Category: Environmental Law – International

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Failure of ClienthEarth v Shell’s derivative claim echoes ia Merchants of Doubt – cross-refers to Dutch Milieudefensie action.

Uupdate 30 01 2024 the Court of Appeal has refused permission to appeal and Client Earth have posted a legal briefing on the issues here.

Update 24 07 2023 the judge has repeated his refusal in judgment [ [2023] EWHC 1897 (Ch)] following CE’s right to have a hearing on the same issue. CE are now seeking permission to appeal.

A late note on ClientEarth v Shell Plc & Ors (Re Prima Facie Case) [2023] EWHC 1137 (Ch) in which Trower J refused to give permission to Client Earth (qualitate qua Shell shareholders) to bring a derivative claim in lieu of Shell, against the corporation’s directors.

The breaches alleged in ClientEarth’s claim are said to arise out of the Directors’ acts and omissions relating to Shell’s climate change risk management strategy as described in relevant corporate documentation. It also alleges breaches relating to the Directors’ response to the order made by the Hague District Court in Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell plc which I reviewed here.

[3]:

The reason the legislation imposes an obligation on a shareholder to obtain permission to bring a derivative claim is that such a claim is an exception to one of the most basic principles of company law: it is a matter for a company, acting through its proper constitutional organs, not any one or more of its shareholders, to determine whether or not to pursue a cause of action that may be available to it. ClientEarth must therefore show that the limited and restricted circumstances in which it is appropriate for the court to authorise it, as a shareholder of Shell, to continue a derivative action against the Directors for breach of duty are present.

Current stage of the process is said to provide a filter for “unmeritorious” or “clearly undeserving” cases, with importantly [5] the applicant having to show that its application establishes a prima facie case before a substantive hearing is held. The substantive application for permission is set out in s.263 of CA 2006, as to which:

i) s.263(2) provides that an application for permission must be refused if the court is satisfied (a) that a person acting in accordance with his duty to promote the success of the company would not seek to continue the claim or (b) / (c) that any act or omission from which the cause of action arises has been authorised or ratified by the company before or since it occurred;

ii) s.263(3) makes provisions for a number of discretionary factors which the court must take into account in reaching its decision – they are (a) whether the member concerned is acting in good faith in seeking to continue the claim, (b) the importance which a person acting in accordance with his duty to promote the success of the company would attach to continuing it, (c) / (d) whether any act or omission from which the cause of action arises would be likely to be authorised or ratified by the company, (e) whether the company has decided not to pursue the claim and (f) whether the act or omission in respect of which the claim is brought gives rise to a cause of action that the member could pursue in his own right rather than on behalf of the company; and

iii) the court is also required by section 263(4) of CA 2006 to have particular regard to any evidence before it as to the views of members of the company who have no personal interest, direct or indirect, in the matter.

[14] The duties relied on by ClientEarth include two of the statutory general duties owed by the Directors to the Company pursuant to s.170 of CA 2006: the duty to promote the success of the Company (s.172 of CA 2006) and the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence (s.174 of CA 2006s).

[16] The duties owed by the Directors are also said to include what are pleaded as six necessary incidents of the statutory duties “when considering climate risk for a company such as Shell”. These are said by ClientEarth to be:

i) a duty to make judgments regarding climate risk that are based upon a reasonable consensus of scientific opinion;

ii) a duty to accord appropriate weight to climate risk;

iii) a duty to implement reasonable measures to mitigate the risks to the long-term financial profitability and resilience of Shell in the transition to a global energy system and economy aligned with the global temperature objective of 1.5°c under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change 2015 (“GTO”);

iv) a duty to adopt strategies which are reasonably likely to meet Shell’s targets to mitigate climate risk;

v) a duty to ensure that the strategies adopted to manage climate risk are reasonably in the control of both existing and future directors; and

vi) a duty to ensure that Shell takes reasonable steps to comply with applicable legal obligations.

[21] ClientEarth is not proposing any specific strategy which it requires the Board to adopt. Instead, it alleges that the Board’s current approach falls outside the range of reasonable responses to climate change risk. [26] ClientEarth needs to show that that the Directors’ current approach falls outside the range of reasonable responses to climate change risk and will cause harm to Shell’s members.

Conflicts lawyers will be interested in the two additional duties which are referred to as the further obligations [22]. They are that, pursuant to the common law of England and Dutch law respectively, a director who is aware of a court order is under a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that the order is obeyed. This is pleaded as a precursor to ClientEarth’s allegation that Shell has failed to comply with the Dutch Order. Shell argue that there is no recognised duty owed by directors to a company in which they hold office to ensure that they comply with the orders of a foreign court and Trower J agrees there is no such authority:  [23] he holds that

while a director of a company is under a legal obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure that an order made by an English court is obeyed, the case on which ClientEarth relied (Attorney-General for Tuvalu v Philatelic Distribution Corpn [1990] 1 WLR 926 at 936E-F) is not authority for the proposition that there is any such duty owed by the directors to the company itself, which is separate or distinct from the duties they owe to the company as codified in Part 10 Chapter 2 of CA 2006. 

and [24]

the nature and extent of the Directors’ duties to Shell are governed by English law as the law of Shell’s incorporation, as to which the underlying point is the same. There is no established English law duty separate or distinct from the general duties owed by the Directors to Shell under CA 2006, which requires them to take reasonable steps to ensure that the order of a foreign court is obeyed, let alone to ensure compliance with that order. It follows that, even if as a matter of Dutch law, the Directors were to owe duties to Shell to take reasonable steps to ensure that the Dutch Order is obeyed, that would be irrelevant to the claims sought to be made in these proceedings, governed as they are by English law. So far as Shell’s potential claims against the Directors are concerned, the only question is whether their response to the Dutch Order rendered them in breach of an English law duty.

No reference here to anything like mutual trust such as by the Dutch courts in Heirs to the Sultan of Sulu v Malaysia.

[25] the judge refers to Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Ltd [1974] AC 821 at 832E/F:  “There is no appeal on merits from management decisions to courts of law: nor will courts of law assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions within the powers of management honestly arrived at.” A classic reminder of merits review v judicial review, in other words.

Then follows a discussion of the evidence (I do not think CPR would have allowed expert evidence at this stage nb so the evidence is provided by in-house-experts) put to the court by ClientEarth and the long and the short of it is the judge’s finding [47] that

“the evidence does not support a prima facie case that there is a universally accepted methodology as to the means by which Shell might be able to achieve the targeted reductions referred to in the ETS. This means that it is very difficult to treat what is said as providing a proper evidential basis for alleging that no reasonable board of Directors could properly conclude that the pathway to achievement is the one they have adopted.”

In the light of Shell’s effective abandonment of climate engagement beyond greenwashing (I realise I am not mincing my words here yet the company’s climate reversal under its new CEO is marketed purposely to attract investors), this is imho a wrong approach to the test. It also underscores the tragedy of climate change’s multi-facetted challenges: because of the extent of the challenge, no singular approach is singlehandedly either efficient or sufficient, yet the opponents of climate action use that as a smokescreen to bedazzle judges with a labyrinth of inaction. Industry’s Merchants of Doubt approach has clearly worked here.

As for the Dutch judgment, the judge is not convinced of the nature of what the judgment really orders, and here, too, CPR rules on evidence seem to have put a spanner in the works (prof Toon van Mierlo’s Opinion not being addressed to the court etc: [53]).

[63] the judge adds obiter that in light of the de minimis extent of ClientEarth’s shareholder interest in Shell, some doubt must be cast on its ulterior rather than derivative interest in the claim. [64]

“it seems to me that where the primary purpose of bringing the claim is an ulterior motive in the form of advancing ClientEarth’s own policy agenda with the consequence that, but for that purpose, the claim would not have been brought at all, it will not have been brought in good faith. The reason for this is that it will be clear to ClientEarth that it is using an exceptional procedure in the form of a derivative action, for a purpose other than the purpose for which the legislation has made it available. If, on the evidence adduced by the applicant, that remains an open and unanswered question irrespective of what Shell might say at the substantive hearing, the court cannot be satisfied that ClientEarth is acting in good faith, a situation which will count strongly against a conclusion that it has established a prima facie case for permission.”

I.a. the judge’s approach [65] of the collateral motive of the shareholder I imagine must be appealable as a point of law.

Geert.

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French court rejects far-reaching role for interlocutory judge in applying French duty of care law. Holds claims against Total are inadmissible.

Thank you Anil Yilmaz, whose reply to a Tweet made me aware of the judgments of end of February in the claim brought by a number of NGOs against Total viz its activities in Uganda. The claim is an ex ante claim brought on the basis of the French statute which introduced the so-called devoir de vigilance or duty of care in the business and human rights sector. It argues that Total’s plan for the Ugandan activities at issue, fail the standard of the Act.

I had earlier flagged the procedural issue in the case and Cédric Helaine has review and links to the judgments here. The court (p.18) notes that the implementing decree which is supposed to detail the requirements of the law, has still not been adopted and that the law itself does not offer a blueprint, a decision tree, a list of indicators, merely indicating that the plan needs to include a ‘reasonable’ list of both pressure points and measures to address these, and that the plan moreover is to be drafted in consultation with stakeholders. In the absence of Government clarification of what this might entail, the court then points out that the reasonable or not character of the plan needs to be assessed by the courts themselves yet (p.20-21) and that a judge in an interlocutory proceeding in particular, can only be asked to discipline those plans which are non-existent, or clearly insufficient (which the judge finds is not the case here), yet cannot be expected to judge the plan’s reasonableness:

S’il entre dans les pouvoirs du juge des référés de délivrer une injonction en application des dispositions susvisées lorsque la société, soumise au régime du devoir de vigilance n’a pas établi de plan de vigilance, ou lorsque le caractère sommaire des rubriques confine à une inexistence  du plan, ou lorsqu’une illicéité manifeste est caractérisée, avec
l’évidence requise en référé, en revanche, il n‘entre pas dans les pouvoirs du juge des référés de procéder à l’appréciation du caractère raisonnable des mesures adoptées par le plan, lorsque cette appréciation nécessite un examen en profondeur des éléments de la cause relevant du pouvoir du seul juge du fond.

The judge concludes that in the case at issue, there is no such obvious shortcoming and that the request therefore is inadmissible given the role of the interlocutory proceedings.

This judgment of course says little on the role of the Act in claims on the merits of duty of care in which Acts such as these play a role (as opposed to claims merely arguing the planning stage is insufficient) however it clearly puts pressure on the French government urgently to produce its more detailed order, and it confirms the need to introduce detail either in these Acts (including in the recently adopted EU Directive) themselves or, swiftly, in executive follow-up. This avoids that judges use trias politica as a way out of having to judge the issues on their merits.

Geert.

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Advocate General’s Opinion in Grupa Azoty again lays bare a serious gap in EU judicial protection, yet does nothing to plug the hole.

Update 14 July 2023 unfortunately the CJEU yesterday confirmed its restrictive approach.

This post merely to cross-refer to my thoughts on Pikamäe AG’s Opinion in Joined Cases C 73/22P and C 77/22 P Grupa Azoty S.A. et al v European Commission, over at prof Peers’ EU Law Analysis blog.

Geert.

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Neighbours trip up big industry with Antwerp judgment holding 3M to account for (common law) nuisance following PFAS pollution.

On 15 May an Antwerp justice of the peace (effectively a first instance judge in ia neighbourly disputes) has issued a common sense, no nonsense judgment against 3M’s pollution for its PFAS pollution of the soil around its manufacturing site at the Port of Antwerp. (For background to PFAS aka per and polyfluoroalkyl substances see also my earlier post on applicable law). PFAS produced there were mainly used in fire extinguishing foam.

Bypassing the sluggish criminal law and public law investigations and enquiries, and in view of alarming levels of PFAS found in the family’s blood, two immediate neighbours at the site claim against 3M on the basis of what is effectively common law nuisance. Such a claim is one of strict liability: it does not seek to establish fault or negligence, rather it aims at addressing the imbalance in proprietary enjoyment.

The judgment reminds us that the historic roots of many an environmental law (think Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 and later Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 1 All ER 53 ) are still good law despite the overwhelming body of local, regional, federal, EU and international environmental statutory laws.

3M (other than to internal civil procedure rules on the court’s jurisdiction) referred ia to its environmental permit and to its use of ‘state of the art environmental technologies; to the distinction between the statutory remediation duty on the one hand and the liability for pollution, on the other; to its voluntary phasing out of PFAS at the site, and to the soil remediation (negotiated with /imposed by the Flemish authorities) it will carry out ia on the claimants’ property ; to the inconclusiveness of data on long-term health impact; and to the need to at the least stay the case in light of ongoing criminal and public law investigations.

The judge held that claimants’ individual rights exist independently of public and criminal procedures and may be enforced separately, and that all four elements for the laws of nuisance are present:

Neighbourliness (the only element not contested by 3M);

Nuisance. For the existence of nuisance, the judge referred ia to statements aka ‘extrajudicial confessions’ made by 3M executives during hearings in the Flemish Parliament;

Excessive nuisance. The nuisance is also held to be excessive, with simple reference ia to clearly abnormal PFAS readings in claimants’ blood;

Attributable to 3M. Here, too, the judge holds straightforwardly: ia mapping ordered by the Flemish Government shows a clear concentration of PFAS on the sites run by 3M.

The judge concludes with a provisional statement of €2,000 damages for the reduced enjoyment by claimants of their property.

The judgment does not indicate the parameters to be used for final determination of damages. Early commentary on the judgment indicates a number of open questions, such as the parameter within which claimants can be considered to be ‘neighbours’, etc. It is clear that 3M will not just appeal, but will generally continue its approach of litigating each and every claim (of note is that Belgium’s collective proceedings provisions are not optimal, and moreover difficult to apply to common law nuisance cases) with convoluted legal reasoning and much distinguishing. Yet the judgment is appealing in its straightforwardness and no doubt inspiring to the many proceedings which, sadly, are en route in this sad episode of industrial ‘innovation’.

Geert.

 

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Harris ea v Environment Agency. The remedy for an Agency’s breach of statutory obligations, with lessons for climate litigation remedies.

Harris ea v Environment Agency [2022] EWHC 2606 (Admin) I fear is another case I let slip on the blog. It is a judgment which discusses to right to an effective remedy following the earlier finding in Harris & Anor v Environment Agency [2022] EWHC 2264 (Admin) that the Agency’s allowing water extraction in three Sites of Special Scientific Interest was in breach of retained EU law, namely Article 6(2) Habitats Directive (measures designed to prevent the deterioration of habitats and species) and of the equally retained EU law precautionary principle.

The issue at stake in current case is the appropriate remedy, a classic challenge in judicial review cases in instances where the authorities have been found in breach of an obligation of effort rather than one of result. Those of us involved in climate litigation will appreciate the difficulty.

The Agency suggests the finding that there was a breach is enough of a remedy. Claimants disagree, seeking an order in the nature of [2018] EWHC 315 (Admin) which the Agency says must be distinguished on the grounds that the regulatory requirements relevant to that order, they argue, is more prescriptive.

Johnson J holds [7] that ‘the claimants have not just a presumptive common law right to a remedy, but also a statutory right’, given Article 19(1) TEU’s right to an effective remedy. A mandatory order that the Environment Agency must formulate a plan is issued [10], a plan which must be produced within 8 weeks [13]; that deadline has passed at the time of posting], disclose that plan to claimants [17] and with the precise formulation of the order [26] being

“The defendant shall, by 4pm on 7 December 2022, provide to the claimants details of the measures it intends to take to comply with its duties under Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive (“Art 6(2)”) in respect of The Broads Special Area of Conservation. The details shall include an indication as to the time by which the defendant intends to have completed those measures. It shall also include, so far as practicable, the scientific and technical basis for the defendant’s assessment of the measures that are necessary to comply with Art 6(2).”

More on the nature of the kind of orders judges may give to authorities is currently discussed in a wide range of environmental law, including climate law litigation. It is an interesting application of the nature of judicial review and trias politica..

Geert.

Monash University, Law 5478 Strategic and Public Interest Litigation.

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Dutch judge gives green light to export ban for fuels banned under EU law. Gives short shrift to extraterritoriality and leakage arguments.

In Zenith Energy Amsterdam B.V. and Exolum Amsterdam BV v The Netherlands a Dutch judge last week rejected the challenge by fuel traders of the Dutch ban on export of fuels to non-EU (particularly Ecowas) countries of fuels falling short of the EU requirements under Directive 98/70. The Dutch Statute is the culmination of established Dutch studies of the sector (The Netherlands being a prime tank storage country) and of repeated EOWAS calls that the export causes issues on their territories.

A first test is the duty of care under the Dutch environmental laws, which in summary obliges industry et al to prevent and /or limit the environmental and public health impacts of their production. The judge [4.10] refers to the travaux and recitals of the Act which contains the duty of care, as having recognised the global, one might say ‘extraterritorial’  impact of Dutch and European industrial activities, and emphasises that the duty of care requires a dynamic interpretation in line with societal and technical developments.

In 4.13 the judge emphasises that Directive 98/70 does not harmonise export outside of the EU and that the Directive therefore does not impede national rules on export and in 4.14 the rule is said not to force duties upon third States who themselves have signalled the difficulties. The judge also explicitly refers to Urgenda and UNEP to emphasise that looking after the environment and public health elsewhere, is an expression of the State’s own duty of care. 4.16 ‘fuel leakage’ (the drug dealer defence: trade will just move elsewhere, Antwerp in particular) has not been made out on the facts, quite the opposite, the State can show that the majority of traders already export cleaner fuel from Dutch ports.

Of note is also that the judge, Vetter J, in commendable Dutch style, does not exhaust himself in the arguments, rather cutting straight to the chase.

A judgment of note. Geert.

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Third party funding for climate change litigation.

A short note to refer to this post on the Wave News which focuses on third party litigation funding and how it might be used in climate change litigation, with input by Yours Truly. A good introductory summary of the opportunities and points of attention of third party funding generally, too.

Geert.

 

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Bravo v Amerisur Resources (Putumayo Group Litigation). Claimants survive time-bar challenge despite questionable finding on Rome II’s evidence and procedure carve-out.

Update 03 10 2023 the claim has now settled.

In Bravo & Ors v Amerisur Resources Ltd (Re The Amerisur plc Putumayo Group Litigation) [2023] EWHC 122 (KB) claimants, who live in remote rural communities in the Putumayo region of Colombia, seek damages from the defendant pursuant to the Colombian Civil Code, and in reliance on Colombia Decree 321/1999, in respect of environmental pollution caused by a spill (or spills) of crude oil on 11 June 2015. The claimants’ two causes of action are pleaded under the headings (i) guardianship of a dangerous activity and (ii) negligence. It is common ground between the parties that the oil spillage was the result of deliberate acts by terrorist organisation, FARC.

Steyn J yesterday held on preliminary issues, including statute of limitation. Defendant contends that the two year limitation period provided by relevant Colombian law re Colombian group actions (‘Law 472’), applies to the claim. Parties agree that in substance, Colombian law is lex causae per A4 and A7 Rome II.

Claimants rely on two points of English law and one of Colombian law. First, they contend that the relevant Article of Law 472 is a procedural provision within the meaning of A1(3) Rome II, and therefore it falls outside the scope of Rome II. I believe they are right but the judge did not. Secondly, they refute the defendant’s contention that this action should be treated as a group action under Law 472. Thirdly, even if they are wrong on both those points, they submit that application of the time limit of Law 472 would be inconsistent with English public policy, and so the court should refuse to apply it pursuant to A26 Rome II.

All but one links to case-law in this post refer to my discussion of same on the blog, with pieces of course further linking to the judgment. Apologies for the pat on my own back but it is nice to see that all but one (Vilca, where parties essentially agreed on the Rome II issue) of the cases referred to in the judgment all feature on the blog.

For claimants, Alexander Layton KC referred to Wall v Mutuelle de Poitiers Assurances and Actavis UK Ltd & ors v Eli Lilly and Co (where the issues were discussed obiter). Defendants rely on Vilca v Xstrata Ltd [2018] EWHC 27 (QB), KMG International NV v Chen [2019] EWHC 2389 (Comm), Pandya v Intersalonika General Insurance Co SA [2020] EWHC 273 (QB), [2020] ILPr 44 and Johnson v Berentzen [2021] EWHC 1042 (QB).

My reception of the High Court’s conclusions in KMG, Pandya, and Johnson was not enthusiastic, and in my review of Pandya in particular I also suggest that the same scholarship relied on in this case, did not actually lend support to the  defendant’s arguments, and I stand by that, too.

Hence Steyn J’s conclusion [102] that Article 15 Rome II

contains a list of matters which are ‘in particular’ to fall under the designated law, irrespective of whether they would be classified as matters of substance or procedure

and [106]

that the provisions of article 15 of Rome II should be construed widely

in my view is wrong. (Note the linguistic analysis in [110] will be of interest to readers interested in authentic interpretation of multi-lingual statutes).

[109] The key question then is which Colombian limitation period applies to these English proceedings, which brings the judge to discuss [115] ff ia Iraqi Civilians v Ministry of Defence (No.2). Here the judge, after discussing Colombian law evidence, holds [137]

that this action has not been brought under Law 472, and it does not fall to be treated as if it had been brought as a Colombian group action. Therefore, this action is not time-barred pursuant to article 47 of Law 472.

Hence claimants lost the argument on Rome II’s procedural exception but won the argument on application of Colombian law.

[139] ff whether the limitation rule should be disapplied pursuant to A26 Rome II is discussed obiter and summarily, with reference of course to Begum v Maran which I discuss here. The judge holds A26’s high threshold would not be met.

Both parties have reason to appeal, and one wonders on which parts of Rome II, permission to appeal will be sought.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, ia para 4.80.

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Dutch court denies RWE, UNIPER damages for coal phase-out. Rejects ia ‘permit defence’ under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme ETS.

RWE’s case (seeking huge damages for the impact on its assets following the Dutch coal phase-out) under investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) continues I understand (I would also suggest it is problematic given the ECT’s fork in the road provisions), while Uniper’s will be dropped as part of its bail-out conditions. Yet this post is about yesterday’s first instance Uniper judgment and RWE judgment in the Dutch courts. I use the Uniper judgment for this post, the RWE judgment is not materially different as to its legal analysis.

Of note is first of all that these judgments are by the ‘commercial’ chamber at the Den Haag court, not an ‘environmental’ chamber. This might be relevant for those wishing to present the judgment as one of a maverick band of environmental crusaders.

RWE and UNIPER’s claims are based on ‘A1P1‘ (Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights) and Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, both of which protect the right to property.

[5.6] the court lays out the benchmarks (translation courtesy of DeepL and double-checked by me):

( a) is there “possession” (property)

( b) is there “interference,” that is, deprivation or regulation of the right to property?

If both these conditions are met, then the following requirements are examined:

( c) is the interference “lawful,” that is, provided for by law;

( d) if so, does the infringement have a legitimate objective that serves to promote the “general interest,” and

( e) if so, is there a “fair balance,” that is, a reasonable balance, between the requirements of the general interest and the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual?

The latter “fair balance test” is not satisfied if there is an individual and excessive burden on the person concerned.

[5.9] the State had argued that uncertain future earnings are not caught by A1P1 however the court [5.10] disagrees. The corporations have a long-term guarantee to use of the site, ia via a long-term lease. That the earnings might potentially not qualify as possessions, does not diminish the qualification of the guaranteed economic interest as ‘property’.

Interference, lawfulness and general interest are established each in one para [5.11 ff] , and did not seem to be the focus of much discussion even by the parties.

Fair balance is discussed extensively [5.14] ff. [5.15.3] the court qualifies the measure as regulatory interference and not de facto expropriation (the latter would have triggered guaranteed compensation rights). Even if electricity generation using coal will be phased-out, after the end of the transition period, Uniper will continue to have use of the site and has indeed already assumed such use in announced coal-free business plans.

The court then discusses the foreseeability at length, concluding [5.16.31] that although the Dutch Government frequently expressed support for modern facilities generating electricity using coal, this was always done with the caveat that that method had to be compatible with the Dutch climate commitments. [5.16.35] the ETS permit defence is dismissed.

[5.17.9] the court, having studies the various scientific reports presented to it, holds that there are most definitely alternative uses for the site. That their profitability is uncertain, is simply also a feature of energy markets as a whole.

[5.18] the court holds that the Dutch coal phase-out does have an effect on reduced CO2 emissions (carbon leakage is not accepted as being of much relevance to that conclusion). For the measure to be considered not the least trade-restrictive, the Dutch State is held to have a wide margin of manoeuvre and it is not established that the State gravely erred in opting for a coal phase-out [5.18.7]. The long transition period is held to substantiate enough room for compensation [5.19.6], again with reference to the volatility of market returns as being part and parcel of energy markets full stop.

Like the Dutch judgments eg in Urgenda, this judgment on protection of property rights viz GHG emission reduction policies, is likely to serve as an international benchmark. It can be appealed, of course.

Geert.

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A primer on the latest climate litigation judgment: Friends of the Earth et al v UK Government. Victory on transparency and data grounds.

Others will no doubt analyse Friends of the Earth Ltd & Ors, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2022] EWHC 1841 (Admin) at much more length. I just thought I would pen down my thoughts when reading the judgment.

The case is a further judgment holding Governments to account for not addressing climate change challenges properly. The United Kingdom being a dualist country (all the more so following Brexit), the arguments do not much feature the Paris Agreement directly. Rather, claimants aim to hold Government to how Parliament said it should act in addressing climate change  in the Climate Change Act 2008 – CCA 2008, and, additionally, through the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights, whether or not in combination with the UK Human Rights Act. The core of the exercise and judgment therefore is one of statutory interpretation.

Of note first of all is that most of the claimants’ arguments were rejected and one assumes therefore that they will be seeking permission to appeal (just as the Government will).

The judgment kicks off with the oblique reference to trias politica. Holgate J [22] cites R (Rights: Community: Action) v Secretary of State for Housing Communities and Local Government [2021] PTSR 553 at [6]: –

“It is important to emphasise at the outset what this case is and
is not about. Judicial review is the means of ensuring that public
bodies act within the limits of their legal powers and in
accordance with the relevant procedures and legal principles
governing the exercise of their decision-making functions. The
role of the court in judicial review is concerned with resolving
questions of law. The court is not responsible for making
political, social, or economic choices. Those decisions, and those
choices, are ones that Parliament has entrusted to ministers and
other public bodies. The choices may be matters of legitimate
public debate, but they are not matters for the court to determine.
The court is only concerned with the legal issues raised by the
claimant as to whether the defendant has acted unlawfully.”

And [194]: judicial review in this case must not be merits review and the judge must adopt a ‘light touch’.

Starting with the ECHR arguments, there were summarily dismissed [261] ff. They engaged with Article 2 ECHR’s right to life, Article 8’s right to family life (these two being the classic anchors for environmental rights in the ECHR) and Article 1 of the first protocol (‘A1P1′)’s right to [protection of property. Holgate J holds that the claimants’ argument on the ECHR ‘goes beyond permissible incremental development of clear and constant Strasbourg case law’ [275] and [269-270] that the Dutch Urgenda decision offers a narrow window of ECHR relevance to climate law which does not open in the current case (with [270] in fine an explicit warning that Dutch authority, it being a monist country, should not hold much sway in England and Wales).

A first ground discussed the role of quantitative v qualitative assessment and whether and the degree to which the Minister was to show the targets could be met quantitatively. The judge held that ‘the CCA 2008 does not require the Secretary of State to be satisfied that the quantifiable effects of his proposals and policies will enable the whole of the emissions reductions required by the carbon budgets to be met. The [statutory] obligation …does not have to be satisfied by quantitative analysis alone.’ [193].

However one of the grounds on which the challenge did succeed is the quality of the input for the Minister’s decision: this overall briefing was held to have omitted data the minister was legally obliged to take into account, and which was not insignificant. As a result the Minister failed to take it into account as a material consideration, so that his decision was unlawful (compare [200]). [221] the briefing was held to have been wanting, in that it failed to identify under the quantitative analysis the contribution each quantifiable proposal or policy would make to meeting the UK’s carbon budgets; and it failed to identify under the qualitative analysis which proposals and policies would meet the 5% shortfall for one of the carbon budgets and how each would do so.

[246] ff (where Holgate J does refer, albeit with statutory distinguishing, to relevant Irish cases), another partial ground is upheld namely that of proper information given to Parliament (and therefore also the public; both a sore point in the current UK Government) on the data reached for the Ministerial conclusion and data on the pathways for delivery themselves. [257]: ‘contributions from individual policies which are properly quantifiable must be addressed in’ the report given to Parliament and hence the public.

The result therefore is important in terms of accountability and transparency (where unfortunately no mention was made of the Aarhus Convention which continues to apply to the UK), with the latter element also being inspirational for other jurisdictions where Governments have been told to go back to the climate change drawing board.

Geert.