Posts Tagged forum non
Performing Right Society Ltd v Qatar Airways Group QCS  EWHC 1872 (Ch) concerns the infringement or not of copyright via Qatar Airways’ inflight entertainment system known as “Oryx One”. Holding on an application for a stay on grounds of forum non conveniens or alternatively on case management grounds, Birss J on Friday first of all noted the relevance of Lucasfilm Limited v Ainsworth  UKSC 39 that the English court can have jurisdiction over claims for infringement of copyright by non-UK acts and under non-UK law where there is a basis for in personam jurisdiction. Which there is because of the presence of the aircraft on the ground or in the territorial airspace of the UK – the airline was served at the London address of the UK branch (defendant, QATAR Airways Group Q.C.S.C. is not domiciled in the UK, I gather). Lucasfilm did not itself deal with forum non.
I flag this case for Birss J gives a good summary of the approach to forum non, building of course on Spiliada but also with reference to Vedanta, Okpabi etc., all reviewed on the blog. Note at 16-17 claimant’s and defendant’s alternative formulations of the Stage 1 cq 2 tests following Spiliada.
The defendant has summarised the test in Spiliada as follows:
“(1) Is there another available forum which is clearly and distinctly the natural forum, that is to say, the “forum with which the action has the most real and substantial connection”?
(2) If there is, is England nevertheless the appropriate forum, in particular because the court is not satisfied that substantial justice will be done in the alternative available forum?”
At: claimant’s rival formulation is:
“Stage 1: Qatar Airways bears the burden of satisfying the Court that the Qatari court is an available forum with competent jurisdiction to determine PRS’s claim and is clearly or distinctly a more appropriate forum than England for the trial of the issues. If it fails to satisfy the Court of these matters, a stay should be refused.
Stage 2: If the Court determines that the Qatari court is prima facie more appropriate, it must nevertheless refuse to grant a stay if PRS demonstrate that, in all the circumstances of the case, it would be unjust for it to be deprived of the right to trial in England.”
The distinctions may seem trivial. However they relate to, firstly, burden of proof and secondly, which factors need to be considered in which stage (and therefore, proven by whom). In particular, it is suggested that issues such as the location of witnesses arose at the first stage yet that at least aspects of the points which were debated about expert witnesses (of foreign law) arose at the second stage not the first.
Birss J ends up summarising Stage 1 as entailing the following headings:
i) the personal connections the parties have to the countries in question; ii) factual connections which the events relevant to the claim have with the countries; iii) applicable law; iv) factors affecting convenience or expense such as the location of witnesses or documents.
I will leave readers to digest the arguments under the various headings themselves, Birss J concludes that Qatar is not clearly a more appropriate forum and does not therefore consider Stage 2.
Readers will remember that the CJEU in Owusu objected to forum non on the basis of its unpredictability. Now, I am not one for arguing that following Spiliada and Vedanta, and given the authority rule to which common lawyers and judges are attuned, forum non be unpredictable. Neither can one posit however, seeing the intensity of the discussion here and in many other cases, that it is an entirely clear exercise.
In La Micro Group (UK) Ltd & Anor v La Micro Group, Inc & Ors EWHC 1405 (Ch) 1st Claimant, LA Micro Group (UK) Ltd (“LA (UK)”), is an English company. It was incorporated in 2004 and acquired by the 2nd Claimant, Mr David Bell, a British citizen resident in England. It now has two issued shares, one in the name of Mr Bell, and one in the name of the 3rd Defendant, Mr Arkadiy Lyampert. Mr Bell and Mr Lyampert are also the two directors of the company. The substantive question raised in the action is as to the beneficial ownership of LA (UK). The position of the Claimants is that Mr Bell and Mr Lyampert are not only the legal owners of the two issued shares but also the beneficial owners, and that they are each entitled to 50% of the distributable profits of the company by way of dividends. Mr Lyampert’s position is the same, although he has indicated that he does not intend to take any active part in the proceedings. All defendants are resident in California.
This preliminary issue is one of jurisdiction given claimants seek permission to serve out of jurisdiction. There are a variety of proceedings in California: disputes between Mr Frenkel and Mr Lyampert in 2010 led to Mr Frenkel and some of LA Inc’s other employees, including Mr Gorban, leaving LA Inc and starting a competing business called IT Creations, Inc (“ITC”). In the words of the Court of Appeal of California, “a profusion of lawsuits followed”.
It is i.a. argued by defendants that it would an abuse of process for LA Inc to relitigate the same issues as were decided by that judgment, even if the CAL judgments do not strictly give rise to res judicata given the differences between parties.
At 49 Nugee J holds on that particular issue that the relevant CAL Judgment did not decide anything about whether LA Inc had lost its rights to a beneficial interest in LA (UK), and the findings of fact on which the Claimants rely were not necessary to the English court’s decision on any of the matters that were in issue.
Of specific interest to the blog is the forum non conveniens application at 58 ff., with at 68 ff consideration of whether one of the pending CAL proceedings is the mirror image of the English ones, which would count heavily in a forum non consideration given the English law’s preference for the whole issue to be submitted to one tribunal. At 78 Nugee J sums up the core issue:
The choice is between (i) allowing the English proceedings to continue so that a definitive answer can be given to one discrete question (has LA Inc lost its beneficial interest?) which will then enable the Californian court to proceed on a correct understanding of what has been decided in England rather than on what is said to be a misapprehension; or (ii) requiring the Claimants, unless they are willing to abandon their claims, to go to California to argue matters that on the view I take are matters of English law and largely concern acts taking place in England.
At 77 Nugee J expresses strong support for Gleichlauf:
(T)here are many advantages in questions of law being decided by a home court rather than a foreign court. Evidence and cross-examination is not required, which is likely to make resolution of the point both quicker and cheaper. And the court is familiar with its own law, in a way that it is not with foreign law, which means that the court’s resolution of the issues is likely to be both easier and more soundly based. Other things being equal, I have no doubt that it is preferable, both in terms of practical convenience and in terms of the ends of justice, for questions of English law to be argued in England as questions of law rather than for them to be argued in California as questions of fact on expert evidence (and possibly, although I have no evidence as to whether this would be the case, before a jury).
He concludes at 92:
England is the most appropriate forum for those matters to be decided; but even in relation to the declarations in respect of Mr Lyampert’s share, leaving the parties to litigate in California has a mix of advantages and disadvantages and there is not in my judgment sufficient to displace England as the forum in which the dispute can most suitably be tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice.
Nugee J does not therefore give Gleichlauf preponderant weight ab initio. Yet all other things being equal, Gleichlauf in this case pushed back a finding of forum non.
Jefferies v Cantor Fitzgerald. The full monty on forum non, case-management etc following team move.
Jefferies International Ltd & Anor v Cantor Fitzgerald & Co & Ors  EWHC 1381 (QB) engages everything including the kitchen sink (but excluding Articles 33-34 Brussels Ia, one assumes because no competing foreign suits were pending when the English courts were seized) in its application for a stay.
The First to Third Claimants [together Jefferies] and the First to Third Defendants [together Cantor] carry on business in the financial services industry internationally, including investment banking and capital markets business and in particular in the international power and renewables sector. The First Defendant is a general partnership organised under the laws of New York. The Second Defendant is an unlimited company registered in England and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. The Third Defendant is a limited liability company incorporated in Hong Kong. The action arises out of what has become known as a team move. Jefferies’ case is that on 20 November 2017 twenty-six of its employees each resigned in materially identical terms, almost all of the resignations took place at 11.00 am London time notwithstanding that this was outside the normal working hours of those who worked in New York and Hong Kong, each of the employees in each jurisdiction instructed the same solicitors and each now works for Cantor. Jefferies asserts that Cantor has directed each of the twenty-six employees to refuse to honour repayment obligations in respect of certain “Replacement Awards” and “Bonuses” which were triggered by their resignations and subsequent employment by Cantor.
The following issues were agreed for determination:
i) Are the claims of Jefferies US against Cantor US subject to an arbitration agreement between Jefferies US and Cantor US, and if so should those claims be stayed pursuant to the Arbitration Act 1996 section 9?
ii) Should Jefferies’ claims against Cantor US and Cantor HK be stayed because England is not the proper place for determination of those claims?
iii) Should Jefferies’ claims against Cantor US and Cantor HK be stayed because Jefferies breached its duty of fair presentation on its without notice application for permission to serve out?
iv) Do Jefferies’ claims against Cantor US and Cantor HK, insofar as they relate to repayment agreements governed by New York law, have no reasonable prospects of success, because those repayment agreements are unenforceable as a matter of New York law?
v) Should service of the claim form and particulars of claim on Cantor US and Cantor HK and the Order of Master Thornett granting permission to serve Cantor US and Cantor HK out of the jurisdiction be set aside on any of the above grounds?
vi) Should the proceedings (or any part of them not otherwise stayed on the above grounds) be stayed on case management grounds pending final award in the FINRA arbitration?
vii) Should Jefferies’ claims against the Employee Defendants be stayed as a result of exclusive jurisdiction clauses in relevant repayment agreements favouring the courts of the State of New York?
viii) Should Jefferies’ claims against the Employee Defendants be stayed on case management grounds pending final award in the FINRA arbitration?
Master Cook dismissed all applications for a stay in a surprisingly (given the size of the list) succinct judgment and readers are best referred to the text itself for perusal. Other than Articles 33-34 (see above), only abuse of process I think could have been added to this extensive list of attempted grounds for a stay.
The background in Wright v Ver  EWCA Civ 672 is the mysterious history of Bitcoin and its creator, ‘Satoashi Nakamoto’. “Satoshi Nakamoto” is the pseudonym used by the person, or persons, who developed Bitcoin. On 31 October 2008 an academic paper was published under the name of Satoshi Nakamoto titled “Bitcoin: A peer to peer electronic cash system”. The academic paper described the manner in which the electronic cash system operated. Dr Craig Wright, claimant and appellant, is a national of Australia who now lives in Surrey. He has lived in the UK since December 2015 after emigrating from Australia. He also became a citizen of Antigua and Barbuda in 2017. He is a computer scientist with a particular interest in cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin. Dr Wright says that he is Satoshi Nakamoto.
Roger Ver, defendant and respondent, is a bitcoin investor and commentator on bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Mr Ver was born in California, and raised in Silicon Valley. He moved to Japan in 2005. In 2014 he renounced his US citizenship and became a citizen of St Kitts & Nevis, although he continues to live in Japan. Mr Ver does not accept that Dr Wright is Satoshi Nakamoto.
The judgment does not address whether Dr Wright is Satoshi Nakamoto.
Dr Wright claims that he was libelled by Mr Ver in a YouTube Video posted on the Bitcoin.com YouTube channel on about 15 April 2019, a tweet containing the YouTube Video posted on Mr Ver’s Twitter Account on 3 May 2019, and a reply on Mr Ver’s Twitter Account posted on 3 May 2019 some 8 minutes after the tweet from Mr Ver. The defamatory meaning of these publications is said to be that Dr Wright “had fraudulently claimed to be Satoshi Nakamoto, that is to say the person, or one of the group of people who developed Bitcoin”.
Never more (data produced were broken down over periods) than 7 of the total YouTube views were in the UK. 7% of Mr Ver’s Twitter followers are in the UK. By judgment dated 31 July 2019 Mr Justice Nicklin found that England and Wales was not clearly the most appropriate place in which to bring the libel claim in this action and made a declaration that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the claim.
The Court of Appeal, Dingemans LJ leading, agreed. Brussels Ia is not engaged. The jurisdictional test is section 9 of the Defamation Act 2013 – I previously discussed it in Sadik v Sadik: ‘A court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action to which this section applies unless the court is satisfied that, of all the places in which the statement complained of has been published, England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place in which to bring an action in respect of the statement.’
At 56 Dingemans notes that after Brexit, the Act’s reach will increase.
The first instance judge had argued inter alia that the evidence showed that Dr Wright was putting down roots in the UK and that would increase the reputational interests that Dr Wright had in this jurisdiction but that could not displace the global reputation that he enjoyed.
Dr Wright’s counsel submitted that the judge had set Dr Wright an impossible task by requiring him to adduce evidence of actual harm to his reputation in each candidate jurisdiction, and concluding that in the absence of such evidence Dr Wright could not satisfy the jurisdictional test. Further it was submitted that the judge had wrongly failed to carry out a comparative assessment as to whether each candidate jurisdiction was appropriate for the claim, and therefore failed to carry out the task mandated by s9.
Relevant factors for jurisdiction are discussed at 61 ff. Evidence will have to be shown of all the places in which the relevant statement has been published, as well as the number of times it has there been published. Targeting the publication at an English audience clearly will be an issue. Further elements include the availability of fair judicial processes in the other jurisdictions in which publication occurred. The available remedies from the Courts of the other jurisdictions may be relevant, as may be the costs of pursuing proceedings in each possible jurisdiction. Other factors that might impact on access to justice, for example language barriers, can be relevant. The location of likely witnesses is another feature that may be relevant. This list of factors is not exhaustive.
In a mercifully succinct manner, Dingemans J reviews all the elements and decides the test has not been met here.
A good primer for the 2013 Act.
MB, Services Ltd and Golovina v Rusal. Forum non and Spiliada in Jersey. Stay granted largely on basis of attorney intimidation.
A quick note on MB and Services Limited and Golovina v United Company Rusal Plc  JRC034 in which Birt C rejected an application for a stay on forum non conveniens grounds. He applied Spiliada of course, with at 139 the reasons for holding on balance that there is a real risk that claimants will not obtain justice in Russia. Note at 7 the specific weight attached to the intimidation of claimants’ attorney in Russia.
Fletcher v Estee Lauder and Clinique. New York judge rejects forum non argument in asbestos litigation. Sheds an interesting light on the perception of England as a forum for non-occupational exposure.
Personal injury cases never make for light reading and Fletcher v Estee Lauder and Clinique is not an exception to that rule. Mrs Fletcher, aged 45, claims that her lifelong use of the Estee Lauder talc and face powder and Clinique loose face powder, starting with puffs of powder purchased by her mother in New York in 1976, followed by regular purchases in the city in later years, caused her to develop mesothelioma.
Thank you Leigh Day, who represent Mrs Fletcher, for reporting on the case. In a preliminary ruling, Justice Mendez rejected a forum non conveniens argument made by the cosmetics giants, who had argued that England is a more natural and suitable forum for the case.
The case is interesting for my readers who follow my reports in the ‘comparative’ binder, for it is not that routine for judges to list arguments against the suitability of England as a forum.
Arguments made pro forum non are on p.2, claimant’s arguments on p.3, and Mendez J’s criteria to dismiss (having earlier established per authority that the burden of proof to dismiss is necessarily high for defendants with a substantial presence in New York) on p.5. Note his reference to the absence of no win no fee (and claimant’s limited resources); absence of jury trial; limited and expensive discovery; and a general hesitation of the legal profession in bringing cases like these (non-occupational exposure claims) against manufacturers.
Most relevant and interesting.
In  EWHC 40 (Ch) Easygroup v Easyfly and ATR Aircraft the issue is the jurisdiction of the English court to hear claims of trade mark infringement, passing off and conspiracy against a Colombian domestic airline, its founder and chief executive, and a French aircraft manufacturer. As always the blog’s interest is not in the substantive issues concerning trademark and passing off, they do however make for interesting reading.
Nugee J considers the jurisdictional issues at 26 ff with respect to the first two defendants and with respect to the French defendant, in para 127 ff. Here the relationship between the EU Trade Mark Regulation 2017/1001 and Brussels Ia comes to the fore. (I continue to find my colleague Marie-Christine Janssens’ 2010 paper most informative on the issues; see also the link to Tobias Lutzi’s analysis of AMS Neve in my report of same). The relevant provisions of the Regulation (previously included in Regulation 207/2009, applied ia in CJEU AMS Neve), read
Article 125. International jurisdiction
1. Subject to the provisions of this Regulation as well as to any provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 applicable by virtue of Article 122, proceedings in respect of the actions and claims referred to in Article 124 shall be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled or, if he is not domiciled in any of the Member States, in which he has an establishment.
2. If the defendant is neither domiciled nor has an establishment in any of the Member States, such proceedings shall be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the plaintiff is domiciled or, if he is not domiciled in any of the Member States, in which he has an establishment.
3. If neither the defendant nor the plaintiff is so domiciled or has such an establishment, such proceedings shall be brought in the courts of the Member State where the Office has its seat.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3:
(a) Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 shall apply if the parties agree that a different EU trade mark court shall have jurisdiction;
(b) Article 26 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 shall apply if the defendant enters an appearance before a different EU trade mark court.
5. Proceedings in respect of the actions and claims referred to in Article 124, with the exception of actions for a declaration of non-infringement of an EU trade mark, may also be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the act of infringement has been committed or threatened, or in which an act referred to in Article 11(2) has been committed.
Article 126. Extent of jurisdiction
1. An EU trade mark court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 125(1) to (4) shall have jurisdiction in respect of:
(a) acts of infringement committed or threatened within the territory of any of the Member States;
(b) acts referred to in Article 11(2) committed within the territory of any of the Member States.
2. An EU trade mark court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 125(5) shall have jurisdiction only in respect of acts committed or threatened within the territory of the Member State in which that court is situated.
The first two defendants are not based in the EU. Here, Article 125(2) grants jurisdiction to the UK courts.
Controversially, at 36 Nugee J applies a forum non conveniens test. It is disputed whether this is at all possible in the Trademark Regulation. He decides England clearly is the appropriate forum: ‘there is no other court that can try the UK trade mark claims, and for the reasons just given [French and Spanish courts might have partial jurisdiction, GAVC] no other court that can grant pan-EU relief in respect of the EU trade mark claims.’
At 37 ff Nugee J then also still considers with reference ia to CJEU Pammer and the discussions on ‘accessibility’ (see also ia Football Dataco) whether there is a ‘serious issue to be tried’ and answers in the affirmative. Here I am assuming this must be seen as part of case-management rather than a jurisdictional test (viz Article 8(1) BIa’s anchor defendant mechanism, a ‘serious issue to be tried’ test is said to be part of the ‘related cases’ analysis; see related discussions ia in Privatbank), unless he reformulates the application of Article 126 as a ‘serious issue to be tried’ test – the structure of the judgment is leaving me confused.
Eventually however the previous Order made by the High Court, granting permission to serve out of jurisdiction, is set aside by Nugee J on grounds of lack of full and frank disclosure at the service hearing – an issue less exciting for this blog however dramatic nevertheless.
The French defendant (who issued a relevant press release (only 11 copies of which were distributed at the Farnborough airshow; this was found to be de minimis; not as such a mechanism available under the EUTMR I don’t think; but it might be under case management) and was also responsible for organising (ia by having the logo painted) the offending branding in France), at the jurisdictional level is dealt with in para 127 ff., first with respect to the trademark claim.
‘By art. 125(1) the default position is that the proceedings shall be brought in the courts of the Member State where the defendant is domiciled: in ATR’s case this is France. Neither art. 125(2) nor art. 125(3) applies to ATR because each only applies if the defendant is neither domiciled nor has an establishment in a Member State. Art. 125(4) does not apply as it is not suggested that ATR has either (a) agreed that the English court should have jurisdiction, or (b) entered an appearance before the English court. That leaves art. 125(5) under which proceedings may also be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the act of infringement has been committed or threatened. In the present case that would also be France (and possibly Spain). It follows that none of the provisions of art. 125 confer jurisdiction on the English court to hear actions based on acts of infringement said to have been carried out by ATR in France and Spain.’
Counsel for EasyGroup accepted ia per AMS Neve that the Trademark Regulation is lex specialis vis-à-vis Brussels Ia but that nevertheless the general spirit of BIa should blow over Regulation 2017/1001. They refer at 130 to the ‘general desirability of avoiding duplicative proceedings and the risk of inconsistent judgments (as exemplified by arts 29 and 30 of Brussels I Recast),’ and argue that ‘it followed that once the English court had jurisdiction over the Defendants for the acts taking place in France (as it undoubtedly did under art. 125(2)), then it must also have jurisdiction over anyone else alleged to be jointly liable for the same acts of infringement.’
This therefore is a makeshift joinder mechanism which Nugee J was not impressed with. He pointed to the possibility under A125(5) to sue the other defendants and the French defendants in one jurisdiction, namely France. An A7(2) BIa action is not possible: A122(2)(a) EUTMR expressly provides that in proceedings based on A124, A7(2) BIa does not apply.
Finally, a claim in conspiracy against the French defendant is not covered by the EUTMR and instead by A7(2) BIa, discussed at 142 ff with reference to (Lugano) authority  UKSC 19, which I discussed here. Locus delicti commissi, Nugee J finds, is not in England: no conspiratorial agreement between ATR and the Defendants in relation to the branding of the aircraft took place in England. At 145: ‘the Heads of Agreement, and Sale and Purchase Agreement, were each signed in France and Colombia, and there is nothing that can be pointed to as constituting the making of any agreement in England.’
As for locus damni, at 148 Nugee J holds this not to have been or potentially be in England:
‘The foundation of easyGroup’s claims in relation to the branding of the aircraft is that once painted they were flown on test flights, and en route to Colombia, in full view of the public. But the public which might have viewed the planes were the public in France and Spain, not the public in the UK. That might amount to a dilution in the brand in the eyes of the French and Spanish public, but it is difficult to see how it could affect the brand in the eyes of the UK public, or otherwise cause easyGroup to sustain loss in the UK. Mr Bloch said that if such a plane crashed, the news would not stop at the Channel and it might adversely affect easyGroup’s reputation in the UK, but no such damage has in fact occurred, and it seems to me far too speculative to say that it may occur. As already referred to, Mr Bloch also relied on easyGroup having suffered damage on the user principle (paragraph 82 above), but it seems to me that damages awarded on this basis would be damages for the loss of an opportunity to exploit easyGroup’s marks by licensing them to be used in France and Spain, and that for the purposes of the first limb of art. 7(2) such damage would therefore be suffered in France and Spain as that is where the relevant exploitation of the asset would otherwise take place.’
This last element (place where the relevant exploitation of the asset would otherwise take place) is interesting to me in Universal Music (purely economic loss) terms and not without discussion, I imagine.
Conclusions, at 152:
(1) There is a serious issue to be tried in relation to each of the claims now sought to be brought by easyGroup against the non-EU defendants.
(2) There was however a failure to make full, frank and fair disclosure at the service out of jurisdiction hearing, and in the circumstances that Order should be set aside.
(3) The question of amending to bring claims against the French defendant. But if it had, Nugee J would have held that there was no jurisdiction for the English court to hear the claims based on the acts in France (or Spain), whether based on trade mark infringement or conspiracy. There is jurisdiction to hear the claims based on the issue of the Press Release in the UK, but Nugee J would have refused permission to amend to bring such claims on the basis that they were de minimis.
A most interesting and thought provoking judgment.
McDonald v Broadspectrum. When does a claim by an employee against her employer ‘relate to’ the contract of employment?
 QSC 313 McDonald v Broadspectrum can go straight into the comparative binder – thank you Angus Macinnis for signalling it. A teacher employed by Broadspectrum on Nauru, sues it for personal injury. Amongst other things, Ms McDonald alleges Broadspectrum failed to provide a safe place or system of work, to warn her about the mould contamination, to provide protective clothing or respirators, to prevent exposure, and to provide adequate ventilation, in each instance in Nauru.
Broadspectrum applied for a declaration at the Supreme Court of Queensland that the substantive law applicable to her claims is the law of New South Wales and for an order setting aside or staying and transferring her claims to the Supreme Court of that State.
The relevant compensation schemes, in Queensland and New South Wales, each exclude from their scheme an employer’s liability arising under the law of another country. Bradley J however held that lex loci delicti is Nauru law, which therefore is lex causae. The argument that the employment contract contained implied term to the contrary was rejected.
As I discussed with Angus, I was confused by the court’s qualification of the facts as ‘tort’ (particularly as it also refers to claimant’s argument re forum contractus being Nauru); is this not a contractual claim rather than one in tort? (and one relating to the employment contract, for that matter). Angus however pointed out that in Australia workplace injury claims are usually brought as tortious breach of care claims rather than breach of a contractual obligation to provide a safe system of work. Comparatively speaking, the EU approach would probably be different. For a comparative (consumer contracts, health and safety) angle see e.g.  EWCA Civ 1889 Committeri v Club Med.
On the issue of concurrent liabilities and EU PIL see recently also Bosworth.