Archive for category Environmental Law – International
Update 16 January 2019 the first such trigger was quickly followed by a second: the EU have requested consultations with Ukraine over the country’s ban on the export of unprocessed woods.
This is a short posting for completeness and filing purposes. The EU have requested consultations with South Korea under the Trade and Sustainable Development chapter of the EU-Korea FTA. Labour rights are at the heart of the request. The request is a first trigger of the ‘Trade and’ consultations chapters under recent EU FTAs. I am not in a position to say more at this stage.
I have review of Shell at the CJEU here, and final judgment in Rotterdam here. Next Thursday the hearing takes places in C-624/17 Tronex which echoes many of the issues in Shell. When, if at all, is the definition of waste triggered in a reverse logistics chain: with a focus on the relationships between the various professional parties in the chain (that the consumer is not handling waste when returning a product in these circumstances is now fairly established).
Questions referred are below.
Handbook of EU Waste law, 2nd ed. 2015, OUP, 1.166 ff and 1.189 ff.
1. (a) Is a retailer which sends back an object returned by a consumer, or an object in its product range that has become redundant, to its supplier (namely the importer, wholesaler, distributor, producer or anyone else from whom it has obtained the object) pursuant to the agreement between the retailer and its supplier to be regarded as a holder which discards the object, within the meaning of Article 3.1 of the Framework Directive? 1
(b) Would the answer to Question 1.(1) be different if the object is one which has an easily repairable fault or defect?
(c) Would the answer to Question 1.(1) be different if the object is one which has a fault or defect of such extent or severity that it is, as a result, no longer suitable or usable for its original purpose?
2. (a) Is a retailer or supplier which sells on an object returned by a consumer, or an object in its product range which has become redundant, to a buyer (of residual consignments) to be regarded as a holder which discards the object, within the meaning of Article 3.1 of the Framework Directive?
(b) Is the answer to Question 2.(1) affected by the amount of the purchase price to be paid by the buyer to the retailer or supplier?
(c) Would the answer to Question 2.(1) be different if the object is one which has an easily repairable fault or defect?
(d) Would the answer to Question 2.(1) be different if the object is one which has a fault or defect of such extent or severity that it is, as a result, no longer suitable or usable for its original purpose?
3. (a) Is the buyer which sells on to a (foreign) third party a large consignment of goods bought from retailers and suppliers and returned by consumers, and/or goods that have become redundant, to be regarded as a holder which discards a consignment of goods, within the meaning of Article 3.1 of the Framework Directive?
(b) Is the answer to Question 3.(1) affected by the amount of the purchase price to be paid by the third party to the buyer?
(c) Would the answer to Question 3.(1) be different if the consignment of goods also contains some goods which have an easily repairable fault or defect?
(d) Would the answer to Question 3.(1) be different if the consignment of goods also contains some goods which have a fault or defect of such extent or severity that the object in question is no longer, as a result, suitable or usable for its original purpose?
(e) Is the answer to Questions 3.(3) or 3.(4) affected by the percentage of the whole consignment of the goods sold on to the third party that is made up of defective goods? If so, what percentage is the tipping point?
A short update on the Court of Justice’s ruling in C-151/17 Swedish Match, in which yesterday it upheld the legality of Directive 2014/40’s ban on ‘snus’ and generally on tobacco products for oral consumption. (Sweden is exempt: Article 15(1) of the 1994 Act of Accession).
The Court reaffirms the bite of the precautionary principle; emphasises the ‘gateway effect’ of snus for the young, including intern alia because consumption of snus can be done very discreetly and hence enforcement of an age ban (a suggested alternative) not effective; and the importance of giving precedence to public health over economic profit.
It also, yet again, shows that measures like these do not fall out of thin air because, as proponents of the precautionary principle would suggest, anti-innovation zealots dream up restrictive measures to kill enterprise. Rather, following extensive scientific advice, the ban is a sensible and proportionate measure to take.
EU Environmental Law, with Dr Leonie Reins, 2017, Chapter 2, Heading IV.
Access to information ironically is subject to a myriad of rules and regulations at the EU level: some of a general nature (particularly: Regulation 1049/2001), some lex specialis (such as Directive 2003/35 and Regulation 1367/2006), but with a complex relationship between lex generalis and lex specialis. Add to the mix in the environmental field, public international law in the form of the Aarhus Convention and, well, what you get is an awful lot of regulatory intransparency. Leonie and I have made an attempt succinctly to summarise same in Chapter 5 of our Handbook on EU environmental law.
In C‑57/16 P Client Earth v EC, the CJEU’s Grand Chamber set aside a General Court judgment which had earlier sided largely with the EC viz two requests of information: the first of those requests sought access to the impact assessment report drawn up by the Commission on the implementation of the ‘access to justice’ pillar of the Aarhus Convention, while the second sought access to the impact assessment carried out by the Commission on the revision of the EU legal framework on environmental inspections and surveillance at national and EU level. Both were refused on the ground for exception provided in Regulation 1049/2001, that ‘access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.’
The Grand Chamber essentially held that access should be granted: core of its reasoning is at para 92: ‘Although the submission of a legislative proposal by the Commission is, at the impact assessment stage, uncertain, the disclosure of those documents is likely to increase the transparency and openness of the legislative process as a whole, in particular the preparatory steps of that process, and, thus, to enhance the democratic nature of the European Union by enabling its citizens to scrutinise that information and to attempt to influence that process. As is asserted, in essence, by Client Earth, such a disclosure, at a time when the Commission’s decision-making process is still ongoing, enables citizens to understand the options envisaged and the choices made by that institution and, thus, to be aware of the considerations underlying the legislative action of the European Union. In addition, that disclosure puts those citizens in a position effectively to make their views known regarding those choices before those choices have been definitively adopted, so far as both the Commission’s decision to submit a legislative proposal and the content of that proposal, on which the legislative action of the European Union depends, are concerned.‘
Essentially: a true transparent policy process requires citisens to be able to impact the flow of the water before it disappears under the bridge.
EC Institutions continue to fight rearguard actions against transparency, which subsequently have to be addressed by the likes of Client Earth. The CJEU could not be clearer in highlighting the patch access to EU policy should continue to follow.
(Handbook of) EU Environmental Law, first ed.2017, Chapter 5. (With Leonie Reins).
One can say many things about climate change litigation by individuals. (See my earlier piece on the Dutch Urgenda case). Many argue that the separation of powers suggest that governments, not judges, should be making climate policy. Or that international environmental law lacks the type of direct effect potentially required for it to be validly invoked by citisens. Others point to the duty of care of Governments; to binding – even if fluffy – climate change obligations taken on since at least the 1990s, and to the utter lack of progress following more than 25 years of international climate change law.
It is therefore no surprise to see that this type of litigation has now also reached the European Court of Justice: the text of the application is here, see also brief legal (by Olivia Featherstone) and Guardian background.
Like cases before it, colleagues shy of preparation materials for an international environmental law course, with comparative EU law thrown in, can use the case to hinge an entire course on.
As Olivia reports, the legal principles involved are the following:
The claimants state that EU emissions leading to climate change are contrary to:
- The principle of equality (Articles 20 and 21, EU Charter)
- The principle of sustainable development (Article 3 TEU, Article 11 TFEU)
- Article 37 EU Charter
- Article 3 UNFCCC
- The no harm principle in international law
- Article 191 ff TFEU (the EU’s environmental policy
One to watch.
EU Environmental Law, with Leonie Reins, Edward Elgar, 1st ed. 2017, part I Chapter 2 in particular.