Granville Technology. Applicable law issues in follow-on cartel damages claim provoke engagement with territorial scope of EU competition law, its effet utile (and contrasts with CJEU in CDC, flyLAL).

In Granville Technology Group Ltd v Chunghwa Picture Tubes Ltd & Ors [2024] EWHC 13 (Comm) Pelling J deals with a follow-on damages claim in the context of the LCD cartel (an EC decision under Article 101 TFEU). In E&W these are characterised as tortious claims for breach of statutory duty, as they are in most EU jurisdictions, too.

The applicable law issues were dealt with under residual English law pre Rome II. The events with which this claim is concerned occurred before 11 January 2009, when Rome II came into effect. For the Brussels Ia and Rome II issues see my paper here. However the judge’s discussion of elements displacing the English law’s presumption of locus damni have important comparative context to EU law as I discuss below.

Claimants were English registered companies carrying on business in England and Wales in the manufacture and/or sale primarily of  desktop PCs sold with monitors and notebooks. They are now all in liquidation. The judge handily recalls the principles [18]] for those not familiar with follow-on actions

A claimant alleging a competition law infringement can bring a claim before the English courts either as a ‘standalone’ claim (in which case it must establish both the breach of competition law alleged and the loss which it alleges was caused thereby); or (as in this case) as a ‘follow-on’ claim, where the claimants rely on the findings of the relevant competition authority (in this case the Commission) to establish breach. The “follow on” option is available because  in law the High Court is bound by infringement decisions of the Commission, such as the Decision. However the claimant in a follow on claim must prove the loss it alleges it has been caused by the infringement relied on…

Damage of course is an issue and [27] in this case as in many similar ones, “complex economic evidence involving statistical modelling at various levels of complexity and sophistication was deployed by both parties but in particular by the defendant in an attempt to identify what part of the price increases in LCD panels over the Relevant Period was attributable to the cartel’s infringing activity.”

[34] Applicable issues of law that arise against some of the defendants, are:

i) Whether any losses that arise out of purchases by the claimants of LCD panels or LCD Products containing LCD panels which were first put onto the market outside the EEA fall outside the territorial scope of EU law and are therefore unrecoverable;

ii) whether the Claim in so far as it arises out of purchases by the claimants of LCD panels or LCD Products containing LCD panels which were first put onto the market in South Korea, Taiwan, China and Japan is governed by the laws of these countries; and if so whether the claims by the claimant to recover damages for breach of TFEU, Article 101 and/or AEEA, Article 53 is a cause of action within the laws of those states. The claimants have not attempted to prove the relevant laws of any of those states and rely on the presumption (“Presumption of Similarity”) that those laws are materially the same as English law unless the contrary is pleaded and proved. The defendants case is that the Presumption of Similarity is of no application applying the decision of the Supreme Court in Brownlie v FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) LLC [2021] UKSC 45 per Lord Leggatt at [119] – [124]. If the defendants are correct on this issue, they maintain the claim fails to the extent that it is based on purchases by the claimants of LCD panels or LCD Products containing LCD panels which were first put onto the market in South Korea, Taiwan and China and Japan. The defendants estimate this at about 78% of the whole. There is a dispute as to the correct percentage in the event the defendants succeeds on the principle  In any event, the claimants submit that if I agree with the defendants on the issue of principle I should adjourn determination of the issue and give the claimants the opportunity to plead and prove the relevant foreign law. I return to that issue below; and

iii) Whether the claims against the third and fourth defendants are statute barred under the Limitation Act 1980 (“LA”). The claimants rely on LA, s.32 and maintain that they could not have with reasonable diligence discovered the relevant facts before publication of the Decision, particularly given that all the claimants are in liquidation and have acted at all material times by their liquidators and their support staff.

The foreign law issue is dealt with [292] ff. The relevant agreements, decisions  and concerted practices all occurred outside the EU in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, as did the overcharge for the LCD panels incorporated into the goods which the claimants ultimately bought: this occurred when the LCD panels were first sold by the cartelists including the defendants to the manufacturers of screens that were then incorporated into monitors and notebooks. Loss to the claimants loss (subject to downstream pass on) happened in E&W, when they purchased monitors or notebooks with LCD screens incorporated into them or the parts necessary to enable them to assemble notebooks. Their losses on reduced sales were also suffered in E&W.

This is where PILA s11 and 12 come in: for their content and implications see my post on UKSC Zubaydah. This is where interesting comparative elements emerge with EU law.

[297]

Once the different elements of the events and the country in which they occurred have been identified, the court then has to make a ‘value judgment’ regarding the ‘significance’ of each of those ‘elements’ in relation to the tort in question – see Iiyama (UK) Ltd v Samsung Electronics Co Limited (ibid.) at [48]. In that case, it was conceded that “…in the modern world the place where a cartel agreement happens to be made is of little significance…” Neither party in this case suggests, and in particular the defendants do not suggest, otherwise. I agree. That being so, the primary considerations that remain by a process of elimination are (a) the place or places where the cartel was intended to be implemented; and (b) the place or places  where the damage resulting from the infringing activity was suffered.

In my aforementioned paper p.150 I criticise the CJEU’s approach for jurisdictional purposes) in C-352/13 CDC which it repeated in C-27/17 flyLAL. For locus delicti commissi, under Article 101 TFEU (cartels), with reference to CDC, the CJEU opted for courts for the place in which the agreement was definitively concluded: this truly is extraordinary for it allows for forum shopping by the cartel participants, and it is a far cry form the sentiment expressed in current judgment (for applicable law) that the place where a cartel agreement happens to be made is of little significance…. For Article 102 TFEU (abuse of dominant position) the picture is more fuzzy at the CJEU as I discuss in my post on flyLAL. I realise the analysis in current judgment is for applicable law, not jurisdiction and I also realise that on applicable law Rome II’s Article 6 is closer to a forum damni analysis (as befits the general DNA of Rome II) than the CJEU’s locus delicti commissi analysis for jurisdiction in CDC and flyLAL.

Parties still disagree however on where that place is where the cartel was first implemented. Defendants say this was at the time prices first incorporated the Overcharge, which was when LCD panels were sold to original equipment manufacturers in Taiwan, Japan, China  and South Korea.

The judge in this context discusses the territorial scope of EU competition law [299] ff:

….if and to the extent that the focus in relation to applicable law should be on the restriction on competition within the internal market, then concluding that EU competition law should not apply to infringing activity that has effect within the EU because the cartelists are based, or conspired, or first gave effect to their conspiracy outside the EU would have a chilling effect on the efficacy of EU competition law as an effective mechanism for protecting and enhancing fair competition for the benefit ultimately of all consumers within the EU.

Enter CJEU Woodpulp, Gencor and Intel. [308] “in my judgment the evidence available establishes that the cartel in issue in these proceedings was a worldwide cartel which was intended to produce and in fact produced substantial indirect effects on the EU internal market.”

[313]

I conclude that the claim is one that comes within the territorial scope of EU competition law Returning to the applicable law issue, these conclusions lead me to the further conclusion that applying PILA, s.11(2)(c),  the applicable law is that of England and Wales including the law of the EU that applied at the time of the events giving rise to this claim.  I reach that conclusion because the most significant elements of those events were (a) the place or places where the cartel was intended to be implemented, which for the reasons I have identified was materially the territory of the EU including the UK and, therefore, England and Wales ; and / or (b) the place or places where the damage resulting from the infringing activity was suffered which again materially was England and Wales. As the Commission makes clear in Article 331 of the Decision, while the effects of the cartel were experienced elsewhere as well that is entirely immaterial for present purposes, as is the fact that a number of sales were first put on the market outside the EU. That is so because the Commission has decided and the Decision establishes that the indirect sales of panels were targeted at the EU (including England and Wales) and were intended to and in the event had substantial effects on competition in the EU (including England and Wales).

Reference here is also made to Deutsche Bahn Ag & Ors v Mastercard Incorporated & Ors [2018] EWHC 412 (Ch) in which both a pre and a post Rome II scenario was at issue.

Obiter, [314]

…had I concluded that the general rule was that the applicable law in relation to sales that were first put on the market outside the EU was the law of the state where that had occurred, I would nonetheless have concluded that the significance of the factors referred to above which connect the tort to the EU and, therefore, England and Wales, so outweighed the factors connecting the tort to the states where LCD screens were first put on the market outside the EU during the Relevant Period so as to make it substantially more appropriate for the applicable law to be the law of England and Wales incorporating that of the EU as relevant. EU competition law is the most appropriate law to apply to a tort concerned with a breach of TFEU, Article 101 to the extent that it has effect within the EU because it comes within the territorial scope of EU competition law and English law is the most appropriate intra EU system of law to apply by reason of the effect on the market so far as the claimants are concerned being in England and Wales, the claimed losses having been suffered in England and Wales and the claimants having carried on business in England and Wales during the whole of the relevant period until they were each placed in administration. The geographical place of incorporation of each claimant is a minor consideration although the first and second claimants were registered in England and Wales and although OTC was registered in Jersey, it nonetheless carried on business in England and Wales and claims in respect of losses suffered there. To my mind it is also at least realistically arguable, given the cost and inconvenience of having to prove separately the competition law of each state where LCD screens were first put on the market outside the EU during the Relevant Period, that to decide otherwise would undermine the direct effect and/or the effectiveness principles.

Of note. Geert.

EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024, [2.447] ff, 4.53 ff.

Deutsche Bank v RusChemAlliance and Unicredit Bank v Ruschemalliance. The Court of Appeal confirming London as the go to court for arbitral anti-suit at least in case of English law as the lex contractus (and the long arm of UKSC Vedanta).

Update 13 March 2024 Paul MacMAhon reports the case is going to the UKSC.

I am mopping up the blog queue so forgive me for posting late on Deutsche Bank v RusChemAlliance [2023] EWCA Civ 1144, a successful appeal of SQD v QYP (Rev1) [2023] EWHC 2145 (Comm). (Regular readers of the blog know that I do tend to Tweet these cases with some direction of the blogpost’s direction of travel).

Nugee LJ [1]

A guarantee issued by a German bank in favour of a Russian company is governed by English law and provides for arbitration in Paris. When a dispute arises, the Russian company issues proceedings in Russia in apparent breach of the arbitration agreement. Should the English court grant an anti-suit injunction (“ASI”) to restrain those proceedings in circumstances where no such injunction could be obtained in France? That is the question raised by this appeal.

In short, the anti-suit injunction was now granted.

Bright J on the basis of the expert’s evidence, had considered at first instance [82]

My understanding from the evidence is that this is not because the grant of ASIs is an emerging doctrine under French law (cf. the incremental acceptance of freezing injunctions: English law was a relatively early adopter, making it natural and often helpful for the English courts to grant worldwide freezing injunctions in support of litigation in jurisdictions where there was no conceptual opposition to freezing injunctions, but the jurisprudence had not yet developed). It is, rather, that French law has a philosophical objection to ASIs.

[83]

“ASIs are not in the French legal toolkit, but this is not a mere omission. It is a deliberate choice. French law considers ASIs to “contradict the fundamental principle of freedom of legal action.” ASIs are a tool that French law does not like.”

That would not [85] stop a French court from recognising an ASI validly issued elsewhere, but this, Bright J had held, was not the scenario at issue: [86]

The facts of this case do not fall within that paradigm. The seat of the arbitration being Paris, the procedural law that the parties have agreed upon is French law. I therefore understand this to be a case where the French court would not enforce an interim ASI granted by this court, were I to grant one. On the contrary, if requested to do so in its capacity of court of the seat of the arbitration, the French court might well grant an anti-ASI.

I do not do this often but it is worthwhile in this case to copy the entire conclusion by the first instance judge seeing as it engages with the important question to what degree an English court should shot across the bow of the seat of arbitration hence across the curial law: [91 ff]

Ultimately, SQD had two main points. 

The first was that the agreement to arbitrate is subject to English law, and the English courts have an interest in securing the performance of contracts that are subject to English law. I accept this in principle, but the English courts will not act in every case where the relevant agreement is subject to English law. This is obvious (i) from the fact that CPR 6.36 does not give the English courts jurisdiction in every case concerning a contract subject to English law – it is always necessary for England and Wales to be the proper forum; and (ii) from the fact that The Angelic Grace acknowledges that there may be exceptional cases where as an ASI should not be granted even though the foreign proceedings are in breach of the agreement to arbitrate. Indeed, Enka at [177] suggests that it should make no difference if the governing law is English or some other law – which may imply that the seat is more important than the governing law.

The second was that the fact that an ASI cannot be obtained in France makes this court the proper forum. SQD said that the availability of ASIs in England and Wales was a legitimate juridical advantage – cf. Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460. However, this begs the question whether it is right to consider the juridical advantage that English jurisdiction offers legitimate, in circumstances where the law of the seat of the arbitration takes a different view.

I have in mind Lord Mustill’s repeated urging in Channel Tunnel of the need to be cautious. I also have in mind the concerns of the DAC report to avoid any conflict or clash, in particular a conflict or clash with the court of the seat of the arbitration. In the light of the evidence that I have received in relation to French law, I consider that England is not the proper forum and that this court should not grant the interim ASI and AEI that SQD seeks.

I have reached that view in two complementary ways. The first is that to grant an interim ASI would be inconsistent with the approach of the courts of the seat of the arbitration and (therefore) with the curial law that applies. This court should have deference to the approach of French law. To do otherwise would or at least might give rise to a conflict or clash.

The second is that the court should also have deference to the objective intention of the parties. The parties deliberately chose Paris as the seat of the arbitration. They must be taken to have done so knowing that the French courts will not grant ASIs. I do not accept as realistic the suggestion that the selection of English law as the governing law indicates an intention that there might be an application to this court, despite the express selection of a French seat.

In some countries, ASIs are readily available to support arbitration. In others, they are not. Each country is free to form its own policy on this point. Similarly, contracting parties are free to arbitrate where they like. If the parties choose to arbitrate in a country such as France, where the policy is that ASI will not be granted and will not generally be enforced, this court should acknowledge the significance of these circumstances. Vive la différence.

It is generally right for the courts of England and Wales to support arbitration in this jurisdiction. It is not the job of the courts of England and Wales to support arbitration in France by granting ASIs, given the fundamentally inconsistent approach in France on whether such support is appropriate or desirable. Indeed, it seems that the support of this court would be unwelcome.

In reaching this conclusion, I note that Lord Mustill appears to have held similar views: see Channel Tunnel at p. 368E-G.

The point that has made me pause longest is that based on Spiliada – i.e., that it would be a virtue, not an insult, for this court to step in where the French courts cannot. The best way of developing that point (I think) would be that, while it is true that the parties have chosen French law as the curial law/law of the seat, they have also chosen to adopt the ICC Rules – which (as I understand it) permit the arbitrators to grant conservatory and interim measures, including ASIs. The French courts cannot grant ASIs, but the arbitrators can (including an emergency arbitrator). Accordingly, even if French law objects to ASIs, the parties do not. All SQD is seeking is an interim ASI to maintain the status quo until the ICC arbitrators can take over and grant their own ASI.

This approach assimilates an ASI granted by this court to one granted by the arbitrators, on the basis that the injunction I am asked to me is an anticipatory and temporary version of the relief that will in due course be given by the arbitrators.

I consider this a false equivalence. There are real differences between orders granted by courts and those made by arbitrators – which is why parties are often astute to ask for relief from the court, where they can find a way to justify this. Above all: court orders are backed by the coercive powers of the state; arbitrators’ orders are not.

This is exemplified by the draft order presented to me by SQD. Prominent on its front page is a penal notice, which threatens the recipient with being held in contempt of court and being fined or having assets seized. The ultimate penalty is imprisonment. This is exactly what the French system regards as unacceptable. The fact that the parties have agreed to the arbitrators being able to make orders for interim measures does not mean that they have implicitly accepted the availability of a court order such as that presented to me in draft.

Ultimately, therefore, I therefore am unmoved by this point and by SQD’s other arguments. SQD’s application is dismissed.

The Court of Appeal reversed and completed the analysis itself. It held that France does not so much have a philosophical objection to ASI, rather lacks the procedure to grant it. [32]

Bright J was hampered by having limited evidence of French law whose import was far from clear, and it is not perhaps surprising that he read that evidence as suggesting that French law had a philosophical objection to the use of ASIs, even to the extent of countenancing an anti-ASI injunction. But the evidence before us, as can be seen, is to a different effect. It is that although a French court does not have the ability to grant an ASI as part of its domestic toolkit, it will recognise the grant of an ASI by a court which does have that as part of its own toolkit, provided that in doing so it does not cut across international public policy.

That last bit is not in fact different from Bright J’s suggestion I believe.

[34] ff Nugee LJ first considers the jurisdiction of the E&W courts. [36]

…It is natural to regard the grant of an ASI to restrain proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement as intimately connected with the arbitration (whether already on foot or proposed), and one can point to statements of high authority to the effect that where the seat of the arbitration is in England, the practice of the English court in readily granting ASIs is part of the “supervisory” or “supporting” jurisdiction of the English court: see, for example, West Tankers Inc v Ras Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtá SpA (The Front Comor) [2007] 1 Ll Rep 391 (“West Tankers (HL)”) at [21] per Lord Hoffmann; and Enka at [174] and [179] per Lords Hamblen and Leggatt. At first blush it might be thought to follow that the natural (and hence “proper”) place in which to bring any claim for an ASI would be the courts of the seat of the arbitration, and hence that where the seat is not in England, England is not the proper place for such a claim.

But he then [37] refers to Briggs LJ’s speech in Vedanta, and his mentioning of

that the task of the Court is to “identify the forum in which the case can be suitably tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice”.

[38]

There is no difficulty in identifying what English law regards as required by “the ends of justice” in a case such as the present. It is the policy of English law that parties to contracts should adhere to them, and in particular that parties to an arbitration agreement, who have thereby impliedly agreed not to litigate elsewhere, should not do so. The English court, faced with an English law governed contract containing a promise by a party not to do something and a threat by that party to do the very thing he has promised not to do, will readily and usually enforce that promise by injunction.

(reference ia to Enka).

      1. The only claim in the present case is a claim for interim injunctive relief based on these well-established principles of English law. Such relief, regarded by English law as a valuable tool to uphold and enforce the arbitration agreement, can only in practice be obtained in England and not in France. Bright J, as explained above, thought, on the basis of the evidence before him, that that was because French law had a philosophical objection to the grant of ASIs. The evidence before us is to a different effect and strongly suggests that while French law does not have the ability to grant an ASI as part of its procedural toolkit, it has no objection in principle to (and will recognise) the grant of an ASI by a court which can by its own procedural rules grant one, at any rate where the basis for the ASI is the parties’ contractual agreement to submit disputes to a particular forum.
      2. In those circumstances it seems to me that the forum in which the claim for an interim ASI can be suitably tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice is the English court, on the simple basis that such a claim cannot be given effect to in France. I do not think it necessary to consider what the position would have been had Bright J’s understanding been correct – that is, if the French court would regard the grant of an ASI by the English court as inappropriate and unwelcome – which raises questions of some difficulty and on which we have heard very little argument. On the position as it appears to us, the choice is between the English court where an ASI can be granted and a French court where it cannot, not because of any hostility to the concept, but because of a lack of domestic procedural rules permitting them. Since it is not to be supposed that DB would take the futile step of applying to a French court for an ASI which it has been repeatedly and clearly advised the French court cannot grant, the real choice is not between two competing forums, but between the English court entertaining the claim and the claim not being brought at all. Seen in this light, I would hold that the English court is indeed the proper place to bring the claim. I would therefore grant DB permission to serve the claim out of the jurisdiction.

Having decided on the existence of ASI jurisdiction, only two paras are then spent to conclude that one must so granted in the circumstances, along with an anti-enforcement injunction AEI should a judgment be obtained in any Russian proceedings.

Compare nb also Commerzbank AG v RusChemAlliance LLC [2023] EWHC 2510 (Comm), and see Unicredit Bank GmbH v Ruschemalliance LLC [2024] EWCA Civ 64 which overturned G v R (In an Arbitration Claim) [2023] EWHC 2365 (Comm) and which is notable because here the ASI is final rather than interim and uncontested.

Note not everyone is happy with the E&W cours becoming the world’s ‘arbitral policeman’ – however the underlying contract being one with English law as the lex contractus would seem to be emerging as a natural boundary to the English courts’ intervention.

Geert.

Rechtbank Den Haag on forum contractus in a loan agreement between family: classic looking over the fence.

I am currently trying to have the Leuven conflict of laws students appreciate Article 7(1) Brussels Ia’s looking over the fence aka conflicts method. On Thursday we shall be reviewing CJEU Tessili v Dunlop and I wonder how many of the students will have seen this post (I am guessing perhaps 2 or 3 out of the 540 in class) for it might help them appreciate the exercise.

For contracts not caught by one of the passe-partout contracts listed in Article 7(1)b, per inter alia Jaaskinen AG (as he then was) in Cormans Collins, the CJEU Tessili v Dunlop formula still applies:  in the 4th ed of the Handbook 4.424 I put it like this

“For each specific obligation (later, as noted, subject to the Shenavai ‘principal obligation’ correction) the court(s) seised would establish ‘place of performance’ and hence jurisdiction on the basis of its own, residual private international law rules for applicable law. It applies its choice of law rules to determine which law governs the contract, and then uses that law to specify the place of performance, ultimately ruling whether it itself has or does not have jurisdiction, or has jurisdiction over only part of the claims. This is referred to as the ‘conflicts (of laws)’ method for deciding jurisdiction, also known as ‘looking over the fence’, seeing as the court looks over the fence between jurisdiction and applicable law in order to decide jurisdiction on the basis of applicable law. Per Tessili v Dunlop (para 13):

[the national court] must determine in accordance with its own rules of conflict of laws what is the law applicable to the legal relationship in question and define in accordance with that law the place of performance of the contractual obligation in question.

Prior to the 1980 Rome Convention, later the Rome I Regulation (see chapter three on applicable law for contracts), there was no harmonisation on deciding applicable law for contracts. This meant that, depending on which court is seised, the result of the looking over the fence exercise could and did have very different outcomes. (Even the Rome I Regulation, however (even more so under the Rome Convention), has gaps in its harmonising approach to the applicable law identification exercise, as I discuss in chapter three.)”

In current case, the agreement is one for the loan of a sum of money between a father and a son, albeit for an interest rate of 5% pa. Repayment of amounts due is now being pursued by a sibling, following the death of the father.

While loan agreements in the professional context arguably are services within A7(1)(b), in a family or friendship context arguably they are not. The Dutch court in current case [2.8] without expressing the family context issue follows Butcher J in Winslet & Ors v Gisel [2021] EWHC 1308 (Comm). As in Winslet, the court here then invited the parties (in an interlocutory judgment) to clarify their position on the conflicts method.

A first stop is Article 3 Rome I because the pursuing sibling argues [2.10] implicit choice of law was made for Dutch law.

The judge further points parties to Article 4(2) (the agreement not being covered by any of the default categories of Article 4(1) Rome I) Rome I’s

Where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1 or where the elements of the contract would be covered by more than one of points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party required to effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence.

and holds [2.11] that the characteristic performance in a loan agreement is carried out by the party loaning the sums. Defendant then argues that the father’s habitual residence at the time of the loan was in Sweden, making Swedish law the lex causae and leading to that law having to determine the place of performance for the purposes of A7(1). Claimant argues the father had already moved to The Netherlands.

In the later judgment once the further arguments of parties received, the judge refuses to entertain the question of implicit choice of law, seeing as the validity of a crucial document is uncertain, but does hold that the father was habitually resident in The Netherlands. Under Dutch law, the retained lex contractus, the payment of a sum of money owed to another, needs to be carried out at the creditor’s domicile at the time the payment is due. Claimant’s domicile (like the defendant’s) being in Sweden, that is where the forum solutionis is located.

Fun with conflicts….

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.424.

Matthews v MACIF. A rare and extensive discussion on refusal of recognition under Brussels I and plenty of grounds leading to refusal of recognition of a French judgment issued in absentia.

Thank you very much confrère Lucian Ilie for sharing copy of the hitherto unreported Thomas Hilton Matthews v Mutuelle Assurance des Commercants et Industriels de France [2023] EWHC 2175 (KB) – Matthews v MACIF for short.

Maître Ilie successfully secured a High Court judgment (Ritchie J sitting on appeal) overturning registration with a view to enforcement under Brussels I (old: Regulation 44/2001) of a Paris Court of Appeal 2 April 2013 judgment, as his chambers report here.

The summons for the Court of Appeal proceedings (as Justice Ritchie’s judgment sets out in detail) had not reached Mr Matthews due to his return to England and the subsequent judgment, reducing an earlier pay-out (which had already been transferred to Mr Matthews) by insurance company MACIF for his injuries etc following collision with a car whilst cycling, was issued in his absence. MACIF unsuccessfully attempted to serve the Court of Appeal judgment on Mr Matthews at his previous location in France, and for 9 years no contact with the Matthews’ in England was made. (From the witness statements Ritchie J accepted that the fact that a copy of the judgment was left with Mrs Matthews’ father in France was not mentioned to the couple, let alone received). MACIF in June 2022 then obtained an Annex V Brussels I certificate of the judgment (which only mentioned that the amount to be paid out to Mr Matthews was now ‘less favourable’, without mentioning numbers) and waited another 9 months before seeking ex parte (judged by Ritchie J [34] to be ‘not right or fair’ in the circumstances) registration of the judgment in England, in language [34] not reflecting any of the background to the case and unlike the Annex V certificate, mentioning an exact amount. The application was granted.

Upon appeal the questions agreed [9] by parties were summarised by the judge as follows [10]

(1) Service: Was the Appellant sufficiently served with notice of (1.1) the start of the appeal and (1.2) the Paris Judgment, such that he could defend the appeal from the Tribunal Judgment and/or appeal the Paris Judgment?

(2) The EC Regulation: Is the Order made by the Master one which he was entitled to make in the light of the assertions that:

(2.1) it does not match the wording of the Annex V certificate summarising the Paris Judgment, the words of which made the Respondent the judgment debtor, not the Appellant and did not order any sum to be paid by the Appellant to the Respondent;

(2.2) the Appellant has recently appealed against the Paris Judgment so is it currently enforceable? The Appellant asserts that the Paris Judgment is a default judgment and not enforceable due to non-service;

(2.3) the Appellant asserts that the Respondent does not have an interest in the Paris Judgment as a creditor and that the Appellant was not ordered to pay anything;

(2.3) (sic) for public policy reasons due to the behaviour of MACIF it should not have been registered.

On the issue of service Ritchie J refers to first instance English judgments which however are backed up by continental scholarship and some indications in CJEU authority: the procedural rules of the lex fori are an indication of valid service but not decisive, and taking into account other points of departure listed [43], he holds that service was not valid, hence triggering Article 34 Brussels I, now Article 45 Brussels Ia (not materially different for the case at issue): lack of service in the Member State of origin shall (not just may) lead to refusal of recognition.

Obiter, the judge also refuses recognition on four more grounds

on form: the presentation of the foreign judgment was obiter held [49] to have amounted to re-writing;

seeing as the Paris Court of Appeal judgment is no longer enforceable in France pending the Mathews’ now launched appeal, it cannot be enforceable in the UK either [50];

[51] MACIF is not a judgment creditor under the Paris judgment: that judgment reduces the amount which Mr Matthews is to receive however it does not directly at least hold title for MACIF to receive payment from Mr Matthews;

[52] the delay in seeking enforcement causing substantial prejudice to Mr Matthews, the unfaithful transcription of the Annex V certificate, the insufficient efforts to locate Mr Matthews; the registration proceedings in E&W which really should have been conducted inter partes  also would have led to a refusal on ordre public grounds.

A rare and extensive Article 34 BI/45 BIa discussion and for that alone, of much note.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.600 ff.

Emiliou AG in BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux. A solid narrow reading of CJEU GAT v LUK (patent infringement) and a most optimistic, contra legem reading of reflexivity.

Update 05 03 2024 see meanwhile concurring views by Lydia Lundstedt here.

Emiliou AG opined the day before yesterday in C‑339/22 BSH Hausgeräte GmbH v Electrolux AB. I flagged the case and discussed its context here.

The case in essence concerns two issues: the extent of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Article 24(4) court in infringement (as opposed to direct invalidity actions); and the question whether A24 works reflexively: ie whether the surrender of jurisdiction should also be applied in cases where the A24(4) court is not in an EU Member State.

The AG’s extensive contextualisation has the merit of summarising established authority on Article 24(4). This allows the AG for instance to reflect on the oddity of GAT v Luk. Despite the ‘object of the proceedings’ often being infringement of intellectual property rights, the CJEU held in that case that the moment the validity of the patent (or other relevant intellectual property rights) is at issue, exclusive jurisdiction of the A24(4) court is triggered. The CJEU rather unsuccessfully attempted to justify the distinction with its approach on the remainder of A24 eg in CJEU BVG.

The AG justifiably signals his disapproval with the fall-out of the GAT v Luk authority, seeing ia that (54)

the judgment in GAT makes the consolidation of infringement claims concerning the different ‘parts’ of a European patent before those courts an unattractive option. It encourages patent holders to start separate proceedings in the various States of registration of those ‘parts’ instead, since, at least, it is certain that the courts of those States are competent to rule on both the infringement and validity of ‘their part’ (as explained in points 26, 28 and 29 above). This creates, in turn, a risk that different courts take contradictory views on the same infringement dispute.

Also note (59) the strong rebuke of the GAT v LUK line in terms of the very nature of private international law

…such considerations do not reveal why, with respect to proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, those courts should have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. In particular, the patent law of the State of registration is not so unique that only the courts of that State would have the ability to comprehend it. While it may be harder for them to do so, the courts of another Member State are perfectly capable of applying such a foreign law. To imply the contrary would be tantamount to questioning the very foundations of the Brussels regime (and the entire field of private international law). …

Ia (64) the AG however points out that unfortunately any call for the CJEU to reverse is futile seeing as Brussels Ia has codified it.

The extent of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Article 24(4) court in infringement proceedings.

Ia (37) the remaining unclarity therefore lies in the GAT v Luk consequences. National practice varies. Some courts practice a stay of the infringement proceedings until the A24(4) court holds on validity, and then insist on a return to the ‘infringement’ court: the “narrow reading” of GAT v LUK. Others carry out a complete referral of the case, including infringement, to the A24(4) court: the “broad” reading”.

In both of these scenarios the stay or referral decision is precarious (73) for there is no procedure under EU law for such referral or mutually respected temporary stay: there is no guarantee the court referred to will act as the first seized court might prefer.

The AG is in favour of the narrow reading: (69) this fits with the exceptional nature of A24; (71) it serves predictability (an echo of A24(2) in BVG): in the broad reading the reach of the jurisdiction of the court seized would depend on the invalidity  raised or not raised as a defence; (73) the possibility under national civil procedure rules to raise an invalidity defence even for the first time upon appeal would lead to a constant threat of torpedoing and once the proceedings stayed, the court first seized loses all grip on the claim and (74) by the time the case returns at all, claimant’s case in infringement proceedings started afresh may meet with statutes of limitation.

(77) ff bifurcation or as the AG calls it the ‘split’ in the proceedings is far from ideal, as (78) is the general implication of GAT v LUK that it forms an exception to the principle that points of defence ought not to impact on jurisdiction, or the reliance on national CPR, the delays etc. Yet the AG calls this route even if ‘less than ideal’, the ‘lesser of two evils’.

He then offers practical guidelines, seeking to give these a foundation in (88) the TRIPS Agreement, the finding in CJEU C‑365/88 Hagen that national CPR must not impact the effet utile of EU law, the TRIPS Agreement, Directive 2004/48, on the patent holder side the right to an effective remedy and, on the alleged infringer’s side, the rights of defence, both protected under Article 47 of the Charter.

(92) the AG suggests in particular that courts should only consider granting a stay where that challenge has a genuine prospect of success (taking into account the presumption of validity following the patent office’s assessment).

In general I have much sympathy for the AG’s narrow reading of GAT v LUK (and one would have hoped the review of Brussels Ia might trigger a proposal to solidify it in the Regulation). I am also genuinely curious to see how far the CJEU will go in picking up some of the guidelines.

The reflexivity issue.

The CJEU 3 judge chamber in IRNova f FLIR was very brief on this question and answered it promptly in the negative. The AG (97) agrees the answer is obvious in the sense that BIa cannot instruct third States courts to hear specific cases.

Unlike the AG however in my view the answer to the question that ‘in essence’ (98) is implied (whether A24(4) deprives Member State courts of the power to adjudicate the validity of third-State patents in the same way that those courts are deprived with respect to patents registered in other Member States) is, rebus sic stantibus, also obvious. Namely that unless the conditions of Articles 33-34 (the forum non conveniens “light” regime) are fulfilled, Article 4 domicile jurisdiction simply stands. Or as the Commission puts it (113), the Courts are “bound” to exercise A4 jurisdiction save in a narrow set of circumstances (i.e. the A33-34 set).

The AG (108) refers to IRNova to suggest A24-25 BIa cannot apply, as such, to dispute having connections of the kind envisioned therein with third States.

The AG posits ia that (117) BIa was not designed to take into account circumstances such as these and that the CJEU therefore should fill the gap. First of all I believe this is incorrect. A4 BIa arguably is a well documented express policy choice to accept EU courts jurisdiction in principle even over matters prima facie strongly linked with territory etc out off the EU. Further, that only A33-34 (and then only in the recital of the Regulation) entertain the possibility to take into account exclusive non-EU courts jurisdiction is a very strong a contrario statutory argument against CJEU freewheeling. The suggestion (118) borrowed from Briggs and Mills that “nothing in the wording of those provisions or in the related recitals indicates that they are meant to regulate exhaustively the possibility for Member State courts to decline jurisdiction in favour of the courts of third States”, echoes Ferrexpo and  imho is simply wrong, and neither Coreck Maritime (121) nor Mahamdia (122) have displaced Owusu.

The AG’s link (128) to public international law and the general appeal of the Moçambique rule are interesting but really just too remote in my view from Brussels Ia’s travaux and statutory provisions and the AG does not I believe properly present A33-34’s travaux or intention (139) ff.

The “implicit derogation from the mandatory effect of Article 4(1)” BIa which the AG posits (147) ff for both A24 and A25 (choice of court) jurisdiction, even construed as a “narrow discretion” (159) ff, is a most optimistic view on inviting the CJEU to rewrite Brussels Ia.

In conclusion, while the CJEU is likely to follow the AG on the narrow reading of A24(4), I would wager it will succinctly reject the arguably contra legem reflexive effect construction. But then as I have said before, I am not a betting man.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.217 ff.

From adit to alloy: the South African High Court denying class certification in Kabwe Anglo American lead poisoning claim. A questionable finding at interlocutory stage, with a sprinkle of third party funding review.

In Various parties obo minors v Anglo-American South Africa Limited and Others (2020/32777) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1474, the High Court of South Africa has refused to certify two class actions against Anglo American South Africa Limited (‘Anglo’). The proposed class action seeks monetary compensation for two classes from the Kabwe district in Zambia, who have been injured by lead exposure: children and women of childbearing age.

Kabwe is the capital of the Zambian Central Province and home to 225 000 people. Members of the proposed classes are estimated to make up approximately 140 000 members of this population. Kabwe is one of the most lead-polluted locations on the planet.

If forum non conveniens is now a classic hurdle for these kinds of cases in England and Wales (watch this space however for Lugano developments), then class certification presents itself in this judgment as a hurdle to an issue that in my view certainly should go to trial.

Windell J sets the scene [12]: (all footnotes in the quotes from the judgment have been omitted)

The application is unique. The applicants, who are citizens of Zambia and peregrini of this court (i.e, people neither domiciled nor resident in South Africa), are seeking redress in a South African Court, for a wrong committed in Zambia. They seek to hold Anglo liable for lead pollution that occurred during its involvement in the Mine from 1925 to 1974, beginning and ending 97 and 47 years ago respectively (the relevant period). The applicants’ cause of action is based on the tort of negligence. The parties agree that Zambian law will govern the substantive issues (the lex causae) and procedural matters will be governed by South African Law — the lex fori (the domestic law of the country in which proceedings are instituted).

[13] the main points of enquiry under Zambian law are laid out (and agreed)

The Zambian law mirrors the relevant English common law principles, which is part of Zambian law by virtue of section 2(a) of the English Law (Extent of Application) (Amendment Act 2011, Chapter 11). This means that English common law principles form part of Zambian law and are binding on Zambian courts, whereas the decisions of English courts are highly persuasive, even though not absolutely binding. Mr Musa Mwenye SC, the former Attorney General of Zambia, and the applicants’ Zambian law expert, opines that in deserving cases, Zambian courts may depart from English decisions if there are good and compelling reasons to do so but will not depart from established principles. The elements of the tort of negligence are therefore well-established. The Zambian Supreme Court has held that it requires proof of a duty of care; a breach of that duty through negligent conduct; actionable harm; a causal connection between the negligent conduct and the harm, involving both factual and legal causation; and damages.

[15] the criteria for the class action enquiry under South African law are listed:

In determining whether a class action is the appropriate procedural vehicle for the claims, the overarching requirement is the interest of justice (See Mukkadam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd. In Trustees for the time being of Children’s Resource Centre Trust and Others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and Others (CRC Trust) the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) identified certain factors to be considered. First, there is a class or classes which are identifiable by objective criteria; Second, a cause of action raising a triable issue; Third, the right to relief depends upon the determination of issues of fact, or law, or both, common to all members of the class; Fourth, the relief sought, or damages claimed, must flow from the cause of action and be determinable and ascertainable; Fifth, if the claim is for damages, there is a suitable procedure for allocating the damages to members of the class; Sixth, the proposed representatives of the classes are suitable to be permitted to conduct the action and represent the class; Seventh, a class action is the most appropriate means of determining the claims of class members, given the composition of the class and the nature of the proposed action.

[19] the conclusion is summarised:

Anglo opposes the application on various grounds. Some of the grounds are valid, while others are not. Hence, I will commence with the three issues that do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the certification of the class action. They are:  Suitability of the class representatives; Commonality and the Funding Agreements. Following that, I will then determine whether there is a cause of action raising a triable issue, which aspect, in my view, is fatal to the application. Finally, I shall discuss ‘Anglo’s alternative case’ which includes the damages claims, the suitability of an opt-out procedure and the class definitions.

In this blog post, in line with the blog’s general interests (here: the business and human rights angle), I will focus on the ‘triable issue’ analysis seeing as it engages with quite a few cases previously reported on the blog.

I do however also want to draw readers’ attention to the discussion [44] ff of the funding arrangements in light of my research grant (and also here) (research now conducted by Charlotte de Meeûs), with as conclusion

[81] As remarked in the interlocutory application, this court, ‘as the guardian of the child’s best interests, has a heightened duty to scrutinise the funding arrangements. Because the purported claims of thousands of Zambian children may be rendered res judicata by an action in a foreign jurisdiction, it is the duty of the court to ensure that these claims are adequately pursued by way of funding arrangements that are not only sufficient, but that do not deliver extortionate profits for third party funders at the cost of the children and that insulates the classes and their lawyers from undue influence from Kabwe Finance.

[82] Anglo’s concerns are without merit because the necessary safeguards developed by our class action jurisprudence have been built into the proposed funding arrangements. First, the applicants have provided detailed disclosure of the funding arrangements, which is without a doubt among the most detailed and transparent disclosures of any class certification proceeding to date. Second, the terms of the relevant funding agreements are explicit that neither the funder nor LD will exercise control over the case, which is to be conducted by MM on the instructions of the class representatives. Third, the applicants are represented by experienced attorneys and independent advocates who are bound by ethical rules to represent the interests of their clients.

[83] Fourth, the funder is part of the Augusta Group, a leading third-party litigation funder with a well-established track record and reputation. That reputation creates its own safeguard. Abuses and underhanded dealings, of the kind that Anglo alleges, would be disastrous to its professional standing and credibility with the courts. Fifth, the funder is bound by the Association of Litigation Funders’ Code (ALF), which explicitly prohibits funder control of litigation and other abuses. AVL is a member of the ALF and the Code’s requirements have been explicitly incorporated in the Claim Funding Agreement, thereby making them contractually binding on the funder.

[84]       Anglo’s attempt to characterise the Code as inadequate protection ignores the history and significance of the Code, as well as the weight it has been given by courts in England and Wales. The significance of the Code was recently explained in Akhmedova:….

[85]       Sixth, the applicants are protected by the provisions of the CFA, particularly s 5 which gives them the right to seek the review of any terms of the contingency fee agreement and the fees. Seventh, in response to Anglo’s repeated claims that the settlement will be hijacked by funders and lawyers to the detriment of the class, applicants and prospective class members are afforded two critical layers of protection: If the class representatives object to any settlement proposal, they may refer a dispute to an independent senior counsel, in terms of the dispute resolution mechanisms in the Claim Funding Agreement. And the applicants and class members are further protected by the court, as the parties would have to seek judicial approval of any settlement, in terms of the procedures approved in the Nkala settlement judgment

 

On the applicants’ case for there being a ‘triable issue’, [86] ff

applicants seek redress in a South African court on the basis that Anglo was the parent company and head office of the Anglo group that oversaw, managed and/or advised the Mine from its headquarters in Johannesburg, within the jurisdiction of this court, during the relevant period. It is asserted that Anglo exercised control over the Mine through an ever-changing set of subsidiaries, and although its organisational structure is quite complex, the Mine was firmly a part of Anglo’s ‘group system’….

applicants contend that the question of whether and when a multinational parent company owes a duty of care in respect of the actions of a foreign subsidiary is well-settled in English law, and they are confident that there is sufficient evidence to prove that Anglo owed a duty of care to the members of the classes.

Applicants refer ia to Vedanta and Okpabi.

[89] even Anglo’s expert on English law is of the opinion that ‘an English court would likely determine that the duty of care alleged in the draft POC together with its supporting affidavit raises a real issue to be tried’. He further stated that ‘[I]t will be a question of fact and degree whether or not the evidence adduced demonstrates a sufficient level of knowledge, control, supervision and intervention for the purposes of attaching legal responsibility.’

[90] ff the case for the applicants is further explained: that over the course of its almost 50-year involvement in the Mine’s affairs, Anglo negligently breached its duty of care by, inter alia, failing to conduct the necessary investigations on the impact of lead pollution on the surrounding communities by taking common sense measures, such as long-term sampling of air, water, soil and vegetation and monitoring the health impacts on the local communities in Kabwe [91]; Anglo’s negligence therefore caused or materially contributed to the existing levels of lead pollution in Kabwe and the resulting actionable harm. It is alleged that Anglo acted negligently in at least five material respects: it failed to investigate; it failed to protect; it failed to cease and relocate; it failed to remediate; and it failed to warn [92].

The judge however sides with Anglo’s arguments, outlined [98] ff. In effect Anglo lays all blame with ZCCM, ‘the obvious culprit’ [100], a Zambian state-owned entity and its predecessors in title who it is said at all times from 1905 to 1994 owned and operated the Mine.

Anglo also refer to the Zambia state-controlled Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd (NCCM), established January 1970. It argues [105] that following the closure of the Mine in 1994, and in accordance with Zambian legislation enacted in 2000, ZCCM retained all historical liabilities associated with the Mine. It held the legal responsibility to address the environmental and health impacts on Kabwe residents and became responsible for the remediation and rehabilitation of the Mine. In the 2000s, the World Bank and the Zambian government attempted on multiple occasions to assist ZCCM in remediating the Mine’s surroundings. These efforts it is said are ongoing, but they have been largely unsuccessful to date.

[106] Anglo argue that ZCCM’s negligence and omissions is an unforeseeable intervening event (novus actus interveniens), that absolves Anglo of all liability.

 

The test at certification stage is “not a difficult hurdle to cross” ([113], with reference to authority) yet Windell J concludes the case is both factually and legally hopeless.

“Factually hopeless” 

[117] ff the judge takes issue with applicants’ so-called ‘Broken Hill attitude’ in support of their argument against Anglo. In doing she, she focuses it seems on the much troubled history of Broken Hill, NSW. Australian readers and students of mine sadly will be very familiar with that name and with the 1893 report.

In essence, the judge dismisses relevance of the 1893 Report [120] referring to the unlikelihood, in her view, of Anglo’s knowledge of the report:

Anglo was only established in 1917. There is not any evidence that the Report came to the attention of Anglo at any point (including between 1925 and 1974). The applicants do not explain how an entity, established 24 years after the Report was published, located in a different country and on a different continent, and in an age of basic forms of communication technology, came to know of this Report. In these circumstances, it cannot be suggested that Anglo had knowledge of the harms set out in the Report.

And [121] the judge refers to alleged levels of nuance in the report.

Applicants’ suggestion [119] that Anglo knowing of the issues will be further established following discovery and further research is not further entertained. That would seem an extraordinary lack of engagement with the evidence. All the more so as it would seem that applicants’ reference to a ‘Broken Hill attitude’, which the judge dismisses, is not their shorthand for a particular safety attitude linked to the NSW mine and the 1890s reporting. Rather a reference to an internal Anglo document commissioned in the 1970s with the very title ‘Broken Hill attitude’, that is: Broken Hill, Kabwe. The ‘attitude’ of lack of regard, and of neglect, is one that is signalled in an internal Anglo document, not catch phrased by applicants.

Anglo’s novus actus interveniens argument referred to above, prima facie sits uneasy with the material contribution element of the law of causation and simply cannot be dealt with at this interlocutory stage.

The judge moreover arguably overlooks applicants ‘modicum of common sense’ [119]. It is, with respect, absurd to suggest there is no prima facie proof of Anglo’s historic knowledge of the harm of lead and more specifically knowledge of harm to the historical Kabwe community. Knowledge of the “adit to alloy” so to speak harm associated with all aspects of lead is historically exceedingly well established. Anglo’s approach to it at a mine in which it was clearly involved for a long period, cannot be readily dealt with at certification stage.

The judge concludes [128] that before the early 1970s, there is no evidence to imply that Anglo was specifically aware of the risks that lead pollution posed to the historical Kabwe community.

The contentions and counterarguments about what ought to have taken place from an engineering point of view to mitigate the risk, in my view are to be discussed at trial, not at certification stage, and the judge’s suggestions [134] ff that at trial applicants would not fair better would seem to exceed the prima facie level required at certification stage (as well as sitting uneasily with the Supreme Court finding in Okpabi).

 

“Legally hopeless”

[145] ff the applicants’ legal arguments, too, are held not to be sufficient in most succinct manner. In essence, the judge dismisses the relevance of ‘current’ authorities such as Vedanta etc. She distinguishes it as follows [148]

to establish that Anglo owed a duty of care 50 years and more ago to the proposed class members currently living in the Kabwe district, this court must be satisfied that there is prima facie evidence to find that between almost 100 and nearly 50 years ago, Anglo must have foreseen that the current community, not the historical community, would suffer harm from lead released into the environment by the Mine during the relevant period.

Relevant authority in the judge’s view is rather Cambridge Water [1994] 2 A.C. 264.

One imagines English tort lawyers will have a lot to say on the most concise (8 paras) discussion of the common law duty of care authority, that leads the judge to her finding that the case is legally untenable.

 

I understand permission to appeal is being sought, as it should.

Geert.

SKAT v ED&F Man Capital Markets. A very early Easter (or: having your qualification cake and eating it) thanks to claim reformulation.

I realise Lent has not even kicked off (it does next Wednesday, Valentine’s day) yet the judicial year already has seen a miraculous resurrection. In Skatteforvaltningen v MCML Ltd [2024] EWHC 148 (Comm) (MCML are formerly known as ED&F Man Capital Markets) SKAT did exactly what I suggested they do namely to amend their claim against these defendants to one for deceit.

(I dare say the did not do it upon the blog’s instruction; otherwise a charitable donation might be in order; note here btw for my review of the UKSC judgment in same.)

As Bright J summarises [5], SKAT’s claims at the start of current proceedings were advanced on the basis that the defendants had acted fraudulently. Such claims were, in general (and along with other causes of action), for the tort of deceit. However, in relation to ED&F Man, SKAT did not allege fraud/deceit but only negligent misrepresentation.

[7] On 5 December 2022, SKAT issued fresh proceedings in which ED&F Man was the sole Defendant. SKAT now alleged that ED&F Man knew that the representations in the Tax Vouchers were false or was reckless. SKAT’s claim in these fresh proceedings is for deceit, just as the initial claim against the other defendants which unlike that against ED&F Man, did survive Dicey Rule 3 /the foreign revenue rule.

In my review of the Court of Appeal judgment, under the title “Skat v Solo Capital Partners. When faced with Dicey rule 3, I’ll see your tax claim and raise it to a fraud one.”, I concluded

The title of this piece of course hints at the relevance of claim formulation. It is also exaggerated: SKAT cannot conjure up fraud elements out of nowhere to reinvent a tax claim as one in mere tortious and fraudulent misrepresentation. However it is clear that in cases that are somewhat murky, claim formulation will be crucial to navigate Dicey Rule 3.

I did not suggest that such claim reformulation ought to be tried in the current case for, well, SKAT it would have seemed have spent their powder. Yet this is exactly what SKAT now have done (and given the size of the claim, who can blame them for trying). Yet prima facie the hurdles for such new attempt seem quite formidable:

[33] ff issue estoppel: the arguable identical issue being tried formulated [43]  by defendant’s counsel as “… whether SKAT’s claims for compensation for making tax refunds it was not obliged to make was a foreign revenue claim for the purpose of Dicey Rule 3, now Dicey Rule 20.” That the claim is now in deceit and not negligence arguably does not change that (in light of claimant being the same, and having their cake and eating it).

The judge sees that differently: [48]: “mere similarity and/or a possible inference or deduction is not sufficient to bring into play the doctrine of issue estoppel.”

[50] Henderson v Henderson abuse of process: the fraud claim if it was to be brought at all, could and should have been brought earlier. The discussion on this is lengthy. For their to be abuse, it is necessary both (a) that the claimant could have raised the matter in the earlier proceedings and (b) that the claimant should have done so. A claimant is not lightly to be deprived of the possibility of a genuine claim. Some kind of harassment or serious prejudice is required, and the judge did not find that infringement of the Aldi joinder rule suffices.

The judge adds

      1. In reaching this conclusion, I principally have in mind that the court must be cautious about shutting litigants out of their right to justice. The need for caution features prominently in several of the authorities in this area (see paragraph 55 above), and is also required by article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
      2. However, it also seems to me relevant that the case SKAT wishes to bring is one of fraud. The general interests of justice, and the wider interests of society as a whole, are not well served if serious financial fraud is not brought to light. If fraud has been committed, the fraudsters should be exposed.

These latter comments of course do not displace the more detailed analysis of the authorities in the previous paras.

The judge refused permission to appeal which the defendants may of course still seek direct from the Court of Appeal. I would have thought there are some unresolved issues of law at stake here.

Geert.

 

Szpunar AG opines SLAPP-sensitive judgment may nay sometimes must be refused recognition under Brussels Ia.

First Advocate General Szpunar today opined in C‑633/22 Real Madrid Club  de Fútbol, AE v EE, Société Éditrice du Monde SA. The case was triggeredy a Le Monde article which claimed that Real Madrid Club de Fútbol had retained the services of Dr. Fuentès, the head of a blood-doping ring previously uncovered in the cycling world.

Le Monde later published Madrid’s reaction of denial but refused to retract the piece. Spanish courts imposed a damages and costs award of close to  €400,000, and a lower award on the journalists involved.

The Court of Appeal at Paris refused to recognise let alone enforce the judgment, referring to French ordre public. It concluded that the orders to pay an exceptional amount made against a journalist and a media organisation could not fail to have a deterrent effect on their involvement in the public discussion of matters of community interest such as to curtail the media’s ability to perform its information and monitoring role, meaning that the recognition or enforcement of the judgments pronouncing those penalties would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with French international public policy by interfering with freedom of expression.

Real Madrid submit, in essence, that a review of the proportionality of damages may only be undertaken where those damages are punitive in nature and not compensatory; that, by substituting its own assessment of the harm for that of the court of origin, the Court of Appeal had reviewed the foreign judgment, in breach of Articles 34(1) and 36 of the Brussels I Regulation; that it did not take account of the seriousness of the wrongs accepted by the Spanish court; that the economic situation of persons on whom a financial penalty is imposed is not a relevant criterion in assessing whether the penalty was disproportionate; that the assessment of proportionality should not be carried out by reference to national standards.

Colleagues with much greater authority on SLAPPs will no doubt have more impactful analysis soon: this post is a heads-up.

CJEU authority includes of course Krombach, Trade Agency, Meroni and Diageo, as well as Charles Taylor Adjusting aka Starlight Shipping, EcoSwiss and Renault. The AG (50) points out that the relevant authorities hitherto have engaged with procedural law ordre public exceptions, rather than substantive rules such as here fundamental rights.

(48) ff he discusses parties’ right under Article 6 ECHR and 47 of the Charter, to have a judgment enforced abroad. (60) ff follows discussion of the principle of mutual trust (which earlier today also featured in Inkreal).

(77) ff he discusses the authorities (see both blog posts referred to above and Handbook 4th ed. 2.619 ff) and highlights the existence of freedom of expression as a fundamental EU, as opposed ‘simply’ national right within the realm of EU ordre public. (142) ff discusses the issue of punitive awards and (159) ff the freezing effect of awards such as the one at issue. He comes to the conclusion that refusal of recognition not just can but must happen where the freezing effect of a libel award endangers participation in the public debate, linked to the financial absorption capacity of both the outlet and journalist concerned:

“un État membre dans lequel est demandée l’exécution d’une décision rendue dans un autre État membre, portant sur une condamnation d’une société éditrice d’un journal et d’un journaliste pour l’atteinte à la réputation d’un club sportif et d’un membre de son équipe médicale par une information publiée dans ce journal, doit refuser ou révoquer une déclaration constatant la force exécutoire de cette décision lorsque l’exécution de celle-ci conduirait à une violation manifeste de la liberté d’expression garantie à l’article 11 de la charte des droits fondamentaux.” (emphasis added)

“Une telle violation existe lorsque l’exécution de ladite décision engendre un effet dissuasif potentiel s’agissant de la participation au débat sur un sujet d’intérêt général tant des personnes visées par la condamnation que d’autres sociétés de presse et journalistes dans l’État membre requis. Un tel effet dissuasif potentiel se manifeste lorsque la somme globale dont le paiement est demandé est manifestement déraisonnable au regard de la nature et de la situation économique de la personne concernée. Dans le cas d’un journaliste, l’effet dissuasif potentiel se présente, en particulier, lorsque cette somme correspond à plusieurs dizaines de salaires minimums standard dans l’État membre requis. Dans le cas d’une société éditrice d’un journal, l’effet dissuasif potentiel doit s’entendre comme une mise en danger manifeste de l’équilibre financier de ce journal. Le juge de l’État membre requis peut tenir compte de la gravité de la faute et de l’étendue du préjudice uniquement pour déterminer si, en dépit du caractère a priori manifestement déraisonnable de la somme globale d’une condamnation, celle-ci est appropriée pour contrecarrer les effets des propos diffamatoires.”

Of much note in the context of the EU’s discussions on a SLAPP Directive.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed, 2024, 2.619 ff.

CJEU does not follow its AG in Inkreal: Confirms wide, subjective scope of international element for choice of court.

As I had half hoped, half predicted, the CJEU today held differently than its AG had opined in C‑566/22 Inkreal aka Inkreal s. r.  v Dúha reality s. r. o..: 

an agreement conferring jurisdiction by which the parties to a contract who are established in the same Member State agree on the jurisdiction of the courts of another Member State to settle disputes arising out of that contract is covered under Article 25 Brussels Ia, even if that contract has no other connection with that other Member State.

The Court cites in support:

[15] ff: statutory wording: [17]: “the wording of [A25(1)] does not preclude an agreement conferring jurisdiction, by which the parties to a contract who are established in the same Member State agree on the jurisdiction of the courts of another Member State to settle disputes arising out of that contract, from being covered under that provision, even if that contract has no other connection with that other Member State.”

[18] ff: context: ‘civil matters having cross-border implications’ (recital 3) and ‘cross-border litigation’ (recital 26) are mentioned yet the ‘international element’ required is not defined. As the CJEU had already held in C-280/20, ZN v Generalno konsulstvo na Republika Bulgaria v grad Valensia, Kralstvo Ispania [the Bulgarian consulate], an equivalent concept must be used as in the order for payments Regulation. That defines the equivalent concept of ‘cross-border litigation’ as ‘one in which at least one of the parties is domiciled or habitually resident in a Member State other than the Member State of the court seised’. In current case [23] the parties to that dispute are established in a Member State other than the Member State of the court which was seised on the basis of the agreement conferring jurisdiction at issue. Moreover, [24] a question relating to the determination of international jurisdiction clearly arises in the case, more specifically whether the courts having jurisdiction to settle this dispute are those of the Czech Republic, or those of the Slovak Republic as the Member State in which the two parties are established.

Further, [26], the interpretation of A25 must also be carried out in the light of the objectives of respecting the autonomy of the parties and enhancing the effectiveness of exclusive choice-of-court agreements, as referred to in recitals 15, 19 and 22 BIa.

Moreover, [27] ff, both predictability and legal certainty, core BIa objectives, are served by the inclusion of choice of court such as in the case at issue. [29] jurisdiction can readily be considered and [30] the possibility of concurrent proceedings is minimised. [31] should choice of court in these circumstances not be valid, BIa is likely not to apply and the application of residual national PIL is likely to lead to conflicting decisions. [32] ff for courts to have to consider additional elements capable of demonstrating the cross-border impact of the dispute concerned, would create uncertainty rather than remedy it.

[35] application of BIa here also demonstrates mutual trust and increased access to justice.

Finally [36] a parallel with the Hague Choice of Court Convention clearly was not sought, quite the contrary, BIa expressly not including a similar provision illistrates its diverging intention.

An excellent judgment echoing many of my earlier expressed sentiments on the issue and arguments.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.30.

 

AGPS BondCo: Court of Appeal obiter slightly opening the jurisdictional can of worms in English restructuring practice.

I have frequently reported on the use of English restructuring and law, including Plans and Schemes of Arrangement, and the forum and applicable law shopping strategies for same. Readers will find the tag ‘restructuring’ or ‘scheme of arrangement’ useful.

My post on Apcoa  summarises many of the issues and cross-refers to many other postings. The same post in a later update reports on Codere, which has become standard reference, and to AGPS Bondco Plc, Re, where the Court’s jurisdiction was unsuccessfully challenged on the basis that the Issuer Substitution was ineffective or invalid as a matter of German law.

That latter judgment has now been successfully appealed in Strategic Value Capital Solutions Master Fund LP & Ors v AGPS BondCo PLC (Re AGPS BondCo PLC) [2024] EWCA Civ 24. The Court of Appeal held that the first instance judge had unjustifiably departed from the paru passi distribution of assets principle in sanctioning the cross-class cram down.

Of note for the blog however is Lord Justice Snowden’s obiter reference to the jurisdiction [29] ff as follows:

      1. After the failure of the consent solicitation, the Group announced its intention to implement the proposed restructuring by an alternative route. This was to propose a restructuring plan under Part 26A and to ask the English court to exercise its cram down power to overcome the objections of the Appellants. To that end, the Plan Company was incorporated in England and Wales as a subsidiary of the Parent Company on 23 December 2022.
      1. On 10 January 2023, the Appellants put forward an alternative restructuring proposal to the Group. That elicited no immediate response, but on 19 January 2023 the SteerCo informed the Company that the Appellants’ proposal was not acceptable.
      1. On 11 January 2023 the Plan Company was substituted for the Parent Company as the issuer of the Notes, ostensibly pursuant to the substitution procedure under the Notes (the “Issuer Substitution”). In connection with that substitution, the Parent Company guaranteed the Plan Company’s obligations under the Notes, and the Parent Company issued back-to-back loan notes to the Plan Company on the same terms as the Notes.
      1. It is self-evident, and the Plan Company accepted before the Judge, that the Issuer Substitution was carried out for the sole purpose of introducing an English company into the Group structure in order to persuade the English court to exercise its jurisdiction under Part 26A. Absent the Issuer Substitution, a proposal for the compromise of foreign law debts owed by a foreign company with no relevant connection with England would not have been entertained by the English court.
      1. The technique of inserting a newly incorporated English company as a substitute obligor or co-obligor of debt owed by a foreign company in order to engage the jurisdiction of the English court under Part 26 or Part 26A has been used in a number of schemes and plans that have been sanctioned at first instance over the last few years: see e.g. Codere Finance (UK) Limited [2015] EWHC 3778 (Ch) and Gategroup Guarantee Limited [2021] EWHC 775 (Ch) at [12]-[23]. Mr. Bayfield KC told the Judge that it was “an established technique”. It has, however, not been the subject of consideration at an appellate level.
      1. The Appellants did not oppose the Plan before the Judge on the basis that the Issuer Substitution was an artificial device that could not justify the exercise of discretion to sanction the Plan. The point did not, therefore, arise for consideration on this appeal. For the avoidance of doubt, and without expressing a view one way or the other, I would wish to make it clear that the fact that this judgment does not deal with this issue should not be taken as an endorsement of the technique for future cases.
      1. The Appellants did, however, challenge the legality of the Issuer Substitution as a matter of German law, both before the Judge, and by proceedings in Germany itself. The Judge heard expert evidence and was satisfied that it complied with German law. The Appellants also indicated that irrespective of our decision on this point, they reserved the right to continue their challenge to the Issuer Substitution in Germany.

(emphasis added)

The point is clearly made obiter, seeing as the issue was not appealed (although it is being litigated in Germany, which evidently will raise interesting further issues); and of course it is possible that Snowden LJ simply mentions the issue for it was litigated at first instance. Yet often if that is the case, the Court of Appeal simply keeps schtum about it. Therefore just possibly it may be hinting that the often applied arguendo approach to jurisdiction for Schemes and Plans (“arguments put forward are not barmy and they are not really opposed by any party therefore we accept jurisdiction”) may not work at least across the board in restructuring cases.

An obiter hint of note.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 5.35 ff.