Posts Tagged Residual conflict of laws
flightright. The extensive CJEU notion of ‘contract’. Mumbles on effet utile and residual private international law.
One of my PhD students, Michiel Poesen, has an extensive case-note coming up on C-274/16 flightright – when it is out I shall include a link here. For the time being therefore I shall be very brief. In summary, the Court held
First of all that the special jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I Recast do not apply to defendants domiciled outside of the EU.
That was as such an obvious finding: these suits are subject to residual national rules on jurisdiction. However the Court makes a point, at 54, to emphasise that in accordance with the principle of effectiveness (effet utile), rules under national law cannot make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law. Here: the rights of passengers under the flight delay compensation rules, Regulation 261/2004. Is that CJEU shorthand for suggesting that if a Member State were not to allow claimants based in the EU, to claim compensation against third-country defendants, it would contravene EU law?
Second, where an operating air carrier which has no contract with the passenger performs obligations under Regulation 261/2004, it is to be regarded as doing so on behalf of the person having a contract with that passenger. (At 64) that carrier must be regarded as fulfilling the freely consented obligations (a reference to the Handte formula) vis-à-vis the contracting partner of the passengers concerned. Those obligations arise under the contract for carriage by air. Consequently, an application for compensation for the long delay of a flight carried out by an operating air carrier such as (here) Air Nostrum, with which the passengers concerned do not have contractual relations, must be considered to have been introduced in respect of contracts for carriage by air concluded between those passengers and the carrier with whom they bought tickets. (Per the first bullet-point above, provided that carrier does have domicile in the EU).
Of note is that this finding of a jurisdictional trigger under the rule of contracts (7(1), does not necessarily imply that at the substantive level, the court with jurisdiction will eventually decide that there is a contract on the basis of the lex causae.
Finally, to determine per Article 7(1)b second -, the court of ‘the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered’, a contract for carriage by air, such as the contracts at issue in the cases in the main proceedings consisting of a single booking for the entire journey, establishes the obligation, for an air carrier, to carry a passenger from a point A to a point C. Such a carriage operation constitutes a service of which one of the principal places of provision is at point C. That finding is not called into question by the fact that the operating operates only the carriage on a flight which does not finish at the place of arrival of the second leg of a connecting flight in so far as the contract for carriage by air relating to the connecting flight covers the carriage of those passengers to the place of arrival of the second leg.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 220.127.116.11.
Once in a while I post on State Immunity, one of my favourites sub-themes in same being waiver of immunity, whether by contractual provision or following submission.  EWHC 385 (Comm) certain underwriters at Lloyds et al v Syrian Arabic Republic et al is a good illustration of the latter. How does one serve a state which is evidently in times of political unrest? And has that State submitted to jurisdiction hence waived immunity?
Claimants’ claim in the United States District Court arose from the 1985 hijacking of EgyptAir flight 648 and the loss to which that gave rise. Adam Johnson and colleagues at Herbert Smith alerted me to the case and their review is excellent. Henshaw J held the former issue (service) very practically: DHL evidence of documents having been delivered to the relevant ministry suffices, even if acceptance of the documents is refused.
Assessment of submission was relevant for there is no Treaty between the US and the UK on recognition and enforcement – hence common law applies. In the absence of any Convention or other instrument for mutual recognition of judgments, a foreign judgment in personam can be recognised only if it was delivered by a court which had jurisdiction according to English private international law. That means that the defendant must either have (i) been present in the foreign jurisdiction when proceedings were commenced, (ii) claimed or counterclaimed in those proceedings, (iii) previously agreed to submit to the jurisdiction, or (iv) voluntarily have submitted himself to the overseas court’s jurisdiction (see Rubin and another v Eurofinance SA  1 AC 236 § 7).
In the present case (i)-(iii) do not apply, so Claimants must show that the Defendants submitted to the US court’s jurisdiction. Which Henshaw J held they had. Of particular note for this blog is that he (at 59) rejects much authority for CJEU precedent, particularly C-150/80 Elefanten Schuh, held under the Brussels Convention. Even if Elefanten Schuh were to apply, Henshaw J does not believe it would have led to a different outcome. At 66 follows an extensive list of arguments leading to a conclusion of submission, with particular emphasis on Notices of Appeal, each of which included a merit-based objection to the judgment appealed from but contained no assertion that the US courts lacked jurisdiction by reason of, or that the claims were barred by, sovereign immunity. The simple fact is that Syria at no stage made any such challenge, save very late in the process.
The judgment therefore is interesting firstly for its discussion of CJEU weight in residual conflict of laws; secondly for the Court’s view on submission and sovereign immunity – in my view very much the right one.