Posts Tagged Lex arbitri
I reported earlier on Sulamerica and the need properly and preferably, expressly to provide for choice of law vis-a-vis arbitration agreements, in particular vis-a-vis three elements: lex arbitri, lex curia, lex contractus. In Shagang the High Court added its view on the possible relevance of a fourth factor: the geographical venue of the arbitration, and its impact in particular on the curial law: the law which determines the procedure which is to be followed.
Atlas Power Ltd -v- National Transmission and Despatch Co Ltd  EWHC 1052 is another good illustration of the relevance (but in practice: rarity) of the proper identification of all four factors.
Bracewell excellently identify the four take away points from Atlas Power:
- It is the seat of arbitration that determines the curial law of the arbitration, not the governing law of the contract.
- (To English Courts) the choice of the seat of arbitration is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of the place designated as the seat of the arbitration having the supervisory role over the arbitration.
- The English courts can and will use their powers to grant anti-suit injunctions to prevent a party from commencing foreign proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement.
- Complex drafting increases the risk of satellite litigation and the accompanying delay and expense.
The core point which Atlas Power illustrates is that specific identification of arbitration venue, curial law, lex contractus and lex arbitri is best done in simple terms. Overcomplication, particularly variance of any of these four points, is a truly bad idea. Specifically: the arbitration clause in the contracts between the parties (text from Bracewell’s overview)
- Started by providing that the “arbitration shall be conducted in Lahore, Pakistan”.
- Then stated that if the value of the dispute was above a certain threshold or fell within a certain category, either party could require that the arbitration be conducted in London.
- Finally, the clause provided that, notwithstanding the previous sentences, either party may require that the arbitration of any dispute be conducted in London, provided that if the dispute did not satisfy the threshold or category requirements set out earlier in the clause the referring party would pay the costs of the arbitration incurred by the other party in excess of the costs that would have been incurred had the arbitration taken place in Pakistan.
Various procedural events led to Phillips J essentially having to decide: whether the parties had validly and lawfully chosen London as the seat of the arbitration (answer: yes); and whether, in light of Pakistani law (which was the law governing the contracts), the choice of London as the seat of arbitration did not result in the English courts having exclusive supervisory jurisdiction with the effect that the courts of Pakistan had at least concurrent jurisdiction (answer: no, for this would result in an unsatisfactory situation where more than one jurisdiction could entertain challenges to an award)
Variation of any litigation relevant articles really does open all sorts of cans of worms.
Location, location, location. Arbitration, curial and applicable law: Shagang v Daewoo confirms the importance of venue.
I reported earlier on Sulamerica and the need properly and preferably, expressly to provide for choice of law vis-a-vis arbitration agreements, in particular vis-a-vis three elements: lex arbitri, lex curia, lex contractus. The High Court has now added its view on the possible relevance of a fourth factor: the geographical venue of the arbitration, and its impact in particular on the curial law: the law which determines the procedure (e.g. such as here, the appointment of a sole arbitrator) which is to be followed.
Christopher Lockwood has a good summary of case and judgment here – I am happy to refer. Of most relevance is Hamblen J’s finding that while a choice of governing law (the substantive law of the contract) is often made express, it is far less common separately to identify curial law: most often, that is simply inferred from the place of arbitration. Moreover, while it is not commercially uncommon to separate procedure and governing law, it is quite uncommon to have ‘a bifurcation between the place of arbitration and the law governing the conduct of the arbitration there’ (at 25). In other words, seat, ‘curia’ of arbitration, which determines arbitral procedure, and geographical place or venue of arbitration, are not commonly separated. Any intention of the parties to do so, must be clearly expressed and cannot be implicitly inferred.
‘that the agreement that the arbitration is “to be held in Hong Kong” carries with it an implied choice of Hong Kong as the seat of the arbitration and of the application of Hong Kong law as the curial law.’ (at 56): location, dear readers: location, location, location.
Martrade Shipping: choice of law means that law can decide the limits to which it wishes to be applied. Including to promote forum shopping.
In  EWHC 1884 (Comm) Martrade Shipping v United Enterprises Corporation, the High Court considered the appeal against an arbitration award in relation to the applicability of the Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998 to charterparties providing for English law and London arbitration.
The vessel was owned by the Defendant, a Marshall Islands company. The vessel was registered in Panama and managed by a Liberian company registered in Greece. The vessel was chartered by the Owners to the Claimant charterers for a time charter trip via the Mediterranean/Black Sea under a charterparty on an amended NYPE form dated 2 July 2005. The Charterers are a German company. The vessel was to be placed at the disposal of the Charterers on passing Aden, and was to be redelivered at one safe port or passing Muscat outbound/Singapore range in Charterers’ option. In the event the vessel loaded cargoes of steel products at Tuapse (Russia), Odessa (Ukraine) and Constanza (Romania) and discharged them at Jebel Ali (UAE), Karachi (Pakistan) and Mumbai (India). Hire was payable in US$ to a bank account in Greece. The broker named in the charterparty as entitled to commission was Optima Shipbrokers Ltd who arre Greek. The charterparty recorded that it was made and concluded in Antwerp.
Consequently, contact with England other than the governing law and arbitration clause was non-existent.
A number of disputes between the parties were referred to arbitration, including a claim by the Owners for unpaid hire, in respect of which the Charterers claimed to be entitled to deduct sums for alleged off-hire, bunkers used during off-hire, and a bunker price differential claim. By the Award the tribunal held that Owners were entitled to an award in respect of hire in the sum of US$ 178,342.73. The tribunal further held that the Owners were entitled to interest on that sum calculated at the rate of 12.75% per annum from 23 September 2005 until the date of payment under the 1998 Act.
The appeal is against the award of interest under the 1998 Act. The Charterers contended before the tribunal, and contend on the appeal, that the 1998 Act has no application by reason of s. 12(1) which provides:
“This Act does not have effect in relation to a contract governed by a law of a part of the United Kingdom by choice of the parties if –(a) there is no significant connection between the contract and that part of the United Kingdom; and (b) but for that choice, the applicable law would be a foreign law.’
Section 12 of the Act therefore provides that where parties to a contract with an international dimension have chosen English law to govern the contract, the choice of English law is not of itself sufficient to attract the application of the Act. Section 12 mandates the application of the penal interest provisions only if one or both of two further requirements are fulfilled. There must be a significant connection between the contract and England (s. 12(1)(a)); or the contract must be one which would be governed by English law apart from the choice of law (s. 12(1)(b)). Either is sufficient. Popplewell J suggests this provision has two objectives:
– the Act reflects domestic policy considerations which are not necessarily apposite to contracts with an international dimension. What is required by the significant connecting factor(s) is something which justifies the extension of a deterrent penal provision rooted in domestic policy to an international transaction. And
– subjecting parties to a penal rate of interest on debts might be a discouragement to those who would otherwise choose English law to govern contracts arising in the course of international trade, and accordingly does not make such consequences automatic.
‘The s.12(1)(a) criterion of “significant connection” must connect the substantive transaction itself to England. Whether they provide a significant connection, singly or cumulatively, will be a question of fact and degree in each case, but they must be of a kind and a significance which makes them capable of justifying the application of a domestic policy of imposing penal rates of interest on a party to an international commercial contract. They must provide a real connection between the contract and the effect of prompt payment of debts on the economic life of the United Kingdom. (at 17).
‘Such factors may include the following:
(1) Where the place of performance of obligations under the contract is in England. This will especially be so where the relevant debt falls to be paid in England. But it may also be so where other obligations fall to be performed in England or other rights exercised in England. If some obligations might give rise to debts payable in England, the policy considerations underlying the Act are applicable to those debts; and if some debts under the contract are to carry interest at a penal rate, it might be regarded as fair and equitable that all debts arising in favour of either party under the contract should do so.
(2) Where the nationality of the parties or one of them is English. If it is contemplated that debts may be payable by an English national under the contract, the policy reasons for imposing penal rates of interest may be engaged; and if only one party is English, fairness may again decree that the other party should be on an equal footing in relation to interest whether he is the payer or the payee.
(3) Where the parties are carrying on some relevant part of their business in England. It may be thought that persons or companies who carry on business in England should be encouraged to pay their debts on time and not use delayed payment as a business tool even in relation to transactions which fall to be performed elsewhere. Moreover a supplier carrying on business in England may fall within the category identified in s.6(2)(a) of those whose financial position makes them particularly vulnerable to late payment of their debts, although these are not the only commercial suppliers for whose benefit the Act is intended to apply. The policy of the Act may be engaged in the protection of suppliers carrying on business in England, whether financially vulnerable or not, even where the particular debts in question fall to be paid by a foreign national abroad.
(4) Where the economic consequences of a delay in payment of debts may be felt in the United Kingdom. This may engage consideration of related contracts, related parties, insurance arrangements or the tax consequences of transactions.’ (at 20).
By contrast, a mere London arbitration or English jurisdiction clause cannot be a relevant connecting factor for the purposes of s.12(1)(a).
Popplewell J therefore expressly links the non-applicability of relevant domestic English law (where such as here that law itself suggests the need for there to be a connection between the case, and England) to the need to maintain the attraction of England as a seat of international commercial arbitration or indeed litigation. Exactly the kind of attitude in which competing courts fall short.
Habas and VSC: Lex arbitri, the bootstrap principle and the irrelevance of ultra vires /excess of authority..
Postscript 1 March 2016 for a similar exercise in Greece, see here.
In Habas and VSC Steel, the Commercial Court applied the Sulamerica route (subsequently applied in Arsanovia) to determine the lex arbitri: the law applicable to the arbitration agreement. Chosen seat of arbitration proved a strong argument to identify the closest and most real connection, in spite of the argument raised that agents for the Claimant had exceeded their authority in agreeing to the arbitration agreement.
The dispute between the Claimant (“Habas”) a company incorporated in Turkey, and the Defendant (“VSC”), a company incorporated in Hong Kong, arose out an alleged contract for the sale by Habas and purchase by VSC of Reinforcing Bars (Steel) for shipment from Turkey to Hong Kong. Following a contested hearing, the Tribunal, issued an Award dated 10 July 2012. Habas challenges the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and its Award on the grounds that the Tribunal erred in finding that there was a binding arbitration agreement made between the parties because:
(1) Steel Park and/or Charter Alpha did not have actual or ostensible authority to conclude the London arbitration agreement on behalf of Habas; and
(2) there was no binding consensus on the terms of the London arbitration agreement.
The Court’s decision is crucial in further illustrating the matrix which English courts will follow in determining lex arbitri. In dismissing relevance of the alleged lack of authority, it also highlights the impact of the ‘bootstrap’ principle: Hamblen J at 109: validity is determined by the putative proper law of the contract. Determining closest connection involves a consideration of the terms of the contract as made, rather than the authority with which it was made. EU conflict of laws, too, follows this principle (in the Rome I Regulation and the recast Brussels I Regulation; with one or two corrections).
Key therefore: the bootstrap principle; as well as the usual suspect: better expressis verbis agree lex arbitri.
Sulamerica applied in Arsanovia – Expressly excluding parts of a national law may lead to that law being lex arbitri.
In Arsanovia, the High Court applied the Sulamerica test for identifying the lex arbitri (see here for the judgment in Sulamerica and for the notion ‘lex arbitri’). Hodges, Kaplan and Godwin excellently review the various other elements of the case here. For current blog the finding on lex arbitri is the most relevant. In particular, Smith J found of high relevance the fact that parties had excluded part of the Indian arbitration Act: at 20:
There is another consideration that to my mind is relevant in this case: that the arbitration agreement included a specific agreement not to seek interim relief under the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“IACA”), including section 9 of that Act, and that the provisions of Part 1 of IACA were expressly excluded.(…) as I see it (…), where parties have expressly excluded specific statutory provisions of a law, the natural inference is that they understood and intended that otherwise that law would apply. Therefore to my mind the reference to IACA in the arbitration agreement supports the claimants’ contention that the parties evinced an intention that the arbitration agreement should be governed by Indian law (except in so far as they agreed otherwise).
It is not uncommon in identifying applicable law (in this case, for the arbitration agreement) to employ selective cancellation of a national aw as evidence of intention for that law to be applicable for the remainder. Whether that intention is properly present in the agreement, in the absence of a specific choice of law clause, inevitably is subject to the discretion of the bench. In the case at issue, the High Court was not swayed by the consideration that the partial exclusion of IACA was intended simply to obstruct Indian case-law on the wide jurisdictional reach of IACA in temporary relief, even for arbitration proceedings taking place outside of India.
The lesson is always the same: choose carefully, and explicitly.