Tag: Zulfikarpašić

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Notaries, national certificates of succession and the concept of ‘court’. Bot AG in WB.

Update 21 September 2020 a new CJEU reference from Poland is on its way, as reported by Carlos Santaló Goris here. This time by a notary itself – which of course begs the question whether the request is admissible under Article 267 TFEU.

Update 24 May the Court yesterday confirmed the Opinion in its entirety.

Case C-658/17 WB is one of the first in which the annoying new rule on anonymisation at the CJEU kicks in. At issue is the characterisation of notaries as ‘court’ under the EU succession Regulation 650/2012.

Particularly with regard to succession law, notaries in the Member States carry out tasks which can be considered ‘judicial’. In some jurisdictions (especially in the Anglo-Saxon world) a court is involved in transferring the estate from the deceased to those inheriting. This is not the case in most Member States with a so-called ‘Latin’ office of notary. A private international law regulation concerning inheritance can therefore not solely be aimed at courts in the traditional sense of the word. In particular, notaries and registry offices, but also testamentary executors entrusted with judicial authority, need to be integrated.

The rules with regard to jurisdiction and applicable law included in the Regulation have to be complied with by all above-mentioned legal professions, though only to the extent that they exercise judicial functions. The Regulation therefore adopts, in Article 3(2), a functional approach of a ‘court’:

For the purposes of this Regulation, the term ‘court’ means any judicial authority and all other authorities and legal professionals with competence in matters of succession which exercise judicial functions or act pursuant to a delegation of power by a judicial authority or act under the control of a judicial authority, provided that such other authorities and legal professionals offer guarantees with regard to impartiality and the right of all parties to be heard and provided that their decisions under the law of the Member State in which they operate:

(a)     may be made the subject of an appeal to or review by a judicial authority; and

(b)    have a similar force and effect as a decision of a judicial authority on the same matter.

The Member States shall notify the Commission of the other authorities and legal professionals referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 79.

Outside of the exercise of judicial functions, notaries are not bound by the rules on jurisdiction, and the authentic instruments they issue circulate in accordance with the provisions on authentic instruments rather than ‘judgments’.

In accordance with Article 79 of the Regulation, the Commission (on the basis of notifications by the Member States) has established a list of the authorities and legal professions which need to be considered as ‘courts’ in accordance with this functional determination. This list will also be particularly interesting for internal national use.

However I have always emphasised to Member States compiling their lists, that unlike in the Insolvency Regulation, where the extent of cover of national proceedings is entirely in the hands of the Member States, for the Succession Regulation it is an autonomous EU  definition which drives cover by the Regulation.

Bot AG agrees (Opinion of 28 February; not available in English). whether or not a particular office and /or function is included in the national notification is not determinant. An EU definition of Court kicks in. He refers in particular to his overview in C-484/15 Zulfikarpašić. Reference is also made to Pula Parking. Applied to the case at issue, Polish notaries by virtue of Polish law may only issue the Polish (not: EU) certificate of succession if there is consensus among the parties and no disagreement e.g. re jurisdiction. No judicial functions therefore and the certificate travels as an authentic instrument, not a judgment.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 6, Heading 6.2.1.

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CJEU in Zulikarpašić: Suggest generic criteria for ‘courts’; completes the analysis for the notarial question at issue.

The Court held  yesterday in Zulikarpašić Case C-484/15. I review Bot AG ‘s Opinion here.  At issue is the interpretation of ‘court’ and ‘judgment’ in the European enforcement order Regulation. Mutatis mutandis therefore the case has implications for most other EU private international law instruments, which employ similar terms. In all of these Regulations, the terms ‘court’ and ‘judgment’ are under- or not at all defined. The CJEU in fact refers to considerations under the Brussels I Recast in its judgment yesterday. And indeed its approach in Zulfikarpašić was confirmed on the same day for the Brussels I Recast, in Pula Parking.

For the determination of a ‘court’ the AG had emphasised guarantees as to independence and impartiality; the power to decide on one’s own authority; leading to a finding which was or may be subject to an exchange of arguments and may be challenged before a judicial authority. The AG had suggested that whether these conditions are fulfilled is for the national courts to assess.

The Court itself referred to a number of classic principles for the interpretation of EU private international law: autonomous interpretation; mutual trust; legitimate expectations. It then reformulated but essentially suggests similar criteria as its AG: for a finding to be qualified as a judgment, it must have been delivered in court proceedings offering guarantees of independence and impartiality and of compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem (at 43).In the Croatian procedure at issue, the notary issues an authentic instrument which, if it is challenged as to its content, is moved up the pecking order to court proceedings. The proceedings before the notary not meeting with the Court’s generic criteria, in contrast with the AG the Court itself already holds that the notaries at issue do not act as courts and their decisions are not ‘judgments’.

Geert.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.1.1. Chapter 6, Heading 6.2.1.

 

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Bot AG in Zulikarpašić: Are notaries ‘courts’ and do they issue ‘judgments’?

Postscript 9 March 2017. The Court held today. Post here.

In Zulikarpašić Case C-484/15, Bot AG opined on 8 September. At issue is the intepretation of ‘court’ and ‘judgment’ in the European enforcement order Regulation. Mutatis mutandis therefore the case has implications for most other EU private international law instruments, which employ similar terms. In all of these Regulations, the terms ‘court’ and ‘judgment’ are under- or not at all defined.

The question was submitted in the context of a dispute between Ibrica Zulfikarpašić, a lawyer established in Croatia, and Slaven Gajer, who is also domiciled in Croatia, regarding the certification as a European Enforcement Order, of a writ of execution issued by a notary based on an authentic document.  The referring court essentially inquires whether a notary who, in accordance with Croatian law, has issued a definitive and enforceable writ of execution based on an authentic document has the power to certify it as a European Enforcement Order where it has not been opposed. If the answer is no, the referring court asks whether a national court can carry out that certification where the writ of execution concerns an uncontested claim.

Article 4(1) of Regulation 805/2004 defines ‘judgment’ as ‘any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be called, including a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court’. Article 2(a) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation now includes exactly the same definition. Yves Bot himself summarised the CJEU’s case-law on the notion of ‘judgment’ in the Brussels I Regulation in Gothaer. He reiterates that Opinion here and I should like to refer readers to my earlier summary of the Opinion in Gothaer.

After a tour de table of the various opinions expressed ia by the EC and by a number of Member States, the Advocate General submits that the concept of ‘court’ should be interpreted, for the purposes of Regulation No 805/2004, as covering all bodies offering guarantees of independence and impartiality, deciding on their own authority by a judgment which, first, was or may be subject to an exchange of arguments before being certified as a European Enforcement Order and, second, may be challenged before a judicial authority (at 108). A functional approach, therefore (at 109).

Advocate General Bot submits therefore that an enforcement title such as a writ of execution issued by a notary based on an authentic document constitutes a judgment within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Regulation No 805/2004, provided that the notary with power to issue that writ adjudicates, in the exercise of that specific function, as a court, which requires him to offer guarantees as to his independence and impartiality and to decide on his own authority by a judgment which, first, was or may be subject to an exchange of arguments before being certified as a European Enforcement Order and, second, may be challenged before a judicial authority. 

Whether these conditions are fulfilled is for the national courts to assess.

This Opinion and the eventual judgment by the Court will also be relevant for the application of the Succession Regulation, 650/2012. In matters covered by that Regulation, notaries throughout the EU have an important say and may quite easily qualifies as a ‘court’. Bot AG refers to the Regulation’s definition of ‘court’ at 71 ff of his current Opinion.

Geert.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.1.1. Chapter 6, Heading 6.2.1.

 

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