Posts Tagged Netherlands
Heavily loaded. Applicable law in follow-up competition cases: watch the Dutch Supreme court in Air Cargo.
Update March 2018. Quentin’s blog has a link to the SC decision refusing to take the case, considering it was academic given that an appeal against the decision of the European Commission is still pending before the EU courts. It has therefore not irreversibly been decided whether the eleven air carriers had violated European competition law. Most probably the case will be back, one imagines.
Quentin Declève alerted me to the Air Cargo damages compensation case currently making its way through the Dutch courts. (I have previously reported on jurisdictional issues re such cases; searching the tag ‘damages’ should help the reader).
I have difficulty locating the actual judgment addressing the issue in this post: namely applicable law in follow-up competition cases. I have however located one or two previous judgments addressing the damages claims assignment issue in same. This web of litigation seems to be particularly knotty and any help by Dutch or other readers would be appreciated.
At issue is whether Rome II applies to the facts ratione temporis; if it does, how Article 6 should be applied, in particular: locus delicti commissi, locus damni and ‘affected markets”; and if it does not, how the previous Dutch residual connecting factor ought to apply.
A case of great relevance to competition law and fair trading cases.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.6.2.
Update 9 Mach 2018 for the rules of procedure of the International Commercial
Chambers of the Amsterdam District Court (Netherlands Commercial Court) and the
Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal) (The NCC Rules) see here.
I was asked yesterday (interview in Dutch) for my thoughts on the Belgian Government’s plans for a Brussels International Business Court. Here goes, in bullet-points format, a slightly extended and more technical version of those preliminary thoughts:
- Three and more’s a crowd. The Belgian move of course is not the first and neither will it be the last. Even pre-Brexit, Member States (and even individual cities within Member States; see Michiel Poesen recently on Frankfort) were vying for the title of preferred place for litigation.
- Brexit evidently may be a game-changer. I have flagged repeatedly that post-Brexit and assuming there will be no deal which would roll-over the UK’s engagement with EU civil procedure law, UK courts will become a lot less attractive. This is due to the more cumbersome recognition and enforcement regime that will be the result of decoupling from Brussels I. The same incidentally does not apply to arbitration. Pre and post Brexit, deal or not, free movement of arbitral awards is subject to the New York Convention.
- Attractiveness as a centre of litigation and legal services is part of regulatory competition. Being known as a place of legal know-how and expedited litigation brings prestige as well as attractive billable hours to the law firms of one’s country.
- Crucially, in an attempt to prise litigation away from London in particular, the use of English in proceedings is always the eye-catcher for the media. However in reality the language of proceedings is to my experience not the defining issue in client’s forum shopping strategies. Know-how of the bench; speed of proceedings; transparency of case-law; and of course ease of recognition and enforcement, are much more so. The Belgian proposal acknowledges as much by touting in particular the ‘collegiality’ and ‘expertise’ of the pool of (domestic and foreign) commercial law experts that will populate the court.
- Unwittingly perhaps but without a doubt, the proposal in flagging the benefits of the BIBC, also highlights the well-known disadvantages of the Belgian courts in ordinary: tardiness of proceedings (the ‘Belgian’ torpedo) in particular. However also very much so, intransparency (as I have repeatedly signalled: access to Belgian case law continues to be highly problematic) and lack of collegiality among the bench: being a judge is a lonely professional existence in Belgium. Professional secrecy rules, practicalities (lack of proper office space), and the aforementioned reporting issues work against Belgian jurisprudence presenting itself as coherent.
- At a technical level, the proposal emphasises repeatedly that the BIBC will be a court. Not an arbitral tribunal. The difference lies particularly in the easy or enforcement. The draft Bill loudly talks the talk in this respect. But does it walk the walk? What a ‘court’ means within the context of EU civil procedure law is of course the prerogative of that EU law: not of the Member States. (I refer to recent blog posts on same). Extensive reference to UNCITRAL’s Model Law on international commercial arbitration is a strange prop to use in the draft, if the idea is to take one’s attention away from arbitration. The BIBC will only take cases in the event of prorogation (choice of court or submission). The pool of judges will mostly be taken from part-timers, not benchers. Most importantly, in my mind: Article 43 of the draft instructs the BIBC, with respect to choice of law, to respect parties’ choice of governing law, and, in the absence of such law, ‘to apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable’. This is a copy /paste from Article 28(2) of the Model Law. In footnote the Act suggests that by omitting the third para of said Law (‘The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur only if the parties have expressly authorized it to do so’), the Bill emphasises the nature of the BIBC as court. It does not. Courts are simply subject to Rome I and II when it comes to applicable law. They do not just ‘consider a law applicable’.
Much to chew on. My analysis is based on a draft Bill which a little bird sent me. This is probably not the final say on the BIBC. (On an aside: @BIBC is already taken. I can think of one or two Twitter Handles which the BE government may want to snap up before someone else does).
Shell holding hauled before Dutch court for infringement of environmental law in Nigeria – All left to be decided
It has been widely reported that Shell’s top holding has been hauled before a Dutch court by a Dutch environmental NGO (Milieudefensie), seeking (with a number of Nigerian farmers) to have the mother holding being held liable for environmental pollution caused in Nigeria. Readers will be aware of Shell being in the docket once or twice these days for so-called ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) issues (see here for relevant links).
The media have been somewhat wrongfooted in reporting on the issue. Establishing jurisdiction in an EU court vis-a-vis a company with seat in the EU, is not exactly rocket science. It is a simple application of the Brussels I Regulation. As readers will be aware, the Court of Justice of the EU has barred national courts from even pondering rejection of such jurisdiction (Owusu: rejection of forum non conveniens considerations).
What is interesting, is the fact that Milieudefensie and the individual applicants are also pursuing the Nigerian daughter company in The Netherlands. In an interim ruling going back to 2009, the court held that the case against the Nigerian daughter may prima facie at least be bundled with the case against the mother holding. I understand however that the bundling issue will be revisited in the proceedings which started yesterday.
Moreover, under the Rome II Regulation, the Dutch court near inevitably will have to apply the lex loci damni i.e. Nigerian law, both against mother and daughter. That not only means that (presumably stricter) EU environmental standards will be out off reach, it also leaves the question whether under Nigerian law (indeed the same would have been the case under Dutch law), in substance the mother can actually be held liable for activities of its daughter.
Finally, were daughter Shell to be held liable, enforcement would have to be sought in Nigeria. Rejection of such enforcement by Nigerian courts is not unlikely.
One assumes that not many of the legal hesitations signaled above will be of much concern to the NGO involved: publicity for the wider CSR issue is arguably what is sought. This begs the more conceptual question whether overall sustainable development is assisted by having courts in ‘developed’ countries exercise jurisdiction and apply ‘developed’ law to cases such as these.
ps for Dutch readers, I have an op-Ed on the case, in Dutch, here.