Posts Tagged submission
Dennis v Tag Group: Speak up, counsel! when contesting injunctions. (And article 24’s jurisdictional rules apply regardless of the domicile of parties).
I reported on submission to jurisdiction in the English legal context in re Golden Endurance, and on the issue of the application of (now) Brussel I Recast’s Article 24’s exclusive jurisdictional rules in Dal Al Arkan. In Dennis v TAG Group  EWHC 919 (Ch) the High Court first of all revisits the issue of submission to jurisdiction in the context of injunction proceedings, and also held that permission for service out of jurisdiction is not required since the (now) Article 24 rules apply regardless of domicile of the parties. Clyde & Co have summary of the facts here.
Mr Dennis was the CEO of the England and Wales incorporated McLaren Technology Group Ltd. He claims he has suffered unfair prejudice as a result of suggested Board resolutions to be passed (and now passed) and relies on purported breaches of the Companies Act 2006, articles of association, shareholder agreement and service agreement to support his petition: this arguably engages Article 24(2) of the Brussels I Recast.
Application for injunctive relief sought to restrain Respondents from placing Plaintiff on garden leave and delegating the authority of the board to an interim committee. At issue first is whether Respondents’ engagement with the injunctive proceedings amounted to submission of jurisdiction. Briggs CR held that it so did: language in isolated correspondence reserving rights as to jurisdiction amounts to nothing if parties keep schtum about it when it really matters: at the injunctive hearings and forms relating to same.
Briggs held that even in the alternative, had there not been submission, Article 24 (I assume what is meant is Article 24(2) given the subject of the claim) applies regardless of the domicile of the parties hence submission is irrelevant (and indeed permission for service out of jurisdiction not required – one assumed to the (insurance) relief of Respindents’ counsel. On that point Dal Arkan had already been confirmed Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc & Alexander Vik  EWHC 459 .
A good and attractively concise ruling.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.
Another posting for the ‘comparative conflicts /dispute resolution’ binder. In order not to be found to have voluntary appeared (‘submitted to jurisdiction’), civil procedure rules worldwide require defendants to flag their opposition to jurisdiction early on in the proceedings. Indeed at the threshold of the litigation: in limine litis.
In EU law, the Court of Justice ruled in Elefanten Schuh that where civil procedure of the Member States requires a defence on the merits at the very earliest opportunity, such defence does not jeopardise objection to jurisdiction made at the same occasion. (Case-law now reflected in the wording of the Brussels I Regulation and its Recast successor).
There is as yet however no CJEU case-law on what level of interaction with the courts leads to submission.
In England, Zumaz Nigeria v First City  EWCA Civ 567 recently held that application for disclosure does not entail submission: for one may need those very documents to contest jurisdiction.
Thank you RPC for now flagging Shenzhen CTS International Logistics Co Ltd v Dajiang International Investment Co Ltd. The court found that by applying to strike out the claim and seeking security for costs (to include the period after the hearing of the stay application), defendant had invoked the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts. As always of course the decision was based on factual merit which RPC’s David Smyth and Hannah Fletcher summarise very well in the posting hyperlinked above.
Beware before you engage with the courts, if you do not wish to be seen as having submitted.
(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.7.
In JEB Recoveries v Binstock,  EWCA Civ 1008, the Court of Appeal (on appeal from the High Court, 2015] EWHC 1063 (Ch)) exhaustively reviewed relevant EU precedent for the determination of the ‘place of performance’ of a contract under Article 5(1) (now 7(1)) of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation. Kitchin LJ first of all refuses to deal with the alleged submission to jurisdiction by Mr Binstock. The argument was made that, by making and pursuing an application for security for costs, Mr Binstock had submitted to the jurisdiction. The issue was however not raised before the High Court and therefore not sub judice at the Court of Appeal.
Mr Binstock (of casino fame) argued that the contracts at issue were not performed in England, for he himself was domiciled in Spain and the claimant in the case at issue (for most of the relevant contracts, jurisdiction was dismissed at hand) had arguably carried out his contractual arrangements largely from Paris.
Relevant CJEU precedent was C-19/09 Wood Floor Solutions the findings of which Lord Justice Kitchin helpfully summarised as follows:
- ‘…First, the place of performance must be understood as the place with the closest linking factor between the contract and the court having jurisdiction and, as a general rule, this will be at the place of the main provision of the services.
- Secondly, the place of the main provision of the services must be deduced, so far as possible, from the provisions of the contract itself.
- Thirdly, if the provisions of the contract do not enable the place of the main provision of the services to be determined, either because they provide for several places where services are to be provided or because they do not expressly provide for any specific place where services are to be provided, but services have already been provided, it is appropriate, in the alternative, to take account of the place where activities in performance of the contract have for the most part been carried out, provided that the provision of services in that place is not contrary to the parties’ intentions as appears from the contract.
- Fourthly, if the place of the main provision of the services cannot be determined on the basis of the terms of the contract or its performance, then it must be identified by another means which respects the objectives of predictability and proximity, and this will be the place where the party providing the services is domiciled.’
Based upon the place where the services have for the most part been carried out, the Court of Appeal held that JEB has no good arguable case that the place of the main provision of Mr Wilson’s services was England.
A neat application of Article 7(1) and an improved re-phrasing of the CJEU’s own rules.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, Chapter 2 Heading 22.214.171.124.,
Golden Endurance v RMA,  EWHC 2110 (Comm), illustrates the attraction of having a unified approach to submission (to jurisdiction), otherwise known as voluntary appearance. In current case, the judgment that needs to be recognised is ex-EU (Moroccan) hence the Brussels I Recast does not apply: English law does. This is in fact exactly why The Hague is working hard at its ‘Judgments’ Convention – not an easy project in my view. As helpfully summarised by Sam Goodman, the court held that a Moroccan judgment would not be recognised in England because the claimant had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Moroccan court. Although the claimant had appeared in the Moroccan proceedings, it had done so in order to ask the court to stay the Moroccan proceedings in favour of arbitration and had only engaged with the merits as it was obliged to do so under Moroccan law.
Of note is that Phillips J points out that under the relevant English statutory rules, the question arises as to when defending a case on its merits, at the same time as contesting jurisdiction, submission applies: a scenario for which the Brussels I Recast provides specifically in Article 26. An English court does not for this exercise rely on civil procedure rules in the country of origin of the judgment: this surely makes sense for otherwise it would encourage forum shopping by unscrupulous claimants. Instead, whether one has submitted is ‘a question of mixed law and fact’ (at 46) which in this case was decided in favour of the claimant in the English court, ‘the claimant, having requested the dismissal of the claim in Morocco in favour of arbitration proceedings and having done so continually and as its primary response, did not voluntarily appear in the Moroccan courts’ (at 47).(The remainder of the judgment relates to transport law: the ‘Hague Rules’).
(Handbook of) EU private international law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.7.
When my tweets on the CJEU are not followed quickly by a blog post, assume I got snowed under. Or that other developments require more immediate analysis. Taser, Case C-175/15, is easily dismissed perhaps as not all that stunning or shocking (puns abound), yet as often, it is worthwhile highlighting what the case does not answer, rather than what it did elucidate.
Taser International, whose seat is in the United States, entered into two non-exclusive distribution agreements with Gate 4. Under those agreements, Gate 4 and its administrator, Mr Anastasiu, undertook to assign to the other contracting party the Taser International trade marks which they had registered, or for which they had applied for registration, in Romania.
Following Gate 4’s and Mr Anastasiu’s refusal to fulfil that contractual obligation, Taser International brought an action before the District Court, Bucharest. Regardless of the existence in those contracts of clauses conferring jurisdiction on a court situated in the US, Gate 4 and Mr Anastasiu entered an appearance before the Romanian court without challenging its jurisdiction. The Court ordered them to undertake all the formalities necessary for the registration of the assignment.
The appeals court seeks clarification as to whether the Brussels I Regulation is applicable to the dispute before it, since the parties elected, for the resolution of their disputes, the courts of a third country. The referring court considers that such a clause conferring jurisdiction on a third country may, for this reason alone, preclude the tacit prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 24 (Article 26 in the Brussels I Recast).
On the assumption, however, that that latter rule is applicable, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether it should, nevertheless, decline jurisdiction on another ground. It also queried whether the exclusive jurisdictional rules of Article 22 are applicable: does a dispute concerning an obligation to assign a trade mark, likely to result in a registration under national law, fall within paragraph 4 of that article.
The CJEU firstly recalled its finding in C-111/09 CPP Vienna Insurance Group: choice of court made per Article 23 (now Article 25) Brussels I, can be overruled by voluntary appearance. The latter in that case simply acts as an amended choice of court. In Taser (at 24) the court now adds that this applies also if that initial choice of court was made ex-EU. The deliberate, later choice, remains a deliberate choice. The Court makes no reference to discussions e.g. in the context of Gothaer, whether the Brussels I Regulation at all should be concerned with choice of court ex-EU or should be entirely indifferent. Arguably, in the Recast Regulation, there is consideration for choice of court ex-EU, in particular in recital 24 combined with Article 33.
Intellectual property lawyers will be disappointed with the Court’s answer to the issue of whether trade mark assignment falls within Article 22(4) [now 24(4)]: Romanian courts in any event had jurisdiction. (at 29).
Plenty left open, therefore. Geert.
(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, chapter 2, heading 126.96.36.199, heading 2.2.7 .
In Ecobank Transnational v Tanoh, the Court of Appeal refused an anti-enforcement injunction because of the applicant’s delay in filing it. Nigel Brook reviews the judgment’s findings on the issue of the anti-enforcement injunction here. The issue in this appeal is whether the High Court was wrong to refuse to grant Ecobank Transnational Incorporated (“Ecobank”), an injunction restraining Mr Thierry Tanoh (“Mr Tanoh”) from enforcing two judgments which he had obtained in Togo and Côte d’Ivoire. In substance the case concerned the relationship between arbitration, proceedings in the court in ordinary, and submission: it is to the latter that I turn my attention in this posting.
The Brussels regime does not apply – at stake is the application of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, which reads in relevant section
“33 For the purposes of determining whether a judgment given by a court of an overseas country should be recognised or enforced in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the person against whom the judgment was given shall not be regarded as having submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by reason only of the fact that he appeared (conditionally or otherwise) in the proceedings for all or any one or more of the following purposes, namely
(a) to contest the jurisdiction of the court;
(b) to ask the court to dismiss or stay the proceedings on the ground that the dispute in question should be submitted to arbitration or to the determination of the courts of another country.”
Whilst the section states that a person shall not be regarded as having submitted by reason only of the facts there mentioned it is silent as to what additional facts are sufficient to establish submission. The Court of appeal confirms the feeling expressed in earlier case-law that Section 33 needs to be applied in parallel with Article 18 of the Brussels Convention, now Article 26 of the Brussels I Recast (and before that, Article 24 in the Brussels I Regulation). That is because Section 33 is largely derived from Article 18 of the Brussels Convention.
In the High Court judgment Burnton LJ said that it would be unfortunate if the principles applied by the courts of England and Wales on whether a litigant had submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign court in non-EU cases were different from the principles applied by the Court of Justice, and therefore those courts, in cases under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions and now the Judgments Regulation.
In current appeal, Clarke LJ held (at 66) ‘I would go further. The decision of the court in Harada in relation to section 33 was heavily influenced by the decision of the European Court in relation to Article 18 of the Brussels Convention. But, now that section 33 has been interpreted in the way that it has, it cannot be right that it should bear a different meaning in cases outwith the European context.‘
Submission was not found to exist.
Do be aware of the limits to the relevant findings: Section 33 was largely borrowed, it appears, from the Brussels Convention. Many parts of English private international law, statutory or not, are no so borrowed. In those areas, the courts of England happily continue to follow their own course.