Posts Tagged Recognition

Radseresht-Spain: The High Court (inter alia) on the revocability of Ismalic /Talaq divorce

In [2017] EWHC 2932 (Fam) Radseresht v Radsheresht-Spain Cohen J is asked to recognise a divorce (and ensuing financial arrangements) granted under Dubai law.

I will not discuss the merits of the case (Justice Cohen does so proficiently, not just to my lay eye but I am assuming also the expert eye; he decides there was an intention to continue to stay married). Rather, the case is an interesting example to show those having to get used to conflict of laws. The High Court has no hesitation to apply Dubai law with all its in and outs (part of the judgment queries whether there were continued sexual relationships between the (ex?) spouses), in a court in London.

Of note is also that the High Court suggests that but for the very late raising of the issue, it could have queried whether the courts at Dubai had jurisdiction in the first place, habitual residence of the parties not having been at the UAE (the suggestion seems to have been made by counsel of the husband that the relevant criterion would have been nationality anyway).

Geert.

 

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Pearl v Kurdistan. The DIFC on waivers of sovereign immunity.

Update 17 November 2017 For discussions in Dutch case-law (including re contractual waiver) with respect to SHAPE, see here.

Thank you Peter Smith over at Tamimi for flagging [2017] DIFC ARB 003 Pearl v Kurdistan. Peter summarises as follows:

‘In 2007, Crescent Petroleum, the oldest privately-owned oil and gas company in the Middle East, agreed with Dana Gas, one the leading publicly-listed natural gas companies in the region, to create a joint venture called Pearl Petroleum (together, “the Consortium”). The Consortium entered into an agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (“KRG”) for the development of the Khor Mor and Chemchemal petrochemical fields in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The KRG were and remain engaged in a political dispute with the Federal Government of Iraq, meaning that the Consortium were unable to export gas produced by the developed fields. As a result, the KRG became liable under its contract with the Consortium to pay a minimum guaranteed price, but it failed to make the required payments in full.’

Arbitration in London under LCIA rules ensued. The contract between the Consortium and the KRG was governed by English law and provided explicitly that “the KRG waives on its own behalf and that of [The Kurdistan Region of Iraq] any claim to immunity for itself and its assets”.

Cooke J held that whilst the UAE’s recognition of other states was a matter of foreign policy which the DIFC Courts could not rule on, construing the KRG’s waiver of immunity was a question of law and not public policy. In agreeing to arbitrate, a party agrees that the arbitration shall be effective in determining the rights of the parties (at 26). The waiver of any claim to immunity for itself and its assets must mean waiver of immunity from execution (at 28): any argument on that is blocked by issue estoppel (at 36).

Sovereign immunity therefore was not a trump which could be played at the time of enforcement: whatever immunity there might or might not have been had been contractually signed away.

An interesting and well argued judgment.

Geert.

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Fasten your (Road and) belts. China to follow example of DIFC and ICC.

Susan Finder has an absolutely indispensable post on two recent initiatives over at the Chinese Supreme Court.

Firstly, the Supreme People’s Court is working on a judicial interpretation of the rules on recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments. This follows the first such recognition from a judgment originating in the United States, Liu Li v. Tao Li and Tong Wu (2015) Yue Wuhan Zhong Min Shang Wai Chu Zi No.00026 – see professor Clarke’s review here. The recent conference at Wuhan which I reported on at my Twitter feed, shows the intensity of engagement of China with the Hague Judgments project.

Next, the SPC is engaging with a multitude of stakeholders to consider setting-up specialist mediation centres, with the examples of Dubai’s DIFC and Singapore’s ICC in mind, to smoothen the participation of foreign governments and companies in China’s Belt and Road initiative. Susan has great review of the implications of same.

Don’t forget to look to the East: Exciting stuff happening there.

Geert.

 

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Ordre Public in Bankruptcy. The Amsterdam Court of Appeals in Yukos.

Michael Broeders and Ulrike Verboom have excellent overview of the decision back in May by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal not to recognise the Russian liquidation order of 1 August 2006 regarding OAO Yukos Oil Company. The refusal to recognise is based on ordre public: in particular, a finding was made that the Russian order contravenes the principles of due process hence also ordre public. Reference was made in extenso to decisions by the European Court of Human rights against Russia in related cases in 2011 and 2014.

Michael and Ulrike also refer to previous case-law of the Dutch Supreme Court which held that on the basis of the lex concursus (here: Russian), there is no principled objection to the Russian trustee in bankruptcy to exercise his powers as such trustee in The Netherlands.

Geert.

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The High Court in Midtown. This is what recognition and enforcement looks like ex-EU.

Don’t it always seem to go, you don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone. Recognition and enforcement intra-EU goes smoothly in civil and commercial matters. So smoothly in fact, the European Commission wanted to abolish the potential for refusal altogether in the Brussels I Recast (regular readers are aware I reported on it at the time of negotiation).

Thank you Clyde & Co for alerting me to a case which highlights how complicated things can get outside of the EU context. In [2017] EWHC 519 (Comm) Midtown Acquisitions v Essar Global parties settled their dispute in an agreement, under which the defendant accepted liability and “confessed to judgment”. The New York courts then entered a Judgment by Confession (similar to an English consent judgment). Recognition and enforcement was sought in England.

In the Brussels system, discussion is still possible on the very notion of ‘judgment’ as I have recently reported (see my postings on Pula Parking and Zulfikarpašić). Refusal of recognition is possible on very narrow grounds. Famously, under the Brussels regime, recognition does not require res judicata of the foreign (intra-EU) judgment. (A misleadingly simple statement made in all Reports. But I’ll leave the detail for another time (see eg Gothaer for earlier analysis).

Outside the Brussels regime however (lest the Brexit negotiations yield a continuing bridge between civil procedure in the UK and EU this will also apply to judgment issued by UK courts), discussion on these two points re-emerges: when can a ruling be considered a ‘judgment’, and does it have res judicata? Defendant in Midtown argues that the New York judgment was not a “judgment” as that expression is used in English law because (i) there was no lis between the parties in New York, (ii) the New York judgment was not final and conclusive and (iii) the New York judgment was not on the merits.

Teare J rejected all three arguments on the basis of relevant precedent. The judgment merits reading for it is a good reminder of the extent of argument ensuing when one is not covered by the umbrella of EU or international harmonisation of recognition and enforcement.  Complications which are not likely to assist the London legal market in maintaining its attraction post Brexit.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.

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A new draft Hague ‘Judgments’ project. Where’s Wally?

I reported earlier on the November 2015 draft ‘Judgments project’ of the Hague Conference on private international law, otherwise known as the draft convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to civil and commercial matters. The working group now has a February 2017 draft out. (The project nota bene has even increased in relevance given Brexit).

I could have titled this post ‘spot the differences’ for of course there are changes in formulation between current and previous version. However my main point of concern remains: the absence of Wally: some type of institutional redress which will assist courts in the interpretation of the Convention. Article 23 now calls for uniform interpretation, and there will, one assumes, be a report accompanying its adoption. (Judging by the size of commentaries on the EU mirror, Brussels I Recast, this could turn out to be a very sizeable report indeed). However without a court system ensuring uniformity of application, the Convention in my view will risk being a dead duck in the water.

Geert. (Not by nature pessimistic. But probably realistic).

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2.

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The November 2015 draft Hague ‘Judgments’ project. A powerful potion or a cauldron full of jurisdictional spells?

The November 2015 draft ‘Judgments project’ of the Hague Conference on private international law, otherwise known as the draft convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to civil and commercial matters, is a very ambitious project which at the same time risks exposing some of the inherent weaknesses of the modus operandi of the Hague Conference. This is not the right forum for an exhaustive analysis. Rather, I would like to flag some areas of interest. Inevitably, an obvious point of reference is the European Union’s Brussels I (Recast) regime.

First, the text itself. The Working Group’s report, which accompanies the draft, explains the history and development of the text and the various options taken. No need to repeat it here. The approach of the Convention is the same ‘mission creep’ which the 1968 Brussels Convention had to resort to, to enhance the free movement of judgments between Member States. Given that the most widespread reason for refusal of recognition and enforcement (R&E), are accusations of excessive or inappropriate exercise of jurisdiction, one can only truly co-ordinate R&E if one also co-ordinates jurisdiction. The Hague Convention takes this route in Articles 5-6, (Exclusive) bases for recognition and enforcement. Following this co-ordination of jurisdictional rules, Article 7 then limits the ground upon which R&E may be refused.

Of note is that Article 4(2)’s ban on merits review (when assessing the possibility of recognition and enforcement), probably does not extend to judgments issued by default. The Article is not clear on what is meant exactly: the first para of Article 4(2) rules out ‘review of the merits’. The second para suggests ‘The court addressed shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction, unless the judgment was given by default.’ Not being bound by findings of fact does not necessarily entail a possibility for merits review, and the text can probably do with clarification at this point.

Article 5(e)’s special jurisdictional rule for contracts, has been clarified compared with earlier versions, however the text remains subject to plenty of room for debate.

Article 8’s room for refusing R&E when the exclusive jurisdictional rules of the Convention were infringed, or where matters excluded from the Convention were at issue, could in our view do with tidying up. It currently mingles scope for refusal of R&E as such, in the case of infringement of the exclusive jurisdictional rules, with discussion of excluded matters as ‘preliminary issues’ only – a clear reference to the EU’s experience with arbitration. Without editorial perfection, however, this article, in combination with Article 2’s excluded matters, risks similar and protracted debate as was /is the case under Brussels I (and the Recast).

Further, the modus operandi, and institutional consequences of the Convention. As indicated, an exhaustive review of the Convention is not possible here. That is due in large part to the extensive comments which one could address vis-a-vis each individual entry of the text. Rather like in the case of each individual provision of the Brussels regime. In the case of the latter, the CJEU is exercised on a very regular basis with the determination of the precise meaning of the heads of jurisdiction. In the Hague process, there is no such institution. One has to rely on the application of the Convention by the signatory States. At some point, one has to assess whether it is tenable not to have some kind of review process at The Hague, lest one risks the Convention being applied quite differently in the various signatory States. Coupled with the additional lawyer of complication were the EU to accede (which it is bound to; however would it really be progress to create additional layers of differentiation?), the CJEU itself might have difficulty accepting a body of judicial review, where the text to be reviewed borders so closely unto the Brussels regime.

Geert.

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