Posts Tagged Mirror application
Sabbagh v Khoury. The jurisdictional gift that keeps on giving. In today’s instalment: the possibility for qualified acknowledgment of service (prorogation) following claimant’s alleged concessions, and amended claim.
Sabbagh v Khoury  EWHC 3004 (Comm) evidently builds upon the High Court and Court of Appeal previous judgments. Pro memoria: claimant established jurisdiction against all the defendants she wished to sue in relation to each element of her claim. Following judgment by the Court of Appeal and the refusal of permission to appeal further by the Supreme Court, the defendants had to decide whether to acknowledge service and accept the jurisdiction of the English Courts or to refuse to acknowledge service.
That jurisdiction should be debated at all was the result of claimant wanting to amend her claim, and having earlier been partially granted such permission. At 13: each defendant decided to acknowledge service and accept the jurisdiction of the English Courts but in each case they purported to qualify the terms on which they acknowledged service, hinging particularly on CPR Part 14: Admissions, and suggesting that a “concession” made on claimant’s behalf that certain Share Sale Agreements relied on by the defendants were “existent, valid and effective“, should have an impact on jurisdiction.
It is interesting to see the qualifications verbatim: at 13: ‘Thus in its letter of 26 March 2018, CMS Cameron McKenna Nabarro Olswang LLP on behalf of the Sabbagh defendants qualified their Acknowledgement of Service as being “… confined to the existing claims set out in the Claim Form, to the limited extent that the Court of Appeal accepted the English court’s jurisdiction over such claims, but subject to the numerous concessions your client has made including but not limited to her explicit abandonment of any claim to be presently entitled to or for delivery up of shares …”. Jones Day, the solicitors then acting for the first defendant similarly qualified his Acknowledgement of Service – see their letter of 26 March 2018. Baker McKenzie qualified the other Khoury defendants’ Acknowledgement of Service as being “… only in respect of the two claims as set out in the Claimant’s Claim Form … and is subject to the numerous concessions the Claimant has made to date …” and added that: “We understand that the Claimant intends to seek to amend her Particulars of Claim and our clients’ position as to whether any such amendment(s), if allowed, impact on the jurisdiction of the court over our clients as regards any claims other than those to which this Acknowledgement of Service is filed is fully reserved, including as to jurisdiction and/or the arbitrability of any such amended claims”. In the circumstances, it is probable that the amendment Baker McKenzie had in mind was one substantially in terms of the draft re-amended Particulars of Claim that had been placed before the Court of Appeal.’
At 21 ff Pelling J discusses the relationship between the amended claim, the earlier findings on jurisdiction, and the ‘concession’, leading at length eventually to hold that there was no impact of the concession on the extent of jurisdiction,
As Pelling J notes at 1 in fine: ‘Even allowing for the value at risk in this litigation all this is obviously disproportionate.’ One assumes the role of various counsel in the alleged concessions made earlier, must have had an impact on the energy with which the issue was advocated.
The case will now proceed to trial, lest there be any other jurisdictional challenges.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 220.127.116.11
2019] EWCA Civ 1219, abuse, Anchor defendant, Anchor defendants, Article 22(2), Bevoegdheid, Brussels I, BVG, C-98/06, Case C-98/06, CJEU, Court of Justice, Curia, ECJ, EEX, EEX Verordening, Exclusive jurisdictional rules, Ferrexpo, Ferrexpo v Gilson, FNC, Forum non conveniens, Freeport, http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2017/1120.html, http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2014/3233.html, https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2019/1219.html, https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2019/3004.html, Insolvency, Interpretation, Judgments Regulation, Jurisdiction, Jurisdiction Regulation, merits review, Mirror application, Reflexive application, Regulation 44/2001, Regulation 650/2012, related actions, Roche Nederland, Sabbagh v Koury, Scope of application, Succession regulation, Wills and succession, Wills and succession exception,  EWHC 3233 (Comm),  EWCA Civ 1120,  EWHC 1330 (Comm)]
Update 24 July 2019 the injunction was partially upheld by the Court of Appeal.
Update 7 June 2018 on 31 May the High Court  EWHC 1330 (Comm)] backed up the CA’s finding with an interim anti-suit (in arbitration) injunction.
In line with my previous post (readers unfamiliar with it may want to refer to it; and to very good Hill Dickinson summary of the case), of particular consideration here is the jurisdictional test under (old) Article 6(1) Brussels I, now Article 8(1) in the Recast, in particular the extent of merits review; and whether the subject matter of the claim comes within the succession exception of Article 1(2)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation.
As for the latter, the Court, after reviewing relevant precedent and counsel argument (but not, surprisingly, the very language on this issue in the Jenard report, as I mention in my previous post) holds in my view justifiably that ‘(t)he source of the ownership is irrelevant to the nature of the claim. ..The subject matter of the dispute is not whether Sana is an heir, but whether the defendants have misappropriated her property.‘ (at 161).
With respect to the application of Article 6(1) – now 8(1), the majority held in favour of a far-reaching merits review. Lady Justice Gloster (at 166 ff) has a minority opinion on the issue and I am minded to agree with her. As she notes (at 178) the operation of a merits test within Article 6(1) does give rise to risk of irreconcilable judgments, which can be demonstrated by reference to the present facts. She successfully, in my view, distinguishes the CJEU’s findings in Kolassa and in CDC, and the discussion at any rate one would have thought, merits CJEU review.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 18.104.22.168
2019] EWCA Civ 1219, abuse, Anchor defendant, Anchor defendants, Article 22(2), Bevoegdheid, Brussels I, BVG, C-98/06, Case C-98/06, CJEU, Court of Justice, Curia, ECJ, EEX, EEX Verordening, Exclusive jurisdictional rules, Ferrexpo, Ferrexpo v Gilson, FNC, Forum non conveniens, Freeport, http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2017/1120.html, http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2014/3233.html, https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2019/1219.html, Insolvency, Interpretation, Judgments Regulation, Jurisdiction, Jurisdiction Regulation, merits review, Mirror application, Reflexive application, Regulation 44/2001, Regulation 650/2012, related actions, Roche Nederland, Sabbagh v Koury, Scope of application, Succession regulation, United Kingdom, Wills and succession, Wills and succession exception,  EWHC 3233 (Comm),  EWCA Civ 1120,  EWHC 1330 (Comm)]
In Winkler v Shamoon  EWHC 2017 Ch Mr Justice Henry Carr broadly follows Mrs Justice Susan Carr in Sabbagh v Khoury (which I have reviewed earlier) on the interpretation of the ‘wills and succession’ exception in the Brussels I Recast (and the Lugano convention). [The Justices themselves, incidentally, are neither related nor married, I understand]. In so doing, Sir Henry follows Dame Susan’s approach vis-a-vis the exclusions in the Brussels I Recast.
Ms Alexandra Shamoon accepts that she is domiciled in the UK for the purposes of the Brussels Regulation. However, she applies for an order on essentially the same basis as that set out above, contending, in particular, that the claim relates to succession and therefore falls outside the scope of the Brussels Regulation. Brick Court have summary of the case and hopefully do not mind me borrowing their heads-up of the facts:
the case concerns the estate of the late Israeli businessman, Sami Shamoon. Mr Shamoon owned and controlled the Yakhin Hakal Group of Israeli companies and was known in his lifetime as one of the wealthiest men in Israel. The claim was brought by Mr Peretz Winkler, formerly the Chief Financial Officer and manager of Yakhin Hakal, against Mrs Angela Shamoon and Ms Alexandra Shamoon, the widow and daughter respectively of Mr Shamoon and the residuary legatees under his will. In his claim Mr Winkler alleged that prior to his death Mr Shamoon had orally promised to transfer to him certain shares worth tens of millions of dollars. On the basis of the alleged promise Mr Winkler claimed declarations against Angela and Alexandra Shamoon as to his entitlement to the shares (which they are due to receive under Mr Shamoon’s will). Angela and Alexandra challenged the jurisdiction of the English Court to hear the claim on the basis that it was a matter relating to “succession” within article 1(2)(a) of the Brussels Regulation and therefore fell outside its scope (and that England was not the natural or appropriate forum for the dispute).
If the claim does fall within the scope of the Regulation, jurisdiction is quite easily established on the basis of the defendant’s domicile – albeit with contestation of such domicile in the UK by Mr Shamoon’s widow and daughter.
Carr J held that the claim was one relating to succession and therefore fell outside of the Brussels I Recast (at 53 ff). While I may concur in the resulting conclusion, I do not believe the route taken is the right one. Sir Henry follows Mrs Justice Carr’s approach in applying the excluded matters of the Brussels I Recast restrictively. I disagree. Exclusions are not the same as exceptions: Article 24’s exclusive rules of jurisdictions are an exception to the main rule of Article 4; hence they need to be applied restrictively. Article 1(2)’s exclusions on the other hand need to be applied solely within the limits as intended. Lead is also taken from Sabbagh v Koury with respect to the role of the EU’s Succession Regulation. Even if the UK is not party to that Regulation, both justices suggest it may still be relevant in particular in assisting with the Brussels I Recast ‘Succession’ exception. If the approach taken in Winkler v Shamoon is followed it leads to a dovetailing of the two Regulations’ respective scope of application. Not a conclusion I think which is necessarily uncontested.
The High Court concludes (at 72) ‘this claim is excluded from the Brussels Regulation and the Lugano II Regulation as its principal subject matter is “succession” within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a). In particular, it is a claim whose object is “succession to the estate of a deceased person” which includes “all forms of transfer of assets, rights and obligations by reason of death”. It is a succession claim which concerns “sharing out of the estate”; and it is a claim within the definition of “succession as a whole” in Article 23 of the Succession Regulation, as a claim whose principal subject matter concerns “the disposable part of the estate, the reserved shares and other restrictions on the disposal of property upon death”: Article 23(h); and an “obligation to …account for gifts, …when determining the shares of the different beneficiaries”: Article 23(i).
Intriguingly, of course, had the UK be bound by the Succession Regulation, and given the dovetailing which the judgment suggest, the next step after rejection of jurisdiction on the basis of the Brussels I Recast, would have been consideration of jurisdiction following the Succesion Regulation. It is ironic therefore to see the Regulation feature as a phantom piece of legislation. Now you see it, now you don’t.
(Handbook EU Private international law, Chapter 2, Heading 22.214.171.124).
Anchor defendant, Anchor defendants, Article 22(2), Bevoegdheid, Brussels I, BVG, C-98/06, Case C-98/06, CJEU, Conflict of laws, Court of Justice, Curia, dovetail, ECJ, EEX, EEX Verordening, geert van calster, http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2014/3233.html, Insolvency, Interpretation, Judgments Regulation, Jurisdiction, Jurisdiction Regulation, Mirror application, Private international law, Regulation 44/2001, Regulation 650/2012, related actions, Sabbagh v Koury, Scope of application, Succession regulation, United Kingdom, Wills and succession, Wills and succession exception, Winkler v Shamoon, Winkler v Shamoon  EWHC 2017 Ch,  EWHC 3233 (Comm),  EWHC 2017 Ch
Sabbagh v Khoury. The High Court considers the ‘wills and succession’ exception, (reflexive application of) the exclusive jurisdictional rule for company matters, and anchor defendants under the Jurisdiction Regulation.
Sabbagh v Khoury is great for oral exam purposes. Hand the student a copy of the case and ipso presto, there is plenty to talk about for at least half an hour.
Sana Sabbagh, who lives in New York, claims that the Defendants have variously, since her father’s stroke, conspired against both him and her to misappropriate his assets (“the asset misappropriation claim”) and, since her father’s death, to work together to deprive her of her entitlement to shares in the group of companies which her father ran (“the share deprivation claim”). Wael, first defendant, is the anchor defendant for jurisdictional purposes. He resides and has at all material times resided in London. The other Defendants live or are based abroad.
Defendants contend in essence (at 83):
a) that the claims against Wael (as noted, the anchor defendant) are so weak that there is no risk of irreconcilable judgments from separate proceedings and so no basis for joinder under Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (“the merits issue”);
b) that the claims fall outside the Brussels Regulation because the Regulation does not apply to “wills and succession” within the scope of Article 1(2)(a) (“the succession issue”), or challenges to the validity of CCG’s organs within the scope of Article 22(2) (“the Article 22 issue”), and the natural and appropriate forum for determining them is Lebanon (“the forum issue”);
c) that the claims are subject to an arbitration clause (or several arbitration clauses) such that a stay is required by s. 9(4) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (“the stay issue”). Any disputes against parties not bound by the arbitration clause should be stayed as a matter of discretion.
(Point c falls outside the scope of current posting).
Logically looking at point b) first (the exclusion of ‘wills and succession’, the High Court first of all considered the proposition that exceptions to the scope of application need to be applied restrictively.
To my knowledge this has not as such been held by the ECJ. Carr J expresses sympathy with the view that the findings of the ECJ in C-292/08 German Graphics in particular (that the insolvency exception not be given an interpretation broader than is required by its objective), could be given broader application, for all exceptions. I am more convinced by defendants’ argument that one needs to be careful to extend the reasoning of German Graphics outside the insolvency context, given that its ruling is inevitably influenced by the existence of the Insolvency Regulation.
However Mrs Justice Carr suggested that whether or not restrictive interpretation ought to be followed, is not quite the determinant issue: rather, that the exceptions should be applied in similar fashion as the exclusive jurisdictional rules of Article 22 (Article 24 in the recast). Those jurisidictional rules, which are an exception to the general rule of Article 2 (4 in the recast), Carr J notes, only apply where the action is ‘principally concerned with’ the legal issue identified in the Article. ‘Have as their object’ is the term used in the Regulation, for 3 out of 5 of the Article 22 exceptions. (For the other two, including those with respect to intellectual property, the term is ‘concerned with’. In fact in other language versions the term is ‘concerned with’ throughout – which has not helped interpretation). ‘Have as their object’ was indeed applied by the ECJ as meaning ‘whose principal subject-matter comprises’ in BVG, viz the Article 22(2) exception. (Not in fact as Carr J notes, ‘principally concerned with’ , which the ECJ only referred to because it is the language used in Article 25’s rule on examination of jurisdiction).
The stronger argument for siding with the High Court’s conclusion lies in my view not in the perceived symmetry between Article 22 (exclusive jurisdictional rules) and Article 1 (scope), but rather in the High Court’s reference in passing to the Jenard report. At C/59/10: ‘matters falling outside the scope of the Convention do so only if they constitute the principal subject-matter of the proceedings. They are thus not excluded when they come before the court as a subsidiary matter either in the main proceedings or in preliminary proceedings.’ Granted, the result is the same, however the interpretative route is neater. Like other things in life (it’s single Malt, not so much general tidiness I am referring to), I like my statutory interpretation neat.
Eventually Carr J held that Ms Sabbagh’s action is principally concerned with assets and share misappropriation, in short, with conspiracy to defraud. If successful, the action will of course impact on Ms Sabbagh’s inheritance. However that does not justify the exclusion of Brussels I to her claim.
[The court was also taken on a short comparative tour of the Succession Regulation, with a view to interpreting the succession exception in Brussels I. Interestingly, Carr J noted that indeed that Regulation may serve as a supplementary means of interpretation of the Jurisdiction Regulation, even though the UK is not bound by the Succession Regulation.]
Next came the potential application of Article 22(2). This issue not only raised the question of whether the action would at all fall within the Article 22(2) remit; but also, whether in that case that Article needs to be applied reflexively, given that the companies concerned are incorporated in Lebanon. Here inevitably reference was made to Ferrexpo. The High Court however held that no question of reflexive application arises, under the same reasoning as above, with respect to the succession exception: the challenge to the corporate decisions was not one of ultra vires or other ‘corporate’ validity: rather, one of their proper characterisation or correctness. They are not therefore substantially concerned with the Article 22(2) exceptions.
The High Court preceded its application of Article 6(1) (joinders /use of an anchor defendant: first defendant is domiciled in London) with a very thorough review of the merits of each of the cases. (At 5, the Court notes that the other defendants live ‘abroad’, most of them seemingly in Greece. However the relevant companies at least seem to be domiciled in Lebanon. Article 6 can only be used against defendants already domiciled in another Member State. For those outside, national conflicts law decides the possibility of joinder).
Article 6 requires that “the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.” ECJ Case-law (in particular Roche Nederland, C-539/03) has it that it is not sufficient that there be a divergence in the outcome of the dispute: that divergence must also arise in the context of the same situation of law and fact (Case C‑539/03 Roche Nederland and Others  ECR I‑6535, paragraph 26). In Freeport, Case C-98/09, the ECJ added that It is for the national court to assess whether there is a connection between the different claims brought before it, that is to say, a risk of irreconcilable judgments if those claims were determined separately and, in that regard, to take account of all the necessary factors in the case-file, which may, if appropriate yet without its being necessary for the assessment, lead it to take into consideration the legal bases of the actions brought before that court. (at 41). It added that where claims brought against different defendants are connected when the proceedings are instituted, (which implies that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings), there is no further need to establish separately that the claims were not brought with the sole object of ousting the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State where one of the defendants is domiciled (Freeport, at 54).
Whether the likelihood of success of an action against a party before the courts of the State where he is domiciled is relevant in the determination of whether there is a risk of irreconcilable judgments for the purposes of Article 6(1), was raised in Freeport but not answered by the ECJ for such answer was eventually not necessary for the preliminary review at issue. In Sabbagh, with reference to precedent in the English courts, the High Court does carry out a rather thorough merits review, effectively to review whether the claim against Wael might not be abusive: ie invented simply to allow him to be used as anchor defendant. Carr J’s extensive merits review hinges on ‘to take account of all the necessary factors in the case-file‘ per Freeport. Whether such detailed review might exceed what is required under Article 6(1) is simply not easily ascertained. (The High Court eventually did decide that Article 6(1) applied on account of one of the pursued claims).
Did I say ‘half an hour’ in the opening line of this posting? An exam using this judgment might take a bit longer…
Anchor defendant, Anchor defendants, Article 22(2), Bevoegdheid, Brussels I, BVG, C-98/06, Case C-98/06, CJEU, Court of Justice, Curia, ECJ, EEX, EEX Verordening, Exclusive jurisdictional rules, Ferrexpo, Ferrexpo v Gilson, FNC, Forum non conveniens, Freeport, http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2014/3233.html, Insolvency, Interpretation, Judgments Regulation, Jurisdiction, Jurisdiction Regulation, Mirror application, Reflexive application, Regulation 44/2001, Regulation 650/2012, related actions, Roche Nederland, Sabbagh v Koury, Scope of application, Succession regulation, United Kingdom, Wills and succession, Wills and succession exception,  EWHC 3233 (Comm)
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