Posts Tagged Provisionary measures
Weco Projects ASP v Zea Marine Carier GmbH: provisional measures, court-appointed surveyor’s powers in the light of arbitration.
Genova’s court ruling in Weco Projects ASP v Zea MArine Carier GmbH is remarkably similar to the Belo Horizonte (Cefetra et al v Ms ‘IDA’ Oetker Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MbH & Co KG et al) ruling at the Court of Rotterdam, which I reviewed here. Transport is of a yacht is the issue, sinking the event, and London arbitration the agreed dispute resolution. What powers do the courts in ordinary still have to order interim measures?
The court could have discussed the arbitration /Brussels Ia interface, as well as Article 35’s provisional measures. Instead, it mentions neither and relies entirely on an Italian Supreme Court precedent as Maurizio Dardani and Luca di Marco review excellently here (many thanks to Maurizio for forwarding me the case). An exciting, and missed opportunity to bring these issues into focus.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.15.
Ergo, and Haras des Coudrettes. Provisional measures under Brussels I Recast and Lugano before the French Supreme Court.
Thank you Nicolas Contis and Leonardo Pinto for reporting judgments by the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) 16-19-731 Ergo Versicherung v Volker and 16-27.913, Haras des Coudrettes v X, both held on 14 March 2018.
The judgments concern the interpretation of Article 35 Brussels I Recast c.q. Article 31 of the Lugano Convention (the second case concerned a defendant domiciled in Switzerland) on provisional measures.
Please refer to Nicolas and Leonardo for a summary of the facts the judicial proceedings in the case. In neither cases do the French courts have subject-matter jurisdiction: in Ergo, the German courts do by virtue of choice of court; in Haras des Coudrettes, the Swiss courts do by virtue of Article 5(3) Lugano (locus delicti commissi being there; and direct damage also having occurred there hence leaving only indirect, financial damage with the French owner of the horse at issue, even if the exact nature and size of those direct injuries could only be later established in France).
In Ergo, the Supreme Court held that ‘la juridiction française (est) compétente pour ordonner, avant tout procès, une mesure d’expertise devant être exécutée en France et destinée à conserver ou établir la preuve de faits dont pourrait dépendre la solution du litige. Appointing an expert to assess any damages caused to a solar plant, and to explore liabilities for such damage, falls within Article 35 Brussels I Recast. I would agree with such a wide reading as I have discussed before in my review of the Belo Horizonte case. The Supreme Court does not consider relevant to the outcome claimants’ argument, that under Article 2 Brussels I Recast, provisional measures only enjoy free movement under the Regulation when ordered by a court with subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed in view of the Supreme Court the Court of Appeal need not even consider whether it has such jurisdiction. Given that the form Annexed to the Regulation includes a box requiring exactly that, this may seem odd. One assumes the Court held so given that the forensic measures ordered, can be rolled out entirely in France: no need for any travel at all.
In Haras des Coudrettes, the Supreme Court annulled because the Court of Appeal had established subject-matter jurisdiction for the Swiss courts, and had subsequently not entertained the possibility of provisional measures, even though the object at issue (the mare: ‘la jument’) is in France: ‘Qu’en statuant ainsi, alors qu’elle relevait que la mesure sollicitée avait pour objet notamment d’examiner la jument située en France, la cour d’appel, qui n’a pas tiré les conséquences légales de ses propres constatations, a violé les textes susvisés.‘
and ‘une mesure d’expertise destinée à conserver ou établir la preuve de faits dont pourrait dépendre la solution du litige, ordonnée en référé avant tout procès sur le fondement du second de ces textes, constitue une mesure provisoire au sens du premier, qui peut être demandée même si, en vertu de cette Convention, une juridiction d’un autre Etat lié par celle-ci est compétente pour connaître du fond’:
expert findings which aim at maintaining or establishing facts upon which the eventual solution of the litigation may depend, fall within the scope of provisional measures and may be ordered even before any entertainment of subject-matter jurisdiction. Again, the fact that for the effective roll-out of the provisional measures no other State need be engaged, must have relevance in this assessment.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.15.
Banca Turco: Popplewell J explains that worlwide freezing orders, particularly ex parte, are not extended willy-nilly.
In  EWHC 662 (Comm) Banca Turco Romana, Popplewell J explained his reasons for discontinuing ex parte freezing orders, with reference among others to C-391/95 Van Uden. At 22-23 he discusses the not entirely clear application of the jurisdictional rules of Brussels I, which indicated that that Regulation was engaged either via Article 2 (now 4: domicile in Romania) or 4 (now 6): residual Member State (here: Romanian) jurisdictional rules, which go on to be sheltered under the Brussels I Regulation.
At 20 he refers to the earlier case of ICICI Bank UK plc v Diminco NV  EWHC 3124 (Comm) in which he summarised the English Courts’ requirements for the issuing of ex parte freezing orders where the defendant is neither resident within the jurisdiction nor someone over whom the court has or would assume in personam jurisdiction for some other reason:
‘the court will only grant a freezing order extending to foreign assets in exceptional circumstances. It is likely to be necessary for the applicant to establish at least three things:
(a) that there is a real connecting link between the subject matter of the measure sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the English court in the sense referred to in Van Uden;
(b) that the case is one where it is appropriate within the limits of comity for the English court to act as an international policeman in relation to assets abroad; and that will not be appropriate unless it is practical for an order to be made and unless the order can be enforced in practice if it is disobeyed; the court will not make an order even within the limits of comity if there is no effective sanction which it could apply if the order were disobeyed, as will often be the case if the defendant has no presence within the jurisdiction and is not subject to the in personam of the English court;
(c) it is just and expedient to grant worldwide relief, taking into account the discretionary factors identified at paragraph 115 of the Motorola case. They are (i) whether the making of the order will interfere with the management of the case in the primary court, e.g. where the order is inconsistent with an order in the primary court or overlaps with it; (ii) whether it is the policy in the primary jurisdiction not itself to make to make worldwide freezing/disclosure orders; (iii) whether there is a danger that the orders made will give rise to disharmony or confusion and/or risk of conflicting, inconsistent or overlapping orders in other jurisdictions, in particular the courts of the state where the person enjoined resides or where the assets affected are located; (iv) whether at the time the order is sought there is likely to be a potential conflict as to jurisdiction rendering it inappropriate and inexpedient to make a worldwide order; and (v) whether in a case where jurisdiction is resisted and disobedience may be expected the court will be making an order which it cannot enforce.”
In Banca Turco discontinuation was ultimately mostly based not on any slip-up of jurisdictional basis, but rather on the absence of full disclosure by the requesting party: at 45: ‘The importance of the duty of disclosure has often been emphasised. It is the necessary corollary of the court being prepared to depart from the principle that it will hear both sides before reaching a decision, which is a basic principle of fairness. Derogation from that basic principle is an exceptional course adopted in cases of extreme urgency or the need for secrecy. If the court is to adopt that procedure where justice so requires, it must be able to rely on the party who appears alone to present the evidence and argument in a way which is not merely designed to promote its own interests, but in a fair and even-handed manner, drawing attention to evidence and arguments which it can reasonably anticipate the absent party would wish to make. It is a duty owed to the court which exists in order to ensure the integrity of the court’s process. The sanction available to the court to preserve that integrity is not only to deprive the applicant of any advantage gained by the order, but also to refuse to renew it.’
Belo Horizonte: Court at Rotterdam (using English as language of the oral procedure): Access to seized documents is no provisional measure under Brussels I Recast.
Arnold van Steenderen and Milan Simić have complete and concise review here of judgment of the Rotterdam court of December 2017 in re the Belo Horizonte (officially Cefetra et al v Ms ‘IDA’ Oetker Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MbH & Co KG et al). The case is a follow-up to 2015 proceedings. In these the Rotterdam court had first sanctioned seizure, and then rejected further action for claimant had not formally requested access to the documents.
Arnold and Milan summarise the facts very very helpfully – I am much obliged for the judgment is in Dutch (although as the judgment shows, the proceedings were actually conducted in English: a nice example of the use of regulatory competition in civil procedure) and their efforts have saved me a lot of translation time:
The decisions of the Rotterdam Court are a result of the carriage under bill of lading of soya beans on behalf of Cefetra B.V. (Netherlands based) on board of the “Belo Horizonte” from Argentina to the United Kingdom. Cefetra supplies raw materials to the feed, food, and fuel industries. Cefetra Ltd. (UK based) was the holder of the b/l’s and English law applied to the b/l’s. The vessel is owned by MS ‘IDA’ Oetker and is time chartered by Rudolf A Oetker (both German based, together addressed as Oetker). MS ‘IDA’ Oetker is the carrier under the b/l’s. London arbitration is agreed upon for any dispute rising from the contract of carriage and the b/l’s.
Following engine failure, ‘(d)uring the voyage, experts commissioned by both Cefetra and Oetker visited the “Belo Horizonte” to preliminary assess the condition of the vessel and its engines. Further investigation was conducted upon arrival in England. Oetker, however, only granted permission for inspection of the engine room and refused to disclose the documents on board. Crew interviews were not allowed as well. Subsequently, Cefetra obtained leave to attachment for the purpose of preserving evidence in the Netherlands on 27 October 2015. The leave was effected by the bailiff on 28 October 2015 on board of the “Belo Horizonte”. Several documents were seized and handed over to a sequestrator. Cefetra initiated proceedings’ to gain access to the seized documents.
The dispute in the main is arbitrable in London.
Oetker disputes jurisdiction of the court at Rotterdam on the basis of defendants’ domicile in Germany. Cefetra argue in favour of jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(1), alternatively 7(2) or indeed Article 35 Brussels I Recast:
- 7(1) forum contractus: for, it is argued, the main agreement between the two parties implies an obligation to provide any relevant evidence; the place of performance for that ‘obligation in question’ lies in The Netherlands since that is where the sequestrator holds them.
- 7(2) forum delicti: Oetker’s obstruction of truth finding is a tort which is located (locus delicti commissi) at Rotterdam since that is where Oetker opposes disclosure.
- 35 provisional, including protective measures.
The Court does not at all entertain Cefetra’s arguments on the basis of 7(1) or 7(2). Wrongly so: plenty of not at all obvious contracts or torts could qualify as same under these provisions. To not address them at all does not make them simply go away.
The court first of all (5.7 in fine) rejects relevance of the arbitration exclusion on the basis of C-391/95 Van Uden Deco-Line. It then sticks to a very restrictive approach to Article 35, with the classic provisionary (not covered by Article 35) v provisional (covered) nature of measures, as also discussed in C-104/03 St. Paul Dairy/Unibel (to which the Court refers). In the words of the court: seizure of evidence is provisional; actual access, copy or extract is not (5.8): the court suggests this is not provisional since it allows the party to gauge the evidentiary position of the party and hence is irreversible.
I disagree -and I have at least a shelf in my library to support the discussion.
Ireversibility in fact (once the evidence seen, the party can never wipe it from its memory, so to speak) does not equate ireversibility in law. The court takes a very limited view of Article 35 and I do not believe it is the right one.
There are not that many national judgments covering Article 35 quite so expressly. This is one to treasure.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.15.
It does not get more The Hague than this. Footballing around jurisdiction, applicable law and corporate finance in ADO Den Haag v United Vansen (PRC)
Thank you Bob Wessels for alerting me to ADO Den Haag v United Vansen (of China). ADO Den Haag NV (the corporate vehicle of a Dutch Premier League club) domiciled at The Hague, sue United Vansen International Sports Co. Ltd, domiciled at Beijing, essentially for the latter to pay a deposit on the premium due for the shares it acquired in the club. Vansen did not appear.
First of all, were Vansen properly summoned in accordance with the Hague Service Abroad Convention (which both China and The Netherlands have ratified)? The court holds that it cannot yet decide that this has actually happened (relevant steps taken via the Dutch judicial authorities only recently having taken place) however it applies Article 15(3)’s provisions for extreme urgency: ‘Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs the judge may order, in case of urgency, any provisional or protective measures.‘
Next up: do the Dutch courts have jurisdiction? Given the defendant’s domicile outside of the EU and the non-applicability of any of Brussel I’s rules where domicile is irrelevant, the Court applied Dutch residual rules of private international law. These grant it jurisdiction essentially in respect of urgent proceedings of attachment.
Of more interest to this blog is the court’s consideration of applicable law, which the Court conducts with reference to Rome I. The share purchase agreement seemingly did not contain choice of law, either implicit or explicit: at 2.15, the court suffices with a mere observation of the absence of choice of law. None of the standard contracts of Article 4(1) Rome I applies [there is some discussion in scholarship whether share purchase is covered by Article 4(1)a’s ‘contract for the sale of goods’], hence the relevance of Article 4(2)’s ‘characteristic performance’ test. Here, the Court declared unequivocally that the characteristic performance is the transfer of the share premium. The habitual residence of the party required to carry out that performance is the relevant connecting factor. In casu therefore, Chinese law in principle is the applicable law.
This in fact is not as straightforward as it may sound. Other legal regimes may find perhaps entry in the shareholder registry following payment, to be the characteristic performance; or the initiation of negotiations to pay a share premium; etc.
However the Dutch court finally settles for Dutch law after all, employing Article 4(3)’s escape clause. It holds that all circumstances of the case indicate that Dutch law is more closely connected: at 2.15: the agreement originated in The Netherlands; the performance has to be carried in The Netherlands (transfer of the sums into a Dutch bank account), and the transfer of the premium will benefit a Dutch company. Although the judgment does not give much detail on the contract, its origins etc., it would seem that in finally opting for Dutch law, the court does make proper application of the rather strict conditions of Article 4(3).
A good illustration of Article 4’s waterfall /cascade.
(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.6.