Posts Tagged Jurisdiction Regulation
Anchor defendants in follow-up competition law cases. The High Court in Vattenfall et al v Prysmian et al.
A classic case of follow-up damages litigation in competition law, here in the high voltage power cables cartel, fines for which were confirmed by the CJEU early July. Core to the case is the application of Article 8(1)’s anchor defendants mechanism. Only two of the defendants are UK incorporated companies – UK subsidiaries of companies that have been found by the European Commission to have infringed EU competition law.
Authority cited includes of course CDC, Roche Nederland and Painer, and Cooper Tyre (sale of the cartelised products can amount to implementation of the cartel). Vattenfall confirms that for the English courts, ‘knowingly implementing’ the cartel has a low threshold.
At 89 ff the Court refers to the pending case of (what I now know to be) C-724/17 Skanska Industrial Solutions e.a.: Finnish Courts are considering the application for cartel damages against parent companies on acquiring cartelist subsidiaries, had dissolved them. Relevance for Vattenfall lies with the issue of knowledge: the Finnish courts wonder what Article 101 TFEU has to say on the degree of knowledge of the cartelist activities, relevant for the liability of the parent company. An application of fraus, or abuse in other words. Elleray DJ however, did not consider the outcome of that reference to be relevant for the case at hand, in its current stage of procedure.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 184.108.40.206
Pro memoria: the AG’s suggested for locus damni not place of financial loss, rather the place within the markets affected by the competition law infringement where the claimant alleges loss of sales: damage located in a Mozaik fashion in other words; for locus delicti commissi with full jurisdiction, the AG distinguishes between Article 101 TFEU (place of the conclusion of the agreement) and 102 TFEU (place where the predatory prices were offered and applied); finally with respect to (now) Article 7(5), the activities of a branch: offering the fixed prices or otherwise having been instrumental in concluding contracts for services at those prices suffices for that branch to have participated in the tort.
The Court itself,
- for locus damni reminds us of the findings in Marinari (which tempered the implications of Bier), implying that one needs to decide whether loss of income of the kind alleged by flyLAL may be regarded as ‘initial damage’, or whether it constitutes solely consequential financial damage which cannot, in itself, lead to a forum under Article 7(2). The Court, like the AG, opts for Mozaik, referring inter alia to its judgment in Concurrences: each place where the loss of income consisting in loss of sales occurred, that is to say, the place of the market which is affected by that conduct and on which the victim claims to have suffered those losses, opens up partial jurisdiction. As I noted in my review of the Opinion, this interpretation aids the tortfeasor: locus damni leading to shattered jurisdiction facilitates anti-competitive behaviour.
- for locus delicti commissi, under Article 101 TFEU (cartels), with reference to CDC, the CJEU opts for courts for the place in which the agreement was definitively concluded: this truly is extraordinary for it allows for forum shopping by the cartel participants. For Article 102 TFEU (abuse of dominant position)
- Prima facie at 52 there is one consolation for those suffering anti-competitive behaviour: the Court holds that the event giving rise to the damage in the case of abuse of a dominant position is not based on an agreement, but rather on the implementation of that abuse, that is to say, the acts performed by the dominant undertaking to put the abuse into practice, in particular by offering and applying predatory pricing in the market concerned. That would seem to suggest full jurisdiction for each of those places where the pricing is offered and applied. However in that para 52 the Court does not verbatim links this to jurisdiction: this it does do in
- Para 53: ‘If it were to be established that the events giving rise to the main proceedings were part of a common strategy intended to oust flyLAL from the market of flights to and from Vilnius Airport and that those events all contributed to giving rise to the damage alleged, it would be for the referring court to identify the event of most importance in implementing such a strategy out of the chain of events at issue in the main proceedings.‘ Courts holding on jurisdiction must not delve too deep into the substance of the case but still have to employ, without looking too deeply at the merits of the case, the lex causae for the anti-competitive behaviour (per Rome II) to identify that event of most importance. In para 54 too the Court emphasises the need to limit the amount of potential jurisdictions (reference here is also made to Universal Music). I cannot be sure: does the combination of paras 52 and 53 suggest that the Court does not accept jurisdiction for all places where the pricing is offered and applied?
- Finally with respect to Article 7(5), the CJEU at 64 holds that the national courts must in particular review whether the activities carried out by the branch included actual acts of offering and applying the predatory pricing alleged and whether such participation in the alleged abuse of a dominant position was sufficiently significant to be regarded as a close link with the dispute in the main proceedings. Separate accounts are not required to conduct that exercise (at 65).
Essentially therefore the Court firmly pulls the Brussels I Recast’s ‘predictability’ card. This is in the interest of companies behaving anti-competitively. I do not read in this judgment a definitive answer however for as I suggested, the combination of paras 52 ff is simply not clear.
(Handbook of) EU private international law), 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 220.127.116.11
When I reported the first salvos in Goldhar v Haaretz I flagged that the follow-up to the case would provide for good comparative conflicts materials. I have summarised the facts in that original article. The Ontario Court of Appeal in majority dismissed Haaretz’ appeal in 2016, 2016 ONCA 515. In Haaretz.com v. Goldhar, 2018 SCC 28, the Canadian Supreme Court has now held in majority for a stay on forum non conveniens grounds. Both the lead opinion, the supporting opinions and the dissents include interesting arguments on forum non conveniens. Many of these, as Stephen Pitel notes, include analysis of the relevance of obstacles in enforcement proceedings.
If ever I were to get round to compiling that published reader on comparative conflicts, this case would certainly feature.
Have a good start to the working-week (lest it started yesterday in which case: bonne continuation).
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 18.104.22.168.
Jurisdiction re prospectus liability (misrepresentation) before the CJEU again. Bobek AG in Löber v Barclays.
Even Advocate-General Bobek has not managed to turn jurisdictional issues re prospectus liability into the prosaic type of analysis which many of us have become fond of. His Opinion in C-307/17 Löber v Barclays is a lucid, systematic and pedagogic review of the CJEU’s case-law on (now) Article 7(2)’s jurisdiction for tort in the context of ‘prospectus liability’ aka investment misrepresentation. Starting with the direct /indirect damage distinction; and focusing of course on the determination of pure economic loss.
Ms Helga Löber invested in certificates in the form of bearer bonds issued by Barclays Bank Plc. In order to acquire those certificates, the corresponding amounts were transferred from her current (personal) bank account located in Vienna, Austria to two securities accounts in Graz and Salzburg. Payment was then made from those securities accounts for the certificates at issue.
Note immediately that the jurisdictional discussion is a result of Article 7(2) not just identifying a Member State: it identifies specific courts within that Member State. Here: claimant brought her claim before a court in Vienna, the place of her domicile. This is also where her current bank account is located, from which she made the first transfer in order to make the investment. The first- and second-instance courts in Vienna however decided that they did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The case is now pending before the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria). That court is asking, in essence, which of the bank accounts used, if any, is relevant to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear the claim at issue.
Close reference is made to Kolassa. In my posting on that case at the time, I noted that the many factual references which the Court built in in its decision, gave it dubious precedent value. Bobek AG in Löber necessarily therefore distinguishes many factual situations. The almost sole focus lies on 7(2): unlike in Kolassa, contracts neither consumer contracts are an issue.
Here are a few things of note:
First, in his review of the existing case-law the AG at 38 points out like I did at the time of the judgment, that the CJEU’s finding in CDC that locus damni for a pure economic loss, in the case of a corporation, is the place of its registered office, is at odds with precedent (he made the same remark in flyLAL).
Next, on locus delicti commissi, the AG suggests that despite Article 7(2)’s instruction, a single ldc within the Member State cannot be determined. The relevant point in his view is the moment from which the prospectus can, by operation of law, start influencing the investment behaviour of the relevant group of investors. In the present case, and considering the national segmentation of the capital market regulation at issue, that relevant group is made up of investors on secondary markets in Austria. At 65: once it became possible to offer the certificates on the Austrian secondary market, that possibility was immediately available for the whole territory of Austria. ‘The nature of the tort of misrepresentation at issue does not allow for the identification of a location within the national territory because once the author of the tort is allowed to influence the given national territory, that influence immediately covers the whole territory, irrespective of the actual means used for the publication of a specific prospectus.’ As we know from CDC, the Court does not readily accept that a single ldc cannot be determined.
Further, for locus damni, the AG suggests (at 78) ‘The place where…a legally binding investment obligation is factually assumed… The exact location of such a place is a matter for the national law considered in the light of available factual evidence. It is likely to be the premises of a branch of the bank where the respective investment contract was signed, which may correspond, as in the Kolassa case, to the place where the bank account is held.‘ That in my view first of all is not a warranted outcome. The investor in Löber is not a consumer within the protected categories of the Regulation. Suggesting the place of conclusion of the obligation leaves room for the claimant to manipulate the forum of any future suit in tort. This is exactly what the Court objected to in Universal Music. Moreover, note the reference to ‘the national law’. It is quite unusual to suggest such a role for lex fori in light of the principle of autonomous interpretation. Unless the AG in fact means the ‘lex contractus’, presumably to be determined applying Rome I.
In summary there are quite a few open questions here – not something of course which I would necessarily object to.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 22.214.171.124.7
Fly lal: Locus delicti commissi for anticompetitive agreements. And application of Article 7(5)’s extension to branch domicile.
AB flyLAL — Lithuanian Airlines (‘flyLAL’) operated flights from Vilnius airport in Lithuania until it was put into liquidation. According to flyLAL, its demise was caused by predatory (that is, below cost) pricing by the Latvian airline Air Baltic Corporation A/S (‘Air Baltic’). That predatory pricing was, it is alleged, part of an anticompetitive strategy agreed between Air Baltic and the operator of Starptautiskā lidosta Rīga (Riga international airport in Latvia, ‘Riga Airport’). Thus, Riga Airport and Air Baltic agreed to drastically reduce the prices paid by Air Baltic for services at Riga airport. The savings were then used by Air Baltic to finance the predatory pricing that drove flyLAL out of the market in Vilnius, Lithuania.
Can Air Baltic and Riga Airport for damages before the courts in Vilnius? The national court and parties refer to three alleged infringements of competition law: (i) abuse of dominance consisting in the system of reductions implemented by Riga Airport; (ii) an anticompetitive agreement between Riga Airport and Air Baltic; and (iii) abuse of dominance in the form of predatory pricing by Air Baltic. Those infringements, it is argued, were interrelated, forming part of a strategy to oust flyLAL from the market in Vilnius and move passengers to Riga airport to the benefit of both Riga Airport and Air Baltic.
There is a lot in the Opinion – among others because as the AG points out, the referring court’s description of the alleged infringement of competition law is not entirely clear. Bobek therefore sets out a set of variables. The Court itself is bound not to distinguish among quite so many. Of note are the AG’s suggestions
- that locus damni here is not place of financial loss, rather the place within the markets affected by the competition law infringement where the claimant alleges loss of sales.That suggestion in my view is helpful for neither the Regulation’s aim of predictability, nor the protection of those damaged by infringement of competition law (the latter not however a stated aim of the Regulation). Put differently: damage located in a Mozaik fashion assists the tortfeasor. The Advocate General reaches this conclusion after a thorough revisit of the initial Bier judgment (and Capotorti AG’s Opinion in same), ditto Marinari and Dumez France. Yet the continuing need to conceptualise the Court’s Bier rule illustrates again in my view the mistake made in that original judgment, to introduce a forum damni despite the utter lack of textual support for same.
- for locus delicti commissi with full jurisdiction, the AG distinguishes between Article 101 TFEU (as regards the alleged anticompetitive agreement between Air Baltic and Riga Airport, the place of the event giving rise to the harm (that is, the loss of sales by flyLAL), is the place of the conclusion of the agreement) and 102 TFEU (alleged predatory pricing by Air Baltic, the place of the event giving rise to the harm is the place where the predatory prices were offered and applied). With respect to Article 101 TFEU, Bobek AG suggests this is identical to the Court’s judgment in CDC . I am not too sure but I am biased. As I noted above, in my view the Court should steer clear of an application of Article 7(2) which allows those infringing competition law to forum shop by manipulating the place of decision-making. In CDC the Court held that ‘the identification, in the jurisdiction of the court seised of the matter, of a specific event during which either that cartel was definitively concluded or one agreement in particular was made which was the sole causal event giving rise to the loss allegedly inflicted on a buyer’ cannot be ruled out. That implies that in other cases the identification of such singular event can be ruled out and that many places may be consider locus delicti commissi.
- finally with respect to (now) Article 7(5), the activities of a branch. The AG does not specify what must be meant by a ‘branch’ – for the national court has already concluded there is such branch. The Advocate General here is perhaps unusually deferential to the factual finding. Whether there is a sufficient nexus between the activities of the branch and the dispute, in the case of tort-based claims requires the branch participate in at least some of the actions constituting the tort (at 137). Offering the fixed prices or otherwise having been instrumental in concluding contracts for services at those prices suffices. In such cases, the branch has again participated in the commission of an act that constitutes a necessary precondition for the abuse (at 142).
A lengthy opinion. And it all started with the fairly straightforward facts of Bier…
(Handbook of) EU private international law), 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 126.96.36.199
Status updated: can a ‘relationship’ be a ‘contract’? CJEU says it’s complicated in Granarolo, and complements the Handte formula.
Update 4 October 2017 for the eventual judgment by the Cour de Cassastion see here: contractual relation upheld.
In C-196/15 Granarolo, extensive reference is made to Brogsitter, in which the CJEU held that the fact that one contracting party brings a civil liability claim against the other is not sufficient to consider that the claim concerns ‘matters relating to a contract’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast. That is the case only where the conduct complained of may be considered a breach of contract, which may be established by taking into account the purpose of the contract, which will in principle be the case only where the interpretation of the contract which links the defendant to the applicant is indispensable to establish the lawful or, on the contrary, unlawful nature of the conduct complained of against the former by the latter.
Kokott AG Opined that there was no such contractual relationship in the case at hand: see my review of the Opinion. The Court held last week and was less categorical. It suggests a contractual relationship between the parties (which did not have a framework agreement in place: rather a long series of one-off contracts) should not be excluded: the long-standing business relationship which existed between the parties is characterised by the existence of obligations tacitly agreed between them, so that a relationship existed between them that can be classified as contractual (at 25).
What follows can be considered a CJEU addition to the rather byzantine double negative C-26/91 Handte formula: ‘matters relating to a contract is not to be understood as covering a situation in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one party towards another’. In Granarolo at 26 the Court notes
The existence of a tacit relationship of that kind cannot, however, be presumed and must, therefore, be demonstrated. Furthermore, that demonstration must be based on a body of consistent evidence, which may include in particular the existence of a long-standing business relationship, the good faith between the parties, the regularity of the transactions and their development over time expressed in terms of quantity and value, any agreements as to prices charged and/or discounts granted, and the correspondence exchanged.
These criteria obviously are quite specific to the question at hand yet it is the first time the Court, carefully, ventures to give indications of some kind of a European ius commune on the existence of ‘a contract’.
Whether any such contract then is a contract for the sale of goods or one for services, is not a call the Court wishes to make. It lists the various criteria it has hitherto deployed, with extensive reference in particular to C-9/12 Corman-Collins, and leaves the decision up to the national court.
Make a mental note of Granarolo. It may turn out to have been quite pivotal. Geert.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 188.8.131.52, Heading 184.108.40.206.9