Posts Tagged UNCITRAL
Update 21 March 2019 the proposal has now been torpedoed by one of the parties formerly serving in Belgium’s government – the BIBC will not be created for the time being.
Update 12 December 2018. The most recent proposal, the one actually adopted in Committee, is here. Note i.a. (Article 20) that the Committee has thankfully (see below) not followed the silly rules on languages. Whether the proposal will lead to law, remains to be seen: as we speak, the Belgian Government has turned into a minority government and not much is certain to go ahead before the next elections (May 2019).
I have reported twice before on the BIBC – once viz the initial version and a second time with my short report for the Parliamentary Hearing. I have now had a minute to review the Council of State’s comments on the amended version – among others with a view to preparing for next week’s conference on hybrid courts in Doha. Note that the Council of State here acts in its advisory function: essentially its opinions aim to improve draft statute so as to avoid future litigation.
What is clear from these recent comments is that the Council does not at all embrace the regulatory competition incentives which lie at the heart of the proposal, in particular in its view on how a matter may be made ‘international’ so as to justify engagement of the BIBC. Its view (let alone the Justice Council’s fear for forum shopping?!: encouraging such shopping being the very raison d’etre of the Act) contradicts the CJEU’s flexible stance on the issue as apparent eg in Vinyls Italia. As I noted in my comments before the Committee, it is a rather odd indeed parochial requirement to insist on parties having used English in their correspondence, before they can validly engage the BIBC. Even the suggested amendment that the use of languages other than Belgium’s three official ones (French, Dutch, German) should suffice, is not convincing to the Council. One hopes the drafters will ignore the Council’s hesitation at this point.
The Council does not of course engage in the political discussions surrounding the proposal: in particular, whether in a country in which the court system arguably does not operate to satisfaction, the creation of an international commercial court may compound, rather than remedy issues.
Videology: Snowden J’s textbook consideration of COMI under UNCITRAL Model Law and EU Insolency Regulations.
Looking at my back queue for blog postings,  EWHC 2186 (Ch) Videology is one I do wish to bring to the attention of my readers. Snowden J refused to recognise proceedings under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code (“Chapter 11”) in relation to Videology Ltd as a foreign main proceeding under Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (“the Model Law”) as incorporated into English law in Schedule 1 to the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (the “CBIR”). He did so because he was not satisfied that the centre of main interests (“COMI”) of the Company was in the US where the Chapter 11 proceedings are taking place. He did, however, grant recognition of the Chapter 11 proceedings as a foreign non-main proceeding.
The Judgment is a master class on COMI determination. Of note are
- at 28 the rejection of, for so long as the UK remains a party to the Recast EIR, any different approach in relation to the concept of COMI under the CBIR/Model Law and the Recast EIR;
- the emphasis on a basket of criteria required to displace the presumption of COMI in place of the registered office;
- at 42 ff the rejection of a narrow focus on, or attachment of overriding importance to, the location in which the directors and senior management act;
- Snowden J’s rejection at 46 ff of the Head Office approach as being determinant under EU law (see also Handbook heading 126.96.36.199.4); and
- the factors referred to eventually to uphold the presumption: at 72: ‘In addition to being the place of its registered office, the UK is where the Company’s trading premises and staff are located, where its customer and creditor relationships are established, where it administers its relations with its trade creditors on a day-to-day basis using those premises and local staff, and where its main assets (the receivables and cash at bank) are located. All of those factors will be visible and immediately ascertainable by the customers, and in particular by the trade creditors, of the Company. The UK is also, importantly, where representations were made to the Company’s main finance creditor that its COMI was situated.’
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.6.1 (specifically also 188.8.131.52.4 for the Head Office discussion).
Update 6 August 2018 the report of the hearing in Dutch and French is here.
I was at the Belgian Parliament yesterday for a hearing on the BIBC, following publication of the Government’s draft bill. For those of you who read Dutch, my notes are attached. We were limited to two pages of comments – the note is succinct.
An important change vis-a-vis the initial version (on which I commented here) is that the Court will now be subject to Belgian private international law (including primacy of EU instruments) for choice of law, rather than being able to pick the most appropriate law (arbitration panel style). That brings the court firmly within Brussels I. Also note my view and references on the Court being able to refer to the CJEU for preliminary review.
Update 9 Mach 2018 for the rules of procedure of the International Commercial
Chambers of the Amsterdam District Court (Netherlands Commercial Court) and the
Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal) (The NCC Rules) see here.
I was asked yesterday (interview in Dutch) for my thoughts on the Belgian Government’s plans for a Brussels International Business Court. Here goes, in bullet-points format, a slightly extended and more technical version of those preliminary thoughts:
- Three and more’s a crowd. The Belgian move of course is not the first and neither will it be the last. Even pre-Brexit, Member States (and even individual cities within Member States; see Michiel Poesen recently on Frankfort) were vying for the title of preferred place for litigation.
- Brexit evidently may be a game-changer. I have flagged repeatedly that post-Brexit and assuming there will be no deal which would roll-over the UK’s engagement with EU civil procedure law, UK courts will become a lot less attractive. This is due to the more cumbersome recognition and enforcement regime that will be the result of decoupling from Brussels I. The same incidentally does not apply to arbitration. Pre and post Brexit, deal or not, free movement of arbitral awards is subject to the New York Convention.
- Attractiveness as a centre of litigation and legal services is part of regulatory competition. Being known as a place of legal know-how and expedited litigation brings prestige as well as attractive billable hours to the law firms of one’s country.
- Crucially, in an attempt to prise litigation away from London in particular, the use of English in proceedings is always the eye-catcher for the media. However in reality the language of proceedings is to my experience not the defining issue in client’s forum shopping strategies. Know-how of the bench; speed of proceedings; transparency of case-law; and of course ease of recognition and enforcement, are much more so. The Belgian proposal acknowledges as much by touting in particular the ‘collegiality’ and ‘expertise’ of the pool of (domestic and foreign) commercial law experts that will populate the court.
- Unwittingly perhaps but without a doubt, the proposal in flagging the benefits of the BIBC, also highlights the well-known disadvantages of the Belgian courts in ordinary: tardiness of proceedings (the ‘Belgian’ torpedo) in particular. However also very much so, intransparency (as I have repeatedly signalled: access to Belgian case law continues to be highly problematic) and lack of collegiality among the bench: being a judge is a lonely professional existence in Belgium. Professional secrecy rules, practicalities (lack of proper office space), and the aforementioned reporting issues work against Belgian jurisprudence presenting itself as coherent.
- At a technical level, the proposal emphasises repeatedly that the BIBC will be a court. Not an arbitral tribunal. The difference lies particularly in the easy or enforcement. The draft Bill loudly talks the talk in this respect. But does it walk the walk? What a ‘court’ means within the context of EU civil procedure law is of course the prerogative of that EU law: not of the Member States. (I refer to recent blog posts on same). Extensive reference to UNCITRAL’s Model Law on international commercial arbitration is a strange prop to use in the draft, if the idea is to take one’s attention away from arbitration. The BIBC will only take cases in the event of prorogation (choice of court or submission). The pool of judges will mostly be taken from part-timers, not benchers. Most importantly, in my mind: Article 43 of the draft instructs the BIBC, with respect to choice of law, to respect parties’ choice of governing law, and, in the absence of such law, ‘to apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable’. This is a copy /paste from Article 28(2) of the Model Law. In footnote the Act suggests that by omitting the third para of said Law (‘The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur only if the parties have expressly authorized it to do so’), the Bill emphasises the nature of the BIBC as court. It does not. Courts are simply subject to Rome I and II when it comes to applicable law. They do not just ‘consider a law applicable’.
Much to chew on. My analysis is based on a draft Bill which a little bird sent me. This is probably not the final say on the BIBC. (On an aside: @BIBC is already taken. I can think of one or two Twitter Handles which the BE government may want to snap up before someone else does).
Postscript 26 April 2016: the PCIA Yukos Arbitral award which I refer to below, was later squashed for lack of jurisdiction – that judgment is currently under appeal.
When should a court being asked to apply the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958) – the ‘New York Convention‘, look mercifully on forum shopping with a view to the smooth enforcement of such award? That, in essence, was the issue in Yukos v Tomskneft at the Irish High Court. Both Yukos Capital and Tomskneft were originally part of the Yukos group – of PCIA Yukos arbitral award fame. Tomskneft was later transferred to Rosneft. Arbitral proceedings had taken place in Switzerland, Yukos’ attempts at enforcement in Russia failed, as they did in France. Singapore attempts are underway.
The Irish courts involvement at first view looks odd. There are no Tomskneft assets in Ireland, neither corporate domicile of any Tomskneft affiliates. As Kelly J noted, the Irish proceedings effectively would serve as a jack for proceedings in other jurisdictions where Tomskneft does hold assets. Waving a successful enforcement order (even if it were in practice nugatory, given the lack of assets) obtained in a ‘respectable’ jurisdiction, would assist with enforcement proceedings elsewhere.
The New York Convention has a pro-enforcement bias however the Irish (and other, especially common law countries’) arbitration act in enforcement of the Convention, runs alongside the application of Irish civil procedure rules ‘out of the jurisdiction’, being against a foreign defendant: Kelly J (at 59): ‘In implementing the Convention as it did, the legislature did not attempt to dispense with the necessity to obtain leave to serve out of the jurisdiction in a case where the respondent is not normally resident within it.‘
US law, too, requires that preliminary to recognising and enforcing a foreign award, in personam jurisdiction must be established. Decision on such remains subject to lex fori. A jurisdiction which all too happily entertains such cases is then said to employ ‘parochial’ or ‘exorbitant’ jurisdictional rules.
In the case at issue, after referencing prior case-law both in Ireland and elsewhere, Kelly J rejected applicant’s request (at 141): ‘It is a case with no connection with Ireland. There are no assets within this jurisdiction. There is no real likelihood of assets coming into this jurisdiction. This is the fourth attempt on the part of the applicant to enforce this award. There is little to demonstrate any “solid practical benefit” to be gained by the applicant. The desire or entitlement to obtain an award from a “respectable” court has already been exercised in the courts of France and is underway in the courts of Singapore.‘
Note therefore that the court is not unsympathetic to the attempt at employing successful (even if hollow) enforcement in one jurisdiction as a lever in the real target jurisdiction (the one with the assets). Except, in the case at issue, similar attempts had already been or still were underway elsewhere.
The case is a very good illustration of the attraction (and uncertainty) of forum shopping, in particular at the enforcement stage. As well as a powerful reminder of the in personam jurisdictional rules of the common law.
here); and the circulation of arbitral awards and arbitration-related judgments, including the issue of the conclusive and preclusive effects of prior arbitral awards in relation to conflicting judgments (res judicata issues: including whether the priority which the Brussels I-Regulation concedes to the New York Convention, means that a court in a Member State can or indeed must give priority to a conflicting arbitral award over a judgment of the court of another EU Member State).the existence of parallel arbitration and judicial proceedings (lis pendens issues; see also
A great kick-off to a continuing debate. Geert.