Posts Tagged Lilydale v Meyn
Happy days!: ‘closest and most real connection’ for identifying lex contractus. Ontario CA in Lilydale v Meyn.
Lilydale v Meyn at the Ontario Court of Appeal (held April 2015 but only reaching me now – thank you to Michael Shafler and colleagues for flagging) is a useful reminder of the common law approach to determining lex contractus in the absence of choice of law. (Here of course an inter-State conflicts issue between Ontario and Alberta). Laskin JA refers in support to english precedent, summarised in quoted passage of Cheshire’s Private International Law:
The court must take into account, for instance, the following matters: the domicil and even the residence of the parties; the national character of a corporation and the place where its principal place of business is situated; the place where the contract is made and the place where it is to be performed; the style in which the contract is drafted, as, for instance, whether the language is appropriate to one system of law, but inappropriate to another; the fact that a certain stipulation is valid under one law but void under another … the economic connexion of the contract with some other transaction … the nature of the subject matter or its situs; the head office of an insurance company, whose activities range over many countries; and, in short, any other fact which serves to localize the contract.
The motion judge’s findings on the relevant criteria were held to be reasonable, as was her overall conclusion that the closest and most real connection to the contract was Ontario.
The case is an interesting reminder of what in the Rome I Regulation is now the final resort, should none of the relevant presumptions in Article 4 apply.
An interesting point in the judgment is the main reason why parties prefer one law over the other: at 3: ‘The issue is important because Alberta and Ontario have different ultimate limitation periods. Even taking into account discoverability, Alberta’s ultimate limitation period is 10 years; Ontario’s is 15 years. The parties agreed that Lilydale’s cause of action arose no later than August 31, 1994. Therefore, as Lilydale did not sue until January 2006, if Alberta law applied, its action was statute-barred; if Ontario law applied, it was not.’
Aren’t statutes of limitation under Canadian conflict of laws, covered by lex fori, as procedural issues, and not, as is seemingly accepted here, lex causae?