Posts Tagged United States
Quattuor, not trias politica. Delegation of legislative power to agencies. Gorsuch addresses the Montesquieuan elephant in the room.
Thank you Alison Frankel at Reuters for bringing to my attention Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch. An immigration case which triggered a delightfully written judgment by Gorsuch CJ on the delegation of power to agencies. In particular the founding fathers’ intention, against the background of separation of powers, with agencies room for statutory interpretation.
Both Ms Frankel’s article and judge Gorsuch’s pieces do much more justice to the debate than I can do in a blog post so I will leave readers first of all to read both. Judge Gorsuch, referring to precedent (Chevron in particular), notes
‘There’s an elephant in the room with us today. We have studiously attempted to work our way around it and even left it unremarked. But the fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.’
Ms Frankel notes that Chevron directed courts defer to executive-branch agencies in the interpretation of ambiguous statutes. Justice Gorsuch reviews what exactly was intended by Chevron and points to the difficulty in excessive deferring to agencies’ interpretation of statutes.
I would summarise his views as ‘Congress meant trias, not quattuor politica.’
My knowledge of US civil procedure does not stretch to understanding what impact Gorsuch CJ’s views have on current US administrative /public law. Anyone out there who can tell me please do. At any rate, the judgment is great material for comparative constitutional law classes, the CJEU’s ECB (C-270/12) case being an obvious port of call.
Update May 2016 the USSC held in March 2016. It held ‘ For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Americold’s citizenship is based on the citizenship of its members, which include its shareholders.’. I confess I do not know what that means – no doubt others do.
One night this week I was teaching a taster class to final year secondary school students (17-18yr olds). I decided I should make it challenging enough. This, I surmised, would help all those present. Either they would now run a mile from Law School, never to look back (thus taking away all doubt). Or their curiosity would be tickled enough for them to want to learn more (thus for them, too, taking away all doubt). I settled on CSR and conflicts: the Shell Nigeria case, with links to Kiobel (and Adam Smith, David Ricardo; special purpose vehicles; and the impending merger between Leuven’s AB Inbev and SAB Miller. All very exciting stuff!, in an allocated tome slot of 30 minutes). I hope readers will agree that conflict of laws does just the trick referred to above: scare off the doubters; pull in the doubters.
Anyways, that class was at the back of my mind as I was reading up on Americold Logistics. I am not a US trained or US qualified lawyer hence this posting may not be howler-proof however I understand that one particular avenue to gain access to US federal courts (as opposed to State courts; and over and above the issue being an issue based on federal law), is so-called ‘diversity jurisdiction’. This means the federal courts can hear a case if the citisenship of the parties involved is diverse: i.e. of at least two different US States or one of them being foreign. I also understand that to determine corporate citisenship, reference is made to the principal place of business (not therefore generally co-inciding with place of incorporation).
But how about trusts? What identity does a trust have with a view to diversity jurisdiction? In Americold Logistics, the Tenth Circuit sua sponte queried whether there was full diversity of citizenship among the parties. In particular, the judges challenged whether the citizenship of Americold Realty Trust, a business trust, should be determined by reference to its trustees’ citizenship, or instead by reference to some broader set of factors. This issue has deeply split courts across the country. Joining the minority of courts, the Tenth Circuit held the jurisdictional inquiry extends, at a minimum, to the citizenship of a trust’s beneficiaries in addition to its trustees’ citizenship. In this case, doing so destroyed diversity of citizenship among the parties. The issue is disputed, following relevant (seemingly inconclusive) precedent, summarised by SCOTUS here. The USCC has now granted certiorari.
This judgment will be of quite some relevance to US legal (trust) practice. I think readers will agree that it was wise not to pick it, and the wider issue of trust identity, for lawyers in spe.
Many thanks to Gideon Kracov for pointing this out to me: the proposed Responsible Electronics Recycling Act (a private member’s Bill) would install an EU-type regime on the export of electric and electronic waste outside of the US. The US have signed but not ratified the Basel Convention : RERA would amount to implementation of the Convention in practice. The Bill also recognises the relevance of recovering the many rare earth materials contained in WEEE.
Here’s the blurb (the official summary of the Bill, in fact):
Introduced in House (07/23/2013)
Responsible Electronics Recycling Act – Amends the Solid Waste Disposal Act to: (1) prohibit the export of restricted electronic waste to countries that are not members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the European Union (EU), or Liechtenstein; (2) require the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop and promulgate procedures for identifying certain electronic equipment as well as additional restricted toxic materials contained in such equipment which poses a potential hazard to human health or the environment; and (3) establish criminal penalties for knowingly exporting restricted electronic waste in violation of this Act. Allows certain exceptions to such export ban.
Defines “restricted electronic waste” to include electronic equipment (excluding parts of a motor vehicle), such as computers, televisions, printers, copiers, video game systems, telephones, and similar used electronic products, that contain cathode ray tubes, batteries, switches, and other parts containing lead, cadmium, mercury, organic solvents, hexavalent chromium, beryllium, or other toxic ingredients.
Requires persons who handle restricted electronic wastes to permit appropriate EPA and state officials access to such wastes upon request.
Directs the Secretary of Energy to establish a competitive research application program to provide grants for research in the recovering and recycling of critical minerals and rare earth elements found in electronic devices.
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”): How does one decide jurisdiction in competition cases.
Whether the US’ Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”) is jurisdictional or rather establishes a substantial condition on the merits under the US Sherman Act (its main anti-trust law) has been extensively debated and arguments for or against now also rely on the seminal Morrison litigation (emphasising the need to draw a careful line between true jurisdictional limitations and other types of rules).
The FTAIA provides in short that the Sherman Act (the main source of US anti-trust or ‘competition’ law) shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless – (1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect – (A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or (B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and (2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the Sherman Act.
In Lotes v Foxconn, Scheindlin USDJ for the US District Court of New York rejected jurisdiction and found FTAIA to be of a jurisdictional nature. Plaintiff and defendant are Chinese corporations, competing in the USB connector market. Neither of them sell or manufacture the connector in the United States, however Lotes, plaintiff, argues that the management by defendant of its patents effectively forecloses Lotes from gaining a foothold in inter alia the US market. Judge Scheindlin found there to be a disconnect between the relevant foreign market (in competition terms) in which the defendant is alleged to create a monopoly (the Chinese market in USB 3.0 connectors), and the US market supposedly affected by the attempted monpolisation.
At the level of competition authorities, the issue of jurisdiction is sometimes managed using comity considerations in inter-State agreements [such as the US -EU agreements: see here and here]. These agreements employ some form of an effects and comity doctrine. Of course where enforcement of competition law is sought through private action, these agreements do not apply, leaving courts to having to apply their standard jurisdictional (or are they – see above) rules. This is no different in the EU, albeit that jurisdiction there is much easier determined, typically on the basis of corporate domicile. What (competition) law applies, is regulated through an EU equivalent, in the Rome II Regulation, of the US’ minimum contacts doctrine.