Posts Tagged Norway
Disciplining abuse of anchor defendants in follow-up competition law cases exceedingly difficult. Borgarting Court of Appeal (Norway) applies CDC in Posten /Bring v Volvo.
After the French Cour de Cassation in MJI v Apple Sales, the Brussels Court of Appeal in FIFA/UEFA, and the Court at Amsterdam in Kemira, (as well as other courts undoubtedly, too; and I have highlighted more cases on the blog), Ørjan Salvesen Haukaas has now reported an application of CDC in a decision of December 2018 by a Norwegian Court of appeal, LB-2018-136341 Posten /Bring v Volvo. The court evidently applies Lugano (Article 6), not Brussels Ia, yet the provision is materially identical.
Norwegian and foreign companies in the Posten/Bring group (mail services) had sued companies in the Volvo group for alleged losses incurred when purchasing trucks from Volvo after certain companies in the Volvo group had been fined for participating in a price-fixing cartel. Posten/Bring also sued a Norwegian company in the Volvo group, which had not been fined for participating in the price-fixing cartel.
Borgarting Court of Appeal held that Norwegian courts have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6(1) Lugano even if the anchor defendant is sued merely to obtain Norwegian jurisdiction. The court solely had to determine whether the claims were so closely connected that there was a risk of irreconcilable judgments, in the absence of any suggested collusion between the anchor defendant and claimants per CDC.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law. 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12, Heading 126.96.36.199.
A case title which sounds a bit like a Scandinavian crimi – that’s because it almost is. In  EWHC 2570 (Pat) Parainen Pearl et al v Jebsen Skipsrederi et al the facts amounted to claimants, who had purchased a vessel containing a pneumatic cement system patented by defendant (a company domiciled in Norway), seeking a declaration of non-infringement (DNI) of said patent. The purchase was somewhat downstream for the vessel had been sold a number of times before.
Claimants suggested jurisdiction for the UK courts for DNIs relating effectively to the whole of the EEA (at least under their reasoning; the specific countries sought were Sweden and Finland). For the English (and Welsh side of things jurisdiction is established without discussion under Article 5(3) Lugano, forum delicti. Reference was made to Wintersteiger and to Folien Fischer.
Claimants suggested that by the first sale to the original owner, defendants had ‘exhausted’ their intellectual property thus rendering the vessel into a good free to sold across the EEA. Should the court agree with that view, that finding of exhaustion would have to be accepted, still the argument went, across the EEA. Hence, an initial finding of exhaustion, given the need to apply EEA law the same in all EEA Member States, would have to be accepted by all other States and conversely this would give the English courts jurisdiction for pan-EEA DNIs.
Arnold J refers to among others Roche, Actavis v Eli Lilly, Marzillier. He holds that a potential finding by an English court of exhaustion may not necessarily be recognised and enforced by other courts in the EU or indeed EEA: it is not for the UK courts to presume that this will be so (despite their being little room for others in the EEA to refuse to enforce): ‘(Counsel for claimant) argued that.., on a proper application of European law, there could only be one answer as to whether or not the Defendants’ rights under the Patent in respect of the Vessel had been exhausted. In my view, however, it does not follow that it would be proper for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over matters that, under the scheme of the Lugano Convention, lie within the province of the courts of other Contracting States.’
Article 5(3) which works for UK jurisdiction, can then as it were not be used as a joinder-type (Article 6(1) Lugano; Article 8(1) Brussels I Recast) bridgehead for jurisdiction on further claims.
Conclusion: UK courts have no jurisdiction in so far as the DNIs extend beyond the UK designation of the Patent.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 188.8.131.52.4, Heading 184.108.40.206.
I have previously referred to the display ban case which Philip Morris took to the EFTA Court. I have only just recently stumbled across the eventual holding of the court which had referred the case to Luxembourg. (The Norwegian court held a year after EFTA’s judgment). Not GAVClaw style to report close to 2 years after date of issue: blame the inadequate (read lack of) system by which EFTA and indeed EU Member States report back on their eventual findings in preliminary review.
The District Court had been instructed by the EFTA Court to review whether the display ban actually affects the sale of domestic products and sale of goods from other EEA States equally. If there is de facto equal treatment, the law surfs on Keck & Mithouard’s exception for ‘selling arrangements’: no infringement of the core prohibition on quantitative restrictions to trade in the first place. (See Alberto Alemanno’s analysis of the EFTA ruling for background).
The national court suggested that the EFTA Court had not been entirely clear on how that test had to be constructed: not at any rate, it held, as a market hindrance test: i.e. that new products’ chances of entering the Norwegian tobacco market should be decisive for the question of whether a restriction exists. It referred inter alia (at p.35 of the copy referred to above) to the fact that the Norwegian Government in its submission to the EFTA Court had suggested that even though such hindrance for new products at the time did not actually exist, it could be expected indeed hoped that this would be the case. The District Court held that in the light of this acknowledgement by the Government, had the EFTA Court found this problematic, it would and should have said so explicitly. (This in some ways might be seen as a risk for the EFTA Court’s tradition, in line with the ECJ’s approach, to practice judicial economy).
The District Court in the end decided to continue the case on the basis of whether national products have a more favourable position due to local habits and customs linked to tobacco use (at p.35): the burden of proof whether the ban actually and not just potentially affects the marketing of imported tobacco products differently than domestic tobacco products lies with PMI, the Court held. That, it said, was not established with clarity: the de facto discriminatory effect of the display ban was found to be too uncertain to be considered a trade barrier.
The Court then somewhat inconsistently (do Norwegian courts practice wide obiter?) did review suitability and proportionality (not needed if Keck & Mithouard applied). Here, without naming the precautionary principle, the Court applies an important consequence often associated with it: the reversal of burden of proof. The Court essentially wanted PMI to show clear evidence for the display ban not being suitable for restricting the consumption of tobacco in Norway, at any rate in the long term (p.48). The Court essentially relies on previous case-law on tobacco advertising and equates suitability of the display ban with relevant studies and case-law on advertising restrictions. This was bound to (although the court took some length to establish it) lead to a finding of suitability.
Finally, as for proportionality proper, the court (with cross-reference i.a. on the effect of these bans elsewhere) did not find less trade restrictive alternatives (within the context of access to information or branding at point of sale).
This judgment just has to be staple fodder for risk classes and the interaction between risk analysis and trade law.