Posts Tagged Recognition and enforcement

Prof Hess on Brexit and Lugano.

A concise note (I am currently tied up mostly in writing research grants. And and and… I hope to return to the blog in earnest later in the week) to signal prof Hess’ excellent short paper on Brexit and judicial co-operation. Prof Hess focuses on the possibility to use the Lugano Convention. (See here for a draft of Michiel Poesen’s overview). I agree that Lugano would not be a good route if one’s intention is to safeguard as much as possible co-ordination between the  UK’s common law approach to private international law, and the EU’s. Neither evidently if one aims to facilitate smooth cross-border proceedings.

Prof Hess has an interesting side consideration on schemes of arrangements. (Including reference to Apcoa). Again I agree that the English courts’ approach to same is not entirely without question marks (particularly jurisdictional issues in the event of opposing creditors: see here). I do not though believe that they would justify hesitation at the recognition and enforcement stage in continental Europe – even after Brexit. At least: not in all Member States. For of course post Brexit, UK judgments become those of a ‘third country’, for which, subject to progress at The Hague, we have no unified approach.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 5.

 

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Radseresht-Spain: The High Court (inter alia) on the revocability of Ismalic /Talaq divorce

In [2017] EWHC 2932 (Fam) Radseresht v Radsheresht-Spain Cohen J is asked to recognise a divorce (and ensuing financial arrangements) granted under Dubai law.

I will not discuss the merits of the case (Justice Cohen does so proficiently, not just to my lay eye but I am assuming also the expert eye; he decides there was an intention to continue to stay married). Rather, the case is an interesting example to show those having to get used to conflict of laws. The High Court has no hesitation to apply Dubai law with all its in and outs (part of the judgment queries whether there were continued sexual relationships between the (ex?) spouses), in a court in London.

Of note is also that the High Court suggests that but for the very late raising of the issue, it could have queried whether the courts at Dubai had jurisdiction in the first place, habitual residence of the parties not having been at the UAE (the suggestion seems to have been made by counsel of the husband that the relevant criterion would have been nationality anyway).

Geert.

 

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Dana Gas v Deutsche Bank et al. Islamic financing. Interest v usury (riba). Depecage, von Munchausen and overriding mandatory law. Partial unenforceability. All in the face of anti-suit.

In [2017] EWHC 2928 (Comm) Dana Gas v Deutsche Bank et al., Leggatt J treats his readers to a concise insight into islamic finance (particularly in para 10) which he needs to do to inform readers of the essence of the case. The operation essentially involves raising investment (with a view to restructuring), organised by the main agreement (of the ‘Mudarabah’ type), subject to UAE law, and supported by a purchase undertaking of the same date, subject to English law. The set-up therefore evidently is not one of dépeçage per se (this would require one and the same agreement being subject to different laws) however it comes close.

Inevitably following unfavourable market conditions, an anti-suit injunction was sought and obtained in the UAE, followed however by English proceedings which required the aint-suit to be lifted – something which Dana Gas did not succeed in as a result of shareholder opposition. The English proceedings were effectively saved from collapse by the involvement of a third party, BlackRock, who as a non-party to the UAE sharia proceedings, were not bound by the anti-suit injunction. The somewhat complicated result is that the English proceedings really can only limp along.

Dana Gas seek confirmation that the transaction is unlawful and all the relevant contractual obligations are unenforceable as a matter of UAE law. Leggatt J with neither emotion nor hesitation refers essentially to Rome I’s universal application: the Mudarabah agreement is subject to UAE law and he is happy to assume it is invalid under UAE law – hence not enforceable by an English court. See in this respect Article 10(1) Rome I.

That however leaves the viability of the purchase undertaking. (at 46) The fact in and of itself that the contract or its performance would be regarded as invalid or unlawful under the law of some other country than England (for example, a country where one of the parties is domiciled or carries on business) is generally speaking irrelevant (reference is made to Kleinwort, Sons & Co v Ungarische Baumwolle Industrie AG [1939] 2 KB 678.

At 48, Dana Gas sets out its case for unenforceability of the purchase agreement under English law. This includes reference to ordre public but also inevitably an attempt to ‘contaminate’ the purchase agreement with the Mudarabah agreement. Leggatt J justifiably turns this around: at 54: it is apparent from the purchase agreement’s terms that the risks against which the Purchase Undertaking is intended to protect the Certificateholders include the risk that the mudarabah and the transaction documents governed by UAE law will turn out to be invalid. That is why they needed to be separated. (In that respect merging the two agreements into one and applying dépeçage might give even stronger force to this argument: however I do not know whether under UAE law such construction would be acceptable).

Further arguments swept aside, the Court turns to ordre public.

Dana Gas nb had employed both ordre public and, earlier Article 9(3) Rome I: overriding mandatory law: a rare treat indeed. Relevant English precedent is Ralli Brothers: Ralli Brothers v Cia Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 1 KB 614: an English court will not enforce an obligation which requires a party to do something which is unlawful by the law of the country in which the act has to be done. Rome’s Article 9(3) operates in a similar context. However Dana Gas later abandoned that claim for (at 80) those rules of law are only applicable if and in so far as the obligations in question have to be performed in the UAE – quod non.

A switch was then made to ordre public, now with Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 as leading precedent. However, here too, it is only if a contract has as its object and intention the performance in a friendly foreign country of an act which is illegal under the law of that country that the contract will be considered (at 82 in fine) contrary to English public policy.

Conclusion:  the Purchase Undertaking is valid and enforceable.

Without claiming anything near proper competence in Islamic finance law, it would seem that Dana Gas does not introduce new principles in that area. However in diligently applying conflicts analysis, Leggatt J in my view does practice a great service: he re-emphasises the need for parties clearly to identify locus implementi: the place of performance of an obligation. When obligations are marked out for a seperate lex causae, such clear identification of place of performance will insulate them from collapse.

Geert.

(Handbook) of Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016: essentially, almost every section of Chapters 2 and 3.

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Pearl v Kurdistan. The DIFC on waivers of sovereign immunity.

Update 17 November 2017 For discussions in Dutch case-law (including re contractual waiver) with respect to SHAPE, see here.

Thank you Peter Smith over at Tamimi for flagging [2017] DIFC ARB 003 Pearl v Kurdistan. Peter summarises as follows:

‘In 2007, Crescent Petroleum, the oldest privately-owned oil and gas company in the Middle East, agreed with Dana Gas, one the leading publicly-listed natural gas companies in the region, to create a joint venture called Pearl Petroleum (together, “the Consortium”). The Consortium entered into an agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (“KRG”) for the development of the Khor Mor and Chemchemal petrochemical fields in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The KRG were and remain engaged in a political dispute with the Federal Government of Iraq, meaning that the Consortium were unable to export gas produced by the developed fields. As a result, the KRG became liable under its contract with the Consortium to pay a minimum guaranteed price, but it failed to make the required payments in full.’

Arbitration in London under LCIA rules ensued. The contract between the Consortium and the KRG was governed by English law and provided explicitly that “the KRG waives on its own behalf and that of [The Kurdistan Region of Iraq] any claim to immunity for itself and its assets”.

Cooke J held that whilst the UAE’s recognition of other states was a matter of foreign policy which the DIFC Courts could not rule on, construing the KRG’s waiver of immunity was a question of law and not public policy. In agreeing to arbitrate, a party agrees that the arbitration shall be effective in determining the rights of the parties (at 26). The waiver of any claim to immunity for itself and its assets must mean waiver of immunity from execution (at 28): any argument on that is blocked by issue estoppel (at 36).

Sovereign immunity therefore was not a trump which could be played at the time of enforcement: whatever immunity there might or might not have been had been contractually signed away.

An interesting and well argued judgment.

Geert.

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Fasten your (Road and) belts. China to follow example of DIFC and ICC.

Susan Finder has an absolutely indispensable post on two recent initiatives over at the Chinese Supreme Court.

Firstly, the Supreme People’s Court is working on a judicial interpretation of the rules on recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments. This follows the first such recognition from a judgment originating in the United States, Liu Li v. Tao Li and Tong Wu (2015) Yue Wuhan Zhong Min Shang Wai Chu Zi No.00026 – see professor Clarke’s review here. The recent conference at Wuhan which I reported on at my Twitter feed, shows the intensity of engagement of China with the Hague Judgments project.

Next, the SPC is engaging with a multitude of stakeholders to consider setting-up specialist mediation centres, with the examples of Dubai’s DIFC and Singapore’s ICC in mind, to smoothen the participation of foreign governments and companies in China’s Belt and Road initiative. Susan has great review of the implications of same.

Don’t forget to look to the East: Exciting stuff happening there.

Geert.

 

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Global Twinjunctions. X v Twitter.

Twitter injunctions – Twinjunctions if you like, rather like Facebook or Google Removal orders, provide classic scenarios for the consideration of the territorial scope of injunctive and enforcement proceedings. Michael Douglas has great review of [2017] NSWSC 1300 X v Twitter. [P.s. 27 November: Michael has more analysis here]. On 28 September 2017, the Supreme Court of New South Wales awarded its final injunction with global reach, directed towards Twitter Inc (based at CAL) and its Irish counterpart, Twitter International Company.

Plaintiff requested removal of tweets and accounts, and also requested ia that Twitter disclose information relating to the identity of a troll, flagging a potential action against that person for breach of confidence. Twitter refused, appealing to its privacy policy. The eventual injunction went very far indeed, as Michael details. Of the issues under discussion, of interest to this post are the jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against foreign defendants who do not appear; and the appropriateness of injunctions expressed to operate ‘everywhere in the world’.

Now, what is refreshing about Pembroke J’s review of the issues is his non-doctrinal analysis of the issue of jurisdiction. He emphasises that there is a long history of courts of equity making in personam orders that are intended to operate extra-territorially (the Court’s jurisdiction is one in equity); (at 40) that Twitter unlike other defendants may disagree with the ruling but will not seek to avoid its social responsibility; that there is a public interest in issuing the worldwide order (and in enforcing it: Pembroke J flags that there are Australia-based assets against which enforcement may be sought); and that given his experience with Twitter, it can be expected to use its best endeavours to give effect to the proposed orders, despite its objection that it is not feasible to pro-actively monitor user content.

Eventually of course the trouble with such an assessment, without consideration of wider issues of public and private international law, is that the issuing, or not, of orders of this kind by the courts, depends on the defendant’s attitude towards compliance. That is hardly a solution serving equal access to the law or indeed equity.

Geert.

 

 

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EU Civil procedure geeks: Time to sit up. Max Planck Luxembourg have their mutual trust study out. Supports arguments against further harmonisation.

Under the leadership of prof Hess, MPI Luxembourg have collated a treasure chest of data on what, in practice, continues to hold up recognition and enforcement of judgments in the EU Member States. The Study, released last week, was conducted for the European Commission. Its main conclusion suggests that in particular the service of documents could do with streamlining.

That all in all modest recommendation suggests that the very variety of civil procedure rules in the EU Member States in and of itself is not the main obstacle in recognition and enforcement. I insert a big caveat here for I have so far only read the exec summary and the main recommendations, however if they are anything to go by, the study in effect has to serve as a strong argument against more harmonisation of civil procedure rules at the EU level.

Debate no doubt to be continued.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.

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