Posts Tagged Germany
Two negatives a positive make? A brief report on anti anti-suit in (among others) continental courts.
A flag on anti anti-suit. Steve Ross reports here on the Paris Court of First Instance (Tribunal de Grande Instance) judgment in RG 19/59311 IPCom v Lenovo /Motorola granting a preliminary injunction. IPCOM GmbH & Co. KG is an intellectual property rights licensing and technology R&D company. Lenovo/Motorola a telecommunications company. As Steve writes, the French Court held that it had jurisdiction over the case with regard to a patent infringement claim and ordered Lenovo to withdraw the motion for an anti-suit injunction which that company had brought before the US District Court of the Northern District of California in so far as it concerns the French part of the patent.
Steve notes (I have not read the actual judgment) that ‘according to the French Court, the international French public order (ordre public) does not recognise the validity of an anti-suit injunction, except where its purpose is to enforce a contractual jurisdiction clause or an arbitral clause. Under all other circumstances, anti-suit injunction proceedings have the effect of indirectly disregarding the exclusive power of each sovereign state to freely determine the international jurisdictional competence of their courts.’
Peter Bert also reports last week a German anti anti-suit injunction at the Courts in Munchen, also for IPR cases.
For progress in the US anti-suit (one ‘anti’ only) application see order here.
Juve Patent report (as does Peter) that the High Court, too, has issued a (partial) anti anti-suit in the case however I have not been able to locate the judgment.
Note that continental courts (see in the French case) finding that anti-suit in general infringes ordre public is an important instruction viz future relationships with UK court orders post Brexit (should the UK not follow EU civil procedure).
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.1.
Airbus v Generali et al: The Court of Appeal on the intensity of review of choice of court under Article 25. Clear echoes of Turner v Grovit and West Tankers.
The claimant in this action and the respondent to the appeal, Airbus, claims declarations (1) that it is not liable to the defendant insurers for losses incurred in relation to an incident which occurred on 29 September 2013 in which an aircraft which it had manufactured sustained damage when landing in Rome and (2) that proceedings commenced against it by the defendants in Italy have been commenced contrary to the terms of an English exclusive jurisdiction clause. The clause in question is contained in an Airframe Warranties Agreement dated 8 July 2010 (“the Warranties Agreement”) concluded between (among others) Airbus and the defendants’ insured, the Italian airline company Alitalia. The issue on this appeal is whether the English court has jurisdiction over these claims by virtue of the jurisdiction clause. Moulder J held that it does and the defendant insurers (henceforth “the appellants”) now appeal.
Appellants contend, in outline, that the jurisdiction clause is of limited scope and does not extend to Airbus’s claims in this action, that the claim for a negative declaration falls within an arbitration clause in a different agreement, a Purchase Agreement dated 31 October 2005 which provides for ICC arbitration in Geneva, and that their own proceedings in Italy under articles of the Italian Civil Code are not within the scope of either clause. They say in addition that they cannot be in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause to which, as insurers, they were never parties and that, regardless of the true construction of the clause, there is no basis on which the English court can make a declaration against them (essentially, per Turner v Grovit and West Tankers).
Males LJ at 49: The standard of proof to be applied in determining whether the English court has jurisdiction under Article 25 of the Brussels Recast Regulation is that of a good arguable case. Kaifer Aislimentos was discussed as relevant authority. However, at 52: ‘sometimes it will be sensible, when a question of law arises on an application to challenge jurisdiction, for the court to decide it rather than merely deciding whether it is sufficiently arguable.’ Discussion of the contractual construction of the choice of court clause then follows at 62 ff and concludes in favour of a wide application in casu.
At 77 ff: The question whether the appellants’ claim in Italy falls within the scope of the English jurisdiction clause. Males LJ notes correctly that this depends on the nature of the claim brought in Italy, not on the defences which may be or have in fact been raised by Alitalia. At 82 he fairly swiftly concludes that even though the Italian claim is for breach of non-contractual obligations under articles of the Italian Civil Code, it is sufficiently connected to the Warranties Agreement to be within the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction clause. At 83 therefore: the commencement and pursuit of the Italian proceedings was contrary to the terms of that clause and that the English court has jurisdiction to determine that claim.
That then brings us to the discussion of what the English courts might potentially do to assist the party relying on the choice of court clause – given the unavailability of anti-suit per West Tankers. Noteworthy is that the new lis alibi pendens rule protecting choice of court following Brussels Ia, seemingly was not deployed or discussed in the Italian proceedings – at any rate there is no reference to any such discussion in the Court of Appeal judgment (other than perhaps at 84 which seems to suggest that amendment of claims brought the issue to the surface and this may not yet have been the case at the time of the discussion of the Italian proceedings).
A statement by the English courts finding infringement of the clause, would not just have an impact on cost rulings but would also ground a delictual claim. At 97 Males LJ settles the discussion whether such a declaration might be possible: ‘I can see no valid basis on which West Tankers can be distinguished. If it is held that commencement of the Italian proceedings by Alitalia would have been a breach of the jurisdiction clause in the Warranties Agreement, it follows that their commencement by the appellant insurers is a breach of an equivalent obligation in equity which Airbus is entitled to enforce and that the English court has jurisdiction to grant a declaration to say so.’
Interesting and highly relevant authority.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Heading 188.8.131.52.2., Heading 2.2.9, Heading 184.108.40.206.
Thank you Bob Wessels for again alerting us (with follow-up here [update 15 January 2018 and here ; looks like regular revisits of prof Wessels’ blog are in order) and also reporting by Lukas Schmidt here) timely to a decision this time by the German courts in Niki, applying the Insolvency Regulation 2015, on the determination of COMI – Centre of Main Interests. Bob’s review is excellent per usual hence I am happy to refer for complete background.
Of particular note is the discussion on the extent of a court’s duty to review jurisdiction ex officio; the court’s correct assumption that in the event of foggy circumstances, the EIR’s presumption of COMI at the place of incorporation must have priority; and finally in my view the insufficient weight the court places on ascertainability by third parties.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.6.1.
I discussed this case with my students the day the judgment came out. Copy of the judgment has travelled with me far and wide. Yet I only now find myself getting round to posting on Anas v Facebook, at the courts at Würzburg back in February. Mr Anas came from Syria as a refugee and took a famous selfie with Frau Merkel. The photo later came to haunt him as fake news sites used it in connecting with accusations of terrorism. Mr Anas thereupon sued Facebook, requesting it to act more swiftly to remove the various content reporting on him in this matter. The Würzburg court obliged. I understand that in the meantime Mr Anas has halted further action against FB which I am assuming includes the appeal which FB must have launched.
Now, the interest for this blog lies not in the issue of fake news, but rather the jurisdictional grounds for the ruling. Mr Anas sued Facebook Ireland, not Facebook Inc. The latter, I would suggest, he might have done on the basis of the Brussels I Recast’s provisions on consumer contracts – albeit that the conditions for that title might not be fulfilled if Mr Anas became a FB user in Syria.
The court did not entertain the consumer title. It did uphold its jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(2) of the Recast, as lex loci damni. (But without consideration of the Shevill limitation). Awkwardly, it then lest my German fails me, goes on to determine its internal jurisdiction on the basis of German civil procedure law. Plaintiff was domiciled in Berlin; not Würzburg. The judgment therefore turns into the proverbial cake and eating it: Article 7(2) does not just lay down jurisdiction for a Member State: it also identifies the very court in that MS that has jurisdiction. It cancels out internal rules of jurisdiction. With Mr Anas’ domicile in Berlin, Wurzburg as locus damni is not immediately obvious.
German speakers, if I am not reading this right please do comment.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.
Location of damage resulting from law firm’s alleged wrongful inducement in breach of exclusive jurisdiction clause. The High Court in AMT v Marzillier.
AMT v Marzillier  EWHC 1085 (Comm) concerns special jurisdiction under tort, Article 5(3) of the Brussels I-Regulation, in the event of a loss of contractual right – as well as a cursory review of the consumer title.
Here: the loss, allegedly due to wrongful inducement by defendant (a law firm) to have a contractual claim heard in England. Contractual claims (alleged precarious investment advice) by a group of individuals had been settled by AMT in Germany. Popplewell J concisely revisits the complete history of Article 5(3), from Bier via Kalfelis and Dumez France to Marinari and Kronhofer, however, leaving out Shevill. (See also below).
On the basis of said precedents he holds that the Courts of England do indeed have jurisdiction: ‘The place where the damage occurred as a result of MMGR’s allegedly tortious conduct was England, where such conduct deprived AMT of the contractual benefit of the exclusive jurisdiction clause which ought to have been enjoyed in England. ‘ (at 46). Counsel for AMT had also put forward an alternative ground which was that the payments for the settlements and costs came from England, and that England is where management time was wasted and future business lost. Not so: Popplewell J: ‘The unquantified heads of loss for wasted management time and loss of business are not the primary heads of claim and do not constitute the main part of the damage said to have occurred as a result of the harmful event. They are not the damage. They are not initial, direct or immediate damage, but to the extent quantifiable and recoverable, merely the remoter financial consequences of the harm suffered in Germany. ‘ (at 52).
Per Shevil, jurisdiction of the English courts will be limited to the extent of damages suffered by the loss of the contractual benefit of the exclusive jurisdiction clause which ought to have been enjoyed in England: how exactly that ought to be quantified (if liability is at all withheld, of course) will not be a straightforward matter, one assumes.
Succinct review is also made of the consumer title, with the finding that on its applicability there is an issue to be tried. At 58, Popplewell J suggests ‘wherever the dividing line is to be drawn in the case of investors, the result is likely to be heavily dependent on the circumstances of each individual and the nature and pattern of investment. At one end of the scale may be the retired dentist who makes a single investment for a modest amount by way of pension provision. At the other may be an investment banker or asset manager who plays the markets widely, regularly and for substantial amounts, for his own account. In between there are many factors which might influence the result, including the profile of the investor, the nature and extent of the investment activity, and the tax treatment of any profits or losses. The issue is fact specific.’ I do not think too much should be read in these examples – more so, the insistence that circumstances of the case do have an impact on the qualification as ‘consumer’.