Posts Tagged NATO
The Brussels Court of Appeal on joinders in the Lugano Convention (in Re Fifa /UEFA arbitration clause).
Thank you Quentin Declève and co-authors for reporting a short while back the Brussels Court of Appeal judgment in RFC Seraing and Doyen Sports v Belgian FA /FIFA /UEFA. (Judgment may be consulted here – I also have a copy). The case in substance concerns FIFA /UEFA’s TPO, Third Party Ownership rules.
Quentin first of all reports on the reasons for the Court to find the arbitration clause between the club and UEFA /FIFA not to be binding. The judgment does not contain copy of the clause (lest I have entirely missed it – but I don’t think so). The clause would not seem to have had a specific lex causae identified: the Court of Appeal uses a mix of Belgian law and New York Convention arguments to rule it invalid.
As we are on the subject of validity of arbitration clauses: please refer to Quentin’s reporting of the Belgian Court’s Supreme Court’s confirmation of validity of NATO’s arbitration clause.
For current blog however I would like to report the findings on the anchor defendant mechanism (19 ff): the Court of Appeal applies Article 6(1) Lugano (UEFA and FIFA are Swiss domiciled), which is the same anchor mechanism as Article 8(1) Brussels I Recast: the anchor defendant being the Belgian Football Association. Freeport and Reisch Montage as well as CDC feature heavily in the Court’s analysis. FIFA and UEFA’s claim is that the Belgian FA is abusively being used as an anchor defendant. The court disagrees: FIFA and the Belgian FA share regulatory powers; the FA is empowered by FIFA statute to impose additional regulations. The FA’s presence in the proceedings is entirely justified and not artificially constructed.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law. 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12, Heading 188.8.131.52.
Update 17 November 2017 For discussions in Dutch case-law (including re contractual waiver) with respect to SHAPE, see here.
‘In 2007, Crescent Petroleum, the oldest privately-owned oil and gas company in the Middle East, agreed with Dana Gas, one the leading publicly-listed natural gas companies in the region, to create a joint venture called Pearl Petroleum (together, “the Consortium”). The Consortium entered into an agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (“KRG”) for the development of the Khor Mor and Chemchemal petrochemical fields in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The KRG were and remain engaged in a political dispute with the Federal Government of Iraq, meaning that the Consortium were unable to export gas produced by the developed fields. As a result, the KRG became liable under its contract with the Consortium to pay a minimum guaranteed price, but it failed to make the required payments in full.’
Arbitration in London under LCIA rules ensued. The contract between the Consortium and the KRG was governed by English law and provided explicitly that “the KRG waives on its own behalf and that of [The Kurdistan Region of Iraq] any claim to immunity for itself and its assets”.
Cooke J held that whilst the UAE’s recognition of other states was a matter of foreign policy which the DIFC Courts could not rule on, construing the KRG’s waiver of immunity was a question of law and not public policy. In agreeing to arbitrate, a party agrees that the arbitration shall be effective in determining the rights of the parties (at 26). The waiver of any claim to immunity for itself and its assets must mean waiver of immunity from execution (at 28): any argument on that is blocked by issue estoppel (at 36).
Sovereign immunity therefore was not a trump which could be played at the time of enforcement: whatever immunity there might or might not have been had been contractually signed away.
An interesting and well argued judgment.