KCA Deutag throws contractual commitment not to oppose into the scheme of arrangement jurisdictional mix.

KCA Deutag UK Finance PLC, Re (In the Matter of the Companies Act 2006) [2020] EWHC 2977 (Ch) is in most part a classic scheme of arrangement sanctioning hearing, with the scheme proposed by a UK-incorporated company with COMI undisputedly there, too. See a range of posts on the blog for the classic jurisdictional analysis.

What is slightly out of the ordinary is the contractual commitment by the creditors not to oppose the scheme in foreign jurisdictions.  Snowden J, at 33:

In this case, two things give me that comfort. The first is that there was an overwhelming vote by Scheme Creditors in favour, and a very large number of such creditors entered into a lock-up agreement which bound them contractually to support the Scheme and not to do anything to undermine it. It is very difficult to see how such creditors who contractually agreed to support the Scheme and/or who voted in favour could possibly be allowed to take action contrary to the Scheme in any foreign jurisdiction, and the number and financial interests of those who did not vote in favour is comparatively very small indeed. That alone is sufficient to demonstrate to me that the Scheme is likely to have a substantial international effect and that I would not be acting in vain if I were to sanction it.

I would intuitively have felt quite the opposite, although detail is lacking (e.g. was the commitment given as a blank cheque before the details of the scheme were known): such contractual commitment even if valid under (presumably; no details are given) English law as the lex contractus of the commitment, could serve to undermine international effectiveness. For I would not be surprised if creative counsel on the continent could find a range of laws of lois de police or ordre public character, to try and object to contractual commitment to sign away the right to oppose.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5. Third edition forthcoming February 2021.

No instant forum coffee. Selecta: Some more substantial reflection on jurisdiction for schemes of arrangement.

In Selecta Finance UK Ltd, Re [2020] EWHC 2689 (Ch) Johnson J considered the jurisdictional issues for schemes of arrangement in a touch more detail than recently has been the regular method in both convening and sanctioning hearings.

Selecta Finance UK Limited is a most recent addition to the ‘Selecta’ group , having been established only on 13 August 2020. (Selecta is said to be the leading provider of unattended self-service coffee and convenience food in Europe).  The Scheme concerns three series of senior secured Notes (“the Existing SSNs“), which have an aggregate principal amount of €1.24 billion plus CHF 250 million. The Existing SSNs were issued originally not by the Company but by Selecta Group BV, its parent company incorporated in the Netherlands. They were issued pursuant to a Trust Deed dated 2 February 2018 , and were originally governed by New York law and subject to a provision for the New York Courts to have exclusive jurisdiction.

With reference to authority, Johnson J accepts that the relevant parties in interest who qualify as the Scheme Creditors are the ultimate beneficial owners of the Existing SSNs. By 14 September 2020, the Existing SSN Holders holding a majority by value of the Existing SSNs had provided their consent to (among others) the following key changes to the terms of the SSNs:  i) Amendment of the governing law provisions of the Trust Deed so that the Existing SSNs are governed by English rather than New York law. ii) Amendment of the jurisdiction provisions of the Trust Deed so that the Existing SSNs are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English Court in relation to any proceedings commenced by an obligor of the Existing SSNs, and the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the English Court in relation to other proceedings; iii) Accession of the Company to the Trust Deed as a co-issuer of the Existing SSNs.

At 18 it is said that an expert report on US and New York law confirms that the amendments to the governing law and jurisdiction clauses of the Trust Deed are valid under New York law and would be regarded as effective in any United States court applying that law.

The relevance of that finding for unwilling SSNs beneficiaries, I would argue, is not undisputedly established under Article 10 and Article 3(2) Rome I.

 

The Company then entered into a Supplemental Trust Deed on 14 September 2020 and thereby became a co-issuer of the Existing SSNs under the Trust Deed. As Johnson J notes at 44: it is only by means of the Supplemental Trust Deed that the Company became co-issuer of the Existing SSNs, and that the governing law and jurisdiction provisions were changed so as to refer to English law and jurisdiction.

It is clear that a jurisdictional link with England & Wales has been established specifically for the purpose of a company taking advantage of the scheme provisions in English law. With reference to Newey J in Re Codere Finance (UK) Ltd [2015] EWHC 3778 (Ch) which I reviewed here, this is held to be ‘good forum shopping’.

Article 25 Brussels Ia jurisdiction is only possible by means of the amendments to the Trust Deed effected via the Supplemental Trust Deed, as I also noted above. As I suggest there, had there been recalcitrant minority Note holders objecting to the change in court and law clause, I think the Scheme would not have been jurisdictionally home and dry on A25 choice of court grounds.

The next classic consideration is under Article 8(1)’s anchor defendant mechanism seeing as jurisdiction against the company is established per Article 4.

At 53 reference is made to Snowden J. who in Van Gansewinkel has suggested that in determining whether A8(1) applies, the Court is required to consider whether the “numbers and size of the scheme creditors domiciled in [the UK]” are “sufficiently large“: the result of that instruction is that applicants tend to point out the (debt) size of the creditors so domiciled, even if in DTEK Newey J held that size and number are irrelevant, ditto in Lecta Paper and Swissport FuellingUpdate 27 October 2020 the disparity on the need for size and number is also noted by Miles J in New Look Financing PLC, Re [2020] EWHC 2793 (Ch).

At 54 comes Johnson J’s obiter, useful finding:

Speaking for myself, I incline to the view that the presence of a single creditor is a necessary, but not of itself a sufficient, condition to the operation of Art. 8. I say that because in terms the power conferred by Art. 8 is engaged where “any one of” a number of defendants is domiciled in England & Wales, but even then the power is to be exercised only in cases where the language of the proviso in Art. 8 is satisfied – i.e., where the claims against the various defendants are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. I did not hear detailed argument on the meaning of this language, and in any event the application before me was uncontested, and so I express my view on it somewhat tentatively; but tentatively it seems to me that the question of expediency posed by the proviso is rather less about the geographical distribution in terms of number and size of the prospective defendants, and is rather more about the expediency in case management terms of connected claims being resolved in one place, even if only one anchor defendant is domiciled there. The argument in this case is that it is expedient for the claims against all EU domiciled Scheme Creditors to be resolved in one place, i.e. in England & Wales, because such claims all relate to the reorganisation of their indebtedness vis-à-vis the Company, and these Courts are best placed to resolve such questions given the separate jurisdiction they exercise over the Company under CA Part 26. Indeed, they may be uniquely placed to do so.

Opposition to the Scheme’s jurisdiction tends to evaporate once it gets to the convening and hearing stage. This is typically because the opposing creditors tend to by that stage be converted to the necessity of restructuring and the unattractiveness of having to pursue debt collection against a corporation in serious financial difficulty. As a result nearly all precedent is first instance only.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5. Third edition forthcoming February 2021.

Bank of Baroda v Maniar. The impact of the lex concursus on personal guarantees.

It was a year ago since I started writing up this post – I must have gotten distracted, for I continue to find the issues both relevant and interesting. In Bank of Baroda v Maniar & Anor [2019] EWHC 2463 (Comm) (not appealed to my knowledge),  Pearce J considered the attempt by an Indian Bank (with business activities in the UK) to enforce personal guarantees given in respect of the liability of an Irish-registered company (which had been set up by the guarantors) under a credit facility. The Irish company had entered into examinership under Irish law, and the Irish courts had approved a scheme of arrangement. Of interest to the blog is whether the bank had properly served notice on the guarantors, in accordance with the Companies Act 2014 (Ireland) s.549.

Claimant referred inter alia to the Gibbs rule, which I discussed in my posting on [2018] EWHC 59 (Ch) International Bank of Azerbaijan , since confirmed by the Court of Appeal. Defendants rely ia on Article 4 of the EIR 2000, Regulation 1346/2000, materially applicable to the proceedings:  “(1)…the law applicable to insolvency proceedings and their effects shall be the law of the Member State within the territory of which such proceedings are opened…(2) The law of the State of the opening of proceedings shall determine the conditions of the opening of those proceedings, their conduct and their closure. It shall determine in particular: .. j. The conditions for and the effects of closure of insolvency proceedings, in particular by composition; k. Creditors’ rights after the closure of insolvency proceedings.”

Claimant concedes that law of the State of the opening, namely Irish law, may be required to be given effect under the EIR, however argues that effect is limited to those aspects of Irish insolvency law which are necessary for the insolvency proceedings to fulfil their aim, and that Section 549 of the Irish Company Act (which concerns the preservation of the right to pursue guarantors) does not fall within the ambit of “the law applicable to insolvency proceedings” to which Article 4(1) of EIR applies.

In other words Claimant does not entertain the possibility of what was Article 13 in the 2000 EIR and is now Article 16 in the 2015 EIR, also applied by the CJEU in Nike, Kornhaas and Lutz. Rather, it more straightforwardly argues that relevant sections of the Irish Company Act are simply not within the scope of the lex concursus and that (at 84) the law governing the guarantees is English law per Article 4 Rome I.  At 109 Pearce J ultimately rather concisely holds

The important point here is the potential effect of a Section 549 offer on creditors’ meetings. The fact that the making of such an offer gives rise to the possibility of the guarantor accepting the offer and exercising the voting rights of the creditor at a members’ meeting creates a significant connection between the notice and the conduct of the examinership itself. This brings the procedure within the ambit of Article 4 of EIR. (now Article 7 EIR 2015 – GAVC)

Why the relation with the carve-out of Article 13 (now 16) was not discussed is not clear to me, particularly as at 156 ff there is discussion of Article 15 (now 18)’s provision : The effects of insolvency proceedings on a lawsuit pending concerning an asset or a right of which the debtor has been divested shall be governed solely by the law of the Member State of which that lawsuit is pending.”) 

Claimant not having discussed Article 13 (16), presumably did not raise the possibility of an appeal, either. 

The remainder of the discussion then turns to the validity of service under Irish law,  to be judged by an English judge. With Pearce J at 138 and 143 I see no reason why the EIR would stand in the way of an English judge so applying the lex concursus, even if an Irish judge would do so with an amount of discretion. At 152 and 154, after consideration, service was deemed not to have been valid.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.7.

The Colouroz Investment et all Scheme of arrangement. Change to asymmetric choice of court issue left to sanction hearing.

In Colouroz Investment et al [2020] EWHC 1864 (Ch.), Snowden J at 59 ff considers the classic issues (see ia Lecta Paper) on the jurisdictional consideration: no cover under the Insolvency Regulation; cover under Brussels Ia (future Brexit alert: ditto under Lugano) left hanging and assumed arguendo (update 18 August 2020 ditto in [2020] EWHC 2191 (Ch) Virgin Atlantic). At 62 Snowden J summarises the position excellently:

‘(T)he court has usually adopted the practice of assuming that Chapter II of the Recast Judgments Regulation applies to schemes of arrangement on the basis that the scheme proposal is to be regarded as a “dispute” concerning the variation of the existing relationship between the company and its creditors under which the company “sues” the scheme creditors as “defendants” seeking an order binding them to the scheme.  If, on the basis of that underlying assumption, the court has jurisdiction over the scheme creditors pursuant to Chapter II of the Recast Judgment Regulation, then there is no need for the Court to determine whether that assumption is correct.

At 64: ‘Credit Agreements and the ICA (Intercreditor Agreement, GAVC) were originally governed by New York law and were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the New York Court. However, as a result of the amendments made on 2 June 2020 with the consent of the requisite majority of the lenders under the contractual amendment regime, the governing law and jurisdiction provisions have now been changed to English governing law and English exclusive jurisdiction.’ At 65: expert evidence on NY law suggests amendments made on 2 June 2020 are valid and binding as a matter of New York law.

This to my mind continues to be a fuzzy proposition under the Rome I Regulation: change of lex contractus by majority must beg the question on the relevant provisions under Rome I. As far as I am are, this hitherto has not been driven home by anyone at a sanction hearing however it is bound to turn up at some point.

At 66 Snowden J, who gives consent for the sanction hearing, announces that one issue that will have to be discussed there is that if the Schemes are sanctioned, the intention is to have the jurisdiction clauses then changed to asymmetric jurisdiction clauses, detailed in 21-23: lenders will be entitled to bring proceedings against the obligors in any jurisdiction although any proceedings brought by the obligors must be brought in England. At 66 in fine: ‘that question is not for decision at this convening hearing, but should be considered at the sanction hearing.’

That’s a discussion I shall look forward to with interest.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5.

 

 

Swissport Fuelling. Another Scheme of arrangement, with a slight twist.

Swissport Fuelling Ltd, Re [2020] EWHC 1499 (Ch) at 59 ff repeats the classic (see Lecta Paper for the status quo), unresolved issue of jurisdiction for schemes of arrangement under under BIa (hence also: Lugano 2007). The case is worth reporting for slightly unusually, the scheme company, UK incorporated, acts as guarantor rather than borrower. Borrowers are mainly incorporated in Luxembourg and Switserland. Under the Credit Agreement, the Borrowers do not have a right of contribution or indemnity against the guarantors, so a claim against them would not ricochet against the UK incorporated Company.

Recognition under New York law is discussed – not yet the issue of recognition under Luxembourgish and Swiss law. That, one imagines, will follow at the sanctioning hearing, which will ordinarly follow the meeting of the scheme creditors which Miles J orders in current judgment.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5.

 

Lecta paper. Scheme of arrangements in the Brexit transition period, and the Brussels IA elephants in the room continue to be undisturbed.

Update 24 June 2020 see also Swissport Fuelling Ltd, Re [2020] EWHC 1499 (Ch) at 59 ff for the further unresolved issue of jurisdiction under BIa.

In Lecta Paper [2020] EWHC 382 (Ch), Trower J picks up where Zacarolii J left off in [2019] EWHC 3615 (Ch) (which I briefly flagged in my post here and which is referred to in current judgment 12) and goes through the usual matrix for assessing the international impact of an English scheme of arrangement on the European continent.

Ultimate parent company is a Luxembourg company, with further controlling interests held by yet another Luxembourg and a Spanish company. A 10-11 Trower J flags a sensitive issue for credit and other financial arrangements: financial instruments subject to New York law, where amended to English law as governing law and the courts at England as non-exclusive jurisdiction. This was done in accordance with New York law, and approved by over 90% of the instruments’ holders. Yet again therefore a crucial question viz schemes of arrangement and the Brussels jurisdictional and applicable law regimes remains unaddressed, namely the event of opposition of a sizeable stake of creditors.

At 33 ff the issue of jurisdiction is discussed along the lines of Apcoa, Codere and NN2 Newco. Under residual private international law, the sufficient connection to England, engineered by the aforementioned change of governing law and jurisdiction in line with the law governing the instruments at the time (New York law, at 38), was held not to be unfair viz the creditors even in the case of the mother company with COMI in Luxembourg. At 44 ff Trower J returns to the issue of whether Brussels Ia can apply at all to the case, particularly via Article 4 juncto Article 8(1), holding for application of Article 25 in the end. However as in the authority he applies, there continue to be a lot of assumptions in this analysis which, failing substantial opposition by creditors, still have not been settled by either UK, CJEU or continental authority.

At 40 follows the equally standard reference to national experts testifying to the scheme’s recognition in the jurisdictions concerned: France, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg.

At 41 Trower J then briefly mentions Brexit (see my reference to similar cases here). Referring again to the national experts but also to his own insight, Justice Trower simply notes that

‘The Recast Judgments Regulation will continue to apply to the recognition of an English judgment in EU member states, notwithstanding the occurrence of Brexit, provided that the judgment has been given in proceedings which were instituted before 31 December 2020, being the end of the transition period. This follows from Article 67(2) of the Withdrawal Agreement. It follows that any sanction order made in this case should be recognised in EU member states, pursuant to the Recast Judgments Regulation, as will their own domestic law dealing with the recognition of judgments. It is also the case that the application of the Rome I Regulation ought to be unaffected by Brexit in any event. As I read the expert reports, they each confirm that that Regulation will continue to apply after the end of the transition period so that the law of the jurisdiction in respect of which they give evidence will recognise the governing law of the relevant contracts, in this case English law, as applying to the variation and discharge of rights under that contract.’

Note as I did above, the continuing Brussels IA cover assumptions, as well as the position post Brexit (whether under Lugano 2007 or not, remains to be seen).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5.

 

Canadian recognition of Syncreon Group English Scheme of Arrangement underscores new markets for restructuring tourism.

An essentially Dutch group employs English restructuring law and has the resulting restructuring recognised in Canada. Need one say more to show that regulatory competition is alive and well and that the UK, England in particular need not fear a halt to restructuring forum shopping post Brexit.

Blakes first alerted me to the case, the Initial recognition order 2019 ONSC 5774 is here (I have not yet managed to locate the final order). Insolvency trustee PWC have a most informative document portal here. See also the Jones Day summary of the arrangements here. The main issue of contention was the so-called third party release in favour of Syncreon Canada which could have bumped into ordre public hurdles in Ontario as these clearly have an impact on the security of underlying debt. The way in which the proceeding are conducted (fair, transparent, with due consideration of minority holders etc.) clearly have an impact on this exercise.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5.

 

 

NN2 Newco limited and Politus BV. The Nyrstar (Belgium) scheme of arrangement’s jurisdictional confirmation.

Update 5 November 2020 the Belgian courts are investigating the wrestling of control over, and use of Nyrstar resources by Trafigura. This will undoubtedly involve conflict of laws issues on the relation between Belgian corporate law and (mostly English) restructuring and contract law.

Update 13 September 2019 same principles on jurisdiction (and reference to NN2Newco) made by Falk J in [2019] EWHC 2412 (Ch) Syncreon Group BVUpdate to the update 😉 December 2019 for the Canadian side of Syncreon see my review here.

Update 13 January 2019 ditto [2019] EWHC 3615 (Ch) Lecta Paper which I review here and where reference is also made to Codere. Jurisdiction upheld on the basis of Article 25 and Articles 8 juncto 4 Brussels Ia.

Update 20 August 2019 For an Irish approval of a scheme of arrangement with extensive US links see Re Ballantyne RE Plc & the Companies Act 2014 [2019] IEHC 407, reported here.

The Nyrstar business was created on 31 August 2007 by combining the zinc and lead
smelting and alloying operations of Zinifex Limited and Umicore NV/SA. Nyrstar is a global multi-metals business, with a market leading position in zinc and lead, and growing positions in other base and precious metals. It is one of the world’s largest zinc smelting companies based on production levels. The Nyrstar business has mining, smelting and other operations located in Europe, the Americas and Australia and employs approximately 4,200 people. The ultimate group Parent is incorporated in Belgium and has corporate offices in Zurich, Switzerland.

Its debt is now being restructured using an English scheme of arrangement, with a variety of new companies being formed as corporate vehicles for same. Readers of the blog will not be surprised: this is a classic example of regulatory (restructuring) competition, which I regularly report on the blog (most recently: New Look, with further references there).

In [2019] EWHC 1917 (Ch) re NN2 Newco limited and Politus BV, Norris J applies the now established jurisdictional test, with one or two points of attention. Against the scheme company jurisdiction is straightforward: this is England incorporated. Against the scheme creditors, English courts apply the jurisdictional test viz the Brussels Ia Regulation arguendo: if it were to apply (which the English Courts have taken no definitive stance on), would an English court have jurisdiction?

At 11: viz the Notes:

They are now governed by English law (in place of New York law). Clause 12.06 of the governing Indenture now reads:- “The courts of England and Wales shall have jurisdiction to settle any disputes that arise out of or in connection with the Indenture, the Notes and the Guarantees, and accordingly any legal action or proceedings arising out of or in connection with the Indenture the Notes and the Guarantees (“Proceedings”) may be brought in such courts. The courts of England and Wales shall have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any Proceedings instituted by [NNH or NN2]… in relation to any Holder or the Trustee on behalf of the Holders (“Issuer Proceedings”). [NNH and NN2], each of the Guarantors, the Trustee and each Holder (each, “a Party”) irrevocably submit to the jurisdiction of such courts and agree that the courts of England and Wales are the most appropriate and the most convenient courts to settle Issuer Proceedings and accordingly no party shall argue to the contrary. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this section 12.06 shall not limit the rights of… each of the Holders to institute any Proceedings against [NNH and NN2] in any other court of competent jurisdiction, nor shall the taking of Proceedings in one or more jurisdictions preclude the taking of proceedings in any other jurisdiction….”

This is an asymmetric jurisdiction clause. The English Courts have jurisdiction over all disputes and the parties agree that they are the most convenient forum and submit to the jurisdiction of the English courts. NNH and NN2 are bound to use the English courts if they sue the Holder of a Note, because the English courts have exclusive jurisdiction in such a case. But the Holder of a Note can also sue NNH and NN2 in any Court that otherwise has jurisdiction, so the English courts have a non-exclusive jurisdiction in such a case.

At 13:

The original governing law of the Existing Bonds was English law. But the holders voted to amend the jurisdiction clause in the Trust Deed to provide: “The courts of England and Wales shall have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any disputes that arise out of or in connection with the Trust Deed and the Bonds, and accordingly any legal action or proceedings arising out of or in connection with the Trust Deed and the Bonds (“Proceedings”) may be brought in such courts. [NNV and NN2] and the Trustee (in its own capacity as such and on behalf of the Bondholders) irrevocably submit to the jurisdiction of such courts and waive any objection to Proceedings in such courts whether on the ground of venue or on the ground that the Proceedings have been brought in an inconvenient forum. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Belgian courts have exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning the validity of decisions of the Board of Directors of NNV of the general meeting of shareholders of NNV and of the general meeting of Bondholders.”

This is a symmetrical jurisdiction clause with a “carve out” for specific proceedings.”

At 18 ff the details of the scheme are outlined. It involves Trafigura financial instruments, Trafigura now being Nyrstar’s controlling shareholder. At 31 ff jurisdiction is discussed. There is no abusive forum shopping (per Codere; which I reference here). The usual Article 8 and Article 25 routes are discussed. With respect to Article 25, the English jurisdiction clauses in the Existing Notes and the Politus Facility are asymmetric; however Norris J at 41 (with reference to authority) does not see that as an obstacle seeing as Article 25 covers both symmetric and asymmetric choice of court.

A final hurdle is whether any order sanctioning the scheme is likely to be effective or whether it is apparent even at this stage that the scheme will not be recognised in other relevant jurisdictions even if sanctioned: this will eventually be settled at the sanctioning hearing however Norris J already indicates that it is unlikely that expert evidence will yield surprising (objectionable) results.

Scheme meetings may therefore be convened.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5.

New Look: Application of the good old rules for schemes of arrangements, with some doubt over the substantial effects test.

In [2019] EWHC 960 (Ch) New Look Secured Issuer and New Look Ltd, Smith J at H applies the standing rules on jurisdiction over the scheme and other companies which I also signalled in Algeco and Apcoa (with further reference in the latter post). Against the scheme companies jurisdiction is straightforward: they are England incorporated.  Against the scheme creditors, English courts apply the jurisdictional test viz the Brussels I Recast (‘a’) Regulation arguendo: if it were to apply (which the English Courts have taken no definitive stance on), would an English court have jurisdiction? Yes, it is held: under Article 8 (anchor defendants). (Often Article 25 is used as argument, too).

At 48 Smith J signals the ‘intensity’ issue: ‘In some cases it has been suggested that it may not be enough to identify a single creditor domiciled in the United Kingdom, and that the court should consider whether the number and size of creditors in the UK are sufficiently large: see Re Van Gansewinkel Groep[2015] EWHC 2151 (Ch) at [51]); Global Garden Products at [25]; Re Noble Group Ltd [2018] EWHC 3092 (Ch) at [114] to [116].’ Smith J is minded towards the first, more liberal approach: at 49. He refers to the liberal anchoring approach in competition cases, both stand-alone (think Media Saturn) and follow-on (think Posten /Bring v Volvo, with relevant links there).

At 51 he also discusses the ‘substantial effects’ test and classifies it under ‘jurisdiction’:

As well as showing a sufficient jurisdictional connection with England, it is also necessary to show that the Schemes, if approved, will be likely to have a substantial effect in any foreign jurisdictions involved in or engaged by the Schemes. This is because the court will generally not make any order which has no substantial effect and, before the court will sanction a scheme, it will need to be satisfied that the scheme will achieve its purpose: Sompo Japan Insurance Inc v Transfercom Ltd, [2007] EWHC 146 (Ch); Re Rodenstock GmbH[2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch) at [73]-[77]; Re Magyar Telecom BV[2013] EWHC 3800 (Ch) at [16].’ 

This is not quite kosher I believe. If, even arguendo, jurisdiction is established under Brussels Ia, then no ‘substantial effects’ test must apply at the jurisdictional stage. Certainly not vis-a-vis the scheme companies. Against the scheme creditors, one may perhaps classify it is a means to test the ‘abuse’ prohibition in Article 8(1)’s anchor mechanism.

A useful reminder of the principles. And some doubt re the substantial effects test.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 5.

 

Stripes US. High Court considers jurisdiction for scheme of arrangement in the usual way.

In [2018] EWHC 3098 (Ch) Stripes US, Smith J deals with jurisdiction for schemes of arrangement in the now well established way (see my last report on same in Algeco):

The EU’s Insolvency Regulation is clearly not engaged: the schemes fall under company law. The High Court then applies the jurisdictional test viz the Brussels I Recast Regulation arguendo: if it were to apply (which the English Courts have taken no definitive stance on), would an English court have jurisdiction? Yes, it is held: under Article 8 (anchor defendants).

The issue in fact splits in two: so far as the question of jurisdiction in relation to a foreign (non-EU or Lugano States based) company is concerned (Stripes US is incorporated in Delaware), the law is clear. It is well-established that the court has jurisdiction to sanction a Scheme in relation to a company provided that company is liable to be wound up under the Insolvency Act 1986.

Turning next to the Scheme Creditors, of the 31 Scheme Creditors, 19.4% by number (26.35% by value) of the ‘defendants’ (an odd notion perhaps in the context of a Scheme sanction) are domiciled in the UK, plenty Smith J holds to suggest enough reason for anchoring: not taking jurisdiction vis-a-vis the defendants domiciled in other Member States, would carry with it a serious risk of irreconcilable judgments.

Finally the case for forum non conveniens (and comity) is considered (vis-a-vis the US defendant), and rejection of jurisdiction summarily dismissed: in this case the relevant agreement which is the subject of the Scheme has a governing law which is (and, I understand, always has been) English law: at 63: ‘Generally speaking, that is enough to establish a sufficient connection. The view is that under generally accepted principles of private international law, a variation or discharge of contractual rights in accordance with the governing law of the contract should be done by the court of that law and will be given effect to in other third-party countries.’ US experts moreover advised any judgment would most probably have no difficulty being enforced in the US

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 5.