Posts Tagged Recognition and enforcement
Salvoni v Fiermonte. CJEU confirms quasi-notarial nature of Brussels Ia’s Article 53 certificate, other than for provisional measures. Consumer protection cannot be raised at that stage. Also rejects interpretative force of substantive consumer law rules for jurisdictional issues.
I reviewed Bobek AG Opinion in Case C-347/18 Salvoni v Fiermonte earlier. The referring court enquires whether the court of origin tasked with issuing the Article 53 Certificate (issued with a view to enabling swift recognition and enforcement) may, of its own motion, seek to ascertain whether the judgment whose enforcement is sought was issued in breach of the rules on jurisdiction over consumer contracts, so that it may, where appropriate, inform the consumer of any such breach and enable her to consider the possibility of opposing enforcement of the judgment in the Member State addressed.
The CJEU has entirely confirmed the AG’s Opinion (no English version at the time of posting): no such second-guessing of jurisdiction.
At 34 ff the Court points out an important distinction with certificates issued with a view to enforcing provisional measures: there, the court issuing the certificate does carry out jurisdictional review (whether the court ordering the measures has jurisdiction as to the substance of the case).
At 40 ff the Court also confirms that substantive consumer protection laws (such as Directive 93/13) do not transfer to the procedural /jurisdictional rules of Brussels Ia: an important conclusion overall.
(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 220.127.116.11, Heading 2.2.16.
Like quite a few of the Opinions and Judgment in my recent blog posts, Szpunar AG’s recent Opinion in C-555/18 KHK v BAC (*mutters his usual rant on the idiocy of the parties’ anonimisation rule*) was issued just before many of us took a short summer break. Carlos Santaló Gorisseemingly did not and I am happy to refer in the main to his analysis.
The Advocate General refers first of all to the infamous decision in 125/79 Denilauler, excluding ex parte provisional or protective measures from enforcement under the then Brussels Convention. The European Account Preservation Order Regulation 655/2014 was intended to fix this particular chink in the European civil procedure armour. Which national decisions fit with its definition of ‘authentic instrument’ is the subject of current proceedings, and Szpunar AG as Carlos reports takes a balanced approach between facilitating free movement without assisting abuse.
Of note is that the EAPO Regulation hitherto has received very little practice. Clarification of its precise scope is crucial.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.15, Heading 18.104.22.168.1.
The representatives at the Diplomatic Conference at the Hague Convention have issued a provisional text of the Convention here. I am short of time to post a quick scan of the Convention – see some of my earlier posts on same. Also, since the Convention has taken on the format of the Brussels regime, it is of course quite an exercise even just to give a quick overview.
Of interest is that Jane Holliday posted a summary of key positive takeaways by prof Paul Beaumont, who was heavily involved in the drafting i.a. as a representative of the EU. These include the room for asymmetric choice of court (not covered by the Hague choice of court Convention and crucial for many common law jurisdictions); and the blend between the US and the EU regime for forum contractus: Article 5(g):
‘the judgment ruled on a contractual obligation and it was given by a court of the State in which performance of that obligation took place, or should have taken place, in accordance with
(i) the agreement of the parties, or (ii) the law applicable to the contract, in the absence of an agreed place of performance,
unless the activities of the defendant in relation to
the transaction clearly did not constitute a purposeful and substantial connection to that State.
Of note of course is also the carve-out for intellectual property and of ‘unilateral’ sovereign debt restructuring, but also of defamation and of privacy.
Much analysis no doubt to follow, as are complications in reaching a unified interpretation of the Convention once ratified.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016. Chapter 2.
Percival v Moto Novu. Your tutorial on enforcement of judgments under Brussels Ia, courtesy of Justice Murray.
In  EWHC 1391 (QB) Percival v Moto Novu LLC Murray J considers the ins and outs of Article 38 Brussels Ia.
The dispute arose out of an aborted property transaction in Italy. Mr Teruzzi and Ms Puthod are husband and wife. La Fattoria was a “pass-through” company incorporated under Italian law and owned by Mr Teruzzi and Ms Puthod through which the property at the centre of the dispute was temporarily owned. It has since been dissolved.
By an Assignment of Rights of Judgment dated 28 March 2011 (but signed by the parties on 29 June 2011) and governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (“the 2011 Assignment”), Mr Teruzzi assigned to the respondent, Motu Novu LLC (“Motu Novu”), a Delaware limited liability company, all of his right, title and interest in the Tribunal Judgment and the CA Milan Judgment. There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the 2011 Assignment was also effective to transfer the right, title and interest of Ms Puthod and La Fattoria in those judgments or, if not, whether that fact is relevant to the effectiveness of the registration.
At 8: Title III (the recognition and enforcement Title) involves two stages: i) under Article 39 of the Regulation, a first stage involving only the applicant, who must be an “interested party” and who applies ex parte to the relevant “court or competent authority” listed in Annex II to the Regulation to obtain an order for registration of the foreign judgment in order to permit enforcement locally; and ii) under Article 43 of the Regulation, a second stage, inter partes, during which the respondent (the judgment debtor) has the opportunity to raise certain limited objections by lodging an “appeal” (under English CPR rules this would be an application to set aside the order).
Under Article 44 of the Regulation, the order made on appeal under Article 43 is subject to a single further appeal on a point of law.
At 11: The ex parte stage of the registration process is governed by Articles 38 to 42 of the Regulation. The inter partes stage is governed by Articles 43 to 47. The remainder of section 2 of chapter III of the Regulation, Articles 48 to 52, deals with miscellaneous points that do not arise in this case, other than in relation to Article 48 (undue delay).
The process is further described in detail in the judgment. This is most helpful. Unless one has done one of these oneself, in all Member States the actual procedure is often shrouded in various levels of fog.
Of longer term authority interest is the discussion of the mistake made at an earlier stage, to register all 3 Italian judgments even though under Italian law only one of them was actually enforceable. At 44 Murray J in my view justifiably excuses this error: there is nothing ‘in the Regulation, or otherwise, (that) limits an applicant’s registration of a foreign judgment to the proportion to which he is entitled. I have seen no authority for that proposition.’
What is also of note is the concept of ‘interested party’. At 45:
The term “interested party” is not defined in the Regulation, but a person who is the assignee of a named judgment creditor, even where there are other named judgment creditors, is clearly an interested party. It seems to me fundamentally incompatible with the deliberately limited and mechanical nature of the registration process under chapter III of the Regulation that the registering court or competent authority should be required to enquire into the nature and extent of an applicant’s interest in a judgment, beyond what is necessary to establish prima facie that the applicant is an interested party.
I believe this is right. That the proceedings leading to the Italian Judgment were served on the Original Claimants on 17 January 2011, pre-dating the 2011 Assignment by over two months has therefore become irrelevant (at 48).
Intricate detail of Title III is not often litigated. This judgment is noteworthy.
(Handbook of) EU private international law 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.
Merinson v Yukos: Dutch settlement following employment contract. Appeal denied. England has full jurisdiction as domicile of the defendant.
In  EWCA Civ 830 the Court of Appeal has dismissed the appeal against Yukos v Merinson which I reviewed here – review which readers may need to appreciate the judgment. Three issues were considered by Gross LJ at the Court of Appeal:
1. Are the Damages Claims and/or the Annulment Claims “matters relating to [an] individual contract of employment” within the meaning of Article 20(1)?>>>Salter DJ’s answer at the High Court was YES. I suggested in my review that that finding should not have been made without considering the lex causae of the employment contract: Rome I in my view should have been engaged here. Both Salter DJ and Gross LJ (at 27 ff) were persuaded however by the highly material nexus between the annulment claims – whether considered together with or separately form the damages claims (Gross LJ distinguished Aspen Underwriting in the process).
2. If so, is the Settlement Agreement “an agreement .. entered into after the dispute has arisen” within the meaning of Article 23(1)?>>>Salter DJ’s answer was negative, on the basis of extensive reference to the Jenard Report and Convention and Regulation scholarship. Gross LJ agrees – I continue to find that conclusion unconvincing.
3. Further, is the English court, in any event, precluded from entertaining the Annulment Claims by Chapter IV of the Recast Judgments Regulation? >>>Here the Court of Appeal made the High Court’s reasoning its own, much more succinctly than its entertaining of the other questions.
Plenty to discuss here for the 3rd ed of the Handbook.
Bobek AG Opined early May (excuse posting delay) in Case C-347/18 Salvoni v Fiermonte. The referring court enquires whether the court of origin tasked with issuing the Article 53 Certificate (issued with a view to enabling swift recognition and enforcement) may, of its own motion, seek to ascertain whether the judgment whose enforcement is sought was issued in breach of the rules on jurisdiction over consumer contracts, so that it may, where appropriate, inform the consumer of any such breach and enable her to consider the possibility of opposing enforcement of the judgment in the Member State addressed.
A related issue therefore to the CJEU judgment in Weil last week.
Mr Alessandro Salvoni, a lawyer based in Milan, asked the Tribunale di Milano (District Court, Milan) to issue Ms Anna Maria Fiermonte (who resides in Hamburg) with a payment order for an amount owed to him as consideration for the professional services rendered by him in connection with legal proceedings concerning a will. Payment order was granted, no challenge was made by Ms Fiermonte (at 24 the AG emphasises that evidently, the court needs to check whether proper service was made). Mr Salvoni then requested the same court to issue the Article 53 Certificate with respect to that order. However this time the same court (with the AG at 22 one can assume that composition was different) proprio motu (and belatedly: see at 15) classified the relationship as B2C under the relevant provisions of Brussels Ia. Ms Fiermonte should have been sued in Hamburg.
Bobek AG courteously calls the court’s initiative ingenious and well-intended (at 29) but has no choice but to conclude that the Regulation simply has no tool for the Court somehow to mitigate let alone correct its earlier mistake. In a gesture effectively of public service (at 34; this rescues something useful from the otherwise fairly futile exercise; I doubt the CJEU will do something similar), the AG then rephrases the question into a more general one, which is detached from the specific course of action apparently contemplated by the national court: Is a national court, when issuing the Article 53 Certificate, entitled (or even obliged), under EU law, to ascertain whether the judicial decision that is to be certified was issued in breach of the rules on jurisdiction over consumer contracts?
At 44 ff the AG delightfully side-steps the chicken and hen issue of the C-54/96 Dorsch criteria (is an A53 court a ‘court’ entitled to preliminary review under Article 267 TFEU) and eventually concludes that there is no room for the A53 Court to assess the application of the consumer title. At 54: ‘
The interpretation of [A53] proposed by the referring court cannot easily be reconciled with the above considerations [speed; simplicity: GAVC]. In particular, that interpretation would in effect back-pedal on one of the main features of the new system introduced by Regulation No 1215/2012. Indeed, the checks that were previously made in the Member State addressed when issuing the exequatur would not be eliminated, but merely shifted to the certification stage carried out in the Member State of origin. That reading of the provision would thus run against the logic and spirit of Regulation No 1215/2012.’
At 81 and 82 the likely outcome of course is pointed at by the AG: Article 45(1)(e)(i) and Article 46 BIa grant consumers a special ground of refusal of recognition and enforcement in cases where the judgment in question conflicts with the jurisdictional rules for the protected categories. This ground has now been handed Ms Fiermonte on a plate – leaving the Milan courts with red cheeks.
(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 22.214.171.124, Heading 2.2.16.