Posts Tagged Refusal
Thank you Francesca Petronio, Fabio Cozzi & Francesco Falco for flagging the Italian Supreme Court’s judgment no. 16601/2017 of 5 July last. Thank you also to professor Marta Requejo for sending me copy of the judgment.
In what is suggested to be a Copernican revolution, the Supreme Court has dropped the Italian legal order’s fundamental objection to punitive damages, which made it near-impossible to obtain recognition and enforcement of in particular US judgments containing such damages. The judgment not surprisingly contains a number of conditions in particular on the excessive nature of such damages.
The judges seem to have been swayed by developments both in Italy (statutory law in places allowing for more than simple compensation of material loss) and US law (truly excessive punitive damages having been reigned in).
Punitive damages are the one example always identified as one of the core applications of ordre public in European recognition and enforcement law. After the Italian example surely this may now be less obvious in many jurisdictions.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.
Refusal of recognition for failure to serve. ECtHR tests the Brussels regime against Strasbourg in AVOTIŅŠ v Latvia
In AVOTIŅŠ v Latvia |Avotins v LAtvia, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR at Strasbourg held late May that Article 6 ECHR (right to fair trial) was engaged but not infringed by the Latvian’s Supreme Court’s application of Article 34(2( Brussel I (now Article 45(1) b Brussels I Recast).
The Article reads ‘A judgment shall not be recognised: (…) 2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so;…
In the case at issue applicant sought refusal by the Latvian court of recognition of a Cypriot judgment issued against him. After review of the Regulation’s core pedigree of mutual recognition and mutual trust, burden of proof particularly exercised the Court: at 121:
‘The fact that the applicant relied on that Article (34(2), GAVC) without having challenged the judgment as required necessarily raised the question of the availability of that legal remedy in Cyprus in the circumstances of the present case. In such a situation the Senate was not entitled simply to criticise the applicant, as it did in its judgment of 31 January 2007, for not appealing against the judgment concerned, and to remain silent on the issue of the burden of proof with regard to the existence and availability of a remedy in the State of origin; Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, like Article 34(2) in fine of the Brussels I Regulation, required it to verify that this condition was satisfied, in the absence of which it could not refuse to examine the applicant’s complaint. The Court considers that the determination of the burden of proof, which, as the European Commission stressed (see paragraph 92 above), is not governed by European Union law, was therefore decisive in the present case. Hence, that point should have been examined in adversarial proceedings leading to reasoned findings. However, the Supreme Court tacitly presumed either that the burden of proof lay with the defendant or that such a remedy had in fact been available to the applicant. This approach, which reflects a literal and automatic application of Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation, could in theory lead to a finding that the protection afforded was manifestly deficient such that the presumption of equivalent protection of the rights of the defence guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 is rebutted. Nevertheless, in the specific circumstances of the present application the Court does not consider this to be the case, although this shortcoming is regrettable.’
Those ‘specific circumstances’ include in particular the applicant’s professional background: at 124:
‘the applicant, who was an investment consultant, should have been aware of the legal consequences of the acknowledgment of debt deed which he had signed. That deed was governed by Cypriot law, concerned a sum of money borrowed by the applicant from a Cypriot company and contained a clause conferring jurisdiction on the Cypriot courts. Accordingly, the applicant should have ensured that he was familiar with the manner in which possible proceedings would be conducted before the Cypriot courts (…). Having omitted to obtain information on the subject he contributed to a large extent, as a result of his inaction and lack of diligence, to bringing about the situation of which he complained before the Court and which he could have prevented so as to avoid incurring any damage’.
I am not convinced by the Court’s view on the burden of proof and on the national court’s duty to assess the law in the State of origin sua sponte. Judges Lemmens and Briede, jointly concurring but for different reasons as the court, in my view have the better argument where they say
‘If the applicant wanted to argue that no remedy had in fact been available to him in Cyprus, in our opinion it would have been for him to raise this issue explicitly before the Supreme Court. We question whether he could expect the Supreme Court to raise that issue of its own motion. And we definitely consider that he cannot complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the lack of an explicit response to an argument that was not explicitly made.’
The end result is the same at the ECtHR. For future application of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation however it makes a big difference.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16, Heading 22.214.171.124.4 (p.198).
Gazprom, arbitral Antisuit Injunctions and the Judgments Regulation: Wathelet AG gets one or two things off his chest
Wathelet AG opined yesterday in Gazprom, Case C-536/13, re the fate of arbitral anti-suit injunctions. (See my posting on the application, for context). He takes the opportunity to add to the chorus of criticism of the ECJ’s West Tankers ruling, at considerable length; and to review the ‘new’ regime under the Brussels I recast, in light of recital 12 of that Regulation.
His review of the ‘new’ regime of the Brussels I recast, and the contrasting positions of the EC and a number of Member States, support my proposition that the recast, by incorporating a summary of previous case-law in its recitals, has certainly not clarified things beyond discussion. Wathelet in fact suggest that the recitals do rebuke the ECJ and return application of the Regulation to the Rich scenario – however I am not convinced that Rich itself necessarily clarifies things. (It, too, like Van Uden and like the current recital, uses a confusing variety of criteria. I have a paper forthcoming on the Brussels I recast (already in a Dutch version should readers be interested) which looks into this).
At any rate, the lengthy review of the position under the recast evidently is outside the scope of the preliminary review, since the recast does not apply to it, and the ECJ is certain not to entertain the AG’s review of the recast and his rebuke of West Tankers at all. (Although his critical views are not likely to endear him to the Court).
Returning to the actual questions, the AG suggests the Court reply that that the Brussels I Regulation is not applicable in the present case (it falling exclusively within the scope of the 1958 New York Convention) and that, in any event, (what is effectively) an anti-suit injunction issued by an arbitration tribunal is not contrary to that Regulation. Finally, that under the New York Convention, a Member State cannot classify Brussels I’s jurisdictional regime as being ‘ordre public’ and hence capable of leading to refusal of recognition of an arbitral award.
The AG decisively supports arbitration in this opinion, however the ECJ is bound to be much shorter (and perhaps less sympathetic) in its judgment. To be continued….
Granted, only Monday mornings arguably may excuse such lame pun in a blog’s posting. However the slightly lousy title should not take away from the relevance of Celtic Salmon v Aller Acqua in which the Irish High Court partially refused recognition of a Danish judgment.
Hogan J summarised the issue as follows: Where a defendant in foreign proceedings governed by the Brussels Regulation (Council Regulation No. 44/2001 EC) fails to advance and maintain a counter-claim for damages for (sic) in those proceedings, is that party then barred by the doctrine of res judicata or by the provisions of the Brussels Regulation itself from re-litigating that counterclaim for damages for breach of contract and negligence in existing proceedings in this jurisdiction where it sues as plaintiff?
Celtic Salmon used Aller Ireland, the Irish subsidiary, as anchor defendant. The mother company, Aller Denmark, was duly joined to the proceedings. Vets, commissioned by Celtic Atlantic, had established a deficiency in the feed supplied by Aller Denmark. The dispute between the parties then started with a letter sent by Celtic Atlantic in July, 2008 claiming damages for the (allegedly) defective fish feed. Aller Denmark responded by denying liability, but also claimed for unpaid invoices in respect of the fish feed. In November 2008, aller Denmark fired the first shot in litigation, suing in Denmark. There were two separate claims. First, Aller Denmark claimed in respect of certain unpaid invoices for the fish feed (“claim 1”). (It also reserved its position to make further claims in this regard. The claim taken forward only related to a fraction of the feed actually supplied). Second, it sought an order that “Celtic be ordered to admit that the delivered feed on which Aller Acqua’s claim is based is in conformity with the contract.” (“claim 2”).
Celtic’s Irish solicitors, according to the judgment, advised that it would be unwise to bring a counter-claim in the Danish proceedings, because to do so “would preclude us from bringing proceedings in Ireland for damages for breach of contract.” In May 2009, Irish proceedings were brought by Celtic. These amounted to a claim for damages for negligence and breach of contract by reason of the allegedly defective nature of the fish feed.
The Danish courts accepted jurisdiction on the basis of Article 5 based upon (whether this had been agreed was disputed between parties) delivery (incoterm) ex works /ex factory. This is the point were procedural difficulties started (hence the relevance of lexi fori). The reports earlier commissioned by Celtic, turned out not to be admissible (or at the very least would be regarded with suspicion) by the Danish courts given that under Danish civil procedure, the court appoints its own experts. However at the time this would have been carried forward, both fish and fish feed were no longer. Celtic Atlantic elected not to pursue the counterclaim in respect of the defective feed, and reserved the right to do so at a later date (without specific reference to Danish or Irish courts).
The Danish court eventually sided with Aller in respect of two claims: claim 1 for debt in respect of the two unpaid invoices in the sum €58,655 plus interest. Claim 2” that “Celtic [Atlantic] be ordered to admit that the delivered feed on which Aller [Denmark]’s claim is based is in conformity with the contract. There was subsequently discussion among Danish experts in the Irish courts, whether the Danish judgment was in default of appearance, given the absence of defence against at least part of it.
The question now sub judice was the fate of the Irish proceedings, Hogan J justifiably concluded that Article 27 JR (the lis alibi pendens rule) no longer had any relevance, given that the Danish proceedings had come to an end. Rather, whether Celtic’s claims in the Irish courts were the same as those entertained in Denmark (and hence continuing them in Ireland, per se abusive, ia given comity) and /or whether Aller could waive the Danish judgment in defence of the Irish claims. The latter would imply recognition of the Danish judgment.
[The High court carries out a review of the Danish court’s jurisdiction under Article 5(1) and 3, with reference as for the latter inter alia to Folien Fischer however in doing so I would argue it surpassed its brief: other than for exclusive jurisdictional rules, under the current Brussels I regime, there is no room for other courts to second-guess the application of the Regulation by other courts].
Article 34(1) of the Brussels Regulation provides that “A judgment shall not be recognised: 1. If such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought…..” Hogan J emphasises procedural rights per Krombach, and the Charter, and concludes that by reason of the manner in which the Danish Administration of Justice Act operated in this case, the effective procedural rights of Celtic Atlantic were violated so far as claim 2 is concerned. He insisted that (only) on ‘the special and particular facts of this case, the existence and operation of the Danish law operated (…) as an “insuperable” procedural obstacle which barred the effective prosecution of its claim.’ (at 124).
A considerate judgment and one which, if only because of its rarity and the insight it offers into procedural and tactical considerations in entertaining, or not, counterclaims, stands out in national case-law on the Brussels I- Regulation.
Postscript 26 April 2016: the PCIA Yukos Arbitral award which I refer to below, was later squashed for lack of jurisdiction – that judgment is currently under appeal.
When should a court being asked to apply the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958) – the ‘New York Convention‘, look mercifully on forum shopping with a view to the smooth enforcement of such award? That, in essence, was the issue in Yukos v Tomskneft at the Irish High Court. Both Yukos Capital and Tomskneft were originally part of the Yukos group – of PCIA Yukos arbitral award fame. Tomskneft was later transferred to Rosneft. Arbitral proceedings had taken place in Switzerland, Yukos’ attempts at enforcement in Russia failed, as they did in France. Singapore attempts are underway.
The Irish courts involvement at first view looks odd. There are no Tomskneft assets in Ireland, neither corporate domicile of any Tomskneft affiliates. As Kelly J noted, the Irish proceedings effectively would serve as a jack for proceedings in other jurisdictions where Tomskneft does hold assets. Waving a successful enforcement order (even if it were in practice nugatory, given the lack of assets) obtained in a ‘respectable’ jurisdiction, would assist with enforcement proceedings elsewhere.
The New York Convention has a pro-enforcement bias however the Irish (and other, especially common law countries’) arbitration act in enforcement of the Convention, runs alongside the application of Irish civil procedure rules ‘out of the jurisdiction’, being against a foreign defendant: Kelly J (at 59): ‘In implementing the Convention as it did, the legislature did not attempt to dispense with the necessity to obtain leave to serve out of the jurisdiction in a case where the respondent is not normally resident within it.‘
US law, too, requires that preliminary to recognising and enforcing a foreign award, in personam jurisdiction must be established. Decision on such remains subject to lex fori. A jurisdiction which all too happily entertains such cases is then said to employ ‘parochial’ or ‘exorbitant’ jurisdictional rules.
In the case at issue, after referencing prior case-law both in Ireland and elsewhere, Kelly J rejected applicant’s request (at 141): ‘It is a case with no connection with Ireland. There are no assets within this jurisdiction. There is no real likelihood of assets coming into this jurisdiction. This is the fourth attempt on the part of the applicant to enforce this award. There is little to demonstrate any “solid practical benefit” to be gained by the applicant. The desire or entitlement to obtain an award from a “respectable” court has already been exercised in the courts of France and is underway in the courts of Singapore.‘
Note therefore that the court is not unsympathetic to the attempt at employing successful (even if hollow) enforcement in one jurisdiction as a lever in the real target jurisdiction (the one with the assets). Except, in the case at issue, similar attempts had already been or still were underway elsewhere.
The case is a very good illustration of the attraction (and uncertainty) of forum shopping, in particular at the enforcement stage. As well as a powerful reminder of the in personam jurisdictional rules of the common law.
Limits to calling upon intellectual property to justify non-disclosure of environmental information – The ECJ in Greenpeace and PAN Europe v Commission (glyphosate)
The ECJ yesterday morning held in an important case with respect to the EU’s transparency regime.
Regulation 1049/2001 constitutes the general regime on access to documents held by EU Institutions. Regulation 1367/2006 implements the Aarhus Convention as far as the EU Institutions are concerned. Directive 91/414 is the plant protection Directive. Under the plant protection Directive, Germany had been the Member State with responsibility to report on the acceptability of approving glyphosate. Greenpeace and Pesticide Action Network Europe had requested access to
– a copy of the draft assessment report issued by Germany, prior to the first inclusion of glyphosate in Annex I to Directive 91/414;
– a complete list of all tests submitted by the operators seeking the inclusion of glyphosate in Annex I;
– the full, complete and original test documents supplied by the operators seeking the inclusion of glyphosate in Annex I, in so far as concerns all long-term toxicity tests, all mutagenicity tests, carcinogenicity tests, neurotoxicity tests and all reproduction studies.
The Commission, upon assist by Germany, granted access to the draft report, with the exception of volume 4 thereof, which the German authorities refused to disclose and which includes the complete list of all tests submitted by the operators seeking the first inclusion of glyphosate in Annex I. Germany was of the opinion that the document at issue contained confidential information relating to the intellectual property rights of the operators which had sought the inclusion of glyphosate in Annex I to Directive 91/414, namely the detailed chemical composition of the active substance produced by each of them, detailed information concerning the process by which each of them produced the substance, information on the impurities, the composition of the finished products and the contractual relations between the various operators which had sought the inclusion of glyphosate.
The ECJ noted the important impact of 1367/2006 on the working of the basic Regulation, Regulation 1049/2001: the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 lays down a legal presumption that an overriding public interest in disclosure (relevant for the application of exceptions written into Regulation 1049/2001) exists where the information requested relates to emissions into the environment, except where that information concerns an investigation, in particular one concerning possible infringements of EU law. The Court held that accordingly, the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 requires that if the institution concerned receives an application for access to a document, it must disclose it where the information requested relates to emissions into the environment, even if such disclosure is liable to undermine the protection of the commercial interests of a particular natural or legal person, including that person’s intellectual property, within the meaning of Article 4(2), first indent, of Regulation No 1049/2001. (at 38) The Court rejected any attempt by the EC to soften the impact of Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006: ‘in claris non fit interpretatio’, the provision has to be read on its prima facie meaning. Any other application ‘would amount to disapplying a clear and unconditional provision of a European Union regulation, which is not even claimed to be contrary to a superior rule of law.‘ (at 44 in fine)
The Court subsequently at length considered the meaning of ‘environmental information’ and gave this a wide interpretation.
The case is a good illustration of the complex web of transparency requirements and the consistent approach of the ECJ in favour of disclosure.
The Lithuanian Supreme Court held on 30 April 2013 that a Russian Federation judgment granting child custody, could not be recognised in Lithuania for reasons of Ordre Public. The 7-year-old child had not been heard (including on his opinion with whom of the parents he’ld prefer to live) either directly or indirectly in the underlying proceedings. Hearing the child, the Court held, was however prerequisite under international human (children’s) rights Conventions.
Recourse to Ordre Public is not common, as readers will be aware. The judgment therefore is quite significant (and correct in my view), particularly as the European Commission is currently trying to map its use across the Member States (within the EU or vis-a-vis relations with third States, such as here).
Thank you to Sigita Fomičiova for the tip-off and copy of the judgment.