Posts Tagged Fraus

Anchor defendants in follow-up competition law cases. The High Court in Vattenfall et al v Prysmian et al.

Thank you Brick Court and Stewarts, among other, for flagging Vattenfall et al v Prysmian et al in which the High Court dismissed a call for summary judgment on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

A classic case of follow-up damages litigation in competition law, here in the high voltage power cables cartel, fines for which were confirmed by the CJEU early July. Core to the case is the application of Article 8(1)’s anchor defendants mechanism. Only two of the defendants are UK incorporated companies – UK subsidiaries of companies that have been found by the European Commission to have infringed EU competition law.

Authority cited includes of course CDC, Roche Nederland and Painer, and Cooper Tyre (sale of the cartelised products can amount to implementation of the cartel). Vattenfall confirms that for the English courts, ‘knowingly implementing’ the cartel has a low threshold.

At 89 ff the Court refers to the pending case of (what I now know to be) C-724/17 Skanska Industrial Solutions e.a.: Finnish Courts are considering the application for cartel damages against parent companies on acquiring cartelist subsidiaries, had dissolved them. Relevance for Vattenfall lies with the issue of knowledge: the Finnish courts wonder what Article 101 TFEU has to say on the degree of knowledge of the cartelist activities, relevant for the liability of the parent company. An application of fraus, or abuse in other words. Elleray DJ however, did not consider the outcome of that reference to be relevant for the case at hand, in its current stage of procedure.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12.1

 

 

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The Aldi principle applied in BVI.

I reported earlier on the Aldi abuse of process principle: a party who intends to bring a subsequent action against existing parties or their privies must raise the issue with the court, which on case-management grounds may hold that all claims must be brought simultaneously.

In 2016 BVIHC 0059 (COM) Serena Chi Yang Hsueh et al v Equity Trustee ltd. et al Chivers J has now held that the principle applies in the British Virgin Islands. Harneys have the report here, and a big thank you to Kimberley Crabbe-Adams and Ian Mann for providing me with copy. Telling, at 94 is Chivers J’s conclusion (following review of authority) that while the specific Aldi requirement may not as such have been promulgated in BVI, there can be no doubt of the obligation of a litigant to put all their cards on the table, before the other party and the court, at an early stage. The CPR demand so, specifically as their overall objective (at 90, referring to CPR 1.1(1) is to deal with cases ‘justly’.

I have pondered before whether there ought not to be an Aldi rule in EU conflicts law, however one can see the difficulty particularly as in the EU context an Aldi principle might favour the actor sequitur forum rei rule to the detriment of special jurisdictional rules: not an outcome supported by the current rules.

Geert.

 

 

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Altun: Fraud and social dumping. The CJEU emphasises the double sides of the mutual trust coin.

Postscript 19 July 2018 in C-356/15 EC v Belgium, the Court runs through its Altun judgment, confirming the possibility of rejection of ‘A1 certificates’, however emphasising the ad hoc nature and the need to respect the procedures running via the European Commission.

When I reported on Saugmandsgaard ØE’s Opinion in C-359/16 Altun, I emphasised the issue of mutual trust. I noted that the AG effectively flipped the coin: sincere co-operation requires sincerity on both sides (my words, not the AG’s). The AG had recalled the Halifax case-law of the CJEU: EU law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends and that national courts may, case by case, take account — on the basis of objective evidence — of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of the persons concerned in order, where appropriate, to deny them the benefit of the provisions of EU law, in the light of the objectives pursued by the provisions of EU law concerned. In November 2017 the CJEU confirmed in C-251/16 Cussens that this principle has direct effect and is directly applicable: it is a general principle of EU law which does not require a national measure transposing it.

In the case at issue, the facts point to non-fulfillment of one of the substantive criteria for the E101 certificate to be issued, namely that only an undertaking which habitually carries on significant activities in the Member State in which it is established may be issued an E101 of that State.

The Court today has confirmed the AG’s view (only the Dutch and French version were available at the time of writing). Mutual trust implies responsibilities on both sides. Upon receiving indications of fraud, the Member State of origin is duty-bound to investigate diligently and either confirm or refute the suspicions. (In the event of continuing divergence, there is an appeals procedure within the relevant secondary law, and if need be the possibility for the host State to pursue infringement proceedings with the home State). Like its AG, the Court emphasises that the fraud must be established in the context of adversarial proceedings with legal guarantees for the persons concerned and in compliance with their fundamental rights, in particular the right to an effective remedy enshrined.

This remains relevant even after the planned changes to the posted workers Directive. In the future system, too, Member States will issue certificates, feed data into the newly created register etc.

Geert.

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Rulings on costs and their impact on the effet utile of EU civil procedure. The High Court in PABLO STAR re copyright infringement.

In [2017] EWHC 2541 (IPEC) Pablo Star Media v Richard Bowen the issue was one over copyright infringement relating to a photograph of Dylan Thomas. Of interest to this blog is not the copyright issue or the height of damages relating to same – I am not a specialist in that area. (As far as the jurisdictional issues are concerned, there is a slightly muddled reference to the Brussels I Recast and various other Regulations including Regulation 542/2014 which I discussed here).

What did trigger my interest, though, is the ruling on costs.

At 33-34 Hacon J quotes the District Judge’s reasoning for obliging claimant (Pablo Star) to pay part of the defendant’s cost, despite having won the case. In that cost award, the District Judge scolds claimant for having initiated proceedings in Ireland as well as the UK, and for considering (or threatening, as the case may be) litigation in the US. The High Court at 38 and 41 leaves aside the proceedings in Ireland as a factor to consider, and now limits the reasoning for the award on cost to the potential proceedings in the US.

Now, costs determination largely is within the realm of national rules of civil procedure. Sometimes, EU and /or international law has a direct impact on cost determination, such as for instance in the case of Aarhus and environmental litigation; or, importantly for the case at issue, Directive 2004/48 on intellectual property rights enforcement (the enforcement Directive). This Directive provides in Article 14 on legal costs

‘Member States shall ensure that reasonable and proportionate legal costs and other expenses incurred by the successful party shall, as a general rule, be borne by the unsuccessful party, unless equity does not allow this.’

That Directive was applied in CJEU C-57/15 UVP v Telenet, expressly condemning Belgium’s restrictive regime on cost recovery in intellectual property cases. The High Court’s finding on cost may to my mind be at odds with that ruling.

More generally, the District Judge’s reference to claimant’s Irish proceedings contributing to the judge’s finding on cost, without a doubt is an infringement of the effet utile of the EU’s jurisdictional regimes. Claimant has a certain right to sue in Ireland and that possibility must in no way be disciplined.  Hacon J at the High Court, purposely or not, may have insulated himself from criticism at this point, by leaving the Irish proceedings outside the consideration and only referring to the threat of US proceedings as relevant for partially shifting costs to the plaintiff.

Absolute numbers in the case are not high. Yet the principle to my mind deserves right to appeal at the CA and, from there on, potentially to the CJEU.

Geert.

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Saugmandsgaard ØE in Altun: Detection of fraud /fighting social dumping trumps mutual trust.

Update 15 January 2018: Judgment on 6 February.

Saugmandsgaard ØE’s would seem fast to become the CJEU’s Advocate General of choice in matters of social dumping – witness the recent Ryanair litigation. In C-359/16 Altun, at issue is the binding nature of the E101 certificate. This certifies that a worker moving within the EU is covered by the social security scheme of the Member State (‘MS’) to which the issuing institution belongs. Standing case-law is that the host MS is not entitled to scrutinise the validity of an E101 certificate in the light of the background against which it was issued: this is the result of the mutual trust built into the relevant secondary law.

In current case the Belgian Supreme Court queries whether that case-law applies where a court of the host MS finds that an E101 certificate was obtained or invoked fraudulently.

The AG summarises the relevant investigation at 10: ‘The Sociale Inspectie (Social Inspectorate, Belgium) conducted an investigation into the employment of the staff at Absa NV, an undertaking governed by Belgian law active in the construction sector in Belgium. That investigation established that from 2008 Absa had practically no staff in its employ and outsourced all manual labour to Bulgarian undertakings under subcontracting agreements. Those Bulgarian undertakings had no activities to speak of in Bulgaria and posted workers to work under subcontracting agreements in Belgium for Absa, partly with the involvement and cooperation of other Belgian companies. The employment of the workers concerned was not notified to the Belgian institution responsible for the collection of social security contributions, as they held E 101 certificates issued by the competent Bulgarian authority, certifying that they were covered by the Bulgarian social security system.’

What follows is essentially the Belgian authorities alleging that their Bulgarian counterparts, having been asked to withdraw the certificates, only answered halfheartedly if at all. The Court of Appeal found that the certificates had been obtained by fraud.

Saugmandsgaard ØE emphasises that the EU social security rules at issue effectively establish a private international law system for social security. They assign authorities competent to issue certificates; they designate the social security law applicable. The principle of mutual trust /sincere co-operation, laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, ensures that authorities in the host MS respect the certificates issued in the home MS. However, the AG then effectively flips the coin: sincere co-operation requires sincerity on both sides (my words, not the AG’s).

The AG recalls the Halifax case-law of the CJEU: EU law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends and that national courts may, case by case, take account — on the basis of objective evidence — of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of the persons concerned in order, where appropriate, to deny them the benefit of the provisions of EU law, in the light of the objectives pursued by the provisions of EU law concerned. [Postscript 22 November 2017: The CJEU confirmed today in C-251/16 Cussens that this principle has direct effect and is directly applicable: it is a general principle of EU law which does not require a national measure transposing it).

The AG does not just refer to case-law on the very secondary law at issue. He opens up the debate to the wider implications of social dumping and regulatory competition:

At 46: ‘socio-economic considerations likewise support priority being given to the combating of fraud in such a situation. In the context of the system of conflict of laws established by … Regulation No 1408/71, fraud linked to the issue of E 101 certificates represents a threat to the coherence of the Member States’ social security schemes. In that regard, I consider that Member States have a legitimate interest in taking appropriate steps to protect their financial interests and to ensure the financial balance of their social security systems. In addition, the use of E 101 certificates obtained or invoked fraudulently is, in my view, a form of unfair competition and calls into question the equality of working conditions on national labour markets.‘ (footnotes omitted)

At 49, the AG suggest a finding of fraud requires the satisfaction of an objective criterion and of a subjective criterion. The objective criterion consists in the fact that the conditions for obtaining the advantage sought are not in fact satisfied. At 51, the subjective factor:  it is to be established that the persons concerned had the intention of concealing the fact that the conditions for the issue of the E 101 certificate were not in fact met, in order to obtain the advantage stemming from that certificate. Proof of the existence of such fraudulent intent may consist in an intentional act, in particular an inaccurate presentation of the true situation of the posted worker or of the undertaking posting that worker, or in an intentional omission, such as the non-disclosure of relevant information.

(In the case at issue, the facts point to non-fulfillment of one of the substantive criteria for the E101 to be issued, namely that only an undertaking which habitually carries on significant activities in the Member State in which it is established may be issued an E101 of that State).

The fraud must be established in the context of adversarial proceedings with legal guarantees for the persons concerned and in compliance with their fundamental rights, in particular the right to an effective remedy enshrined (at 52).

If the AG’s Opinion is followed, and taking into account Commissioner Thyssen’s recent progress on the reform of the relevant laws, the social dumping window is closing yet a bit more.

Geert.

 

 

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Expect some final turbulence. CJEU wrongfoots Ryanair and Crewlink on ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’.

I reported earlier on Saugmandsgaard ØE’s opinion in Cases C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, Nogueira et al and Osacar v Ryanair. The CJEU yesterday held and as I put it in immediate comment on the case reported in the FT, the Court’s view clearly resonates with the current mood against social dumping.

The case here ostensibly concerns jurisdiction only, however the Rome I Regulation includes mandatory protection of the employee guaranteed by the laws of the same place where (s)he habitually carries out his /her work. Hence a finding in the context of the Brussels I Recast inevitably has an impact on applicable law, too.

Firstly the Court has no mercy for the limiting choice of court agreement in the relevant contracts (at 53): in the case of employment contracts, a jurisdiction clause cannot apply exclusively and thus prohibit the employee from bringing proceedings before the courts which have jurisdiction under the protective regime of the Brussels I Recast.

The Court then essentially reiterates its AG: The concept of ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’ must be interpreted as referring to the place where, or from which, the employee in fact performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer (at 59). Referring to its earlier case-law, the Court reiterates that national courts must, in particular, determine in which Member State is situated (i) the place from which the employee carries out his transport-related tasks, (ii) the place where he returns after his tasks, receives instructions concerning his tasks and organises his work, and (iii) the place where his work tools are to be found. (at 63). The place where the aircraft aboard which the work is habitually performed are stationed must also be taken into account (at 64).

The CJEU’s judgment then zooms in particularly on the notion of ‘home base’, a term used in relevant EU civil aviation law. The concept of ‘place where, or from which, the employee habitually performs his work’ cannot be equated with any concept referred to in another act of EU law (at 65).  However that does not mean that it is irrelevant to determine the place from which an employee habitually carries out his work. In fact, the Court held, the concept is likely to play a significant role in the identification of place of habitual employment in cases as these (at 69). In fact, taking account of the facts of each of the present cases, it would only be if applications, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, were to display closer connections with a place other than the ‘home base’ that the relevance of the latter for the identification of ‘the place from which employees habitually carry out their work’ would be undermined (at 73).

Nationality of the aircraft is summarily dismissed at 75, as being of any relevance at all.

At 62, the Court, importantly, also wars against fraudulent forum shopping: ‘That circumstantial method makes it possible not only to reflect the true nature of legal relationships, in that it must take account of all the factors which characterise the activity of the employee (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 March 2011, Koelzsch, C‑29/10, EU:C:2011:151, paragraph 48), but also to prevent a concept such as that of ‘place where, or from which, the employee habitually performs his work’ from being exploited or contributing to the achievement of circumvention strategies (see, by analogy, judgment of 27 October 2016, D’Oultremont andOthers, C‑290/15, EU:C:2016:816, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

The case now goes back to Mons howecer as has been reported, it is almost inconceivable for that court not to find Charleroi to be the place of habitual employment. Despite Ryanairs bravado, it is clear this judgment blows a hole in its regulatory strategy.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed 2016, Chapter 2, Heading , Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.5.

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Vinyls Italia. A boon for conflict of laws (with a fraus component) and important findings on the insolvency Pauliana.

Another one from the exam queue. I reported earlier on Szpunar AG’s Opinion in C-54/16 Vinyls Italia – readers may want to refer tot that post before reading on. The case concerns the extent to which a bona fide creditor may insulate payments made to it by the insolvent debtor, to the detriment of the collectivity of the creditors, using choice of law for its contract with the debtor away from the lex concursus. The Court held on 8 June, much along the lines of its AG and earlier precedent especially Nike with respect to anti-avoidance actions. The judgment therefore is not of great novelty for this part of the insolvency Regulation. It is on the other hand of crucial importance for the interpretation of ‘international’ in European private international law.

Firstly, whether the court hearing the insolvency proceedings can or must raise the Article 13 (now 16) even if the party profiting from the insulation of its payments from the insolvency, has failed expressly to do so in its submissions. This, the CJEU held, is a matter of procedure, not harmonised in the Insolvency Regulation and lex fori therefore, subject to the usual condition that effet utile is guaranteed and that EU law is equally applied as national law.

The Court had already held in Nike that the defendant in an anti-avoidance (Pauliana) action has to prove both the facts from which the conclusion can be drawn that the act is unchallengeable and the absence of any evidence that would militate against that conclusion (at 25). The Court in Vinyls Italia qualifies that statement: the party bearing the burden of proof must show that, where the lex causae makes it possible to challenge an act regarded as being detrimental, the conditions to be met in order for that challenge to be upheld, which differ from those of the lex fori concursus, have not actually been fulfilled. However defendant does not have to show that the lex causae does not provide, in general or in the abstract, any means to challenge the act in question: such means of challenging the act almost always exist, at least in the abstract, and such strict interpretation would therefore deprive Article 13 (now 16) of its effectiveness (at 38). Of course how wide exactly the net of voidness needs to be cast, is not entirely clear from the judgment.

The final question then deals with the possibility of relying on (now) Article 16 in the situation provided for in Article 3(3) of the Rome I Regulation, that is to say, where all the elements relevant to the situation in question between the parties to a contract are located in a country other than the country whose law is chosen by those parties. Now, the Rome I Regulation does not ratione temporis apply to the facts at issue and on the similar provisions of the Rome Convention, the referring court is not entitled to ask questions. The CJEU therefore decides to simply reply to the question of this being a purely domestic contract, by reference to Article 16 of the insolvency Regulation only. It nevertheless however uses both Regulation and Convention a contrario. Both existed at the time of adoption of the Insolvency Regulation. The latter does not include an Article 3(3) type provision. That it does not, must, the Court held, mean that the Insolvency Regulation saw no need at all to limit the use of lex contractus for insulation reasons, even in the case of purely domestic contracts.

There is however one condition: Fraus (omnia corrumpit) aka abuse of (EU) law. Here, the Court refers to its findings last summer in C‑423/15 Kratzer. EU law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends. A finding of abuse requires a combination of objective and subjective elements. First, with regard to the objective element, that finding requires that it must be apparent from a combination of objective circumstances that, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by EU rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved. Second, such a finding requires a subjective element, namely that it must be apparent from a number of objective factors that the essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain an undue advantage.

Here, Article 16 may be disregarded only in a situation where it would appear objectively that the objective pursued by that application, in this context, of ensuring the legitimate expectation of the parties in the applicability of specific legislation, has not been achieved (a tough condition if the lex contractus is wisely chosen), and that the contract was made subject to the law of a specific Member State artificially, that is to say, with the primary aim, not of actually making that contract subject to the legislation of the chosen Member State, but of relying on the law of that Member State in order to exempt the contract, or the acts which took place in the performance of the contract, from the application of the lex fori concursus. In this respect (at 55), choice of law of a Member State other than the Member State in which parties are established does not create any presumption regarding an intention to circumvent the rules on insolvency for abusive or fraudulent ends.

The findings on fraus amount to strong support for a wide interpretation of the concept ‘international’ in EU private international law. (That an entirely Italian situation was made ‘international’ simply by choice of law ex-Italy was not considered an issue). A development to be applauded. These same findings also make it very difficult within the context of Article 13 (now 16) successfully to mount a challenge of payments detrimental to the collectivity. This aspect of the case is what i.a. Gilles Lindemans objects to in the judgment. However the CJEU logic I suppose lies in what it sees firmly as the object and purpose of Article 16: it protects the legitimate expectations of the party who has benefitted from an act detrimental to all the creditors. In some way it prevents contractual sclerosis for parties suspected of being close to payment issues. Securitisation is facilitated if the lex causae is fixed, independent of the lex concursus. Not just fraus (a very improbable route now) but probably more importantly the burden of proof per C-310/14 Nike, protects the collectivity.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.7.1. Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.8.1.

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