaumann criteria (which I discussed ia here in the context of environmental law) effectively are a denial of justice and that Article 6 ECHR requires the Dutch courts to grant such access in the CJEU’s stead. An interesting argument.
Note subsequently at 13.9 ff where Brussels Ia is discussed, the suggestion that given the large diaspora of Eritreans in The Netherlands, locus damni (actual or potential) lies there. This is in my view not an argument easily made under Article 7(2) Brussels Ia given CJEU authority.
Ships classification and certification agencies. The CJEU (again) on ‘civil and commercial’, and immunity.
I earlier reviewed Szpunar AG’s Opinion in C‑641/18 Rina, on which the Court held on 7 May, confirming the AG’s view. Yannick Morath has extensive analysis here and I am happy to refer. Yannick expresses concern about the extent of legal discretion which agencies in various instances might possess and the impact this would have on the issue being civil and commercial or not. This is an issue of general interest to privatisation and I suspect the CJEU might have to leave it to national courts to ascertain when the room for manoeuvre for such agencies becomes soo wide, that one has to argue that the binding impact of their decisions emanates from the agencies’ decisions, rather than the foundation of the binding effect of their decisions in public law.
I was struck by the reference the CJEU made at 50 ff to the exception for the exercise of official authority, within the meaning of Article 51 TFEU.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 126.96.36.199.1.
MB, Services Ltd and Golovina v Rusal. Forum non and Spiliada in Jersey. Stay granted largely on basis of attorney intimidation.
A quick note on MB and Services Limited and Golovina v United Company Rusal Plc  JRC034 in which Birt C rejected an application for a stay on forum non conveniens grounds. He applied Spiliada of course, with at 139 the reasons for holding on balance that there is a real risk that claimants will not obtain justice in Russia. Note at 7 the specific weight attached to the intimidation of claimants’ attorney in Russia.
I reported earlier on complex enforcement issues concerning SAS Institute v World Programming. In  EWCA Civ 599 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd Flaux J gives an overview of the various proceedings at 4:
The dispute between the parties has a long history. It includes an action brought by SAS against WPL in this country in which SAS’s claims were dismissed; a decision by WPL, following an unsuccessful challenge on forum non conveniens grounds, to submit to the jurisdiction of the North Carolina court and to fight the action there on the merits; a judgment in favour of SAS from the North Carolina court for some US $79 million; an attempt by SAS to enforce the North Carolina judgment in this jurisdiction which failed on the grounds that enforcement here would be (a) an abuse of process, (b) contrary to public policy and (c) prohibited by section 5 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (“the PTIA”); and a judgment from the English court in favour of WPL for over US $5.4 million, which SAS has chosen to ignore.’
A good case to use therefore at the start of a conflicts course to show students the spaghetti bowl of litigation that may occur in civil litigation. There are in essence English liability proceedings, decided in the end following referral to the CJEU (Case C-406/10); North Carolina liability proceedings, in which WPL submitted to jurisdiction after an earlier win on forum non grounds was reversed on appeal and the NC courts came to the same conclusions as the English ones despite a finding they were not (clearly) under an obligation to apply EU law; next, an SAS enforcement attempt in England which failed (with permission to appeal refused): my earlier post reviews it; next, enforcement proceedings of the NC judgment in California. That CAL procedure includes an assignment order and WPL sought an anti-suit injunction to restrain SAS from seeking assignment orders as regards “customers, licensees, bank accounts, financial information, receivables and dealings in England”: it was not given the injunction for there was at the time no CAL assignment order pending which could be covered by anti-suit. Currently, it seems, there is, and it is an anti-suit against these new assignment orders which is the object of the current proceedings.
At 59 ff follows a discussion of the situs of a debt; at 64 ff the same for jurisdiction re enforcement judgments, holding at 72
Applying these internationally recognised principles to the present case, the North Carolina and California courts have personal jurisdiction over WPL but do not have subject matter jurisdiction over debts owed to WPL which are situated in England. That is so notwithstanding that the losses for which the North Carolina court has given judgment were incurred by SAS in the United States. Nevertheless the effect of the proposed Assignment Order would be to require WPL to assign debts situated in England to SAS which would at least purport to discharge its customers from any obligation owed to WPL, while the effect of the proposed Turnover Order would be to require WPL to give instructions to its banks in England which would discharge the debts situated in England currently owed by the banks to WPL. In substance, therefore, the proposed orders are exorbitant in that they affect property situated in this country over which the California court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, thereby infringing the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.
Which is later confirmed at 83. Consequently the earlier order is overturned: at 89: ‘it follows also that the judge’s conclusion that the Assignment and Turnover Orders were not “markedly exorbitant” was based upon a mistaken premise.’
The anti-suit and anti-enforcement applications are dealt with in particular with reference to comity, and largely granted with some collateral notices of intention by SAS not to seek a particular kind of enforcement.
Someone somewhere must have made partner on this litigation.