Posts Tagged Locus damni
In  EWHC 1041 (Ch) MX1 and SES v Fardad Farahzad (defendant’s appeal for summary judgment) claimants are domiciled in Israel and Luxembourg respectively. Their action results from some 57 tweets published by a Twitter account going under the title “@MX1 Leaker”. The Tweets make various allegations of bribery and corruption against the First Claimant. Claimants suggest a conspiracy between the defendant and former employees (for the Tweet seemed furnished with internal information which the defendant would not have had access to).
Defendant’s domicile is not specified but for the purposes of the litigation is not relevant: for jurisdiction is seemingly undisputed and even if this were not based on the Brussels I Recast, the English courts have to apply Rome II to determine applicable law.
Defendant’s request for summary dismissal is based inter alia on the argument that if and to the extent the Claimants or either of them have suffered loss or damage as a result of the Conspiracy, the place of that loss or damage was not England. The applicable law identified by the Rome II Regulation – according to the Defendant: Israeli law – did not recognize the ‘lawful means conspiracy’ pleaded by the Claimants as a cause of action.
Arguments centred around Article 4(1) Rome II: neither 4(2) or (3) were engaged by counsel. Damage pleaded by the Claimants is as follows: (paras refer to the Particulars of Claim)
“23. Unless restrained by the court, the Defendant will cause damage to the business of the Claimants in England and Wales and elsewhere by publishing or facilitating the publication of harmful tweets pursuant to the Conspiracy.
24. Further, unless the Defendant is ordered by the court to delete the Tweets, the Claimants will suffer damage to its business in the future by reason of the continued public existence of the Tweets.
25. By reason of the matters aforesaid, the Claimants have suffered loss and damage. The best particulars which the Claimants can currently give are that: (a) The Claimants have incurred the costs of investigating the Conspiracy in approximately the sum of US$350,000 including costs of at least £100,000 incurred in England in respect of the services of Kroll and of the Claimants’ lawyers which are not recoverable as part of the costs of this claim; (b) The Claimants have also incurred additional costs investigating the allegations made in the Tweets.”
It is the £100K which Smith J at 39 ff applies Article 4(1) to, and he does so with harmonious interpretation (‘resonance’) between Brussels I Recast’s Article 7(2) and Rome II in mind.
Smith J held that the costs of investigating the conspiracy were incurred when the claimants entered into the agreements with investigators and lawyers to have the conspiracy investigated, and therefore in England. It is irrelevant that those costs were not the claimants’ predominant loss (paras 40, 46). The case will undoubtedly lead to Mozaik (‘fragmentation’), but that too is resonant with Brussels I Recast (Shevill).
A good starter introduction to Rome II.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.4.
JSC BTA Bank v Khrapunov. UK Supreme Court confirms the conspiracy itself, not its implementation, as locus delicti commissi under Lugano. Does not entertain locus damni.
The UK Supreme Court held in  UKSC 19 JSC BTA Bank v Khrapunov late March. Defendant is based in Switzerland, hence triggering the Lugano Convention. Addleshaw Goddard have the history of the case and I am happy to refer for those facts. Suffice to say that at the core is a claim in tort of conspiracy, alleging that Mr Khrapunov and his father in-law Mr Ablyazov conspired to injure the Bank by preventing it from enforcing its judgments against Mr Ablyazov’s assets.
First let’s have a look at was not discussed at the SC: domicile and locus damni. As for the former, domicile once held but now fleed from was correctly rejected by Teare J as establishing domicile under Lugano (or indeed Brussels). The argument that jurisdiction should, nevertheless, be taken still to be domiciled in England because defendant was in breach of an obligation under the worldwide freezing order prohibiting him from leaving the jurisdiction, was likewise rejected. An interesting proposition though.
Now, for the location of the locus damni. At 29 the SC refers to the Bank’s argument at the High Court and Court of Appeal stage. The Bank’s argument was that the damage occurred in England. This was based on the contention that its worldwide freezing order and its judgments against Mr Ablyazov were located here and had been reduced in value by the alleged conduct in relation to assets in other jurisdictions. The High Court and Court of Appeal considered that the element of damage proximate to the harmful event was the Bank’s inability or reduced ability to execute against those assets in the places where they were located. Another fine example of the difficult implications of Bier and not one which the CJEU has hitherto had the occasion to review. (But current case will not reach it).
As for locus delicti commissi, the Bank submit that the event giving rise to the damage was the conspiracy itself, which was hatched in England. At the High Court Teare J rejected this submission, because he considered that the cause of the damage was not the conspiracy but its implementation: a suggestion I like in the context of competition law, as readers of the blog will be aware. Teare J was not followed by the Court of Appeal though, which identified the place where the conspiratorial agreement was made as the place of the event which gives rise to and is at the origin of the damage.
The SC refers to CJEU authority to conclude with CDC and at 41 it reiterates the CA’s core reasoning: ‘As Sales LJ explained (at para 76), in entering into the agreement Mr Khrapunov would have encouraged and procured the commission of unlawful acts by agreeing to help Mr Ablyazov to carry the scheme into effect. Thereafter, Mr Khrapunov’s alleged dealing with assets the subject of the freezing and receivership orders would have been undertaken pursuant to and in implementation of that agreement, whether or not he was acting on instructions from Mr Ablyazov.’
The Supreme Court concludes that the making of the agreement in England should be regarded as the harmful event which set the tort in motion.
The judgment keeps open many issues, however. For starters, to have a sole birthplace of conspiratorial agreement is handy in the case at issue however it is likely not often to be so clearly the case (as Dan and Tom point out, particularly not in a digital context). Moreover, for those instances where Mr Khrapunov were not to be acting on instructions from Mr Ablyazov, questions of ultra vires so to speak and hence of a separate tort would arise.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 22.214.171.124
Fly lal: Locus delicti commissi for anticompetitive agreements. And application of Article 7(5)’s extension to branch domicile.
AB flyLAL — Lithuanian Airlines (‘flyLAL’) operated flights from Vilnius airport in Lithuania until it was put into liquidation. According to flyLAL, its demise was caused by predatory (that is, below cost) pricing by the Latvian airline Air Baltic Corporation A/S (‘Air Baltic’). That predatory pricing was, it is alleged, part of an anticompetitive strategy agreed between Air Baltic and the operator of Starptautiskā lidosta Rīga (Riga international airport in Latvia, ‘Riga Airport’). Thus, Riga Airport and Air Baltic agreed to drastically reduce the prices paid by Air Baltic for services at Riga airport. The savings were then used by Air Baltic to finance the predatory pricing that drove flyLAL out of the market in Vilnius, Lithuania.
Can Air Baltic and Riga Airport for damages before the courts in Vilnius? The national court and parties refer to three alleged infringements of competition law: (i) abuse of dominance consisting in the system of reductions implemented by Riga Airport; (ii) an anticompetitive agreement between Riga Airport and Air Baltic; and (iii) abuse of dominance in the form of predatory pricing by Air Baltic. Those infringements, it is argued, were interrelated, forming part of a strategy to oust flyLAL from the market in Vilnius and move passengers to Riga airport to the benefit of both Riga Airport and Air Baltic.
There is a lot in the Opinion – among others because as the AG points out, the referring court’s description of the alleged infringement of competition law is not entirely clear. Bobek therefore sets out a set of variables. The Court itself is bound not to distinguish among quite so many. Of note are the AG’s suggestions
- that locus damni here is not place of financial loss, rather the place within the markets affected by the competition law infringement where the claimant alleges loss of sales.That suggestion in my view is helpful for neither the Regulation’s aim of predictability, nor the protection of those damaged by infringement of competition law (the latter not however a stated aim of the Regulation). Put differently: damage located in a Mozaik fashion assists the tortfeasor. The Advocate General reaches this conclusion after a thorough revisit of the initial Bier judgment (and Capotorti AG’s Opinion in same), ditto Marinari and Dumez France. Yet the continuing need to conceptualise the Court’s Bier rule illustrates again in my view the mistake made in that original judgment, to introduce a forum damni despite the utter lack of textual support for same.
- for locus delicti commissi with full jurisdiction, the AG distinguishes between Article 101 TFEU (as regards the alleged anticompetitive agreement between Air Baltic and Riga Airport, the place of the event giving rise to the harm (that is, the loss of sales by flyLAL), is the place of the conclusion of the agreement) and 102 TFEU (alleged predatory pricing by Air Baltic, the place of the event giving rise to the harm is the place where the predatory prices were offered and applied). With respect to Article 101 TFEU, Bobek AG suggests this is identical to the Court’s judgment in CDC . I am not too sure but I am biased. As I noted above, in my view the Court should steer clear of an application of Article 7(2) which allows those infringing competition law to forum shop by manipulating the place of decision-making. In CDC the Court held that ‘the identification, in the jurisdiction of the court seised of the matter, of a specific event during which either that cartel was definitively concluded or one agreement in particular was made which was the sole causal event giving rise to the loss allegedly inflicted on a buyer’ cannot be ruled out. That implies that in other cases the identification of such singular event can be ruled out and that many places may be consider locus delicti commissi.
- finally with respect to (now) Article 7(5), the activities of a branch. The AG does not specify what must be meant by a ‘branch’ – for the national court has already concluded there is such branch. The Advocate General here is perhaps unusually deferential to the factual finding. Whether there is a sufficient nexus between the activities of the branch and the dispute, in the case of tort-based claims requires the branch participate in at least some of the actions constituting the tort (at 137). Offering the fixed prices or otherwise having been instrumental in concluding contracts for services at those prices suffices. In such cases, the branch has again participated in the commission of an act that constitutes a necessary precondition for the abuse (at 142).
A lengthy opinion. And it all started with the fairly straightforward facts of Bier…
(Handbook of) EU private international law), 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 126.96.36.199
Thank you Andreas Christofides for flagging Aristou v Tesco Personal Finance, a case which engaged Article 7(2) and, I presume, Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast: forum delicti cq forum contractus. I tried to obtain copy of judgment but failed. It might not have helped me much anyway for I assume it was drafted in Greek.
For the facts of the case please refer to the link above. From Andreas’ description of the case I am assuming the Cypriot court firstly must have decided there was a contract between claimant and the UK bank, per Handte; that this was a service contract; and that per 7(1)b second indent, that service was provided in the UK. And that for the application of Article 7(2) both locus delicti commissi and locus damni were also the UK. (The court may in doing so have referred to Universal Music: not just location of the bank account in the UK but other factors, too).
Any Greek readers, in possession of the judgment: please correct if need be.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 188.8.131.52.7; Heading 184.108.40.206.b.
Heavily loaded. Applicable law in follow-up competition cases: watch the Dutch Supreme court in Air Cargo.
Update March 2018. Quentin’s blog has a link to the SC decision refusing to take the case, considering it was academic given that an appeal against the decision of the European Commission is still pending before the EU courts. It has therefore not irreversibly been decided whether the eleven air carriers had violated European competition law. Most probably the case will be back, one imagines.
Quentin Declève alerted me to the Air Cargo damages compensation case currently making its way through the Dutch courts. (I have previously reported on jurisdictional issues re such cases; searching the tag ‘damages’ should help the reader).
I have difficulty locating the actual judgment addressing the issue in this post: namely applicable law in follow-up competition cases. I have however located one or two previous judgments addressing the damages claims assignment issue in same. This web of litigation seems to be particularly knotty and any help by Dutch or other readers would be appreciated.
At issue is whether Rome II applies to the facts ratione temporis; if it does, how Article 6 should be applied, in particular: locus delicti commissi, locus damni and ‘affected markets”; and if it does not, how the previous Dutch residual connecting factor ought to apply.
A case of great relevance to competition law and fair trading cases.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.6.2.