Posts Tagged Brussels I recast

Aspen Underwriting: The Supreme Court overrules on the issue of economically weaker parties in the insurance section.

I wrote earlier on the judgments at the High Court and the Court of Appeal in Aspen Underwriting v Kairos Shipping. The Supreme Court held yesterday and largely upheld the lower courts’ decisions, except for the issue of whether an economically equal party may nevertheless enjoy the benefit of the insurance section of Brussels Ia.

Reference is best made to my earlier posting for full assessment of the facts. The Supreme Court considered four issues.

Issue 1: Does the High Court have jurisdiction pursuant to the exclusive English
jurisdiction clause contained in the Policy? This was mostly a factual assessment (is there a clear demonstration of consent to choice of court) which Lord Hodge for the SC held Teare J and the Court of Appeal both had absolutely right. Lord Hodge refers in support to a wealth of CJEU and English (as well as Singapore) courts on assignment and contractual rights v contractual obligations.

Issues 2 and 3: Are the Insurers’ claims against the Bank matters ‘relating to
insurance’ (issue 2) within section 3 of the Regulation and if so, is the Bank entitled to rely on that section (issue 3)?

On issue 2, Teare J and the Court of Appeal had held that the Insurers’ claim against the Bank was so closely connected with the question of the Insurers’ liability to indemnify for the loss of the Vessel under the Policy that the subject matter of the claim can fairly be said to relate to insurance.

On this issue the insurers had appealed for they argued that a claim can be regarded as a matter relating to insurance only if the subject matter of the claim is, at least in substance, a breach of an obligation contained in, and required to be performed by, an insurance contract. They referred in particular to Brogsitter and also to Granarolo and Bosworth.

Lord Hodge disagreed with claimant, upholding Teare J and the CA: the need for restrictive interpretation is mentioned (at 38) and at 35 it transpires that of particular relevance in his analysis, is the very wording of the title of the insurance section: unlike all other special jurisdictional rules of interest, it does not include ‘contracts’. Further (at 36),

‘the scheme of section 3 is concerned with the rights not only of parties to an insurance contract, who are the insurer and the policyholder, but also  beneficiaries of insurance and, in the context of liability insurance, the injured party, who will generally not be parties to the insurance contract.’

At 40 he holds that in any event the Brogsitter test is met:

‘The Insurers’ claim is that there has been an insurance fraud by the Owners and the Managers for which the Bank is vicariously liable. Such a fraud would inevitably entail a breach of the insurance contract as the obligation of utmost good faith applies not only in the making of the contract but in the course of its performance.’

[Of note is that the ‘related to’ issue was discussed in Hutchinson and is at the CJEU as C-814/19, AC et al v ABC Sl as I flag in my review of Hutchinson].

However (issue 3) both Teare J and the CA eventually held that the insurance title failed to provide the bank with protection for they argued (as I noted with reference in particular to CJEU Voralsberger) that protection was available only to the weaker party in circumstances of economic imbalance between the claimant insurer and the defendant.

Here the SC disagrees and overrules. Lord Hodge’s reasons are mentioned at 43 ff, and I will not repeat them fully here. They include his view on which he is entirely right and as I have pointed out repeatedly, that recitals may be explanatory but only the rules in the Regulation have legal effect). Bobek AG’s Opinion in C-340/16 Kabeg features with force. Hofsoe is distinguished for, at 56,

‘In none of these cases where the CJEU has relied on the “weaker party” criterion to rule on applications to extend the scope of the section 3 protections beyond those parties who were clearly the policyholder, the insured, the beneficiary or the injured party, did the court call into question the entitlement of those expressly-named persons to that protection by reason of their economic power.’

That assessment is not entirely consistent for as Lord Hodge himself notes, and the CJEU acknowledges, in KABEG, Vorarlberger, Group Josi and GIE the jurisdiction of the forum actoris had been extended under articles 11(1)(b) and 13(2) to include the heirs of an injured party and also the employer who continues to pay the salary of the injured party while he was on sick leave.

All in all, it agree following Lord Hodge’s convincing review of the cases, that it is acte clair that a person which is correctly categorised as a policyholder, insured or beneficiary is entitled to the protection of section 3 of the Regulation, whatever its economic power relative to the insurer. (Even if particularly following Hofsoe the application of the section as a whole might need a more structured revisit by the CJEU). In the case at hand the Bank is the named loss payee under the Policy and therefore the “beneficiary” of that Policy (at 60).

In conclusion: Under A14 BIa the Bank must be sued in The Netherlands.

Finally, whether claims in unjust enrichment fall within article 7(2) (answered by Teare J in the negative) ‘does not arise’ (at 60). I am not entirely sure what this means: was it no longer challenged or was Teare J’s analysis on this straightforward? A different reply than that of Teare J would have required overruling Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Glasgow City Council (No. 2) [1999] 1 AC 153 (HL), that a claim in unjust enrichment for mistake was neither a matter ‘relating to contract’ nor a matter ‘relating to tort’ for the purposes of EU private international law – an issue I discussed in my earlier posting in particular in its relationship with Rome I and II. With the SC’s refusal to entertain it, that authority therefore stands.

One does wish that the CJEU at some point have an opportunity further to clarify the insurance section and will do so in a holistic manner. The SC judgment here is one big step in the good direction.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.1, Heading 2.2.11.2.

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Cyberinsults over patents, unfair competition and jurisdiction. The Paris Court of Appeal in Manitou v JCB.

In Manitou v J.C. Bamford Excavators, (defendant is better known as ‘JCB’ which in England is an eponym for ‘digger’ or excavator) the Paris Court of Appeal held that French Courts have jurisdiction in an interesting tale of patent insults. JCB (England incorporated) had obtained a French injunction against Manitou (domiciled at France) obliging it to halt production of one of its products possibly in violation of a JCB patent. On the eve of an important trade fair taking place in France, JCB boasted about the injunction in a Twitter, Linked-in and website post. Manitou argue the post was insulting and an act of unfair competition.

Manitou claim jurisdiction on the basis of A7(2) BIa, special jurisdiction for tort, per CJEU C-618/15 Concurrences /Samsumg /Amazon, which I reviewed here. It refers to all sites on which the news was posted being accessible in France (Pinckney would have been strong authority here); to the post discussing a French judgment which is only aimed at and enforceable in France; and that its publication was timed to coincide with the aforementioned French fair. JCB on the other hand argue mere accessibility does not suffice and that the sites did not target readers in France.

The Court refers both to Shevill and to Concurrences; decides that the very fact that the site was published in English does not insulate it from French jurisdiction (seeing also that plenty of potential clients looking to buy from Manitou at the time would have been in France for the fair); and that the publication clearly would have affected the brand’s reputation in France and also its sales there. Jurisdiction therefore established.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2

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Petrobas securities class action. Applicable law update: Dutch court holds under Rome II on lex causae in tort for purely economic loss. Place of listing wins the day (and leads to Mozaik).

Thank you Matthias Lehmann for flagging and reviewing the Rotterdam Court’s judgment late in January on applicable law in the Petrobas case. I had earlier reviewed the jurisdictional issues, particularly the application of Brussels Ia’s Article 33-34.

The case relates to a Brazilian criminal investigation into alleged bribery schemes within Petrobras, which took place between 2004 and 2014. The court first, and of less interest for the blog, deals with a representation issue, holding that Portuguese speakers cannot be represented in the class, for the Portuguese version of the relevant dispute settlement provisions, unlike the English translation, was not faulty.

Turning then to applicable law at 5.39 ff. Events occurring on or after 12 January 2009 are subject to the Rome II Regulation. For those before that date, Dutch residual PIL applies which the Court held make Brazilian law lex causae as lex loci delicti commissi: for that is where the alleged fraud, bribery and witholding of information happened.

For the events which are covered by Rome II, the court does not wait for the CJEU finding in VEB v BP and squarely takes inspiration from the CJEU case-law on purely financial damage and jurisdiction: Kronhofer, Kolassa, Universal Music. The court notes that the CJEU in these cases emphasised a more than passing or incidental contact with a State (such as: merely the presence of a bank account) as being required to establish jurisdiction as locus damni. At 5.47 it rejects the place of the investor’s account as relevant (for this may change rapidly and frequently over time and may also be easily manipulated) and it identifies the place of the market where the financial instruments are listed and traded as being such a place with a particular connection to the case: it is the place where the value of the instruments is impacted and manifests itself. It is also a place that meets with the requirements of predictability and legal certainty: neither buyer nor seller will be surprised that that location should provide lex causae.

Conclusion therefore is one of Mozaik: Brasil, Argentina, Germany, Luxembourg are lex causae as indeed may be other places where Petrobas financial instruments are listed. (At 5.49: Article 4(2)’s joint domicile exception may make Dutch law the lex causae depending on who sues whom).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed.2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.4.

 

 

 

 

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PrivatBank v Kolomoisky and Boholiubov. The Court of Appeal reverses the High Court ia on abuse of the anchor mechanism. Further consideration, too, of the reflexive effect of Article 28’s lis alibi pendens, and of Article 34.

The Court of Appeal in [2019] EWCA Civ 1708 has reversed [2018] EWHC 3308 (Ch) PrivatBank v Kolomoisky and Boholiubov et al which I reviewed here. When I tweeted the outcome on the day of release I said it would take a little while for a post to appear, which indeed it has. Do please refer to my earlier post for otherwise the comments below will be gobbledegook.

As a reminder: the High Court had set aside a worldwide freezing order (‘WFO’) granted earlier at the request of Ukraine’s PrivatBank, against Ihor Kolomoisky and Hennadiy Boholiubov – its two former main shareholders.

Fancourt J’s judgment implied in essence first of all, the Lugano Convention’s anchor defendant mechanism, concluding that any artificial fulfilment (or apparent fulfilment) of the express requirements of Article 6.1 is impermissible, and this includes a case where the sole object of the claim against the anchor defendant is to remove the foreign defendant from the jurisdiction of domicile. Bringing a hopeless claim is one example of such abuse, but the abuse may be otherwise established by clear evidence. In principle, the fact that there is a good arguable case against the anchor defendant should not prevent a co-defendant from establishing abuse on some other ground, including that the “sole object” of the claim is to provide jurisdiction against a foreign domiciled co-defendant.

The English Defendants serving as anchor, were not considered legitimate targets in their own right and hence the ‘sole object’ objection was met. 

The Court of Appeal in majority (Lord Newey at 270 ff dissenting) disagreed and puts particular emphasis on the non-acceptance by Parliament and Council at the time of adoption of Brussels I, of an EC proposal verbatim to include a sole object test like was done in Article (then) 6(2) (it also refers to drafters and rapporteur Jenard making a bit of a muddle of the stand-alone nature, or not, of the sole object test). Following extensive consideration of authority it decides there is no stand-alone sole object test in (now) Article 8(1) Brussels I (or rather, its Lugano equivalent) but rather that this test is implied in the Article’s condition of connectivity: at 110: ‘we accept Lord Pannick’s analysis that, as shown by the references to Kalfelis and Réunion,..that the vice in using article 6(1) to remove a foreign defendant from the courts of the state of his domicile was met by a close connection condition.’

Obiter it held at 112 ff that even if the sole object test does exist, it was not met in casu, holding at 147 that the ability to obtain disclosure from the English Defendants provided a real reason for bringing these proceedings against them.

Fancourt J had also added obiter that had he accepted jurisdiction against the Switzerland-based defendants on the basis of the anchor mechanism, he would have granted a stay in those proceedings, applying the lis alibi pendens rule of Lugano reflexively, despite the absence of an Article 34 mechanism in Lugano. The Court of Appeal clearly had to discuss this given that it did accept jurisdiction against the Switserland-based defendants, and held that the High Court was right in deciding in principle for reflexive application, at 178: ‘This approach does not subvert the Convention but, on the contrary, is in line with its purposes, to achieve certainty in relation to jurisdiction and to avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments.’

That is a finding which stretches the mutual trust principle far beyond Brussels /Lugano parties and in my view is far from clear.

However, having accepted lis alibi pendens reflexively in principle, the Court of Appeal nevertheless held it should not do so in casu, at 200 as I also discuss below: ‘the fact that consolidation was not possible was an important factor militating against the grant of a stay, when it came to the exercise of discretion as to whether to do so’.

Finally, stay against the English defendants was granted by the High Court on the basis of A34 BIa, for reasons discussed in my earlier post. On this too, the Court of Appeal disagreed.

Firstly, on the issue of ‘related’ actions: At 183: ‘The Bank argues that the actions are not “related” in the sense that it is expedient to hear and determine them together, because consolidation of the Bank’s claim with Mr Kolomoisky’s claim in the defamation proceedings would not be possible. It is submitted that unless the two actions can be consolidated and actually heard together, it is not “expedient” to hear and determine them together. In other words, the Bank submits that expediency in this context means practicability.’ The Court of Appeal disagreed: At 191: ‘The word “expedient” is more akin to “desirable”, as Rix J put it, that the actions “should” be heard together, than to “practicable” or “possible”, that the actions “can” be heard together. We also consider that there is force in Ms Tolaney’s point that, if what had been intended was that actions would only be “related” if they could be consolidated in one jurisdiction, then the Convention would have made express reference to the requirement of consolidation, as was the case in article 30(2) of the Recast Brussels Regulation.’

Further, on the finding of ‘sound administration of justice’: at 211: ‘the unavailability in the Ukrainian court of consolidation of the Bank’s current claim with Mr Kolomoisky’s defamation claim remains a compelling reason for refusing to grant a stay. In particular, the fact that the Bank’s claim would have to be brought before the Ukrainian commercial court rather than before the Pechersky District Court in which the defamation proceedings are being heard means that if a stay were granted, the risk of inconsistent findings in these different courts would remain. Furthermore, we accept Lord Pannick’s overall submission that, standing back in this case, it would be entirely inappropriate to stay an English fraud claim in favour of Ukrainian defamation claims, in circumstances where the fraud claim involves what the judge found was fraud and money laundering on an “epic scale” ‘

Finally, at 213, ‘that the English claim against Mr Kolomoisky and Mr Bogolyubov and the English Defendants should be allowed to proceed, it inevitably follows that the BVI Defendants are necessary or proper parties to that claim and that the judge was wrong to conclude that the proceedings against the BVI Defendants should be set aside or stayed.’

One or two issues in this appeal deserve to go up to the CJEU. I have further analysis in a forthcoming paper on A34.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law – 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.14.5

 

 

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Weco Projects ASP v Zea Marine Carier GmbH: provisional measures, court-appointed surveyor’s powers in the light of arbitration.

Genova’s court ruling in Weco Projects ASP v Zea MArine Carier GmbH is remarkably similar to the Belo Horizonte (Cefetra et al v Ms ‘IDA’ Oetker Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MbH & Co KG et al) ruling at the Court of Rotterdam, which I reviewed here. Transport is of a yacht is the issue, sinking the event, and London arbitration the agreed dispute resolution. What powers do the courts in ordinary still have to order interim measures?

The court could have discussed the arbitration /Brussels Ia interface, as well as Article 35’s provisional measures. Instead, it mentions neither and relies entirely on an Italian Supreme Court precedent as Maurizio Dardani and Luca di Marco review excellently here (many thanks to Maurizio for forwarding me the case). An exciting, and missed opportunity to bring these issues into focus.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.15.

 

 

 

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CJEU confirms ‘targeting’ as a jurisdictional trigger for EU trademark infringement in AMS Neve.

Update 11 September 2019 Tobias Lutzi has excellent additional analysis hereUpdate 19 September 2019 Esther Noske has interesting German case-law background here and CDC are I bit more excited about the pioneering aspect of the case than I am, here – that is probably because I am not a pur sang intellectual property lawyer.

The CJEU today has held in C‑172/18 AMS Neve, confirming Szpunar AG’s Opinion which I briefly reviewed earlier. Eleonora Rosati has excellent analysis here and I am happy to refer entirely. As I note in my handbook, ‘targeting’, ‘directed at’ and ‘business models’ are a variety of jurisdictional triggers across EU law. The lack of uniform terminology does not assist the unsuspected reader or practitioner.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Heading 2.2.8.2.5; Heading 2.2.11.2.4 (quoted by the AG in his Opinion).

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