Posts Tagged Article 8(1)
Stand alone cartel damages suits: The High Court in Media Saturn Holding v Toshiba on anchoring jurisdiction.
In  EWHC 1095 (Ch) Media Saturn Holding v Toshiba et al, Barling J is concerned with stand-alone damages suits following the European Commission decision in COMP/39437 – TV and Monitor Tubes. None of the Defendants was an addressee of the Decision (some of their parent companies were). The claims are, therefore, “standalone” rather than “follow-on” actions, and the Decision is not binding on the court so far as the claims against the Defendants are concerned, as it would have been had the Defendants been addressees. Nevertheless, Claimants place considerable reliance upon the evidential effect of the Decision.
Claims are strike out and summary judgment application, intertwined with challenges to jurisdiction. These essentially relate to there being no arguable claim against the “anchor” defendants, particularly Toshiba Information Systems UK ltd – TIS.
At 114: Claimants refute the suggestion that the claim has been brought against TIS on a speculative basis in the hope that something may turn up on disclosure and/or simply to provide an anchor defendant for jurisdictional purposes. They point to the Commission’s finding, at Recital 595, that the cartel was implemented in the EEA through sales of cartelised CPTs that had been integrated into the finished products.
The substantive law issue of implementation of the cartel therefore is brought in not just to argue (or refute) summary dismissal, but also to shore (or reject) the jurisdictional claim under Article 8(1) Brussels 1a.
Barling J establishes as common ground (at 90) that ‘as a matter of law an entity can infringe Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 53 EEA if it participates in relevant cartel activity, in the sense of being a party to an agreement or concerted practice which falls within that Article, or if it knowingly implements a cartel to which it may not have been a party in that sense. [counsel for defendants] submitted that there is no arguable case that TIS had the requisite knowledge. However, what is sufficient knowledge for this purpose is not common ground’.
At 300 ff the most recent CJEU authority is discussed: C-724/17 Vantaan kaupunki v Skanska of March 2019.
This leads to a relevant discussion on ‘implementation’ of the cartel, which mutatis mutandis is also relevant to Article 7(2) (locus delicti commissi). At 117-118:
‘TIS [similar arguments are discussed viz other defendants, GAVC] was involved in activities which were important to the operation of the cartel from the Toshiba perspective. These included the manufacture of CTVs using the cartelised product acquired from an associated company which itself was one of the established cartelists, and the onward sale of the transformed product. TIS also had direct commercial dealings with the Claimants relating to bonuses on sales of, inter alia, the transformed products. In my judgment there is an arguable case that those activities amounted to the actus reus of participation in and/or implementation of the cartel. The available material is sufficient to preclude the summary disposal of that issue.’
At 139 ff much CJEU and national authority is discussed, viz a variety of the defendants, on the issue of ‘implementation’ for summary dismissal on substantive grounds, a discussion which then at 259 ff is applied to the jurisdiction issue. Reference is made to Brownlie v Four Seasons, to C-103/05 Reisch Montage and of course to C-352/13 CDC. At 273 Barling J distinguishes excellently in my view between predictability as part of the DNA of CJEU Brussels Ia case-law on the one hand, and its treatment (and rejection) as a stand-alone criterion on the other hand:
‘[argument of counsel] is in danger of treating the statement of the CJEU in Reisch Montage as adding a free-standing and distinct criterion of foreseeability to the preconditions of application expressly set out in Article 8(1). If that criterion were to be applied generally, and without reference to those express pre-conditions, there would be a risk of the EU law principle of legal certainty being compromised, instead of respected as Reisch Montage expressly requires. That case states that the special rule in Article 8(1) must be interpreted so as to ensure legal certainty. The special rule’s express precondition is that “the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments…” Therefore, by virtue of Reisch Montage, it is those words that must be interpreted strictly so as to respect legal certainty and thereby ensure foreseeability. In other words, foreseeability is inextricably linked to the closeness of the connection between the two sets of claims, and the criterion will be satisfied if a sufficiently close connection of the kind described in Article 8(1) exists.’
And at 276
‘It is correct that the anchor defendants were not addressees of the Decision and that there were no UK addressees. However, there is no reason why this should be significant. Article 8(1) is capable of applying in a competition claim regardless of whether a Commission infringement decision exists. What matters is that there is a claim that the anchor defendant is guilty of an infringement, and that the case against the non-anchor defendant is sufficiently “closely connected” to that claim within the meaning and for the purposes of Article 8(1). The fact that neither entity is an addressee of a Commission decision (if there is one) and that neither is the subject of any other regulatory process or civil claim relating to the cartel, is, if not immaterial, then of marginal relevance.’
For all anchor defendants the conclusion is that there is an arguable claim that they participated in and/or knowingly implemented the cartel. That strongly militates against the sole purpose of the (two sets of) proceedings being to oust the jurisdiction of the other EU courts. No abuse has occurred.
At 316 a final postscript is added suggesting summarily that the Supreme Court’s Vedanta might have an impact on the ‘abuse’ issue. The judgment concerned inter alia an alleged abuse of EU law in the context of the predecessor provision to Article 8(1). The Court gave consideration to the test for the “sole purpose” issue. At 317: Barling J: ‘I can see no basis on which my conclusions in that regard are affected by this decision.’
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 22.214.171.124.
Disciplining abuse of anchor defendants in follow-up competition law cases exceedingly difficult. Borgarting Court of Appeal (Norway) applies CDC in Posten /Bring v Volvo.
After the French Cour de Cassation in MJI v Apple Sales, the Brussels Court of Appeal in FIFA/UEFA, and the Court at Amsterdam in Kemira, (as well as other courts undoubtedly, too; and I have highlighted more cases on the blog), Ørjan Salvesen Haukaas has now reported an application of CDC in a decision of December 2018 by a Norwegian Court of appeal, LB-2018-136341 Posten /Bring v Volvo. The court evidently applies Lugano (Article 6), not Brussels Ia, yet the provision is materially identical.
Norwegian and foreign companies in the Posten/Bring group (mail services) had sued companies in the Volvo group for alleged losses incurred when purchasing trucks from Volvo after certain companies in the Volvo group had been fined for participating in a price-fixing cartel. Posten/Bring also sued a Norwegian company in the Volvo group, which had not been fined for participating in the price-fixing cartel.
Borgarting Court of Appeal held that Norwegian courts have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6(1) Lugano even if the anchor defendant is sued merely to obtain Norwegian jurisdiction. The court solely had to determine whether the claims were so closely connected that there was a risk of irreconcilable judgments, in the absence of any suggested collusion between the anchor defendant and claimants per CDC.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law. 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12, Heading 126.96.36.199.
Petrobas securities class action firmly anchored in The Netherlands. Rotterdam court applying i.a. forum non conveniens under Brussels Ia.
Many thanks to Jeffrey Kleywegt and Robert Van Vugt for re-reporting Stichting Petrobas Compensation Foundation v PetrÓleo Brasilieiro SA – PETROBRAS et al. The case, held in September (judgment in NL and in EN) relates to a Brazilian criminal investigation into alleged bribery schemes within Petrobras, which took place between 2004 and 2014. the Court had to review the jurisdictional issue only at this stage, and confirmed same for much, but not all of the claims.
The Dutch internal bank for Petrobas, Petrobas Global Finance BV and the Dutch subsidiary of Petrobas, Petrobas Oil and Gas BV are the anchor defendants. Jurisdiction against them was easily established of course under Article 4 Brussels Ia.
Issues under discussion, were
Firstly, against the Dutch defendants: Application of the new Article 34 ‘forum non conveniens’ mechanism which I have reported on before re English and Gibraltar courts. At 5.45: defendants request a stay of the proceedings on account of lis pendens, until a final decision has been given in the United States, alternatively Brazil, about claims that are virtually identical to those brought by the Foundation. They additionally argue a stay on case management grounds. However the court finds
with respect to a stay in favour of the US, that
the US courts will not judge on the merits, since there is a class settlement; and that
for the proceedings in which these courts might eventually hold on the merits (particularly in the case of claimants having opted out of the settlement), it is unclear what the further course of these proceedings will be and how long they will continue. For that reason it is also unclear if a judgment in these actions is to be expected at ‘reasonably short notice’: delay of the proceedings is a crucial factor in the Article 34 mechanism.
with respect to a stay in favour of Brasil, that Brazilian courts unlike the Dutch (see below) have ruled and will continue to rule in favour of the case having to go to arbitration, and that such awards might not even be recognisable in The Netherlands (mutatis mutandis, the Anerkennungsprognose of Article 34).
Further, against the non-EU based defendants, this of course takes place under residual Dutch rules, particularly
Firstly (Dutch CPR) Article 7(1)’s anchor defendants mechanism such as it does in Shell. The court here found that exercise of jurisdiction would not be exorbitant, as claimed by Petrobas: most of the claims against the Dutch and non-Dutch defendants are so closely connected as to justify a joint hearing for reasons of efficiency, in order to prevent irreconcilable judgments from being given in the event that the cases were heard and determined separately: a clear echo of course of CJEU authority on Article 8(1). The court also rejects the suggestion that application of the anchor mechanism is abusive.
It considers these issues at 5.11 ff: relevant is inter alia that the Dutch defendants have published incorrect, incomplete, and/or misleading financial information, have on the basis of same during the fraud period issued shares, bonds or securities and in that period have deliberately and wrongly raised expectations among investors. Moreover, at 5:15: Petrobras has itself stated on its website that it has a strategic presence in the Netherlands.
Against two claims ‘involvement’ of the NL-based defendants was not upheld, and jurisdiction denied.
Further, a subsidiary jurisdictional claim for these two rejected claims on the basis of forum necessitatis (article 9 of the Duch CPR) was not upheld: Brazilian authorities are clearly cracking down on fraud and corruption (At 5.25 ff).
Finally and again for these two remaining claims, are the Netherlands the place where the harmful event occurred (Handlungsort) and /or the place where the damage occurred (Erfolgsort)? Not so, the court held: at 5.22: the Foundation has not stated enough with regard to the involvement of the Dutch defendants in those claims, for the harmful event to be localised in the Netherlands with some sufficient force. As for locus damni and with echos of Universal Music: at 5.24: that the place where the damage has occurred is situated in the Netherlands, cannot be drawn from the mere circumstance that purely financial damage has directly occurred in the Dutch bank accounts of the (allegedly) affected investors – other arguments (see at 5.24) made by the Foundation did not convince.
Finally, an argument was made that the Petrobas arbitration clause contained in its articles of association, rule out recourse to the courts in ordinary. Here, an interesting discussion took place on the relevant language version to be consulted: the Court went for the English one, seeing as this is a text which is intended to be consulted by persons all over the world (at 5.33). The English version of article 58 of the articles of association however is insufficiently clear and specific: there is no designated forum to rule on any disputes covered by the clause. Both under Dutch and Brazilian law, the Court held, giving up the constitutional right of gaining access to the independent national court requires that the clause clearly states that arbitration has been agreed. That clarity is absent: the version consulted by the court read
“Art. 58 -It shall be resolved by means of arbitration [italics added, district court], obeying the rules provided by the Market Arbitration Chamber, the disputes or controversies that involve the Company, its shareholders, the administrators and members of the Fiscal Council, for the purposes of the application of the provision contained in Law n° 6.404, of 1976, in this Articles of Association, in the rules issued by the National Monetary Council, by the Central Bank of Brazil and by the Brazilian
Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as in the other rules applicable to the functioning of the capital market in general, besides the ones contained in the agreements eventually executed by Petrobras with the stock exchange or over-the-counter market entity, accredited by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, aiming at the adoption of standards of corporate governance established by these entities, and of the respective rules of differentiated practices of corporate governance, as the case may be.”
A very relevant and well argued case – no doubt subject to appeal.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed.2016, Chapter 2, almost in its entirety.
PrivatBank v Kolomoisky and Boholiubov. The High court puts the spotlight on the abuse of the anchor mechanism, on reflexive effect of lis alibi pendens, and on Article 34’s new rule.
In  EWHC 3308 (Ch) PrivatBank v Kolomoisky and Boholiubov et al the High Court has set aside a worldwide freezing order (‘WFO’) granted earlier at the request of Ukraine’s PrivatBank, against Ihor Kolomoisky and Hennadiy Boholiubov – its two former main shareholders.
The case considers a high number of issues to which even a long blog post cannot do justice – I will consider these further in a paper in progress.
The issues to be determined, are
- First, whether the Bank has a good arguable case (as pleaded in the particulars of claim) that loss of US$1.91 billion plus interest was caused to it by the alleged fraud of the Defendants. For the purposes of these applications, all Defendants do not dispute that there is a good arguable case that US$248 million of loss was caused to the Bank by the pleaded fraud, but they deny any good arguable case of loss in excess of that amount.
- Second, whether the worldwide freezing orders should be set aside in whole or in part for non-disclosure or misrepresentation, or reduced to or reimposed in a lesser maximum sum than the current maximum sum of US$2.6 billion.
- Third, whether the Court has jurisdiction over the First and Second Defendants under Article 6.1 Lugano by reason of the claim against the English Defendants as “anchor defendants”. Although the claims as pleaded against the First and Second Defendants and the English Defendants are closely connected, the particular issue is whether the claim against the English Defendants was brought with the sole object of removing the First and Second Defendants from Swiss jurisdiction and so was an abuse of Article 6
- Fourth, if there is jurisdiction against the First and Second Defendants, whether the claims against them and the English Defendants should be stayed on grounds of lis pendens in Ukraine. This raises separate questions:
- a) Whether the Court has power to stay proceedings against the First and Second Defendants (where jurisdiction only exists (if at all) under the Lugano Convention) in favour of proceedings in a non-Convention state, namely Ukraine. The First and Second Defendants argue that Article 28 of the Convention, which empowers a Convention State to stay proceedings on grounds of lis pendens in another Convention State, should be applied by analogy (or ‘reflexively’ in favour of proceedings in a non-Convention State.
- b) Whether the Court should stay proceedings against the English Defendants (who are sued in accordance with Article 4 of the recast Brussels Regulation) in favour of proceedings in Ukraine. The issue here is as to the meaning, effect and application of Article 34 of the Regulation, which as from 10 January 2015 conferred a power on EU States in defined circumstances to stay proceedings in favour of proceedings in a non-Member State (“a third State”).
- Fifth, to the extent that the Court has power to stay on grounds of lis pendens in Ukraine, whether it should exercise that power given the nature of the proceedings in Ukraine, the degree of connection between the Bank’s claim and Ukraine and the risk of irreconcilable judgments if no stay is granted.
- Sixth, whether the Court should set aside the permission granted without notice to serve the claim form on the BVI Defendants out of the jurisdiction, or alternatively stay the proceedings against the BVI Defendants on grounds of forum non conveniens.
Fancourt J’s judgment implies in essence
First of all, very careful and complete consideration of the Lugano Convention’s anchor defendant mechanism.
(hence also implicating Brussels I Recast case-law, particularly Reisch Montage, Freeport and CDC), but also Sabbagh v Khoury, in which as I noted at the time the Court of Appeal struggles with the precise role for merits review in examining a potential abuse of the anchor defendant mechanism.
One assumes counsel for the defendants did an excellent job in deciphering precedent. This includes Ali Malek QC who is clearly a counsel of choice for international litigation, witness his involvement in other cases, too, this week: on which more soon on the blog.
Kolomoisky and Boholiubov may be sued in England and Wales, despite their Swiss domicile, only if the claims against them and the claims against the English Defendants are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together, to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings: that is the wording of Article 6.1 of the Lugano Convention, as it is of (now) Article 8(1) Brussels I Recast.
[Note parties, Mr Bogolyubov specifically, earlier in the year in  EWHC 160 (Ch) successfully had applied for a declaration that they were not domiciled in the UK; hence no Article 4 jurisdiction.
As I have pointed out on various occasions (use ‘fraud’ or ‘fraus’ as a search term in the blog’s search box), abuse is not a concept easily caught in statute and given the need for high predictability in the application of the Brussels and Lugano regimes, the CJEU is not finding it easy to provide much instruction.
Justice Fancourt excellently reviews the issues 85 ff and it is best to let those paras speak for their insightful selves. One readers have done so, they will see that at 93, his conclusion is ‘any artificial fulfilment (or apparent fulfilment) of the express requirements of Article 6.1 is impermissible, and this includes a case where the sole object of the claim against the anchor defendant is to remove the foreign defendant from the jurisdiction of domicile. Bringing a hopeless claim is one example of such abuse, but the abuse may be otherwise established by clear evidence. In principle, the fact that there is a good arguable case against the anchor defendant should not prevent a co-defendant from establishing abuse on some other ground, including that the “sole object” of the claim is to provide jurisdiction against a foreign domiciled co-defendant.‘
Onus of proof of abuse lies on the defendant, and it was met here: the English Defendants serving as anchor, are not considered legitimate targets in their own right. Five reasons for same are listed in para 99 ff: it is clear that a single criterion will not be enough to meet the burden of proof, rather a number if indications will contribute to an overall finding of abuse.
Having established that the Switzerland-based defendants ought to be sued there or indeed in the Ukraine, the Court turns to the English defendants’ attempt to have it apply Brussels I Recast’s new Article 34 rule on lis alibi pendens in favour of third States.
At 129, Justice Fancourt reviews the cases which might potentially be said to be ‘related’ to the English proceedings. At the heart of that analysis lies a defamation claim which (at 144) ‘Although the causes of action in the Ukrainian claim of the First Defendant and the claim of the Bank in the current proceedings are quite different, I am satisfied that there is considerable factual overlap between the allegations made against the Defendants in the Bank’s claim and the allegations published by the Ukrainian journal that the First Defendant seeks to challenge as unfounded and defamatory in the Ukrainian proceedings. The general subject-matter is one and the same: a fraudulent scheme to embezzle huge sums of money from the Bank, orchestrated by the First and Second Defendants and making use of a large number of shell companies, including the English and BVI Defendants, to circulate monies and conceal their whereabouts. Key issues that may have to be determined in each claim will be: whether there was a fraudulent scheme; who set it up and operated it; how did it work; what was its purpose; who benefited from the scheme, and how much money was unlawfully removed from the Bank.’
This analysis presumes, in my view correctly, that the term ‘related’ in the Article 34 rule, is to be interpreted in line with (now) Article 30 Brussels I Recast on related intra-EU actions.
At 145: ‘if the appeal in the defamation proceedings were to fail, or the claims be otherwise disposed of on a limited point of law, any stay granted under Article 34 (or by analogy with it) will be lifted.‘
Upon reflection, a stay of proceedings in favour of the Ukranaian case, is granted, for the reasons that
- (the ultimate condition for applying Article 34) a potential eventual judgment in Ukraine on the defamation case is likely to be recognised and enforced in England; this is the so-called [but not so by the High Court 🙂 ] Anerkennungsprognose;
- the claim has a high proximity to the Ukraine: the issues raised in common by the defamation claim and the current proceedings are almost exclusively concerned with events in Ukraine; the majority of witnesses will be Ukrainian, and Ukrainian law will apply to decide both sets of proceedings. By contrast, none of the harmful acts complained of occurred in England; the matters in issue have no connection with England at all, and the existence of three English defendants is of no materiality. The proximity of the claim to Ukraine therefore points strongly in favour of a stay.
- finally, at 158 ff: The Bank nevertheless argues that a stay would be contrary to the proper administration of justice – a core criterion to Article 34. ‘It contends that the current proceedings cry out for determination by a truly independent tribunal. But the Bank does not contend that the Ukrainian court is unable to resolve the issues or that it cannot obtain justice in Ukraine. There is no evidence on the basis of which this court can conclude that the Ukrainian courts would not provide justice to the parties. Similarly, there is no evidence before the court that would justify a conclusion that the Ukrainian judiciary is not independent. The Bank complains about how the First Defendant obtained an interim injunction against the Bank and Hogan Lovells on 15th December 2017, without proper process taking place; but this order was set aside in Ukraine on appeal, demonstrating that justice can be achieved by the Bank.’
Note that at 161 Justice Fancourt emphasises the relative character of the stay: ‘The argument against a stay would have greater weight if the stay to be granted under Article 34 (or by reference to its principles) were a once and for all decision, but it is clear that it should not be so confined. Under Article 34.2, these proceedings may be continued at any time when it is appropriate to do so, and so potential prejudice to the Bank in granting a stay is thereby limited. If the appeal in Ukraine is dismissed, or if though successful the claim is disposed of without a judgment on the merits, or if the First Defendant does not properly pursue the claim to judgment, the grounds for a continuing stay are likely to fall away’.
Fancourt J also adds obiter that had he accepted jurisdiction against the Switzerland-based defendants on the basis of the anchor mechanism, he would have granted a stay in those proceedings, too, applying the lis alibi pendens rule of Lugano reflexively, despite the absence of an Article 34 mechanism in Lugano. Consideration of this issue is at 114 ff, with of course reference to Ferrexpo. (Although even there this particular point may have been made obiter, as Justice Fancourt himself points out at 123). The suggestion is made that in accepting such reflexive, ex-Lugano effect of the Lugano lis alibi pendens rule, the courts should take instruction from the Article 34 Brussels I-Recast conditions. This is not a straightforward proposition by any means and the debate is far from settled.
Finally, jurisdiction against the BVI defendants is dismissed at this time on the basis of forum non conveniens: at 172 and necessarily entangled with the other findings: ‘So far as forum conveniens is concerned, the claim against the First and Second Defendants will not proceed in England. The natural forum for a trial of that claim is Ukraine though, as regards Lugano Convention States, the First and Second Defendants are entitled to be sued in Switzerland. The task of the court in exercising its discretion is to identify the forum in which the case can be suitably tried in the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice: see Altimo Holdings at . The natural forum is Ukraine, in that all the parties are Ukrainian, almost all the events occurred in Ukraine and Ukrainian law is the governing law. There is no suggestion by any party that they cannot have a fair trial in Ukraine. However, the Bank may not be willing to sue the First and Second Defendants in Ukraine: if it cannot sue them in England it may sue them in Switzerland.
With PrivatBank v Kolomoisky and Boholiubov we now have a much more reasoned application of Article 34 than the more concise considerations in B.win v Emerald Bay and also interesting additional analysis as compared to Zavarco.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law – 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 188.8.131.52
Anchor defendants in follow-up competition law cases. The High Court in Vattenfall et al v Prysmian et al.
A classic case of follow-up damages litigation in competition law, here in the high voltage power cables cartel, fines for which were confirmed by the CJEU early July. Core to the case is the application of Article 8(1)’s anchor defendants mechanism. Only two of the defendants are UK incorporated companies – UK subsidiaries of companies that have been found by the European Commission to have infringed EU competition law.
Authority cited includes of course CDC, Roche Nederland and Painer, and Cooper Tyre (sale of the cartelised products can amount to implementation of the cartel). Vattenfall confirms that for the English courts, ‘knowingly implementing’ the cartel has a low threshold.
At 89 ff the Court refers to the pending case of (what I now know to be) C-724/17 Skanska Industrial Solutions e.a.: Finnish Courts are considering the application for cartel damages against parent companies on acquiring cartelist subsidiaries, had dissolved them. Relevance for Vattenfall lies with the issue of knowledge: the Finnish courts wonder what Article 101 TFEU has to say on the degree of knowledge of the cartelist activities, relevant for the liability of the parent company. An application of fraus, or abuse in other words. Elleray DJ however, did not consider the outcome of that reference to be relevant for the case at hand, in its current stage of procedure.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 184.108.40.206
Towards the end of July, the Court at Amsterdam applied the recent CJEU judgment in CDC, on the application of (now) Article 8’s rule on anchor defendants. The case also involved CDC – busy bees on the competition enforcement front, this time pursuing inter alia Kemira, a Finnish company, using Akzo Nobel NV, domiciled in The Netherlands, as anchor defendants.
The court referred in extenso to the CJEU’s CDC case, noting inter alia that it is not up to CDC to show that the suit was not just introduced to remove Kemira from the Finnish judge: that Kemira suggests that introduction of the suit in The Netherlands is not very logical given the absence of factual links to that Member State, does not suffice. The court also adopted the CJEU’s finding on choice of court and liability in tort. In the absence of specific proviso in a standard contractual choice of court, the application of such choice of court to extracontactual liability [such as here, for infringement of competition law] cannot be assumed.
Finally, at 2.18, the Court also referred to argument made by Kemira that Finish and Swedish law ought to apply to the interpretation (not: the validity) of the choice of court agreement. That would have been an interesting discussion. However in light of the court’s earlier judgment on the irrelevance of the court of choice, the court did not entertain that issue.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law. 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12, Heading 220.127.116.11.