Posts Tagged limitation periods
Pandya v Intersalonika. Plenty of (appealable?) things to chew on re limitation periods and Rome II.
Many thanks 2TG for initially flagging the judgment, and for Maura McIntosh and colleagues not just for further reviewing it but also for sending me copy: for the case has not yet appeared on the usual sites.
In Pandya v Intersalonika  EWHC 273 (QB), Tipples J held that proceedings were time-barred in accordance with Greek law as the lex causae, where the claim form was issued in the English courts before the expiry of the applicable Greek limitation period, but was not served until after that period had expired.
The claim arises out of a road traffic accident that happened in Kos, Greece on 29 July 2012. The claimant is a UK national and was on holiday in Kos with her family when she was struck by a motorcycle as she was crossing the road. The claimant suffered a severe traumatic brain injury and was then aged fifteen. Defendant is the Greek-registered insurance company which provided insurance to the motorcyclist or the motorcycle that he was riding.
That claimant is entitled to sue the insurer in England is not of course, contrary to Tipples J passing reference, a result of Rome II but rather of Brussels IA. Jurisdiction however at any rate was not under discussion.
Defendant then relies on A15(h) Rome II to argue a time bar under Greek law, the lex locus damni: service of the claim is a rule of Greek law in relation to limitation and a claim has to be issued and served to interrupt the limitation period. This means that the requirement of service cannot be severed, or downgraded, to a step which is simply governed by the rules of civil procedure under English law. Claimant by contrast argues that service of the claim is a point of pure procedure, which falls squarely within Article 1(3) and is governed by the rules of civil procedure under English law.
At 25 ff Tipples J discusses the issue (I highlight the most relevant arguments; compare nb with the situation under the Rome Convention in Mineworkers):
- starting with the principle of autonomous interpretation;
- further, a need for wide interpretation of A15 which she derives from its non-exhaustive character. I do not agree that non-exhaustive listings necessarily equate broad interpretations;
- thirdly the need, by contrast, to interpret A1(3) narrowly ‘because it is an exception’ to the general rule of lex locus damni in A4. This too I disagree with: A1(3) states it ‘it shall not apply to evidence and procedure, without prejudice to Articles 21 and 22’ (which concern formal validity and burden of proof). In my view A1(3) like A1(2) defines the scope of application, like A1(2). It is listed separately from the issues in A1(2) for unlike those issues, part of the excluded subject-matter is partially brought back into the scope of application. If anything therefore needs to be interpreted restrictively, it is the partial cover of evidence and procedure. Seemingly between parties however this was not disputed.
- Further support is found in Dicey & Morris 15th ed., which refers to Wall v Mutuelle de Poitiers a case which discusses the issues somewhat, yet if anything more in support of English law applying to the discussion in Pandya rather than the other way around. (A reference further on in Andrew Dickinson’s Rome II Volume with OUP in my mind, too, further underlines the opaqueness of the A1 /A15 distinction and does not clearly lend support pro the lex causae argument).
- Fifth, predictability and certainty are cited in support however how these gazump exclusions from the scope of application is not clear to me.
- Finally PJSC Tatneft v Bogolyubov is referred to but dismissed as irrelevant (which surprises me).
Held: the claim was time-barred and therefore dismissed.
I would suggest there is plenty of scope for appeal here.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3.
Spring v MOD and Evangelisches Krankenhaus Bielefeld. Joinder (based on Article 8(1) Bru I Recast) ultimately fails given limitation period in the lex causae.
 EWHC 3012 (QB) Spring v MDO and Evengelisches Krankenhaus Bielefeld is unreported as far as I can tell (and I have checked repeatedly). Thank you Max Archer for flagging the case and for sending me copy of judgment a few months back. (I am still chipping away at that queue).
In 1997, Claimant was stationed in Germany with the British Army. The Claimant very seriously fractured his right leg and ankle whilst off duty in Germany (the off duty element evidently having an impact – on duty injuries arguably might not have been ‘civil and commercial’). He was then treated at the Second Defendant’s hospital under an established arrangement for the treatment of UK service personnel between the First (the Ministry of Defence) and Second Defendants (the German hospital). Various complications later led to amputation.
The Brussels I Recast Regulation applies for claimant did not introduce the claim against the second defendant until after its entry into force: 18 years in fact after the surgery. This was the result of medical reports not suggesting until after July 2015 that the German hospital’s treatment has been substandard. Rome II ratione temporis does not apply given the timing of the events (alleged wrongful treatment leading to damage).
Yoxall M held that Article 8(1)’s conditions for anchoring /joinder were fulfilled, because of the risk of irreconcilable judgments (at 35). Even if the claim against the First Defendant is a claim based on employer’s liability whereas the claim against the Hospital is based on clinical negligence. Should the proceedings be separate there is a risk of the English and German courts reaching irreconcilable judgments on causation of loss. At 35: ‘It would be expedient for the claims to be heard together – so that all the factual evidence and expert evidence is heard by one court. In this way the real risk of irreconcilable judgments can be avoided.’
With reference to precedent, Master Yoxall emphasised that ‘in considering Article 8(1) and irreconcilable judgments a broad common sense approach is justified rather than an over-sophisticated analysis’ (at 36).
Yoxal M is entirely correct when he states at 37 that Article 8(1) does not include a requirement that the action brought against the different defendants have identical legal bases. For decisions to be regarded as contradictory the divergence must arise in the context of the same situation of law and fact (reference is made to C-98/06 Freeport).
Next however the court considers as a preliminary issue, the limitation period applying between claimant and the German defendant and holds that the Hospital have an arguable case that the claim is statute barred in German law (German expert evidence on the issue being divided). The latter is the lex causae for the material dispute (on the basis of English residual private international law), extending to limitation periods per Section 1(3) of the Foreign Limitations Period Act 1984 (nota bene partially as a result of the 1980 input by the Law Commission, and not entirely in line with traditional (or indeed US) interpretations of same). This ultmately sinks the joinder.
As a way forward for plaintiff, the Court suggests  EWCA Civ 1436 Masri. In this case the Court of Appeal essentially held that joinder on the basis of Article 8(1) may proceed even if litigation against the England-based defendants are not the same proceedings, but rather take place in separate action. Masri has not been backed up as far as I know, by European precedent: Clarke MR held it on the basis of the spirit of C-189/87 Kalfelis, not its letter. Moreover, how the German limitation periods would then apply is not an obvious issue, either.
An interesting case and I am pleased Max signalled it.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 22.214.171.124.
Update 2 October 2018 the Court of Appeal on 26 September 2018 in  EWHC 2499 (Comm) had to hold again on allowing a re-amended claim in the case.
In  EWCA Civ 1581 Tatneft v Bogolyubov the Court of Appeal held that an English court can allow addition of a claim which is time barred by the governing law identified by Rome I or Rome II. At 72 Longmore J notes ‘Under Article 12.1(d) of Rome I and Article 15(h) of Rome II, the applicable foreign law governs limitation of actions.’ However neither Rome I nor Rome II apply to matters of procedure (Article 1(3) in both of the Rome Regulations).
The Court of Appeal clearly takes Article 1(3) at face value by allowing amendment of the claim even if it thence includes a claim time barred under the lex causae: not to do so would endanger the consistent application of English procedural law. Article 12 cq 15 do not sit easily with Article 1(3). That has been clear from the start and it is an issue which needs sorting out. In the absence of such clarification, it is no surprise that the English courts should hold as Longmore J does here.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Chapter 4.