Brussels IA arbitration exception claxon. Recognition of Spanish Prestige judgment in England & Wales. Res judicata issues concerning arbitration referred to the CJEU. Ordre public exceptions re Human Rights not upheld.

The London Steam-Ship Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v The Kingdom of Spain (M/T PRESTIGE) [2021] EWHC 1247 (Comm) has been in my blog in-tray for a little while: I had thought of using it for exam purposes but have now decided against that.

The case is the appeal against Cook J’s registration of the Spanish judgment in the Prestige disaster.  I have reported thrice before on the wider litigation – please use tag ‘Prestige’ in the search box.

References in the judgment are to Brussels I (44/2001), not its successor, Brussels Ia (1215/2012) however the  relevant provisions have not materially changed. Application is for recognition and enforcement of the Spanish Judgment to be refused,  and the Registration Order to be set aside for one or both of two main reasons, namely: (1) that the Spanish Judgment is irreconcilable with a 2013 Hamblen J order, upheld on Appeal,  enforcing the  relevant Spanish award (A34(3) BI), and (2) that recognition would entail a manifest breach of English public policy in respect of (a) the rule of res judicata and/or (b) human and fundamental rights (A34(1) BI).

Butcher J referred the first issue to the CJEU on 18 December 2020 – just before the Brexit deadline. I have not been able to obtain a copy of that judgment – the judge merely refers to it in current one. The CJEU reference, now known as Case C-700/20, is quite exciting for anyone interested in the relationship between arbitration and the Brussels regime. Questions referred, are

1) Given the nature of the issues which the national court is required to determine in deciding whether to enter judgment in the terms of an award under Section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, is a judgment granted pursuant to that provision capable of constituting a relevant ‘judgment’ of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of EC Regulation No 44/2001?

(2) Given that a judgment entered in the terms of an award, such as a judgment under Section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, is a judgment falling outside the material scope of Regulation No 44/2001 by reason of the Article 1(2)(d) arbitration exception, is such a judgment capable of constituting a relevant ‘judgment’ of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of the Regulation?

(3) On the hypothesis that Article 34(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 does not apply, if recognition and enforcement of a judgment of another Member State would be contrary to domestic public policy on the grounds that it would violate the principle of res judicata by reason of a prior domestic arbitration award or a prior judgment entered in the terms of the award granted by the court of the Member State in which recognition is sought, is it permissible to rely on Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 as a ground of refusing recognition or enforcement or do Articles 34(3) and (4) of the Regulation provide the exhaustive grounds by which res judicata and/or irreconcilability can prevent recognition and enforcement of a Regulation judgment?

These are exciting questions both on the arbitration exception and on the res judicata refusal for recognition and enforcement. They bring into focus the aftermath of CJEU West Tankers in which the status of the High Court confirmation of the English award was also an issue.

The Club’s argument that recognition would be contrary to English public policy because the Spanish Judgment involved a breach of human and fundamental rights was not referred to the CJEU. Discussion  here involves ia CJEU Diageo. Suggested breaches, are A 14(5) ICCPR; breach of fundamental rights in the Master being convicted on the basis of new factual findings made by the Supreme Court; inequality of arms; and; A1P1.

There is little point in rehashing the analysis made by Butcher J: conclusion at any rate is that all grounds fail.

That CJEU case is one to look out for!

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed 2021, 2.84 ff, 2.590 ff.

 

Begum v Maran. A hopeful Court of Appeal finding on duty of care; however open issues on its engagement with Rome II’s environmental heading.

I am late in reporting  Begum v Maran (UK) Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 326, in which the Court of Appeal rejected an application for strike-out. I reported on the High Court judgment here and I should add I am instructed for claimant in the case. Oliver Holland, the lead Leigh Day solicitor in the case, discusses its implications together with Rachel Bonner (who was led by Richard Hermer) here.

Coulson LJ held that it is at least arguable (reminder: the specific action that was being discussed was an application for strike-out) that Maran does have a duty of care. His analysis essentially leans heavily on the fact that Maran availed itself of a disposal route, the consequences of which it was much aware of. It is clear that the well-known Bangladesh route to escape health, safety and environmental standards for the dismantling of ships, is questionable under the Basel Convention on Hazardous wastes and their disposal, and that shipowners have been using privity of contract in an attempt to shield themselves from any liability for consequences which are neither unexpected nor infrequent.

Others have written on the duty of care issue and I will focus on the A7 Rome II discussion: the lex specialis for environmental damage – on which I have a paper forthcoming (but to find more time!).  At 78 ff Coulson LJ firstly links the requirement of causality (the use of the flimsy ‘arising out of’) to the non-contractual obligation claimed (here: corporate duty of care), rather than the one immediately following the damage (here: negligence, recklessness causing death). That duty of care does not, it was held, ‘arise out of’ environmental damage. [82]: ‘In essence, it is the duty to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the sale of the vessel for demolition purposes did not endanger human life or health. That duty did not arise out of environmental damage; it had nothing to do with environmental damage at all. It arose out of the complete absence of workplace safety.’ And at 86: ‘even if the court had to consider whether the death (rather than the duty) arose out of environmental damage, the result would be the same…the death arose out of the absence of safe working practices and, in particular, the absence of a safety harness.’ Support is found in scholarly sources suggesting a narrow interpretation of A7; other sources are not discussed (despite having been submitted) and I continue to be convinced such limiting interpretation is not supported by the travaux. Males J, in his mostly concurring opinion, agrees that the last thing on A7 is far from said although he, too, holds that A7 is not engaged in casu.

Lord Justice Coulson obiter considers locus delicti commissi (which would be  the alternative lex causae under A7) and at 91 succinctly holds (pro memoria: obiter) that this would not have been England. There is authority I would suggest for the opposite finding and the judge’s interpretation of Arica Victims, I submit,  leaves room for discussion: at 91 he correctly refers to the Ovre Norrland Court of Appeal having pointed to ‘key decisions’ having been made in Sweden. These to me seem present in current case, too (and here: located in England).

At 110 ff the ordre public argument under A26 Rome II, which could displace the shorter statute of limitation of the Bangladeshi lex causae, for the longer English one, is succinctly dismissed as not meeting A26’s high hurdle. This leaves a narrower (and perhaps curiously indirect) ‘undue hardship’ argument under the E&W Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 to be discussed as a preliminary issue at the remanded trial in the High Court.

A most relevant case, also highlighting the many unresolved issues under A7 Rome II.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 4.54 ff.

State aid and collective waste recycling bodies. Pitruzzella AG in Société Eco TLC.

Must Article 107 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that a system whereby a private, non-profit eco-body, approved by the public authorities, receives contributions from those who place on the market a particular category of product and who enter into a contract with it to that effect, in return for a service consisting in the organisation on their behalf of the treatment of the waste from those products, and redistributes to operators responsible for the sorting and recovery of that waste, subsidies the amount of which is set out in the approval, in the light of environmental and social targets, is to be regarded as State aid within the meaning of that provision?

That is the question as phrased in C‑556/19 Société Eco TLC and on which Pitruzzella AG Opined on 28 May. TLC stands for Textiles, Lignes de maisons, and chaussures (textiles, household linen and shoes). Producers or as the case may be first importers pay a fee to the collective body in lieu of their personal commitments under extended producers responsibility per Waste Framework Directive 2008/98.

The AG of course revisits the definition of ‘State Aid’ under CJEU C-379/98 Preussen Elektra, on which more here and here. Preussen Elektra remains controversial for it would seem to give Member States quite a bit of room for manoeuvre to reach the same result as direct State Aid more or less simply by inserting a private operator who receivs funds directly from private operators however in line with direct State instructions on level and modalities of payment.  The AG opines that in the case at issue there is no State Aid however he directs further factual lines of enquiry (ia re the State control over payments by the collective body to recyclers.

Geert.

Handbook of EU Waste law, 2nd ed. 2015 OUP, para 4.116 ff.

 

Our scoping study on a principle of ‘essential use’ in international and European regulatory (particularly chemicals) law.

Update 1 March 2021 the paper has now been published  Transnational Environmental law – open acces.

Update 15 May 2020 see the ECHA consultation on PFAS regulation launched this very week.

With Kathleen Garnett I have co-authored a paper where we scope the ‘essential uses’ approach to product regulation, particularly in chemicals.

Could calls for the stricter regulation of one particular type of chemical herald the introduction of a new (or not) ‘principle’ in international and EU regulatory law, namely that of ‘essential use’ as a precondition for market authorisation?

The concept of ‘essential use’ or ‘non-essential use’ has been referenced in a number of EU policy papers. Kathleen and I focus on Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (‘PFAS’)  in chemicals legislation and firstly, map the concept of ‘essential use’ in international and EU law; further, discuss its limited application in the case-law of the European Court of Justice; and, before we conclude, carry out a preliminary investigation as to (if it does not currently exist in EU law), whether it might be so included de lege ferenda.

Happy reading. We are submitting to journal.

Geert, Kathleen.

Is the innovation principle compatible with a European Green Deal?

Rather than blogging my own piece on this week’s CEPS study (in which no mention is made of the covert study supporting same), I am happy to reblog the analysis of one of the co-authors of my earlier paper on same. Excellent analysis with which I agree entirely.

BLING

K J Garnett

On the day before Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s new team was voted in by the European Parliament, an independent, Brussels-based, think-thank CEPS published their third report on the Innovation Principle : ‘Study supporting the interim evaluation of the innovation principle’. With von der Leyen promising to tackle climate change and promote a European Green Deal now would be a good time to examine whether the innovation principle fits in with this vision for greater sustainability or whether its true intention is to curb Europe’s strict environmental laws?  

As lawyers we are familiar with general principles and those practicing European law are familiar with the fact that the EU applies a number of general principles : proportionality, subsidiarity, substantive & fundamental human rights, precaution,… Authority for the EU’s legal principles stems from primary law, typically the Treaties themselves or, more rarely, when the CJEU…

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Climate change litigation reaches the CJEU’s desk.

Update 24 May 2019 Prediction below has been realised: the case has been declared inadmissible on standing grounds which no doubt will be appealed. All the classics feature: Plaumann; Inuit; Jégo-Quéré; Stichting Greenpeace; with them the issues concerning the implementation by the EU of the Aarhus Convention, an issue which at the moment is subject to an extensive study by Milieu.

One can say many things about climate change litigation by individuals. (See my earlier piece on the Dutch Urgenda case). Many argue that the separation of powers suggest that governments, not judges, should be making climate policy. Or that international environmental law lacks the type of direct effect potentially required for it to be validly invoked by citisens. Others point to the duty of care of Governments; to binding – even if fluffy – climate change obligations taken on since at least the 1990s, and to the utter lack of progress following more than 25 years of international climate change law.

It is therefore no surprise to see that this type of litigation has now also reached the European Court of Justice: the text of the application is here, see also brief legal (by Olivia Featherstone) and Guardian background.

Like cases before it, colleagues shy of preparation materials for an international environmental law course, with comparative EU law thrown in, can use the case to hinge an entire course on.

As Olivia reports, the legal principles involved are the following:

The claimants state that EU emissions leading to climate change are contrary to:

  • The principle of equality (Articles 20 and 21, EU Charter)
  • The principle of sustainable development (Article 3 TEU, Article 11 TFEU)
  • Article 37 EU Charter
  • Article 3 UNFCCC
  • The no harm principle in international law
  • Article 191 ff TFEU (the EU’s environmental policy

One to watch – albeit that standing /locus standi requirements before the CJEU are likely to be a big hurdle: my 2003 paper on same is still relevant (albeit one has to make allowance for Treaty changes since Lisbon).

Geert.

EU Environmental Law, with Leonie Reins, Edward Elgar, 1st ed. 2017, part I Chapter 2 in particular.

CJEU confirms strict reading of energy unanimity requirement in legal basis case.

I reviewed Mengozzi AG’s Opinion in C-5/16 Poland v EP and Council here. The CJEU today confirmed his reading. Firstly (at 41), aim and content of the measure determines its legal basis. Not its actual effects after entry into force for that would require speculation. Further (at 43 ff) Article 191 TFEU mandates the EU to take measures to tackle climate change. The measures taken to that end necessarily affect the energy sector of Member States. A broad interpretation of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU would risk having the effect of making recourse to the special legislative procedure, which the Treaty FEU intended as an exception, into the general rule.

At 61: the MSR is a one-off intervention on the part of the legislature for the purpose of correcting a structural weakness of the ETS that could prevent the scheme from fulfilling its function of encouraging investment with a view to reducing carbon dioxide emissions in a cost-effective manner and being a driver of low-carbon innovation contributing to the fight against climate change. At 62 and in conclusion: it does not follow from the analysis of the aim and content of the contested decision that the first outcome pursued by that decision is significantly to affect a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.

(In the remainder of the judgment the Court rejects arguments based on proportionality etc.).

This is an important day for the legal basis of EU environmental policy.

Geert.

 

 

Mengozzi AG saves ETS in energy policy legal basis opinion.

Others have studied the EU’s legal basis for energy policy much better than I have. Chiefly among them Dr Leonie Reins. e.g.  for RECIEL here and in her Phd here. The impact of this discussion is high. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a formal energy Title in the EU Treaties. Whether so designed or not, the prospect of that Title’s requirement on unanimity for measures which ‘have a significant effect on a Member State’s choice between different energy sources’ looms heavily over the EU’s environment policy.

The EU’s emissions trading system – ETS is the prime candidate for falling victim to an extensive interpretation of Article 192(2)c TFEU, which harbours the unanimity requirement within the Treaty’s environment Title. [The energy Title, Article 194, has similar challenges].

In C-5/16 Poland v EP and Council Mengozzi AG Opined last week. At issue is Poland’s opposition to a MSR. MSR is a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme,.  Essentially it is a long-term parking for surplus allowances to enable the ETS to safeguard collapse of prices in the event of excess supply. The resulting increase in the price of allowances was inter alia intended to encourage fuel switching and to discourage investments in coal-fired power stations (hence of course Poland’s interest).

Relevant to future reference is especially the AG’s view at 25, which I include in full:

‘as a derogation, Article 192(2)(c) TFEU is to be interpreted strictly, especially since an efficient modern environment policy cannot ignore energy questions. I share the fears expressed by the defendants and the interveners that the applicant’s proposed interpretation of Article 192(2)(c) TFEU and the conclusions which it draws from that interpretation for the examination of the legal basis of the contested decision would effectively block any legislative initiative by recognising a right of veto for Member States, as the Union would adopt measures inviting them only to rationalise their CO2-consuming activities. Furthermore, such an interpretation would doom the ETS to failure as it would prevent the EU legislature from correcting its structural deficiencies. In addition, although I would point out that the goal of introducing the MSR is not to form the price of allowances but simply to ensure the efficiency of the ETS, in any event, an operator’s choice of a certain energy source or production technology cannot depend on that price alone, which does not in itself define the production costs, which are determined by a variety of factors. Even with the introduction of the MSR, the choice of technology still remains in the hands of operators and is not dictated by the European Union.’

I am not sure to what degree the Court’s judgment will enable us to draw criteria with wider impact than just the current case – but it would certainly be helpful.

Mengozzi AG firstly emphasises strict interpretation of the ‘energy mix’ exception. Further, in the paras preceeding the aforecited one, he links amendments to existing laws largely to the legal basis of that initial instrument. He also supports the Institutions and Spain, France and Sweden (intervening; the position of Germany, also intervening, was not made clear) in their warning against veto power in the energy /climate change context. Finally he further dilutes the exception by looking at policies as they work in practice, not just in theory. On this point, the AG looks at the ETS specifically however his view has broader appeal: it would essentially mean that when Member States’ and individuals’ /undertakings’ behaviour is determined by regulatory intervention, some of which clearly based on a legal basis other than Article 192(2)c TFEU, the latter is not determinant in deciding proper legal basis.

This is an important case for the future of EU environment and energy policy.

Geert.

 

 

Introducing: EU environmental law. A handbook.

This post should be preceded by a boast alert, but hey: a pat on one’s own shoulder does not hurt once in a while. With Dr Leonie Reins I have written EU Environmental Law, which has now been published by Edward Elgar. The blurb is here. Leonie and I have given a concise yet we hope complete overview of this ever-growing part of EU law. We hope it will please the reader!

I have copy /pasted the TOC below.

We are now turning our attention to (inter alia): EU energy law.

Geert.

Contents: 1. Setting the context

PART I BASICS/FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2. Principles of European Environmental Law 3. Environmental law making in the European Union 4: Implementation and enforcement Public Participatory Rights 6. Additional tools in implementing European Environmental Law 7. Environmental and Strategic Impact Assessment 8. Environmental Liability and Environmental Crime 9. State Aid and Competition Law

PART II SUBSTANTIVE LEGISLATION 10. Biodiversity and Nature Conservation 11. Water protection legislation and policy 12. Noise pollution legislation and policy 13. Air pollution legislation and policy 14. Climate Change legislation and policy 15. Waste legislation and policy 16. Chemicals legislation and policy 17. Trade and the Environment

Index

Environmental due diligence (met in casu) is clearly part of BIT requirements. Allard v Barbados.

Thank you Govert Coppens for alerting me to the PCIA award‘s publication. I had reported earlier on this case in which  the Canadian owner of an eco-tourist facility in Barbados sued the Government of Barbados for an alleged breach of the full protection and security provision (among other provisions) in the Canada- Barbados bilateral investment treaty. Peter Allard argues in his claim that Barbados breached its treaty obligations by failing to enforce its domestic environmental laws, which he alleges led to the environment being spoilt and a loss of tourist revenues at his eco-resort.

The Tribunal is careful not to phrase the case as a pioneering case or a case in any way anything but run of the mill. This is evident from its very consideration (at 53) that ‘underlying the claims is a fundamental factual disagreement as to whether the Claimant has suffered loss or damage as a result of any actions or inactions of Barbados.’

This subsequently leads the Tribunal into what is effectively peer review of parties’ opposing expert reports on variety in fish and bird species, salinity, the health of crabs, etc., coming down in favour of Barbados: no convincing case of deterioration was made by claimant. One must bear in mind that the burden of proof lies with the latter. Next the Tribunal concluded that, even if it had found that there was a degradation of the environment at the Sanctuary during the Relevant Period (which it did not), it would not have been persuaded that such degradation was caused by any actions or inactions of Barbados.

The Tribunal further found that, being aware of the environmental sensitivities of the Sanctuary, Barbados took reasonable steps to protect it (at 242). It formulates Barbados’ BIT duties here as being a duty of care, not strict liability. It then undertook due diligence of the steps Barbados had taken to address known environmental concerns for the area and concluded (at 249) that ‘Barbados’ approach in addressing the Sluice Gate and general pollution issues at the Sanctuary as part of its governance of the entire area does not fall short of what was appropriate and sufficient for purposes of the duty of due diligence required by Article II(2)(b) of the BIT.

 

This tribunal was clearly not in a law-making mood but that arguably does not matter. The analysis it undertakes unequivocally and matter of factly establishes that countries’ indifference (quod non in casu) to take steps necessary to contain and remedy environmental degradation are a clear breach of BITS’ core requirements.

Geert.