Tag: Van Uden

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Weco Projects ASP v Zea Marine Carier GmbH: provisional measures, court-appointed surveyor’s powers in the light of arbitration.

Genova’s court ruling in Weco Projects ASP v Zea MArine Carier GmbH is remarkably similar to the Belo Horizonte (Cefetra et al v Ms ‘IDA’ Oetker Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MbH & Co KG et al) ruling at the Court of Rotterdam, which I reviewed here. Transport is of a yacht is the issue, sinking the event, and London arbitration the agreed dispute resolution. What powers do the courts in ordinary still have to order interim measures?

The court could have discussed the arbitration /Brussels Ia interface, as well as Article 35’s provisional measures. Instead, it mentions neither and relies entirely on an Italian Supreme Court precedent as Maurizio Dardani and Luca di Marco review excellently here (many thanks to Maurizio for forwarding me the case). An exciting, and missed opportunity to bring these issues into focus.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.15.

 

 

 

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Arcelor Mittal v Essar. The High Court races ahead in its support for arbitration. On comity, fraud, and worldwide freezing orders.

 

[2019] EWHC 724 (Comm) ArcelorMittal USA LLC v Essar Steel Limited and others is quite the highlight in worldwide regulatory competition for championing arbitration.

As 20 Essex Street note, Jacobs J refused to vary an earlier worldwide freezing order (WFO), despite the award being foreign, Claimant and Defendant companies being foreign, there being no significant assets within the jurisdiction, and the courts at Mauritius (defendant is Mauritius-incorporated, defendant to the Arbitration Claim, and the debtor under the ICC award) potentially feeling gazumped by their English colleagues.

Of note over and above Essex Street’s analysis is

  • the defendants urging the Court on the grounds of comity (no need for the English courts to act at policeman for assets located abroad: at 72, referring to Popplewell J. in Conocophillips China Inc v Greka Energy (International) BV. [2013] EWHC 2733) to resist the call for a WFO. This was rejected (at 81) with the argument ‘I consider that I am entitled to proceed on the basis of the evidence that the Mauritian courts would not regard the WFO as offensive in some way.’; and ‘The WFO does not presently conflict with any order of the Mauritian courts, and this is not a case where the Mauritian courts have refused equivalent relief or where there is evidence that those courts would be likely to do so.’ Jacobs J therefore does consider comity quite carefully.

 

  • the Court’s sense of urgency in what it sees as a case of fraus: At 45:

‘There is no precise definition of what is meant by the phrase “international fraud” found in the case-law, but I do not consider that it is confined to cases where the underlying cause of action is a claim in deceit or a proprietary claim relating to the theft of assets. If there is a strong case of serious wrongdoing comprising conduct on a large or repeated scale whereby a company, or the group of which it is a member, is acting in a manner prejudicial to its creditors, and in bad faith, then I see no reason why the English court should not be willing to intervene rather than to stand by and allow the conduct to continue and, to put the matter colloquially, to let the wrongdoer get away with it. In the present case, I would regard the attempted dissipation of Essar Steel’s US$ 1.5 billion asset, in the face of the commencement of arbitration proceedings, as sufficient in itself potentially to warrant intervention under the “international fraud” exception, or as constituting “exceptional circumstances”.’

 

  • and the rejection at 73 of a CJEU C-391/95 Van Uden type of restraint, requiring a real connecting link between the subject matter of the measures sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the English court.

 

Geert.

 

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Banca Turco: Popplewell J explains that worlwide freezing orders, particularly ex parte, are not extended willy-nilly.

In [2018] EWHC 662 (Comm) Banca Turco Romana, Popplewell J explained his reasons for discontinuing ex parte freezing orders, with reference among others to C-391/95 Van Uden. At 22-23 he discusses the not entirely clear application of the jurisdictional rules of Brussels I, which indicated that that Regulation was engaged either via Article 2 (now 4: domicile in Romania) or 4 (now 6): residual Member State (here: Romanian) jurisdictional rules, which go on to be sheltered under the Brussels I Regulation.

At 20 he refers to the earlier case of ICICI Bank UK plc v Diminco NV [2014] EWHC 3124 (Comm) in which he summarised the English Courts’ requirements for the issuing of ex parte freezing orders where the defendant is neither resident within the jurisdiction nor someone over whom the court has or would assume in personam jurisdiction for some other reason:

‘the court will only grant a freezing order extending to foreign assets in exceptional circumstances. It is likely to be necessary for the applicant to establish at least three things:

(a)        that there is a real connecting link between the subject matter of the measure sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the English court in the sense referred to in Van Uden;

(b)        that the case is one where it is appropriate within the limits of comity for the English court to act as an international policeman in relation to assets abroad; and that will not be appropriate unless it is practical for an order to be made and unless the order can be enforced in practice if it is disobeyed; the court will not make an order even within the limits of comity if there is no effective sanction which it could apply if the order were disobeyed, as will often be the case if the defendant has no presence within the jurisdiction and is not subject to the in personam of the English court;

(c)        it is just and expedient to grant worldwide relief, taking into account the discretionary factors identified at paragraph 115 of the Motorola case. They are (i) whether the making of the order will interfere with the management of the case in the primary court, e.g. where the order is inconsistent with an order in the primary court or overlaps with it; (ii) whether it is the policy in the primary jurisdiction not itself to make to make worldwide freezing/disclosure orders; (iii) whether there is a danger that the orders made will give rise to disharmony or confusion and/or risk of conflicting, inconsistent or overlapping orders in other jurisdictions, in particular the courts of the state where the person enjoined resides or where the assets affected are located; (iv) whether at the time the order is sought there is likely to be a potential conflict as to jurisdiction rendering it inappropriate and inexpedient to make a worldwide order; and (v) whether in a case where jurisdiction is resisted and disobedience may be expected  the court will be making an order which it cannot enforce.”

In Banca Turco discontinuation was ultimately mostly based not on any slip-up of jurisdictional basis, but rather on the absence of full disclosure by the requesting party: at 45: ‘The importance of the duty of disclosure has often been emphasised.  It is the necessary corollary of the court being prepared to depart from the principle that it will hear both sides before reaching a decision, which is a basic principle of fairness.  Derogation from that basic principle is an exceptional course adopted in cases of extreme urgency or the need for secrecy.  If the court is to adopt that procedure where justice so requires, it must be able to rely on the party who appears alone to present the evidence and argument in a way which is not merely designed to promote its own interests, but in a fair and even-handed manner, drawing attention to evidence and arguments which it can reasonably anticipate the absent party would wish to make.  It is a duty owed to the court which exists in order to ensure the integrity of the court’s process.  The sanction available to the court to preserve that integrity is not only to deprive the applicant of any advantage gained by the order, but also to refuse to renew it.’

Geert.

 

 

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Belo Horizonte: Court at Rotterdam (using English as language of the oral procedure): Access to seized documents is no provisional measure under Brussels I Recast.

Arnold van Steenderen and Milan Simić have complete and concise review here of judgment of the Rotterdam court of December 2017 in re the Belo Horizonte (officially Cefetra et al v Ms ‘IDA’ Oetker Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MbH & Co KG et al). The case is a follow-up to 2015 proceedings. In these the Rotterdam court had first sanctioned seizure, and then rejected further action for claimant had not formally requested access to the documents.

Arnold and Milan summarise the facts very very helpfully – I am much obliged for the judgment is in Dutch (although as the judgment shows, the proceedings were actually conducted in English: a nice example of the use of regulatory competition in civil procedure) and their efforts have saved me a lot of translation time:

The decisions of the Rotterdam Court are a result of the carriage under bill of lading of soya beans on behalf of Cefetra B.V. (Netherlands based) on board of the “Belo Horizonte” from Argentina to the United Kingdom. Cefetra supplies raw materials to the feed, food, and fuel industries. Cefetra Ltd. (UK based) was the holder of the b/l’s and English law applied to the b/l’s. The vessel is owned by MS ‘IDA’ Oetker and is time chartered by Rudolf A Oetker (both German based, together addressed as Oetker). MS ‘IDA’ Oetker is the carrier under the b/l’s. London arbitration is agreed upon for any dispute rising from the contract of carriage and the b/l’s.

Following engine failure, ‘(d)uring the voyage, experts commissioned by both Cefetra and Oetker visited the “Belo Horizonte” to preliminary assess the condition of the vessel and its engines. Further investigation was conducted upon arrival in England. Oetker, however, only granted permission for inspection of the engine room and refused to disclose the documents on board. Crew interviews were not allowed as well. Subsequently, Cefetra obtained leave to attachment for the purpose of preserving evidence in the Netherlands on 27 October 2015. The leave was effected by the bailiff on 28 October 2015 on board of the “Belo Horizonte”. Several documents were seized and handed over to a sequestrator. Cefetra initiated proceedings’ to gain access to the seized documents.

The dispute in the main is arbitrable in London.

Oetker disputes jurisdiction of the court at Rotterdam on the basis of defendants’ domicile in Germany. Cefetra argue in favour of jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(1), alternatively 7(2) or indeed Article 35 Brussels I Recast:

  • 7(1) forum contractus: for, it is argued, the main agreement between the two parties implies an obligation to provide any relevant evidence; the place of performance for that ‘obligation in question’ lies in The Netherlands since that is where the sequestrator holds them.
  • 7(2) forum delicti: Oetker’s obstruction of truth finding is a tort which is located (locus delicti commissi) at Rotterdam since that is where Oetker opposes disclosure.
  • 35 provisional, including protective measures.

The Court does not at all entertain Cefetra’s arguments on the basis of 7(1) or 7(2). Wrongly so: plenty of not at all obvious contracts or torts could qualify as same under these provisions. To not address them at all does not make them simply go away.

The court first of all (5.7 in fine) rejects relevance of the arbitration exclusion on the basis of C-391/95 Van Uden Deco-Line. It then sticks to a very restrictive approach to Article 35, with the classic provisionary (not covered by Article 35) v provisional (covered) nature of measures, as also discussed in C-104/03 St. Paul Dairy/Unibel (to which the Court refers). In the words of the court: seizure of evidence is provisional; actual access, copy or extract is not (5.8): the court suggests this is not provisional since it allows the party to gauge the evidentiary position of the party and hence is irreversible.

I disagree -and I have at least a shelf in my library to support the discussion.

Ireversibility in fact (once the evidence seen, the party can never wipe it from its memory, so to speak) does not equate ireversibility in law. The court takes a very limited view of Article 35 and I do not believe it is the right one.

There are not that many national judgments covering Article 35 quite so expressly. This is one to treasure.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.15.

 

 

 

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