Posts Tagged handbook
This post should be preceded by a boast alert, but hey: a pat on one’s own shoulder does not hurt once in a while. With Dr Leonie Reins I have written EU Environmental Law, which has now been published by Edward Elgar. The blurb is here. Leonie and I have given a concise yet we hope complete overview of this ever-growing part of EU law. We hope it will please the reader!
I have copy /pasted the TOC below.
We are now turning our attention to (inter alia): EU energy law.
Contents: 1. Setting the context
PART I BASICS/FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2. Principles of European Environmental Law 3. Environmental law making in the European Union 4: Implementation and enforcement Public Participatory Rights 6. Additional tools in implementing European Environmental Law 7. Environmental and Strategic Impact Assessment 8. Environmental Liability and Environmental Crime 9. State Aid and Competition Law
PART II SUBSTANTIVE LEGISLATION 10. Biodiversity and Nature Conservation 11. Water protection legislation and policy 12. Noise pollution legislation and policy 13. Air pollution legislation and policy 14. Climate Change legislation and policy 15. Waste legislation and policy 16. Chemicals legislation and policy 17. Trade and the Environment
When my tweets on the CJEU are not followed quickly by a blog post, assume I got snowed under. Or that other developments require more immediate analysis. Taser, Case C-175/15, is easily dismissed perhaps as not all that stunning or shocking (puns abound), yet as often, it is worthwhile highlighting what the case does not answer, rather than what it did elucidate.
Taser International, whose seat is in the United States, entered into two non-exclusive distribution agreements with Gate 4. Under those agreements, Gate 4 and its administrator, Mr Anastasiu, undertook to assign to the other contracting party the Taser International trade marks which they had registered, or for which they had applied for registration, in Romania.
Following Gate 4’s and Mr Anastasiu’s refusal to fulfil that contractual obligation, Taser International brought an action before the District Court, Bucharest. Regardless of the existence in those contracts of clauses conferring jurisdiction on a court situated in the US, Gate 4 and Mr Anastasiu entered an appearance before the Romanian court without challenging its jurisdiction. The Court ordered them to undertake all the formalities necessary for the registration of the assignment.
The appeals court seeks clarification as to whether the Brussels I Regulation is applicable to the dispute before it, since the parties elected, for the resolution of their disputes, the courts of a third country. The referring court considers that such a clause conferring jurisdiction on a third country may, for this reason alone, preclude the tacit prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 24 (Article 26 in the Brussels I Recast).
On the assumption, however, that that latter rule is applicable, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether it should, nevertheless, decline jurisdiction on another ground. It also queried whether the exclusive jurisdictional rules of Article 22 are applicable: does a dispute concerning an obligation to assign a trade mark, likely to result in a registration under national law, fall within paragraph 4 of that article.
The CJEU firstly recalled its finding in C-111/09 CPP Vienna Insurance Group: choice of court made per Article 23 (now Article 25) Brussels I, can be overruled by voluntary appearance. The latter in that case simply acts as an amended choice of court. In Taser (at 24) the court now adds that this applies also if that initial choice of court was made ex-EU. The deliberate, later choice, remains a deliberate choice. The Court makes no reference to discussions e.g. in the context of Gothaer, whether the Brussels I Regulation at all should be concerned with choice of court ex-EU or should be entirely indifferent. Arguably, in the Recast Regulation, there is consideration for choice of court ex-EU, in particular in recital 24 combined with Article 33.
Intellectual property lawyers will be disappointed with the Court’s answer to the issue of whether trade mark assignment falls within Article 22(4) [now 24(4)]: Romanian courts in any event had jurisdiction. (at 29).
Plenty left open, therefore. Geert.
(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, chapter 2, heading 188.8.131.52, heading 2.2.7 .
Anti-suit once again climaxes outside the Brussels I (Recast) context. The High Court in Crescendo Maritime.
As I have reported before, English practice is to continue using anti-suit injunctions outside of the Brussels I Regulation, in particular to support arbitration. Recent application was made in Crescendo Maritime, restraining litigation in China. Teare J confirmed among others (per Toepfer v Cargill) that forum non conveniens (Chine was the natural forum for litigation in ordinary) has little relevance in the context of arbitration clauses.
Kennedys have background to the case (essentially, backdating of a shipbuilding contract to avoid newly introduced international rules on tank coatings). The considered use of anti-suit once again underlines the importance of tools of civil procedure to support global arbitration practices.
European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 184.108.40.206
Winrow v Hemphill: The High Court emphasises exceptional nature of ‘manifestly closer connected’ in Rome II. Clarifies ‘habitual residence’.
Winrow v Hemphill ( EWHC 3164), involved a road traffic accident that occurred in Germany on 16 November 2009. The claimant was a rear seat passenger in a vehicle driven by Mrs Hemphill (‘the first defendant’), which collided head on with a German vehicle. The defendant admitted fault for the collision. As a result of the collision, the claimant sustained personal injury, for which she received some treatment in Germany and further ongoing treatment in England. She and her husband returned to live in England in June 2011, earlier than planned. ‘Second defendant’ was the German insurer of the first defendant.
The following was agreed between the parties:
- iii) Since the claimant’s husband was due to leave the army in February 2014 after twenty-two years’ service he would have returned to England one and a half to two years before that date to undertake re-settlement training. It was always their intention to return to live in England.
- ii) At the time of the accident the claimant was living in Germany, having moved there in January 2001 with her husband who was a member of Her Majesty’s Armed Services. Germany was not the preferred posting of the claimant’s husband, it was his second choice. He had four separate three year postings in Germany.
- i) The claimant was a UK national.
- iv) Whilst in Germany, the claimant and her family lived on a British Army base where schools provided an English education.
- v) While in Germany, the claimant was employed on a full-time basis as an Early Years Practitioner by Service Children’s Education, (UK Government Agency).
- vi) The claimant claimed continuing loss and damage including care and assistance and loss of earnings. She asserted that the majority of her loss has been and will be incurred in England. The claimant alleged continuing pain, suffering and loss of amenity.
- vii) The first defendant was a UK national and an army wife, with her husband serving with the Army in Germany. She had been in Germany for between eighteen months and two years before the accident. She returned to England soon afterwards.
The High Court was asked (1) what law applies per Article 4 Rome II, and (2) whether under the circumstances, Article 4(3) Rome II might have any relevance.
On the habitual residence issue, Rome II corrects the overall lex loci damni rule in cases of joint habitual residence between tortfeasor and victim (which was argued to be the case here). Habitual residence was also argued to play a role in the ‘closer connection’ test (see below).
Rome II, the Regulation of the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, does not define ‘habitual residence’ for individuals acting in their personal capacity. The matter therefore is one of national conflicts law. The habitual residence for a natural person is only defined by ht Regulation when it comes to his acting in the course of his business activity. ‘Habitual residence’ is a concept which is not used in Brussels I, however it is used in the Brussels II bis Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matter of parental responsibility, where it is left undefined, and in the Rome III Regulation (an instrument of enhanced co-operation and hence not applicable in all Member States) implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of applicable law to divorce and legal separation, where, too, somewhat oddly given its date of adoption (after Rome I and II) it is left undefined.
The Court of Justice has defined ‘habitual residence’ in Swaddling, Case C-90/97, within the context of social security law (entitlement of benefits subject to a residence requirement) as the place ‘where the habitual centre of their interests is to be found. In that context, account should be taken in particular of the employed person’s family situation; the reasons which have led him to move; the length and continuity of his residence; the fact (where this is the case) that he is in stable employment; and his intention as it appears from all the circumstances.’
Undoubtedly the context of the adjudication needs to be taken into account, such as in Swaddling, a social security case, in which the seeking of holding of employment is likely to have a much greater relevance for determining habitual residence than in the context of, say, maintenance or parental responsibility (where, for instance, the interest and ‘anchorage’ of the child is likely to be much more relevant). [See also House of Lords M v M,  EWHC 2047 (Fam), a case referred to in Winrow]. Moreover, the Court of Justice itself has warned that its case-law on habitual residence in one area, cannot be directly transposed in the context of any other (Case C-523/07, A).
It is obvious however that the ‘centre of interest’ test which in one way or another finds its way into habitual residence in all relevant EU law, includes a subjective element: the intention of a person to be anchored in a particular place. This was argued to be relevant in the case at issue, because both victim and tortfeasor were resident in Germany on account of their husbands’ military posting there.
Slade J in my view justifiably held that having regard to the length of stay in the country, its purpose and the establishing of a life there, habitual residence of the Claimant at the time of her accident was Germany. It is not because she followed her husband who was posted in Germany on Army business, that she was in Germany involuntarily.
On the issue of manifestly closer connected per Article 4(3) Rome II, the High Court first of all confirmed the exceptional character of the escape clause, however emphasises, and I have great sympathy for this view, that in reviewing that exceptional possibility, there should be no limitation in principle of factors that can be taken into account: Article 4(3) clearly is an exception to the EU’s mantra of predictability in EU private international law, however one which even the European Commission foresaw and which is inherent to the very nature of the exception. Hence the High Court considered inter alia the joint nationality of the victims (with an interesting discussion on whether United Kingdom nationality may be relevant for the consideration of English law being applicable – there is no such thing as ‘English’ nationality); habitual residence at the time of the accident and subsequently; location of subsequent consequences (the victim now suffering those in England; loss of earning occurring in England), etc.: even what a particular court in a particular Member State may consider to be relevant for the application of 4(3) may be very unpredictable indeed may also be disparate across the EU.
However on balance Slade J held that the balance was in favour of not applying the escape clause, particularly in view of the period of time of habitual residence in Germany, and subsequent continuing residence in that country (ia for follow-up treatment). Final holding therefore was
- Factors weighing against displacement of German law as the applicable law of the tort by reason of Article 4(1) are that the road traffic accident caused by the negligence of the First Defendant took place in Germany. The Claimant sustained her injury in Germany. At the time of the accident both the Claimant and the First Defendant were habitually resident there. The Claimant had lived in Germany for about eight and a half years and remained living there for eighteen months after the accident.
- Under Article 4(3) the court must be satisfied that the tort is manifestly more closely connected with English law than German law. Article 4(3) places a high hurdle in the path of a party seeking to displace the law indicated by Article 4(1) or 4(2). Taking into account all the circumstances, the relevant factors do not indicate a manifestly closer connection of the tort with England than with Germany. The law indicated by Article 4(1) is not displaced by Article 4(3). The law applicable to the claim in tort is therefore German law.
This judgment to my knowledge is one of few discussing Article 4(3)’s escape clause in such detail. A judgment which does justice to both the exceptional nature of the provision, and the need to consider all relevant factors.