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Uzdaroji Akcine Bendrove “Palink” et al v CNH Industrial NV et al. Truck cartel, applicable law Article 6 Rome II. The Dutch SC has an opportunity to clarify a most dense statutory provision.

A further effort in tackling the blog queue. Those with an interest in the application of Rome II to purely economic damage will be interested in Uzdaroji Akcine Bendrove “Palink” et al v CNH Industrial NV et al ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2023:7093 and most probably will have seen my Tweet on the case at the time (January 2024).

The Dutch Supreme Court (the referring court oddly calling claimants “claimanten” in Dutch; my Dutch colleagues will correct me however surely this is a novel Anglicism and one which must be firmly stopped and pronto; what’s wrong with *eisers*?) has been seized with a preliminary reference on the application of Article 6 Rome II.

That Article identifies the applicable law for infringement of competition law and acts restricting free competition and it is a calamitous statutory provision.

Article 6. Unfair competition and acts restricting free competition

1.   The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of an act of unfair competition shall be the law of the country where competitive relations or the collective interests of consumers are, or are likely to be, affected

2.   Where an act of unfair competition affects exclusively the interests of a specific competitor, Article 4 shall apply

3. | (a) | The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a restriction of competition shall be the law of the country where the market is, or is likely to be, affected. | (b) | When the market is, or is likely to be, affected in more than one country, the person seeking compensation for damage who sues in the court of the domicile of the defendant, may instead choose to base his or her claim on the law of the court seised, provided that the market in that Member State is amongst those directly and substantially affected by the restriction of competition out of which the non-contractual obligation on which the claim is based arises; where the claimant sues, in accordance with the applicable rules on jurisdiction, more than one defendant in that court, he or she can only choose to base his or her claim on the law of that court if the restriction of competition on which the claim against each of these defendants relies directly and substantially affects also the market in the Member State of that court.

4.   The law applicable under this Article may not be derogated from by an agreement pursuant to Article 14.

A first question referred relates to the qualification of infringement of competition law, Article 101 TFEU (prohibition of cartels) in particular  as a singular, continuous event or rather a chain of new events: if it is a simple and continuous unlawful conduct it would lead to separate claims for damages at the time the damage is suffered; the alternative is that it results in a single claim for damages per victim, consisting of various damage items.

The conflicts relevance also kicks in ratione temporis viz the singular /continuous qualification: what is the decisive point in time for determining the applicable conflict rule?

Furthermore, the first instance court has referred on A6(3)(a) Rome II. Should the determination of the applicable law be based on the country where the first purchaser of the truck to which the claim relates is established (also in the case of transport services)? Or must this be connected to the place where the truck or transport service was purchased? Or does another criterion apply?

If it is held that competitive conditions have been affected at least throughout the internal market, how can A 6(3) b Rome II be applied (choice of law by claimant for the lex fori: “the person seeking compensation for damage who sues in the court of the domicile of the defendant, may instead choose to base his or her claim on the law of the court seised”)?

With regard to Article 6(3)(b) Rome II, the court asks the Supreme Court whether a choice of law for the lex fori can be made if the following requirements are met: that the market is or is likely to be affected in more than one country; that one of the defendants be brought before the court of his place of residence; that the market in the Member State of that court is directly and significantly affected by the restriction of competition.

Or does the (additional) requirement that the consequences for the victim must have occurred in different countries, including (in this case) the Netherlands, also apply to the application of Article 6(3)(b) of Rome II?

This will be an interesting SC judgment on one of the most dense Rome II Articles. Will the SC at its turn refer to the CJEU?

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 4.53 ff.

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B&C v Atlas Flexibles. Court Amsterdam holds deposition of fact witnesses with a view to assessing viability of set-aside action, is not caught by either the New York Convention or A35 Brussels Ia.

A quick note on the first instance court in Amsterdam in B&C v Atlas Flexibles e.a. ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2023:4982. Relevant parties are bound by an SPA (share purchase agreement) with binding arbitration clause (pointing to Germany). B&C are pondering the viability of a pauliana (set-aside). To assist them with the viability decision they would like to depose a Netherlands-domiciled director of one of the corporations involved.

[4.3] the court holds that under the New York Convention (Article 2) the recognition of an arbitration agreement only extends to the subject-matter capable of settlement by arbitration. There is no indication that the arbitral panel could be asked to order deposition of a fact witness in The Netherlands hence it is held that the NY Convention is not engaged.

As for Brussels Ia, [4.4] the court holds that A35 is not engaged, either: fact witnesses depositions, it holds, are not a ‘provisional or protective measure’, merely a preparatory one with a view to pondering future litigation.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.576 ff.

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Beverage City v Advance Magazine. The CJEU adopts flexible approach to anchor defendant mechanism in Trademark cases.

I have been absolutely swamped in recent months and as a result, the blog has suffered. In coming up for some air, I decided to first tackle some of the oldest drafts in my blog queue. First up is CJEU C-832/21 Beverage City & Lifestyle GmbH et al v Advance Magazine Publishers Inc held let’s say a little while ago (September 2023; did I flag I have been busy?) which in essence clarifies CJEU Nintendo.

The EU Trademark Regulation 2017/1001 has lex specialis conflict of laws provisions viz Brussels Ia. However it does not specify an anchor mechanism and therefore [26] Article 8(1) Brussels Ia  applies in full.

I discussed Richard de la Tour AG’s Opinion here. As I summarised when I tweeted the judgment, the CJEU has essentially followed the AG’s suggestion of a flexible interpretation of the A8(1) conditions:

with respect to the the A8(1) (compare CJEU The Tatry) condition relating to the existence of the “same situation of law”, this [31] “appears to be satisfied” (final check is for the national court) where the claim concerns the protection of claimant’s exclusive right over EU trade marks, which is based on EU trademark law identical to all EU Member States. [29] Any difference in the legal bases under national law of claims relating to that protection is irrelevant to the assessment of the risk of conflicting decisions.

further, with respect to the condition of “same situation of fact”,  [37]

“the existence of a connection between the claims concerned relates primarily to the relationship between all the acts of infringement committed rather than to the organisational or capital connections between the companies concerned. Similarly, in order to establish the existence of the same situation of fact, particular attention should also be paid to the nature of the contractual relationship between the customer and the supplier.”

[38] Anchor defendant Beverage City & Lifestyle was connected to Beverage City Polska by an agreement for the exclusive distribution of the energy drink ‘Diamant Vogue’ in Germany.

“That exclusive contractual relationship between those two companies may make it more foreseeable that the acts of infringement of which they are accused may be regarded as concerning the same situation of fact, capable of resulting in a single court having jurisdiction to rule on the claims brought against all of the actors who committed those acts.”

The CJEU throughout the judgment emphasises the sound administration of justice objective supporting the joinder mechanism.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2023, 2.505 ff, 2.518.

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First AG Szpunar in HUK-Coburg. Correctly imo opines that the pursuit of individual interests may (but not readily) qualify as overriding mandatory law, Rome II.

First Advocate General Szpunar Opined last week in Case C-86/23 E.N.I., Y.K.I. v HUK-COBURG-Allgemeine Versicherung AG – let’s call that case HUK-Coburg. The case concerns the application of Article 16 Rome II’s lois de police aka lois d’application immédiate aka overriding mandatory provisions.

A claim is issued for compensation submitted by private individuals, who are Bulgarian nationals, in accordance with compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, against an insurance company for non-material damage caused by the death of their daughter in a road traffic accident in Germany.

The core issue to determine by the CJEU is the concept of overriding mandatory provisions in Article 16 Rome II and in particular the determination of the criteria for classifying rules safeguarding individual rights and freedoms as ‘overriding mandatory provisions’. This echos the discussion in Unamar, where the Brussels Court of Appeal eventually held that the relevant Belgian provisions only serve the interests of private parties, not of the Belgian public legal order, hence there can be no question of application of the lois de police exception (current Opinion suggests ‘only’ as the key word in the Court of Appeal’s analysis). The current discussion by the AG also echoes the facts in Lazar.

Contrary to German law (28), Bulgarian law (lex fori) (29) provides that compensation for non-material damage is determined by the court giving judgment on the basis of fair criteria. That court points out that, under Bulgarian law, compensation is payable for all mental pain and suffering endured by parents on the death of their child as a result of an unlawfully and culpably caused road traffic accident. It is not necessary for the harm to have resulted indirectly in pathological damage to the health of the victim.

(32) The mere fact that, by applying the lex fori, there would be a different outcome with regard to the amount of compensation from that which would have been reached by applying the lex causae is not sufficient to conclude that the Bulgarian provision at issue may be classified as an ‘overriding mandatory provision’ within the meaning of Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation, provided, the AG adds,  that the application of the lex causae is compatible with considerations of justice.

(36) Over and above CJEU Unamar, the Court also in Da Silva Martins explored the concept and the criteria. (42) ff the AG recalls the general principles, and (56) he points to recital 32 Rome II’s reference to ‘‘considerations of public interest’. The AG is absolutely right in opining that safeguarding individual interest may absolutely contribute to the protection of public interest. His argument (60) is common sense and absolutely right:

A first argument is linked to the interplay of collective and individual interests. Thus, in the field of tort law, the rules that a Member State establishes in order to protect a category of persons who have sustained damage, by modifying, in particular, the burden of proof or by establishing a minimum threshold for compensation, could have the principal objective to restore the balance between the competing interests of private parties. Indirectly, they could therefore also contribute to safeguarding the social and economic order of the Member State by reducing the impact of accidents on public resources.

On the basis of CJEU authority as outlined, the AG concludes that the case at issue may absolutely lead to the court seised applying Bulgarian law however only if

it finds, on the basis of the existence of sufficiently close links with the country of the forum and a detailed analysis of the terms, general scheme, objective and context of the adoption of that directive, that it is of such importance in the national legal order that it justifies a departure from the applicable law designated pursuant to Article 4 [Rome II].

A good opinion which I hope will be followed by the Court.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 4.87 ff.

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FTI Touristik. Emiliou AG spot on on both the international element required for consumer contracts, and territorial jurisdiction included in Brussels Ia’s consumer title.

In his Opinion in C-774/22 JX v FTI Touristik, Advocate General Emiliou in my opinion is spot on for both core elements of the case. A consumer domiciled in Germany issues a claim against a tour operator also established in Germany in relation to a contract for a package of travel services booked by that consumer for a trip abroad. Does Brussels Ia apply and does the consumer title of the Regulation assign territorial as well as national jurisdiction?

The trip is sold as a package holiday. That is relevant, for the consumer title does not apply to mere contracts of transport. The consumer in the case at issue suggests that the operator failed in its duties under the Package Travel Directive to inform ia re visa requirements and brings a case in his domicile, Nuremberg (as opposed to Munich, the defendant’s domicile).

The AG is absolutely right to spend a mere two paras on the territorial jurisdiction issue. The answer follows from the very wording of the consumer title. (18):

The referring court’s doubts concerning the function of the forum actoris rule for consumers call for a swift response. It stems from the very wording of Article 18(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. A comparison of the two provisions it contains is enlightening in that regard. The forum rei rule refers to the ‘courts of the Member State’ in which the professional is domiciled. By contrast, the forum actoris rule refers to the ‘courts for the place’ where the consumer is domiciled. That terminological difference is not trivial. It is designed precisely to indicate that, whereas the first rule merely confers international jurisdiction on the courts system of the designated State, taken as a whole, the second rule gives both international and territorial jurisdiction to the court for the locality of the consumer’s domicile, irrespective of the allocation of jurisdiction otherwise provided for by the rules of procedure of that State.

On the next issue, the international element, the AG refers to the discussion in German scholarship on ‘false internal cases’ (unechteInlandsfälle). Does the foreign destination of the trip give the contractual relationship an international character? (29) ff he finds support in the broad conception of the international element in BIa generally. Owusu of course, Lindner, ZN v Bulgarian Consulate, IRnova and most recently Inkreal are all relevant authority.

(33) The AG refers to some clear examples of what the majority view would call unechteInlandsfälle which without a doubt however are caught by Brussels Ia:

For instance, where a court of a Member State is called upon to determine a case which, on the one hand, involves two litigants domiciled in that State but, on the other, relates to a tort that took place abroad, or the tenancy of an immovable property located in another country, the Brussels I bis Regulation applies.

Emiliou AG is not a fan of ZN v Bulgarian Consulate not because it viewed the case as being international but rather because it relies too much on the definition of ‘international’ in the European Order for Payment Regulation 1896/2006 (respective domiciles of the parties and the seat of the court seised). (38-39)

On the one hand, Regulation No 1896/2006 was adopted to tackle the difficulties faced by creditors seeking to recover uncontested claims from debtors in other Member States. It is aimed at simplifying and speeding up the recovery of such claims, through the creation of a uniform procedure allowing a creditor to obtain, from a court of a Member State, a judicial decision on such a claim, which can easily be enforced in the Member State where the debtor’s assets are located, while guaranteeing a level playing field in terms of rights of defence throughout the European Union. The definition of ‘cross-border case’ given in that regulation – based on the respective domiciles of the parties and the seat of the court seised – has a certain logic in that context. Where the parties are domiciled in the same State, the remedies provided by the courts of that State, under its procedural law, are usually sufficient to ensure that the creditor swiftly recovers his or her claim. Therefore, the procedure laid down in that regulation is not necessary.

On the other hand, the Brussels I bis Regulation purports to unify the rules of conflicts of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters. That definition is too narrow and, thus, ill-suited for that purpose. As explained in points 32 and 33 above, questions of international jurisdiction may arise even where the litigants are domiciled in the same Member State and the courts of that State are seised. Moreover, that instrument also contains rules on recognition and enforcement of judgments given by the courts of the Member States. To be fit for purpose, those rules must apply whenever the authorities of a Member State are required to recognise or enforce a decision delivered by a court of another Member State, even where it concerns an internal dispute between two persons domiciled in the latter State. That definition also does not accommodate that situation.

(41) the AG insists the CJEU no longer refer to the OFP Regulation in interpreting Brussels Ia:

I urge the Court to refrain, in the future, from referring to Regulation No 1896/2006 in that context. Should the Court wish to draw inspiration from, and to ensure consistency with, other instruments on that issue, [Rome I and Rome II] fit the bill better, as will be seen below.

(I have in the past voiced concern with too much BIa /RI and II parallel as has the CJEU itself in Kainz).

More in general though and away from purposive construction in light of other PIL instruments, the AG opines straightforwardly that the destination of the trip constitutes a relevant ‘international element’ for the purposes of BIa.

The place of destination of the trip is also the place where, under the package travel contract, (most of) the services were provided or should have been provided to the traveller (the flight would land nearby, the hotel be situated there, and so on). In other words, that contract was, or should have been, essentially performed there. In my view, where a court of a Member State is called upon to determine a dispute related to the performance of a contract, and the place of performance is in a foreign country, that factor is ‘such as to raise questions relating to the determination of the international jurisdiction of that court’. (Reference to Richard de la Tour AG in Inkreal).

CJEU Lindner at the jurisdictional level echoes in (45) in the AG’s reference to Rome I:

An analogy can also be made, in my view, with the Rome I Regulation and the relevant case-law of the Court. Similar to the Brussels I bis Regulation with respect to jurisdiction, that instrument determines the law applicable to a contract where the situation ‘involv[es] a conflict of laws’. In that regard, it stems from the case law of the Court that the rules of the Rome I Regulation are applicable to any contractual relationship with a ‘foreign element’. Indeed, it is only where such a contract has connections with a country (or countries) other than that of the court seised that that contract could potentially be governed by different, conflicting national laws, and that court may wonder which law to apply in order to resolve a dispute. Pursuant to the same case law, that concept of ‘foreign element’ is not limited to the respective domiciles of the contracting parties. The fact that the contract is to be performed in another country constitutes such an ‘element’.  A connection of that kind obviously ‘involv[es] a conflict of laws’. The court seised can contemplate the possibility that the law of the country of performance could apply instead of its own. [Much appreciated reference in footnote to the 2nd ed of the Handbook, 2016, GAVC]. Thus, the rules of that regulation are necessary to resolve that conflict.

The somewhat convoluted reasoning by which the CJEU came to international element in Maletic (where the Court could just as well simply had referred to the foreign destination of the trip) is explained by the AG (49) by the fact that the real difficulty in that case was on which party to anchor the forum solutionis analysis.

(56) In further support comes Article 18(1)s’ ‘regardless of the domicile of the other party’, clearly designed with third States parties in mind, is broad enough to capture  the situation where the supplier is domiciled in the same the Member State as the consumer.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed 2024, 2.22 ff and 2.233 ff.

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MOL v Mercedez-Benz. Locus damni in the truck cartel follow-on claim. Emiliou AG tries to make sense of complicated authority, finally to reject role for competition law’s ‘economic unit’ in assigning jurisdiction.

In competition law there is a strong presumption of attributability of daughter’s action to the mother corporation as I discussed ia in my post on CJEU C-508/11 P ENI (references to further case-law there). In general in competition law there is a strong emphasis on the concept of an ‘economic unit’ which readly looks beyond the legal fiction of separate corporate personality.

In C‑425/22 MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt. v Mercedes-Benz Group AG (let’s shorten that to ‘MOL v Mercedez-Benz) Emiliou AG opined that for the purposes of Article 7(2) Brussels Ia jurisdiction a parent company cannot rely on the competition law concept of an economic unit in order to establish the jurisdiction of the courts where it has its registered seat to hear and determine its claim for damages for the harm suffered by its subsidiaries.

(14) Applicant is a company established in Hungary. It has a controlling interest in companies belonging to the MOL group. It is either the majority shareholder or holds another form of exclusive controlling power over a number of companies, such as MOLTRANS, established in Hungary; INA, established in Croatia; Panta and Nelsa, established in Italy; ROTH, established in Austria; and SLOVNAFT, established in Slovakia. During the infringement period identified by the relevant Commision Decision (the Trucks Cartel)

The AG of course refers to Bier, Dumez France (direct damage in one person rules out an extra A7(2) forum for the third party (mother corporation) victim of indirect damage), and other core cases on A7(2) which this blog frequently refers to and /or has discussed:

C‑352/13 CDC: A7(2) locus delicti commissi for cartels is the court of the place where the cartel was definitively formed, confirmed in flyLAL and criticised by me inter alia here;

C‑352/13 CDC (holding ia that A7(2) locus damni for infringement of cartel is the victim’s registered seat); that solution too as the AG notes (44) was met by criticism both by Bobek AG in his Opinion in flyLAL and by scholarship;

C-30/20 Volvo: more emphasis Emiliou AG suggests on the link between the market affected by the anticompetitive conduct and the place where the claimants allege to have suffered harm; in my post on the case I point out the CJEU’s fuzziness on the issue;

He also distinguishes CJEU Tibor Trans‘ distinct view on (in)direct damage as follows (36-37) – footnotes omitted:

36. It is true, as the applicant notes, that in the judgment in Tibor-Trans (which related to the same collusive behaviour as that established in the Commission Decision at issue in the present case), the Court distinguished that case from the scenario in Dumez. The particularity of the facts in Tibor-Trans was that the applicant in that case, an end user of the trucks, did not purchase any trucks from the defendant directly, but did so through a dealership. However, that did not prevent the Court from finding that the applicant’s claim in that case concerned direct damage, because that damage was found to be the immediate consequence of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU, given that the overcharge resulting from the collusive agreement was passed on to that applicant by the dealers.

37. Such passing-on may occur within a supply chain where the alleged victim acquires the goods (or services) which have been subject to a cartel. That, however, is not claimed to have occurred in the case in the main proceedings. Instead, the applicant appears to present the initial harm suffered by its subsidiaries as its own.

(52) The AG points out that the distinguishing feature here is that the applicant’s registered seat is situated outside the affected market. (57) Applicant seeks to extend the application of the registered seat connecting factor to establish jurisdiction in relation to its claim in which it seeks compensation for harm suffered solely by other members of its economic unit.

Emiliou AG does not believe the competition law concept can simply be extended for jurisdictional services, referring also to Szpunar AG’s Opinion in C‑632/22 (service of documents) on which see prof Matthias Weller here. For his extensive arguments based on A7(2)’s requirement of proximity, predictability of forum, Gleichlauf (less convincing imo), and that BIa’s jurisdictional rules guarantee efficient enforcement (particularly in A4 domicile jurisdiction), see the Opinion.

His final conclusion is that (98)

the term ‘the place where the harmful event occurred’, within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, does not cover the registered office of the parent company that brings an action for damages for the harm caused solely to that parent company’s subsidiaries by the anticompetitive conduct of a third party, and where it is claimed that that parent company and those subsidiaries form part of the same economic unit.

As my colleague Joeri Vananroye summarises the Opinion:

“In corporate law terms: yes to outsider veil piercing, no to insider reverse veil piercing. Outsiders may disregard legal structure and go for economic reality; but not those who set up that structure. See also: rules on derivate damages.”

Blame Bier /Mines de Potasse d’Alsace for this complex set of rules and distinguishing.

Geert.

EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.438 ff.

 

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Project Lietzenburger. Following the Court of Appeal’s hint in AGPS Bondco, an extensive discussion of move of COMI and ordre public recognition of an English restructuring Plan.

Project Lietzenburger Strabe Holdco, Re [2024] EWHC 468 (Ch) would seem to heed my prediction when I reviewed AGPS BondCo (“Strategic Value Capital Solutions Master Fund LP & Ors v AGPS BondCo PLC (Re AGPS BondCo PLC) [2024] EWCA Civ 24) here: that the English jurisdictional basis for schemes of arrangement and restructuring plans for corporations without English anchor prior to the restructuring, is less certain than court practice suggested.

Prior to AGPS Bondco and as I report in many posts which readers can find using the ‘scheme of arrangement’, in the event of a non-E&W incorporated debtor whose debt was being restructured, the classic technique is to insert a newly incorporated English company as a substitute obligor or co-obligor of debt owed by a foreign company in order to engage the jurisdiction of the English court. That technique in itself has not changed, but the court’s fairly ready acceptance of jurisdiction arguendo is now coming under some pressure.

As I reported in the past, the arguendo technique’s smooth riding through the courts first if all was assisted by the general absence of challenge by creditors. Even those not entirely convinced of the economic soundness of the restructuring at issue would eventually give up opposition when push came to shove. Further, pre-Brexit the assumption that a scheme or a plan would be readily recognised across the EU as a ‘judgment’ under Brussels Ia, despite question marks over the soundness of that ia viz the definition of ‘judgment’ and the application of BIa’s ‘insolvency’ exception, similarly lubricated passage through the courts. Post Brexit and absent UK Lugano membership, things have not necessarily changed from the content point of view; however they have certainly changed from the perception point of view.

In the case at issue, Richards J refers to AGPS Bondco and discusses COMI shift of the Plan corporation at length [69] ff.

The plan company having its COMI in E&W is one of the jurisdictional routes available. The Insolvency (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 are the main port of call, and Re Swissport Holding International SARL [2020] EWHC 3556 (Ch) (unreported), which I flagged  in my discussion of Barings v Galapagos here is the lead judgment referred to on the principles of COMI. One of the issues in Barings is the question of ‘permanency’ of COMI move, an urgent issue in Barings but perhaps less immediately concerning in current case (the judge does briefly address it [85]).

The judge having decided that COMI was indeed located in E&W then [86] ff discussed whether this move of COMI might have been in breach of Luxembourg law. The structure of this analysis is not entirely clear. Whether COMI moved in breach of applicable lex societatis is not in itself I would suggest relevant to the COMI move itself and indeed this is not how the judge seems to approach it. One assumes his analysis on this point is part of his consideration of whether the courts at Luxembourg would recognise the Plan, alongside [103] ff where the potential of exclusive Luxembourg jurisdiction is considered. Consideration including by the experts is made of CJEU C-723/20 Galapagos BidCo Sarl, with the judge eventually by a slender margin deciding that the view is to be preferred that Lux courts would not consider themselves to have such jurisdiction.

On recognition proper (again I am not quite sure of the structure here). [112] ff consider the Re DTEK Energy BV test, with consideration in particular of the COMI move as fraude à la loi /fraus (additionally in the form of fraude au jugement) and on balance the judge holds that it is unlikely that the LUX courts would object on ordre public grounds (ia given EU law’s acceptance of COMI move for restructuring purposes.

The same ordre public test under German law with an important Brexit consequence [125]: “Both experts agree that an English judgment sanctioning the Plan would be recognised in Germany only if the Plan Company’s COMI is in England at the time of any order sanctioning the Plan. Without that, the German courts would not accept that the English courts have jurisdiction for the purposes of s343 of the InsO.” I am not an expert on German law but it seems prima facie implicit in that opinion that a Plan would have to be considered an insolvency and indeed [125] ff follows that discussion. Here the judgment takes an interesting turn with [130] the presence of cross-class cram-down in an English Plan leading to pro inspiratio an Annex A EU Insolvency Regulation notified German procedure, StaRUG, in implementation of EU Directive 2019/1023 on Preventive Restructurings (the “Restructuring Directive”), the Plan being considered one in insolvency.

Consider the competing reasons:

Professor Thole’s reasons for concluding that the Plan would be recognised and given effect to in Germany can be summarised as follows:

i) The Plan is similar in nature to a StaRUG. StaRUGs fall within the list of “insolvency proceedings” set out in Annex A.

ii) Proceedings set out in Annex A are “insolvency proceedings” for the purposes of the InsO. In official commentaries on German domestic legislation, the German legislature has stated that, in deciding whether non-EU proceedings constitute “insolvency proceedings”, it is helpful to consider their similarities with proceedings listed in Annex A.

iii) Since the Plan is similar to a StaRUG, which falls within Annex A, a German court would likely conclude that an order sanctioning the Plan would be an order in “insolvency proceedings” for the purposes of the InsO.

iv) That conclusion is not altered by the accepted fact that the Plan does not deal with all the Plan Company’s creditors (such as professional advisers). The requirement for “collective proceedings” is present by virtue of the fact that the Plan deals with the rights of the Plan Company’s financial creditors. That conclusion is supported by a comparison with StaRUGs which likewise do not need to deal with the claims of all creditors.

v) Accordingly, the Plan would be enforced and recognised under the terms of the InsO.

      1. Professor Skauradszun’s reasons for reaching a contrary conclusion can be summarised as follows:

i) German legal literature categorises plans under Part 26A as “preventive restructuring frameworks” which are the province of the StaRUG Act rather than the InsO. Accordingly, a German court would consider that the question whether the Plan should be recognised and enforced in Germany should be answered by reference to the StaRUG Act, rather than by reference to the InsO.

ii) The StaRUG Act does not provide for preventive restructuring frameworks of a non-EU member state to be recognised or enforced in Germany. There is, therefore a “gap” in German domestic legislation which means that non-EU “preventive restructuring frameworks” are inherently incapable of being recognised in Germany. Since Germany has a civil law tradition, the courts would not seek to fill that gap by adopting a strained interpretation of the concept of “insolvency proceedings” so as to enable the Plan to be recognised under the InsO. Rather, a German court would look to the legislature to fill the gap if it saw fit.

iii) The Plan falls outside the definition of “insolvency proceedings” in the InsO applying orthodox principles of interpretation which are not affected by any wish to fill a perceived gap in the legislation. That is because the Plan lacks the requisite element of “collectivity” to satisfy the definition.

iv) The fact that the Plan is similar to procedures (such as a StaRUG) listed in Annex A is not relevant. While German legislation does indeed take into account similarities with EU insolvency proceedings, the InsO only requires a comparison to be made with proceedings listed in the EU Insolvency Regulation prior to it being recast in 2015. The German court would not apply an “always speaking” doctrine of statutory interpretation to “update” those references to include Annex A of the Insolvency Regulation Recast.

 These are interesting positions and in the end the judge sides by a very narrow margin with the former. 

Further consideration of the plan then lead to the judge suggesting a number of amendments but for the purposes of the blog, the findings on jurisdiction and recognition are as extensive as they are exciting.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 5.35 ff.

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Granville Technology. Applicable law issues in follow-on cartel damages claim provoke engagement with territorial scope of EU competition law, its effet utile (and contrasts with CJEU in CDC, flyLAL).

In Granville Technology Group Ltd v Chunghwa Picture Tubes Ltd & Ors [2024] EWHC 13 (Comm) Pelling J deals with a follow-on damages claim in the context of the LCD cartel (an EC decision under Article 101 TFEU). In E&W these are characterised as tortious claims for breach of statutory duty, as they are in most EU jurisdictions, too.

The applicable law issues were dealt with under residual English law pre Rome II. The events with which this claim is concerned occurred before 11 January 2009, when Rome II came into effect. For the Brussels Ia and Rome II issues see my paper here. However the judge’s discussion of elements displacing the English law’s presumption of locus damni have important comparative context to EU law as I discuss below.

Claimants were English registered companies carrying on business in England and Wales in the manufacture and/or sale primarily of  desktop PCs sold with monitors and notebooks. They are now all in liquidation. The judge handily recalls the principles [18]] for those not familiar with follow-on actions

A claimant alleging a competition law infringement can bring a claim before the English courts either as a ‘standalone’ claim (in which case it must establish both the breach of competition law alleged and the loss which it alleges was caused thereby); or (as in this case) as a ‘follow-on’ claim, where the claimants rely on the findings of the relevant competition authority (in this case the Commission) to establish breach. The “follow on” option is available because  in law the High Court is bound by infringement decisions of the Commission, such as the Decision. However the claimant in a follow on claim must prove the loss it alleges it has been caused by the infringement relied on…

Damage of course is an issue and [27] in this case as in many similar ones, “complex economic evidence involving statistical modelling at various levels of complexity and sophistication was deployed by both parties but in particular by the defendant in an attempt to identify what part of the price increases in LCD panels over the Relevant Period was attributable to the cartel’s infringing activity.”

[34] Applicable issues of law that arise against some of the defendants, are:

i) Whether any losses that arise out of purchases by the claimants of LCD panels or LCD Products containing LCD panels which were first put onto the market outside the EEA fall outside the territorial scope of EU law and are therefore unrecoverable;

ii) whether the Claim in so far as it arises out of purchases by the claimants of LCD panels or LCD Products containing LCD panels which were first put onto the market in South Korea, Taiwan, China and Japan is governed by the laws of these countries; and if so whether the claims by the claimant to recover damages for breach of TFEU, Article 101 and/or AEEA, Article 53 is a cause of action within the laws of those states. The claimants have not attempted to prove the relevant laws of any of those states and rely on the presumption (“Presumption of Similarity”) that those laws are materially the same as English law unless the contrary is pleaded and proved. The defendants case is that the Presumption of Similarity is of no application applying the decision of the Supreme Court in Brownlie v FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) LLC [2021] UKSC 45 per Lord Leggatt at [119] – [124]. If the defendants are correct on this issue, they maintain the claim fails to the extent that it is based on purchases by the claimants of LCD panels or LCD Products containing LCD panels which were first put onto the market in South Korea, Taiwan and China and Japan. The defendants estimate this at about 78% of the whole. There is a dispute as to the correct percentage in the event the defendants succeeds on the principle  In any event, the claimants submit that if I agree with the defendants on the issue of principle I should adjourn determination of the issue and give the claimants the opportunity to plead and prove the relevant foreign law. I return to that issue below; and

iii) Whether the claims against the third and fourth defendants are statute barred under the Limitation Act 1980 (“LA”). The claimants rely on LA, s.32 and maintain that they could not have with reasonable diligence discovered the relevant facts before publication of the Decision, particularly given that all the claimants are in liquidation and have acted at all material times by their liquidators and their support staff.

The foreign law issue is dealt with [292] ff. The relevant agreements, decisions  and concerted practices all occurred outside the EU in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, as did the overcharge for the LCD panels incorporated into the goods which the claimants ultimately bought: this occurred when the LCD panels were first sold by the cartelists including the defendants to the manufacturers of screens that were then incorporated into monitors and notebooks. Loss to the claimants loss (subject to downstream pass on) happened in E&W, when they purchased monitors or notebooks with LCD screens incorporated into them or the parts necessary to enable them to assemble notebooks. Their losses on reduced sales were also suffered in E&W.

This is where PILA s11 and 12 come in: for their content and implications see my post on UKSC Zubaydah. This is where interesting comparative elements emerge with EU law.

[297]

Once the different elements of the events and the country in which they occurred have been identified, the court then has to make a ‘value judgment’ regarding the ‘significance’ of each of those ‘elements’ in relation to the tort in question – see Iiyama (UK) Ltd v Samsung Electronics Co Limited (ibid.) at [48]. In that case, it was conceded that “…in the modern world the place where a cartel agreement happens to be made is of little significance…” Neither party in this case suggests, and in particular the defendants do not suggest, otherwise. I agree. That being so, the primary considerations that remain by a process of elimination are (a) the place or places where the cartel was intended to be implemented; and (b) the place or places  where the damage resulting from the infringing activity was suffered.

In my aforementioned paper p.150 I criticise the CJEU’s approach for jurisdictional purposes) in C-352/13 CDC which it repeated in C-27/17 flyLAL. For locus delicti commissi, under Article 101 TFEU (cartels), with reference to CDC, the CJEU opted for courts for the place in which the agreement was definitively concluded: this truly is extraordinary for it allows for forum shopping by the cartel participants, and it is a far cry form the sentiment expressed in current judgment (for applicable law) that the place where a cartel agreement happens to be made is of little significance…. For Article 102 TFEU (abuse of dominant position) the picture is more fuzzy at the CJEU as I discuss in my post on flyLAL. I realise the analysis in current judgment is for applicable law, not jurisdiction and I also realise that on applicable law Rome II’s Article 6 is closer to a forum damni analysis (as befits the general DNA of Rome II) than the CJEU’s locus delicti commissi analysis for jurisdiction in CDC and flyLAL.

Parties still disagree however on where that place is where the cartel was first implemented. Defendants say this was at the time prices first incorporated the Overcharge, which was when LCD panels were sold to original equipment manufacturers in Taiwan, Japan, China  and South Korea.

The judge in this context discusses the territorial scope of EU competition law [299] ff:

….if and to the extent that the focus in relation to applicable law should be on the restriction on competition within the internal market, then concluding that EU competition law should not apply to infringing activity that has effect within the EU because the cartelists are based, or conspired, or first gave effect to their conspiracy outside the EU would have a chilling effect on the efficacy of EU competition law as an effective mechanism for protecting and enhancing fair competition for the benefit ultimately of all consumers within the EU.

Enter CJEU Woodpulp, Gencor and Intel. [308] “in my judgment the evidence available establishes that the cartel in issue in these proceedings was a worldwide cartel which was intended to produce and in fact produced substantial indirect effects on the EU internal market.”

[313]

I conclude that the claim is one that comes within the territorial scope of EU competition law Returning to the applicable law issue, these conclusions lead me to the further conclusion that applying PILA, s.11(2)(c),  the applicable law is that of England and Wales including the law of the EU that applied at the time of the events giving rise to this claim.  I reach that conclusion because the most significant elements of those events were (a) the place or places where the cartel was intended to be implemented, which for the reasons I have identified was materially the territory of the EU including the UK and, therefore, England and Wales ; and / or (b) the place or places where the damage resulting from the infringing activity was suffered which again materially was England and Wales. As the Commission makes clear in Article 331 of the Decision, while the effects of the cartel were experienced elsewhere as well that is entirely immaterial for present purposes, as is the fact that a number of sales were first put on the market outside the EU. That is so because the Commission has decided and the Decision establishes that the indirect sales of panels were targeted at the EU (including England and Wales) and were intended to and in the event had substantial effects on competition in the EU (including England and Wales).

Reference here is also made to Deutsche Bahn Ag & Ors v Mastercard Incorporated & Ors [2018] EWHC 412 (Ch) in which both a pre and a post Rome II scenario was at issue.

Obiter, [314]

…had I concluded that the general rule was that the applicable law in relation to sales that were first put on the market outside the EU was the law of the state where that had occurred, I would nonetheless have concluded that the significance of the factors referred to above which connect the tort to the EU and, therefore, England and Wales, so outweighed the factors connecting the tort to the states where LCD screens were first put on the market outside the EU during the Relevant Period so as to make it substantially more appropriate for the applicable law to be the law of England and Wales incorporating that of the EU as relevant. EU competition law is the most appropriate law to apply to a tort concerned with a breach of TFEU, Article 101 to the extent that it has effect within the EU because it comes within the territorial scope of EU competition law and English law is the most appropriate intra EU system of law to apply by reason of the effect on the market so far as the claimants are concerned being in England and Wales, the claimed losses having been suffered in England and Wales and the claimants having carried on business in England and Wales during the whole of the relevant period until they were each placed in administration. The geographical place of incorporation of each claimant is a minor consideration although the first and second claimants were registered in England and Wales and although OTC was registered in Jersey, it nonetheless carried on business in England and Wales and claims in respect of losses suffered there. To my mind it is also at least realistically arguable, given the cost and inconvenience of having to prove separately the competition law of each state where LCD screens were first put on the market outside the EU during the Relevant Period, that to decide otherwise would undermine the direct effect and/or the effectiveness principles.

Of note. Geert.

EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024, [2.447] ff, 4.53 ff.

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Deutsche Bank v RusChemAlliance and Unicredit Bank v Ruschemalliance. The Court of Appeal confirming London as the go to court for arbitral anti-suit at least in case of English law as the lex contractus (and the long arm of UKSC Vedanta).

Update 13 March 2024 Paul MacMAhon reports the case is going to the UKSC.

I am mopping up the blog queue so forgive me for posting late on Deutsche Bank v RusChemAlliance [2023] EWCA Civ 1144, a successful appeal of SQD v QYP (Rev1) [2023] EWHC 2145 (Comm). (Regular readers of the blog know that I do tend to Tweet these cases with some direction of the blogpost’s direction of travel).

Nugee LJ [1]

A guarantee issued by a German bank in favour of a Russian company is governed by English law and provides for arbitration in Paris. When a dispute arises, the Russian company issues proceedings in Russia in apparent breach of the arbitration agreement. Should the English court grant an anti-suit injunction (“ASI”) to restrain those proceedings in circumstances where no such injunction could be obtained in France? That is the question raised by this appeal.

In short, the anti-suit injunction was now granted.

Bright J on the basis of the expert’s evidence, had considered at first instance [82]

My understanding from the evidence is that this is not because the grant of ASIs is an emerging doctrine under French law (cf. the incremental acceptance of freezing injunctions: English law was a relatively early adopter, making it natural and often helpful for the English courts to grant worldwide freezing injunctions in support of litigation in jurisdictions where there was no conceptual opposition to freezing injunctions, but the jurisprudence had not yet developed). It is, rather, that French law has a philosophical objection to ASIs.

[83]

“ASIs are not in the French legal toolkit, but this is not a mere omission. It is a deliberate choice. French law considers ASIs to “contradict the fundamental principle of freedom of legal action.” ASIs are a tool that French law does not like.”

That would not [85] stop a French court from recognising an ASI validly issued elsewhere, but this, Bright J had held, was not the scenario at issue: [86]

The facts of this case do not fall within that paradigm. The seat of the arbitration being Paris, the procedural law that the parties have agreed upon is French law. I therefore understand this to be a case where the French court would not enforce an interim ASI granted by this court, were I to grant one. On the contrary, if requested to do so in its capacity of court of the seat of the arbitration, the French court might well grant an anti-ASI.

I do not do this often but it is worthwhile in this case to copy the entire conclusion by the first instance judge seeing as it engages with the important question to what degree an English court should shot across the bow of the seat of arbitration hence across the curial law: [91 ff]

Ultimately, SQD had two main points. 

The first was that the agreement to arbitrate is subject to English law, and the English courts have an interest in securing the performance of contracts that are subject to English law. I accept this in principle, but the English courts will not act in every case where the relevant agreement is subject to English law. This is obvious (i) from the fact that CPR 6.36 does not give the English courts jurisdiction in every case concerning a contract subject to English law – it is always necessary for England and Wales to be the proper forum; and (ii) from the fact that The Angelic Grace acknowledges that there may be exceptional cases where as an ASI should not be granted even though the foreign proceedings are in breach of the agreement to arbitrate. Indeed, Enka at [177] suggests that it should make no difference if the governing law is English or some other law – which may imply that the seat is more important than the governing law.

The second was that the fact that an ASI cannot be obtained in France makes this court the proper forum. SQD said that the availability of ASIs in England and Wales was a legitimate juridical advantage – cf. Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460. However, this begs the question whether it is right to consider the juridical advantage that English jurisdiction offers legitimate, in circumstances where the law of the seat of the arbitration takes a different view.

I have in mind Lord Mustill’s repeated urging in Channel Tunnel of the need to be cautious. I also have in mind the concerns of the DAC report to avoid any conflict or clash, in particular a conflict or clash with the court of the seat of the arbitration. In the light of the evidence that I have received in relation to French law, I consider that England is not the proper forum and that this court should not grant the interim ASI and AEI that SQD seeks.

I have reached that view in two complementary ways. The first is that to grant an interim ASI would be inconsistent with the approach of the courts of the seat of the arbitration and (therefore) with the curial law that applies. This court should have deference to the approach of French law. To do otherwise would or at least might give rise to a conflict or clash.

The second is that the court should also have deference to the objective intention of the parties. The parties deliberately chose Paris as the seat of the arbitration. They must be taken to have done so knowing that the French courts will not grant ASIs. I do not accept as realistic the suggestion that the selection of English law as the governing law indicates an intention that there might be an application to this court, despite the express selection of a French seat.

In some countries, ASIs are readily available to support arbitration. In others, they are not. Each country is free to form its own policy on this point. Similarly, contracting parties are free to arbitrate where they like. If the parties choose to arbitrate in a country such as France, where the policy is that ASI will not be granted and will not generally be enforced, this court should acknowledge the significance of these circumstances. Vive la différence.

It is generally right for the courts of England and Wales to support arbitration in this jurisdiction. It is not the job of the courts of England and Wales to support arbitration in France by granting ASIs, given the fundamentally inconsistent approach in France on whether such support is appropriate or desirable. Indeed, it seems that the support of this court would be unwelcome.

In reaching this conclusion, I note that Lord Mustill appears to have held similar views: see Channel Tunnel at p. 368E-G.

The point that has made me pause longest is that based on Spiliada – i.e., that it would be a virtue, not an insult, for this court to step in where the French courts cannot. The best way of developing that point (I think) would be that, while it is true that the parties have chosen French law as the curial law/law of the seat, they have also chosen to adopt the ICC Rules – which (as I understand it) permit the arbitrators to grant conservatory and interim measures, including ASIs. The French courts cannot grant ASIs, but the arbitrators can (including an emergency arbitrator). Accordingly, even if French law objects to ASIs, the parties do not. All SQD is seeking is an interim ASI to maintain the status quo until the ICC arbitrators can take over and grant their own ASI.

This approach assimilates an ASI granted by this court to one granted by the arbitrators, on the basis that the injunction I am asked to me is an anticipatory and temporary version of the relief that will in due course be given by the arbitrators.

I consider this a false equivalence. There are real differences between orders granted by courts and those made by arbitrators – which is why parties are often astute to ask for relief from the court, where they can find a way to justify this. Above all: court orders are backed by the coercive powers of the state; arbitrators’ orders are not.

This is exemplified by the draft order presented to me by SQD. Prominent on its front page is a penal notice, which threatens the recipient with being held in contempt of court and being fined or having assets seized. The ultimate penalty is imprisonment. This is exactly what the French system regards as unacceptable. The fact that the parties have agreed to the arbitrators being able to make orders for interim measures does not mean that they have implicitly accepted the availability of a court order such as that presented to me in draft.

Ultimately, therefore, I therefore am unmoved by this point and by SQD’s other arguments. SQD’s application is dismissed.

The Court of Appeal reversed and completed the analysis itself. It held that France does not so much have a philosophical objection to ASI, rather lacks the procedure to grant it. [32]

Bright J was hampered by having limited evidence of French law whose import was far from clear, and it is not perhaps surprising that he read that evidence as suggesting that French law had a philosophical objection to the use of ASIs, even to the extent of countenancing an anti-ASI injunction. But the evidence before us, as can be seen, is to a different effect. It is that although a French court does not have the ability to grant an ASI as part of its domestic toolkit, it will recognise the grant of an ASI by a court which does have that as part of its own toolkit, provided that in doing so it does not cut across international public policy.

That last bit is not in fact different from Bright J’s suggestion I believe.

[34] ff Nugee LJ first considers the jurisdiction of the E&W courts. [36]

…It is natural to regard the grant of an ASI to restrain proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement as intimately connected with the arbitration (whether already on foot or proposed), and one can point to statements of high authority to the effect that where the seat of the arbitration is in England, the practice of the English court in readily granting ASIs is part of the “supervisory” or “supporting” jurisdiction of the English court: see, for example, West Tankers Inc v Ras Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtá SpA (The Front Comor) [2007] 1 Ll Rep 391 (“West Tankers (HL)”) at [21] per Lord Hoffmann; and Enka at [174] and [179] per Lords Hamblen and Leggatt. At first blush it might be thought to follow that the natural (and hence “proper”) place in which to bring any claim for an ASI would be the courts of the seat of the arbitration, and hence that where the seat is not in England, England is not the proper place for such a claim.

But he then [37] refers to Briggs LJ’s speech in Vedanta, and his mentioning of

that the task of the Court is to “identify the forum in which the case can be suitably tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice”.

[38]

There is no difficulty in identifying what English law regards as required by “the ends of justice” in a case such as the present. It is the policy of English law that parties to contracts should adhere to them, and in particular that parties to an arbitration agreement, who have thereby impliedly agreed not to litigate elsewhere, should not do so. The English court, faced with an English law governed contract containing a promise by a party not to do something and a threat by that party to do the very thing he has promised not to do, will readily and usually enforce that promise by injunction.

(reference ia to Enka).

      1. The only claim in the present case is a claim for interim injunctive relief based on these well-established principles of English law. Such relief, regarded by English law as a valuable tool to uphold and enforce the arbitration agreement, can only in practice be obtained in England and not in France. Bright J, as explained above, thought, on the basis of the evidence before him, that that was because French law had a philosophical objection to the grant of ASIs. The evidence before us is to a different effect and strongly suggests that while French law does not have the ability to grant an ASI as part of its procedural toolkit, it has no objection in principle to (and will recognise) the grant of an ASI by a court which can by its own procedural rules grant one, at any rate where the basis for the ASI is the parties’ contractual agreement to submit disputes to a particular forum.
      2. In those circumstances it seems to me that the forum in which the claim for an interim ASI can be suitably tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice is the English court, on the simple basis that such a claim cannot be given effect to in France. I do not think it necessary to consider what the position would have been had Bright J’s understanding been correct – that is, if the French court would regard the grant of an ASI by the English court as inappropriate and unwelcome – which raises questions of some difficulty and on which we have heard very little argument. On the position as it appears to us, the choice is between the English court where an ASI can be granted and a French court where it cannot, not because of any hostility to the concept, but because of a lack of domestic procedural rules permitting them. Since it is not to be supposed that DB would take the futile step of applying to a French court for an ASI which it has been repeatedly and clearly advised the French court cannot grant, the real choice is not between two competing forums, but between the English court entertaining the claim and the claim not being brought at all. Seen in this light, I would hold that the English court is indeed the proper place to bring the claim. I would therefore grant DB permission to serve the claim out of the jurisdiction.

Having decided on the existence of ASI jurisdiction, only two paras are then spent to conclude that one must so granted in the circumstances, along with an anti-enforcement injunction AEI should a judgment be obtained in any Russian proceedings.

Compare nb also Commerzbank AG v RusChemAlliance LLC [2023] EWHC 2510 (Comm), and see Unicredit Bank GmbH v Ruschemalliance LLC [2024] EWCA Civ 64 which overturned G v R (In an Arbitration Claim) [2023] EWHC 2365 (Comm) and which is notable because here the ASI is final rather than interim and uncontested.

Note not everyone is happy with the E&W cours becoming the world’s ‘arbitral policeman’ – however the underlying contract being one with English law as the lex contractus would seem to be emerging as a natural boundary to the English courts’ intervention.

Geert.

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Rechtbank Den Haag on forum contractus in a loan agreement between family: classic looking over the fence.

I am currently trying to have the Leuven conflict of laws students appreciate Article 7(1) Brussels Ia’s looking over the fence aka conflicts method. On Thursday we shall be reviewing CJEU Tessili v Dunlop and I wonder how many of the students will have seen this post (I am guessing perhaps 2 or 3 out of the 540 in class) for it might help them appreciate the exercise.

For contracts not caught by one of the passe-partout contracts listed in Article 7(1)b, per inter alia Jaaskinen AG (as he then was) in Cormans Collins, the CJEU Tessili v Dunlop formula still applies:  in the 4th ed of the Handbook 4.424 I put it like this

“For each specific obligation (later, as noted, subject to the Shenavai ‘principal obligation’ correction) the court(s) seised would establish ‘place of performance’ and hence jurisdiction on the basis of its own, residual private international law rules for applicable law. It applies its choice of law rules to determine which law governs the contract, and then uses that law to specify the place of performance, ultimately ruling whether it itself has or does not have jurisdiction, or has jurisdiction over only part of the claims. This is referred to as the ‘conflicts (of laws)’ method for deciding jurisdiction, also known as ‘looking over the fence’, seeing as the court looks over the fence between jurisdiction and applicable law in order to decide jurisdiction on the basis of applicable law. Per Tessili v Dunlop (para 13):

[the national court] must determine in accordance with its own rules of conflict of laws what is the law applicable to the legal relationship in question and define in accordance with that law the place of performance of the contractual obligation in question.

Prior to the 1980 Rome Convention, later the Rome I Regulation (see chapter three on applicable law for contracts), there was no harmonisation on deciding applicable law for contracts. This meant that, depending on which court is seised, the result of the looking over the fence exercise could and did have very different outcomes. (Even the Rome I Regulation, however (even more so under the Rome Convention), has gaps in its harmonising approach to the applicable law identification exercise, as I discuss in chapter three.)”

In current case, the agreement is one for the loan of a sum of money between a father and a son, albeit for an interest rate of 5% pa. Repayment of amounts due is now being pursued by a sibling, following the death of the father.

While loan agreements in the professional context arguably are services within A7(1)(b), in a family or friendship context arguably they are not. The Dutch court in current case [2.8] without expressing the family context issue follows Butcher J in Winslet & Ors v Gisel [2021] EWHC 1308 (Comm). As in Winslet, the court here then invited the parties (in an interlocutory judgment) to clarify their position on the conflicts method.

A first stop is Article 3 Rome I because the pursuing sibling argues [2.10] implicit choice of law was made for Dutch law.

The judge further points parties to Article 4(2) (the agreement not being covered by any of the default categories of Article 4(1) Rome I) Rome I’s

Where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1 or where the elements of the contract would be covered by more than one of points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party required to effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence.

and holds [2.11] that the characteristic performance in a loan agreement is carried out by the party loaning the sums. Defendant then argues that the father’s habitual residence at the time of the loan was in Sweden, making Swedish law the lex causae and leading to that law having to determine the place of performance for the purposes of A7(1). Claimant argues the father had already moved to The Netherlands.

In the later judgment once the further arguments of parties received, the judge refuses to entertain the question of implicit choice of law, seeing as the validity of a crucial document is uncertain, but does hold that the father was habitually resident in The Netherlands. Under Dutch law, the retained lex contractus, the payment of a sum of money owed to another, needs to be carried out at the creditor’s domicile at the time the payment is due. Claimant’s domicile (like the defendant’s) being in Sweden, that is where the forum solutionis is located.

Fun with conflicts….

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.424.