Posts Tagged Recognition and enforcement
Update 17 November 2017 For discussions in Dutch case-law (including re contractual waiver) with respect to SHAPE, see here.
‘In 2007, Crescent Petroleum, the oldest privately-owned oil and gas company in the Middle East, agreed with Dana Gas, one the leading publicly-listed natural gas companies in the region, to create a joint venture called Pearl Petroleum (together, “the Consortium”). The Consortium entered into an agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (“KRG”) for the development of the Khor Mor and Chemchemal petrochemical fields in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The KRG were and remain engaged in a political dispute with the Federal Government of Iraq, meaning that the Consortium were unable to export gas produced by the developed fields. As a result, the KRG became liable under its contract with the Consortium to pay a minimum guaranteed price, but it failed to make the required payments in full.’
Arbitration in London under LCIA rules ensued. The contract between the Consortium and the KRG was governed by English law and provided explicitly that “the KRG waives on its own behalf and that of [The Kurdistan Region of Iraq] any claim to immunity for itself and its assets”.
Cooke J held that whilst the UAE’s recognition of other states was a matter of foreign policy which the DIFC Courts could not rule on, construing the KRG’s waiver of immunity was a question of law and not public policy. In agreeing to arbitrate, a party agrees that the arbitration shall be effective in determining the rights of the parties (at 26). The waiver of any claim to immunity for itself and its assets must mean waiver of immunity from execution (at 28): any argument on that is blocked by issue estoppel (at 36).
Sovereign immunity therefore was not a trump which could be played at the time of enforcement: whatever immunity there might or might not have been had been contractually signed away.
An interesting and well argued judgment.
Susan Finder has an absolutely indispensable post on two recent initiatives over at the Chinese Supreme Court.
Firstly, the Supreme People’s Court is working on a judicial interpretation of the rules on recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments. This follows the first such recognition from a judgment originating in the United States, Liu Li v. Tao Li and Tong Wu (2015) Yue Wuhan Zhong Min Shang Wai Chu Zi No.00026 – see professor Clarke’s review here. The recent conference at Wuhan which I reported on at my Twitter feed, shows the intensity of engagement of China with the Hague Judgments project.
Next, the SPC is engaging with a multitude of stakeholders to consider setting-up specialist mediation centres, with the examples of Dubai’s DIFC and Singapore’s ICC in mind, to smoothen the participation of foreign governments and companies in China’s Belt and Road initiative. Susan has great review of the implications of same.
Don’t forget to look to the East: Exciting stuff happening there.
Twitter injunctions – Twinjunctions if you like, rather like Facebook or Google Removal orders, provide classic scenarios for the consideration of the territorial scope of injunctive and enforcement proceedings. Michael Douglas has great review of  NSWSC 1300 X v Twitter. On 28 September 2017, the Supreme Court of New South Wales awarded its final injunction with global reach, directed towards Twitter Inc (based at CAL) and its Irish counterpart, Twitter International Company.
Now, what is refreshing about Pembroke J’s review of the issues is his non-doctrinal analysis of the issue of jurisdiction. He emphasises that there is a long history of courts of equity making in personam orders that are intended to operate extra-territorially (the Court’s jurisdiction is one in equity); (at 40) that Twitter unlike other defendants may disagree with the ruling but will not seek to avoid its social responsibility; that there is a public interest in issuing the worldwide order (and in enforcing it: Pembroke J flags that there are Australia-based assets against which enforcement may be sought); and that given his experience with Twitter, it can be expected to use its best endeavours to give effect to the proposed orders, despite its objection that it is not feasible to pro-actively monitor user content.
Eventually of course the trouble with such an assessment, without consideration of wider issues of public and private international law, is that the issuing, or not, of orders of this kind by the courts, depends on the defendant’s attitude towards compliance. That is hardly a solution serving equal access to the law or indeed equity.
EU Civil procedure geeks: Time to sit up. Max Planck Luxembourg have their mutual trust study out. Supports arguments against further harmonisation.
Under the leadership of prof Hess, MPI Luxembourg have collated a treasure chest of data on what, in practice, continues to hold up recognition and enforcement of judgments in the EU Member States. The Study, released last week, was conducted for the European Commission. Its main conclusion suggests that in particular the service of documents could do with streamlining.
That all in all modest recommendation suggests that the very variety of civil procedure rules in the EU Member States in and of itself is not the main obstacle in recognition and enforcement. I insert a big caveat here for I have so far only read the exec summary and the main recommendations, however if they are anything to go by, the study in effect has to serve as a strong argument against more harmonisation of civil procedure rules at the EU level.
Debate no doubt to be continued.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.
Thank you Francesca Petronio, Fabio Cozzi & Francesco Falco for flagging the Italian Supreme Court’s judgment no. 16601/2017 of 5 July last. Thank you also to professor Marta Requejo for sending me copy of the judgment.
In what is suggested to be a Copernican revolution, the Supreme Court has dropped the Italian legal order’s fundamental objection to punitive damages, which made it near-impossible to obtain recognition and enforcement of in particular US judgments containing such damages. The judgment not surprisingly contains a number of conditions in particular on the excessive nature of such damages.
The judges seem to have been swayed by developments both in Italy (statutory law in places allowing for more than simple compensation of material loss) and US law (truly excessive punitive damages having been reigned in).
Punitive damages are the one example always identified as one of the core applications of ordre public in European recognition and enforcement law. After the Italian example surely this may now be less obvious in many jurisdictions.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.
Vulture funds (and Yukos) fail in Round 1 against Belgian enforcement regime viz sovereign immunity. No reference to Luxemburg on compatibility of Brussels I with international law.
Thank you Quentin Declève for alerting me to the Constitutional Court’s judgment on a related action (where MNL were joined by Yukos) namely against the act of 23 August 2015 which introduced Article 1412quinquies in the Belgian Judicial Code. It is noteworthy that the action against the Act of July has not yet been decided by the Court (that case number, for the aficionados, is 6371), at the least I have not been able to locate any judgment).
As Quentin summarises, as a general rule, Article 1412 quinquies of the Belgian Judicial Code provides that assets located in Belgium that belong to a foreign State are immune from execution and cannot be subject to enforcement proceedings by creditors. Exceptions to that rule are possible if very strict conditions are met: a party wishing to seize the assets belonging to a State needs to obtain a prior authorisation from a judge. This judge will only authorise the seizure if (i) the foreign State has “expressively” and “specifically” consented to the seizure of the assets; (ii) the foreign State has specifically allocated those assets to the enforcement of the claim which gives rise to the seizure; and (iii) the assets are located in Belgium and are allocated to an economic or commercial activity.
The Court has now annulled the word ‘specifically’ but has otherwise left the Act intact. Quentin summarises how the Court found that this proviso is not part of international law on State immunity.
Now, picking up where Quentin left: part of applicants’ arguments relate to Brussels I Recast. The argument is made that Belgium with its Act re-introduces exequatur, now that is has been abolished by the Recast. Belgium’s Government seems to argue that the law relating to seizure has public order character and hence is covered by the ordre public exception of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, and that seizure in Belgium which would go against public international customary law on State immunity, along the same lines would be covered by the ordre public exception of the Recast (para A.5.2, p.6).
The Court (at B.29.1 ff, .34 ff) deals with the Brussels I arguments very very succinctly: it refers to Article 41(1) which other than the substantive requirements of title III, makes recognition and enforcement subject to the law of the State of enforcement. The Court also says enforcement is not entirely obstructed: some of the foreign entities’ assets remain subject to seizure; and there are other ways of enforcement other than seizure. Finally the Court suggests that the Brussels I Recast surely must not be applied in a way which would be incompatible with international customary law. By rejecting the suggestion for a prelimary reference to Luxembourg (suggestion made by the Belgian State, unusually), the Court clearly believes that call is not one that has to be made by Luxembourg. Pitty: that would have been an interesting reference.
Again, NML Capital’s action against the Vulture Fund Act is still ongoing, lest I have missed withdrawal. As I noted in my paper, this Act I believe is wanting on various grounds, including some related to the New York Convention and the Brussels I Recast.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16, Heading 22.214.171.124.4.