Posts Tagged Weil

Gray v Hurley. Court of Appeal refers to Luxembourg on anti-suit to support EU jurisdiction against ex-EU action.

Update a few hours after posting. For the New Zealand perspective see Jan Jakob Bornheim’s thread here.

I reviewed the High Court’s decision (refusal of anti-suit) in Gray v Hurley here. The Court of Appeal [2019] EWCA Civ 2222 has now referred to Luxembourg.

As I noted at the time, the High Court discussed the matrimonial exception of Brussels Ia, as well as the exclusive jurisdictional rule of Article 24(1), and (briefly) Article 25’s choice of court. The appeal however only concerns the application of Article 4’s domicile rule. Was Mr Hurley domiciled in England on 26 March 2019, when the court was seized?  Article 62(1) Brussels Ia refers to the internal law. Lavender J decided that Mr Hurley was not domiciled in England, however that Lindner should be read as extending to the defendant’s last known domicile in a case where the Court: (1) is unable to identify the defendant’s place of domicile; and (2) has no firm evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant is in fact domiciled outside the European Union. I suggested at the time that this is a very relevant and interesting reading of Lindner, extending the reach of Brussels Ia as had been kickstarted by Owusu, with due deference to potential New Zealand jurisdiction (New Zealand domicile not having been established).

Note also that Mr Hurley had initially also relied on A34 BI1 however later abandoned this line. Article 34 is however cross-referenced in the discussion on Article 4’s domicile rule.

The Court of Appeal has concluded that the meaning of Article 4(1) and its applicability in this case is not acte clair and has referred to Luxembourg. The focus of the discussion was not whether or not Ms Gray was domiciled in England (see however my doubts as to the extension of Linder in the case at issue). Rather, the focus is on anti-suit and Article 4: Ms Gray submits that Article 4(1) provides her with a right not to be sued outside England, where she is domiciled, and that the court is obliged to give effect to this right by the grant of an anti-suit injunction to restrain proceedings in a third State.

As the Court of Appeal notes, the consequences of her arguments are that an EU-domiciled tortfeasor who was being sued only in a third State could require the court of his domicile to grant an anti-suit injunction – in contrast to the ‘flexible mechanism’ under Articles 33 and 34 in cases where the same or related proceedings exist in both jurisdictions. By the same token, if there are proceedings in a Member State, the defendant could seek an anti-suit injunction to prevent the claimant from taking or continuing unrelated proceedings in a third State. And, as appears from the present case, it is said that it makes no difference that the claimant’s case is not one that the courts of the Member State could themselves entertain, meaning that the ‘right’ said to be conferred on the claimant by Article 4(1) would have no content.

Yet again therefore interesting issues on the use of anti-suit to support EU (rather than: a particular Member State) jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal is minded not to side with Ms Gray, for comity reasons (anti-suit being a serious meddle in other States’ jurisdictional assessment) and because the use of anti-suit here would not serve the Regulation’s objectives of sound and harmonious administration of justice. At 52 it suggests the MS Gray line of reasoning would have profound consequence which would be expected to be explicit in the Regulation and not to be arrived at sub silentio – but refers to the CJEU for certainty.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2 practically in its entirety.

 

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Gray v Hurley [2019] EWHC 1636 (QB). Engages big chunks of Brussels Ia and eventually relies on Lindner to uphold Article 4 jurisdiction.

Thank you Jan Jakob Bornheim for flagging Gray v Hurley [2019] EWHC 1636 (QB), in which as he puts it, ‘there is a lot going on’. Judgment is best referred to for facts of the case. On 25 March 2019 Mr Hurley commenced proceedings against Ms Gray in New Zealand. On 26 March 2019 Ms Gray issued the claim form in the present action and obtained an order for alternative service.

Of interest to the blog is first of all the matrimonial exception of Brussels Ia, nota bene recently applied by the CJEU in C-361/18 WeilArticle 1(2)(a) Brussels Ia (Lavender J using the English judges’ shorthand ‘Judgments Regulation’) provides that it does not apply to matters relating to: “…rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship or out of a relationship deemed by the law applicable to such relationship to have comparable effects to marriage.”

There is no EU-wide harmonisation of the conflict of law rules for matrimonial property. The UK is not party to the enhanced co-operation rules in the area and Lavender J did not consider any role these rules might play in same. Rome I and Rome II have a similar exception as Brussels Ia and at 111 Lavender J takes inspiration from Recital 10 Rome II which states that this exception “should be interpreted in accordance with the law of the Member State in which the court is seised.” Discussion ensues whether this is a reference to the substantive law of the court seized (Ms Gray’s position; English law does not deem their relationship to have comparable effects to marriage) or the private international law rules of same (Mr Hurley’s position; with in his view residual English private international law pointing to the laws of New Zealand, which does deem their relationship to have comparable effects to marriage). Lavender J does not say so expresses verbis but seems to side with the exclusion of renvoi: at 115: ‘I do not consider that the relationship between Ms Gray and Mr Hurley was a relationship deemed by the law applicable to such relationship to have comparable effects to marriage.’ Brussels Ia’s matrimonial exception therefore is not engaged.

Next, the application of the exclusive jurisdictional rule of Article 24(1) is considered. Ms Gray’s claim here essentially aims to establish her full ownership of the ‘San Martino’ property in Italy. Webb v Webb is considered, as are Weber v Weber and Komu v Komu (readers of the blog are aware that A24(1) cases often involve feuds between family members). Lavender J concludes that Ms Gray’s claim essentially is like Webb Sr’s in Webb v Webb: Ms Gray is not seeking an order for the sale of San Martino (and it does not appear that the right of pre-emption would be triggered by a judgment in her favour, as it would be by an order for sale). Nor is she seeking to give effect to her existing interest in San Martino. Rather, she claims that Mr Hurley holds his interest in San Martino on trust for her.

Application of Article 25 choice of court is summarily dismissed at 131 ff: there was choice of court and law (pro: Italy) in the preliminary sales and purchase agreement between the seller and Ms Gray. However, this clearly does not extend to the current dispute.

Next comes the application of Article 4’s domicile rule. Was Mr Hurley domiciled in England on 26 March 2019, when the court was seized?  Article 62(1) Brussels Ia refers to the internal law. Application is made by Lavender J of inter alia [2018] EWHC 160 (Ch), Shulman v Kolomoisky which I also included here; he also considers the implications of CJEU C-327/10 Lindner, and eventually decides that Mr Hurley was not domiciled in England, however that Lindner should be read as extending to the defendant’s last known domicile in a case where the Court: (1) is unable to identify the defendant’s place of domicile; and (2) has no firm evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant is in fact domiciled outside the European Union. This is a very relevant and interesting reading of Lindner, extending the reach of Brussels Ia as had been kickstarted by Owusu, with due deference to potential New Zealand jurisdiction (New Zealand domicile not having been established).

Final conclusion, therefore, is that Ms Hurley may rely on Article 4 Brussels Ia. Quite what impact this has on the New Zealand proceedings is not discussed.

Interesting judgment on many counts.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2 practically in its entirety.

 

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The CJEU in Weil: assessment of the scope of application of Brussels Ia at the A53 certificate stage; and a narrow reading of the matrimonial exception.

The CJEU this morning held (without AG Opinion) in C-361/18 Ágnes Weil v Géza Gulácsi.

Overall context is that Brussels Ia does not apply to ‘the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession’.

Ms Weil and Mr Gulácsi were unregistered partners. Mr Gulácsi was ordered by Hungarian court order to pay Ms Weil approximately EUR 2 060, together with interest for late payment, by virtue of the settlement of rights in property arising out of their de facto (unregistered) non-martial partnership. Ms Weil later applied to the same court to have it issue the Article 53 certificate which would facilitate her enforcement in the UK (where Mr Gulácsi lives and has a regular income). Questions raised, were

‘(1)      Is Article 53 of Regulation … No 1215/2012 to be interpreted as meaning that, if requested by one of the parties, the court of the Member State that delivered the decision must issue the certificate relating to the decision automatically, without examining if [the case] falls within the scope of Regulation … No 1215/2012?

(2)      If the answer to the first question is in the negative, is Article 1(2)(a) of Regulation … No 1215/2012 to be interpreted as meaning that a repayment action between members of an unregistered non-marital [de facto] partnership falls within the scope of the rights in property arising out of a relationship deemed … to have comparable (legal) effects to marriage?’

The  Court answers the first question in the negative: at the recognition and enforcement stage, things must go very swift indeed. The mutual trust required of courts must be backed up by proper consideration of the Regulation by the courts of the Member State of initial adjudication: at 33:

‘the need to ensure the swift enforcement of judgments, while preserving the legal certainty on which the mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European Union is based, justifies, in particular in a situation such as that of the main proceedings — where the court which gave the judgment to be enforced did not adjudicate, when giving that judgment, on whether [Brussels I and Ia] was applicable — that the court hearing the application for the certificate ascertains, at that stage, whether the dispute falls within that regulation.’

It adds at 35 that

the enforcement procedure, under Regulation No 44/2001, precludes, like enforcement under Regulation No 1215/2012, any subsequent review on the part of a court of the Member State addressed of whether the action giving rise to the judgment for which enforcement is sought falls within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, the grounds for challenging the declaration that a judgment is enforceable being exhaustively laid down by that regulation.

This I find interesting for unless I missed it, there has not yet been a CJEU decision holding this much and as I discuss on pp 191-192 of the Handbook, there is scholarly discussion on same.

With respect to the matrimonial property exception, the CJEU after of course emphasising the need for a restrictive interpretation of the exceptions, acknowledges that Brussels Ia has extended this but only to relationships deemed comparable to marriage (at 44). Unregistered partnerships do not qualify.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.1.2, Heading 2.2.16.1.2 .

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