Posts Tagged Forum shopping

Glaxo v Sandoz. Collateral use of evidence. Discovery (‘disclosure’) shopping at the High Court.

Glaxo Welcome v Sandoz et al  [2018] EWHC 3229 (Ch),  puts the spotlight on an important part of international forum shopping, namely discovery /disclosure, in particular collateral use of document obtained in one jurisdiction, in litigation in another. What is fundamentally at stake is that the launch of proceedings in a discovery friendly jurisdiction, may be simply employed as a jack for obtaining evidence to be used in a discovery-heavy jurisdiction.

Claimants apply for an order permitting the second claimant to use certain documents disclosed by some of the defendants (“the Sandoz Defendants”) in the claim in the English courts, in a claim in Belgium between the second claimant and Sandoz NV (“Sandoz Belgium”). The two claims are part of global litigation between members of the GlaxoSmithKline and Sandoz groups of companies. In Europe there are claims in several jurisdictions including England and Wales, The Republic of Ireland, Germany, The Netherlands and Belgium. The disclosure exercise between the claimants and the Sandoz Defendants has been very substantial. It involved the Sandoz Defendants reviewing 406,300 documents using 50 legally qualified reviewers. This led to the subsequent disclosure of slightly in excess of 75,000 documents to the claimants.

As Marsh CM notes at 11, ‘There is a marked contrast in the manner in which litigation is conducted in England and Wales on the one hand and Belgium (and most other Civil law countries) on the other hand. In England and Wales, the ability to obtain disclosure that is adverse to the other party’s claim is an important feature of litigation. However, the evidence provided in connection with the application shows that disclosure is only available in a very limited form in Belgium. One of the issues to be determined is whether disclosure obtained in this jurisdiction should be made available to a party that is engaged in litigation in a jurisdiction where disclosure, if not unknown, is very limited in scope.’

He is of course spot on: obtaining relevant documentation from the other party is not easily done in Belgium (and elsewhere) and often needs to be deduced from final filings of submissions or indeed at the hearing stage.

Relevant authority is discussed at 22 ff., and is really quite relevant: the discussion shows among others great consideration of rule of law concerns, mutual trust between EU Member States and Council of Europe parties, and the relevance of applicable law in the assessment (at 22(5): ‘The Belgian Claim proceeds under harmonised EU law as set out in the Trade Mark Directive. It follows that the English court is in a better position to consider initial relevance of the documents to the issues in the Belgian Claim than would be the case were the claim to be one brought under domestic Belgian law’).’

Final conclusion is in favour of collateral use of a substantial amount of documents. It is worth copying Marsh CM’s reasons in full: at 60:

(1)    The parties to this claim, and associated companies, are engaged in litigation on a very wide scale in many jurisdictions. They are part of very substantial businesses with equal resources. There is no suggestion that the application is oppressive.

(2)    Although the legal basis for this claim and the Belgian Claim are markedly different, there are similarities between some of the issues that are engaged.

(3)    The claimants have been able to satisfy the court that the majority of the documents they seek to use are likely to be relevant to the Belgian Claim. The interests of justice would therefore militate in favour of the claimants having an opportunity to obtain advice about their use in the Belgian Claim.

(4)    Use of the documents to enable the second claimant to consider whether, having obtained advice, a claim against additional parties should be pursued is, to my mind, more compelling than use of documents in connection with the Belgian Claim. There are no risks of adversely affecting the existing proceedings. The court should be slow to stand in the way of a party who wishes to obtain advice about pursuing a lawful course of action.

(5)    There is now an agreed procedure for the orderly progress of the appeal in Brussels with the second claimant filing an additional brief followed by Sandoz Belgium. The disruption, if any, by the introduction of additional documents has been minimised.

(6)    The number of documents the claimants seek to use is relatively small. Those that may be used in the Belgian Claim are not disproportionate in volume to what is at stake in those proceedings. There is no real danger that the Belgian Claim will be overwhelmed with additional documents even if all of them are deployed and Sandoz Belgium considers it is necessary to file additional documents to counter documents having been ‘cherry picked’ by the claimants.

(7)    The difference of approach between litigation in England and Belgium is a factor, but one of limited weight. There is no suggestion that the use of documents obtained in disclosure is an abuse of this court’s process. The risk of the Belgian Court’s process being subverted by the introduction of disclosure documents is marginal, particularly bearing in mind the involvement of the Belgian lawyers and the procedure that has been agreed.

(8)    I accept Mr Hickman’s submission in relation to the documents exhibited to Morris 7. The documents that are exhibited were extensively discussed in the witness statement which was read by the Deputy Judge. Although the claimants do not make an application for a declaration that they are permitted to use those documents as of right, the documents have been legitimately deployed for the purposes of an application heard in open court (subject only to the pro tem confidentiality order).

(9)    It is not open to the Sandoz Defendants to say, and they have not submitted, that if the order permitting use of the documents is made, their position in the Belgian Claim is prejudiced, in the sense that the likelihood of them successfully prosecuting the claim and/or defending the counterclaim is reduced. The interests of justice require that material which is likely to be relevant should be permitted for proper purposes. A reduction in their prospects of success is an immaterial consideration in their favour and, if anything, it weighs in the balance in favour of the claimant.

 

Geert.

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Stripes US. High Court considers jurisdiction for scheme of arrangement in the usual way.

In [2018] EWHC 3098 (Ch) Stripes US, Smith J deals with jurisdiction for schemes of arrangement in the now well established way (see my last report on same in Algeco):

The EU’s Insolvency Regulation is clearly not engaged: the schemes fall under company law. The High Court then applies the jurisdictional test viz the Brussels I Recast Regulation arguendo: if it were to apply (which the English Courts have taken no definitive stance on), would an English court have jurisdiction? Yes, it is held: under Article 8 (anchor defendants).

The issue in fact splits in two: so far as the question of jurisdiction in relation to a foreign (non-EU or Lugano States based) company is concerned (Stripes US is incorporated in Delaware), the law is clear. It is well-established that the court has jurisdiction to sanction a Scheme in relation to a company provided that company is liable to be wound up under the Insolvency Act 1986.

Turning next to the Scheme Creditors, of the 31 Scheme Creditors, 19.4% by number (26.35% by value) of the ‘defendants’ (an odd notion perhaps in the context of a Scheme sanction) are domiciled in the UK, plenty Smith J holds to suggest enough reason for anchoring: not taking jurisdiction vis-a-vis the defendants domiciled in other Member States, would carry with it a serious risk of irreconcilable judgments.

Finally the case for forum non conveniens (and comity) is considered (vis-a-vis the US defendant), and rejection of jurisdiction summarily dismissed: in this case the relevant agreement which is the subject of the Scheme has a governing law which is (and, I understand, always has been) English law: at 63: ‘Generally speaking, that is enough to establish a sufficient connection. The view is that under generally accepted principles of private international law, a variation or discharge of contractual rights in accordance with the governing law of the contract should be done by the court of that law and will be given effect to in other third-party countries.’ US experts moreover advised any judgment would most probably have no difficulty being enforced in the US

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 5.

 

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The Brussels International Business Court – Council of State continues to resist.

Update 12 December 2018. The most recent proposal, the one actually adopted in Committee, is here. Note i.a. (Article 20) that the Committee has thankfully (see below) not followed the silly rules on languages. Whether the proposal will lead to law, remains to be seen: as we speak, the Belgian Government has turned into a minority government and not much is certain to go ahead before the next elections (May 2019).

I have reported twice before on the BIBC – once viz the initial version and a second time with my short report for the Parliamentary Hearing. I have now had a minute to review the Council of State’s comments on the amended version – among others with a view to preparing for next week’s conference on hybrid courts in Doha. Note that the Council of State here acts in its advisory function: essentially its opinions aim to improve draft statute so as to avoid future litigation.

What is clear from these recent comments is that the Council does not at all embrace the regulatory competition incentives which lie at the heart of the proposal, in particular in its view on how a matter may be made ‘international’ so as to justify engagement of the BIBC. Its view (let alone the Justice Council’s fear for forum shopping?!: encouraging such shopping being the very raison d’etre of the Act) contradicts the CJEU’s flexible stance on the issue as apparent eg in Vinyls Italia. As I noted in my comments before the Committee, it is a rather odd indeed parochial requirement to insist on parties having used English in their correspondence, before they can validly engage the BIBC. Even the suggested amendment that the use of languages other than Belgium’s three official ones (French, Dutch, German) should suffice, is not convincing to the Council. One hopes the drafters will ignore the Council’s hesitation at this point.

The Council does not of course engage in the political discussions surrounding the proposal: in particular, whether in a country in which the court system arguably does not operate to satisfaction, the creation of an international commercial court may compound, rather than remedy issues.

Geert.

 

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Is the end of discovery in Ireland nigh? The Irish Court of Appeal is very critical in Tobin v MOD. (And Hogan J reminds us of great potential for PhDs).

Given that discovery plays an important factor in forum shopping, Hogan J’s very critical comments on the extensive possibilities in Ireland are quite relevant. Arthur Cox have good analysis of [2018] IECA 230 Tobin v MOD here  and I am in general happy to refer.  Those of you interested in comparative litigation really should take a moment to read the Judge’s comments in full. Yet again, it seems to me, a topic for serious PhD (in comparative civil procedure) analysis.

Geert.

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The Brussels International Business Court – My notes for the parliamentary hearing.

Update 6 August 2018 the report of the hearing in Dutch and French is here.

I was at the Belgian Parliament yesterday for a hearing on the BIBC, following publication of the Government’s draft bill. For those of you who read Dutch, my notes are attached. We were limited to two pages of comments – the note is succinct.

An important change vis-a-vis the initial version (on which I commented here) is that the Court will now be subject to Belgian private international law (including primacy of EU instruments) for choice of law, rather than being able to pick the most appropriate law (arbitration panel style). That brings the court firmly within Brussels I. Also note my view and references on the Court being able to refer to the CJEU for preliminary review.

Geert.

 

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Algeco: Scheme of arrangements tourism continues, with tenacious questions still outstanding.

Thank you Tom Whitton and Helen Kavanagh  for flagging Algeco Scotsman PIK SA [2017] EWHC 2236 (Ch). Algeco has COMI in Luxembourg.  This was clear when the relevant scheme of arrangement (‘SAR’) was being discussed. To manage potential problems at the jurisdictional stage, Hildyard J at 22 lists the precautions the company and the majority of the lenders took:

‘Accepted by the relevant 75 per cent or more, was first, the amendment of the governing law clause in the PIK Loan Agreement to change the governing law from New York law to English law; secondly, the amendment of the jurisdiction clause to submit the parties to the non-exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of England; and thirdly, a waiver of any restrictions under the PIK loan agreement so as to permit the company to take all steps necessary to confirm or establish sufficient connection with England including, if appropriate, to take steps to ensure that its COMI is in England.’

When the unsuspected reader sees ‘COMI’ of course (s)he is forgiven for immediately pondering application of the EU’s Insolvency Regulation – quod certe non: for it is clear (ia as a result of schemes of arrangement not being included in relevant Annex) that SARs fall under company law. Hildyard J’s jurisdictional kick-off at 43 is telling: ‘Dealing first with jurisdiction, the primary question is whether this Luxembourg company, the subject of the scheme, is a qualifying company so to be subject to section 895 of the Companies Act’. Idem at 45.

At 47 the High Court then applies the jurisdictional test viz the Brussels I Recast Regulation arguendo: if it were to apply (which the English Courts have taken no definitive stance on), would an English court have jurisdiction? Yes, it is held: under Article 8 (anchor defendants) and under Article 25 (choice of court).

Yet this in my view is where recourse to SARS in the English courts continues to be exposed: loan agreements and facilities agreements now routinely adopt choice of court and law in favour of English courts and ditto law. Yet where they do not, or did not, the ‘willing’ creditors consent to a change in the agreement in favour of the English courts, with the unwilling creditors left behind. Whether this holds scrutiny under Rome I is far from certain. As for Article 8, its use here may be seen as a form of abuse, disciplined under the Regulation.

Hildyard J considers the case one of ‘good forum shopping’ (at 57-58), with reference to Apcoa which I review here. The concerns above continue in my view to highlight weaknesses in the construction, which so far have not led to any collapse of this restructuring tourism. At 58 the High Court emphasises that there are cases of inappropriate forum shopping in this context (one of that includes haste) yet the role of Rome I in this context has so far played little of a role.

It is noteworthy that in my view (and I so testified in re Apcoa) even a wrong view of the English courts on Rome I’s impact, would not suffice for jurisdictions outside of the UK to refuse to recognise the scheme under Brussels I – all with the huge Brexit caveat evidently.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 5.

 

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Campbell v Campbell: A recent guide to worldwide freezing injunctions.

Worldwide freezing injunctions are one of the civil procedure reasons for forum shopping to the English courts. [2017] EWHC 2747 (Ch) Campbell v Campbell is an excellent illustration  of the current state of the law, with Sarah Worthington QC expertly summarising and applying precedent. The application is for a freezing injunction over assets located outside England and Wales, partly in aid of domestic proceedings (partnership dissolution proceedings) and partly in aid of foreign proceedings (proceedings in Jersey re claims for 50% interest in shareholdings).

One for the comparative binder.

Geert.

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