Posts Tagged EEX

Andrew Burness v Saipem SpA. Cyprus SC considers jurisdiction in the EEZ, and forum non conveniens.

Thank you  Elias Neocleous & Co  for reporting Andrew Burness v Saipem SpA, in which the Cypriot Supreme Court confirmed jurisdiction over claims related to Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (under UNCLOS), and rejected application of forum non conveniens. The claims followed an accident on board the vessel Saipem 1000 in the Cyprus EEZ.

The first issue is one under public international law, which I will leave to others. The second is an interesting application of forum non conveniens. Its application had been suggested for none of the parties are Cypriot nationals, neither were the witnesses, or any of the insurance and other companies involved. One assumes the card played was one of convenience, and costs. However the Supreme Court particularly emphasised that the accident had occurred in the process of prospection or exploitation of Cyprus’s natural resources: that makes the Cypriot courts particularly suited to hearing the case, despite the many foreign elements.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.14.5.`

, , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

The Brussels jurisdictional regime at 50. A conference at Leuven on 23 March.

As I am about to take the family on a half-term break (and with no less than 22 draft blog posts in the ledger – February /March are likely to be intense blog months), I am pleased to flag a conference which I am calling together with Jura Falconis, the faculty’s student-run law review.

Registration and program are here. Below is the blurb and exciting line-up. It would be great to see many of you at Leuven! Geert.

*****

In 2018 we celebrate the 50th year since the adoption of the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. The 1968 attempt to facilitate the free movement of judgments in the EU, helped lay the foundations for the exciting developments in European private international law which have occurred since. Many of the outstanding issues in what is now the Brussels I Recast (also known as EEX-bis; or Brussels Ibis) continue to have an impact on other parts of European civil procedure.

Co-organised by Leuven Law’s Institute of Private International Law and Jura Falconis, KU Leuven’s student law review, this event will consider, capita selecta wise, the application and implications of the Convention and its successors. It will also discuss the future direction of EU private international law both for civil and commercial matters, and for issues outside of commercial litigation. At a time when in most Member States the majority of commercial transactions have some kind of international element, this is a timely refresher for practitioners, judges, students and scholars alike.

PROGRAM

Morning program. Chaired by professor Jinske Verhellen (U Gent)

10:00 – 10:30 
Registration and welcome

10:30 – 10:35 
Opening by Jura Falconis

10:35 – 11:00
Les grands courants of 50 years of European private international law
Professor Geert Van Calster (KU Leuven)

11:00 – 11:30
Regulatory competition in civil procedure between the Member States
Professor Stéphanie Francq (UC Louvain)

11:30 – 12:00 
The application of Brussels I (Recast) in the Member States
Professor Burkhard Hess (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg)

12:00 – 12:15
Discussion

12:15 – 13:00
Lunch

Afternoon program. Chaired by professor Karen Vandekerckhove (European Commission’s Directorate General for Justice and Consumers, UC Louvain)

13:00 – 13:30
Brussels calling. The extra-EU application of European private international law
Professor Thalia Kruger (U Antwerpen)

13:30 – 14:00
The (not so symbiotic?) relation between the Insolvency and the Brussels I regimes
Arie Van Hoe (NautaDutilh, U Antwerpen)

14:00 – 14:30
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Brussels Regime
Professor Stefaan Voet (KU Leuven)

14:30 – 15:00
Brussels I Recast and the Hague Judgments Project
Professor Marta Pertegas (U Antwerpen)

15:00 – 15:15
Discussion

15:15 – 15:45
Coffee break

15:45 – 16:10
Provisional measures under the Brussels regime
Professor Arnaud Nuyts (ULB)

16:10 – 16:30
Brussels falling. The relationship between the UK and the EU post Brexit
Dr Helena Raulus (UK Law Societies’ Brussels office)

16:30 – 16:50
The current European Commission agenda for the development of European private international law
Dr Andreas Stein (European Commission’s Directorate General for Justice and Consumers)

16:50 – 17:15
The CJEU and European Private International Law
Ilse Couwenberg (Judge in the Belgian Supreme Court/Hof van Cassatie)

17:15 – 17:30
Close of conference
Professor Geert Van Calster (KU Leuven)

17:30 – 18:30
Drinks

 

, , , ,

Leave a comment

Sabbagh v Khoury. The Court of Appeal struggles on merits review for anchor defendants.

Update 7 June 2018 on 31 May the High Court [2018] EWHC 1330 (Comm)] backed up the CA’s finding with an interim anti-suit (in arbitration) injunction.

Sabbagh v Khoury at the High Court was the subject of a lengthy review in an earlier post. The Court of Appeal has now considered the issues at stake, in no lesser detail.

In line with my previous post (readers unfamiliar with it may want to refer to it; and to very good Hill Dickinson summary of the case), of particular consideration here is the jurisdictional test under (old) Article 6(1) Brussels I, now Article 8(1) in the Recast, in particular the extent of merits review; and whether the subject matter of the claim comes within the succession exception of Article 1(2)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation.

As for the latter, the Court, after reviewing relevant precedent and counsel argument (but not, surprisingly, the very language on this issue in the Jenard report, as I mention in my previous post) holds in my view justifiably that ‘(t)he source of the ownership is irrelevant to the nature of the claim. ..The subject matter of the dispute is not whether Sana is an heir, but whether the defendants have misappropriated her property.‘ (at 161).

With respect to the application of Article 6(1) – now 8(1), the majority held in favour of a far-reaching merits review. Lady Justice Gloster (at 166 ff) has a minority opinion on the issue and I am minded to agree with her. As she notes (at 178) the operation of a merits test within Article 6(1) does give rise to risk of irreconcilable judgments, which can be demonstrated by reference to the present facts. She successfully, in my view, distinguishes the CJEU’s findings in Kolassa and in CDC, and the discussion at any rate one would have thought, merits CJEU review.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12.1

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

On ‘civil and commercial’, and, again, notaries as courts. The CJEU in Pula Parking.

Issued on the same day as Zulfikarpašić, Pula Parking Case C-551/15 deals with similar core issues, with a few extras thrown in (see also the review by Burkhard Hess here). Pula Parking, a company owned by the town of Pula (Croatia), carries out, pursuant to a decision of the mayor of that town, the administration, supervision, maintenance and cleaning of the public parking spaces, the collection of parking fees and other related tasks. In September 2010, Mr Tederahn, who is domiciled in Germany, parked his vehicle in a public parking space of the town of Pula. Pula Parking issued Mr Tederahn with a parking ticket. Since Mr Tederahn did not settle the sums due within the period prescribed, Pula Parking lodged, on 27 February 2015, with a notary whose office is in Pula, an application for enforcement on the basis of an ‘authentic document’. A notary issued a writ of execution on 25 March 2015, on the basis of that document.  In his opposition, Mr Tederahn put forward a plea alleging that the notary who issued the writ of execution of 25 March 2015 did not have substantive and territorial jurisdiction on the ground that that notary did not have jurisdiction to issue such a writ on the basis of an ‘authentic document’ from 2010, against a German national or a citizen of any other EU Member State.

Does the Brussels I recast apply at all? And does it relate also to the jurisdiction of notaries in the Republic of Croatia?

On the temporal scope of the Brussels I Recast, the Court repeats its (Brussels Convention) Sanicentral (Case 25/79) finding: the only necessary and sufficient condition for the scheme of the Regulation to be applicable to litigation relating to legal relationships created before its entry into force is that the judicial proceedings should have been instituted subsequently to that date. Accession timing is irrelevant to the case: per C-420/07 Apostolides the Act of Accession of a new Member State is based essentially on the general principle that the provisions of EU law apply ab initio and in toto to that State, derogations being allowed only in so far as they are expressly laid down by transitional provisions.

On the substantial scope of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, for the issue of ‘civil and commercial’ the Court refers to its standing case-law (particularly most recently Aertssen and Sapir). In casu, it would seem (the national court is asked to confirm) that the parking debt claimed by Pula Parking is not coupled with any penalties that may be considered to result from a public authority act of Pula Parking and is not of a punitive nature but constitutes, therefore, mere consideration for a service provided. Brussels I applies.

However, notaries in casu do not act as courts: in a twin approach with Zulfikarpašić, the Court holds that the writ of execution based on an ‘authentic document’, issued by the notary, is served on the debtor only after the writ has been adopted, without the application by which the matter is raised with the notary having been communicated to the debtor. (at 58) Although it is true that debtors have the opportunity to lodge oppositions against writs of execution issued by notaries and it appears that notaries exercise the responsibilities conferred on them in the context of enforcement proceedings based on an ‘authentic document’ subject to review by the courts, to which notaries must refer possible challenges, the fact remains that the examination, by notaries, in Croatia, of an application for a writ of execution on such a basis is not conducted on an inter partes basis.

Geert.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.1.1. Chapter 6, Heading 6.2.1.

 

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

Status updated: can a ‘relationship’ be a ‘contract’? CJEU says it’s complicated in Granarolo, and complements the Handte formula.

Update 4 October 2017 for the eventual judgment by the Cour de Cassastion see here: contractual relation upheld.

In C-196/15 Granarolo, extensive reference is made to Brogsitter, in which the CJEU held that the fact that one contracting party brings a civil liability claim against the other is not sufficient to consider that the claim concerns ‘matters relating to a contract’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast. That is the case only where the conduct complained of may be considered a breach of contract, which may be established by taking into account the purpose of the contract, which will in principle be the case only where the interpretation of the contract which links the defendant to the applicant is indispensable to establish the lawful or, on the contrary, unlawful nature of the conduct complained of against the former by the latter. 

Kokott AG Opined that there was no such contractual relationship in the case at hand: see my review of the Opinion. The Court held last week and was less categorical. It suggests a contractual relationship between the parties (which did not have a framework agreement in place: rather a long series of one-off contracts) should not be excluded: the long-standing business relationship which existed between the parties is characterised by the existence of obligations tacitly agreed between them, so that a relationship existed between them that can be classified as contractual (at 25).

What follows can be considered a CJEU addition to the rather byzantine double negative C-26/91 Handte formula: ‘matters relating to a contract is not to be understood as covering a situation in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one party towards another’. In Granarolo at 26 the Court notes

The existence of a tacit relationship of that kind cannot, however, be presumed and must, therefore, be demonstrated. Furthermore, that demonstration must be based on a body of consistent evidence, which may include in particular the existence of a long-standing business relationship, the good faith between the parties, the regularity of the transactions and their development over time expressed in terms of quantity and value, any agreements as to prices charged and/or discounts granted, and the correspondence exchanged.

These criteria obviously are quite specific to the question at hand yet it is the first time the Court, carefully, ventures to give indications of some kind of a European ius commune on the existence of ‘a contract’.

Whether any such contract then is a contract for the sale of goods or one for services, is not a call the Court wishes to make. It lists the various criteria it has hitherto deployed, with extensive reference in particular to C-9/12 Corman-Collins, and leaves the decision up to the national court.

Make a mental note of Granarolo. It may turn out to have been quite pivotal. Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2, Heading 2.2.11.2.9

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

Schmidt v Schmidt: Family feud again leads to discussion of forum rei sitae & forum connexitatis in Brussels I Recast.

An unusually high proportion of cases under Article 22 (old) or 24 (Recast) Brussels I relate to family disputes on property. Webb v Webb, Weber v Weber, Komu v Komu, and now, C-417/15 Schmidt v Schmidt. It’s all about keeping up with the Joneses.

Kokott AG opined in Schmidt last week – the Opinion is not available in English. Mr Schmidt had gifted a (otherwise unspecified) piece of Vienna real estate to his daughter, who lives in Germany. Ms Schmidt is included in the land register as the owner. Mr Schmidt subsequently sues in Austria for the annulment of the gift due to alleged incapacity at the time of the gift, and for removal of the registration. Is the action caught by Article 24? (in which case Ms Schmidt’s claim of lack of jurisdiction fails).

The Advocate General first of all suggests that the referring court’s request should not be turned down simply because it did not specify the time of seizure: in other words it is not clear whether the case is covered by the old or the Recast Brussels I Regulation. Ms Kokott however suggests the Court should not be pedantic about this and answer the question regardless, seeing as the rule has not changed.

Next up and potentially trickier, is the exclusion of capacity from the scope of application of the Regulation. However the Advocate General is right when she suggest that the exclusions should only be relevant where they concern the main object of the litigation. Not, as here, when they are raised incidentally. (She discusses in some detail the linguistic implications given different wording in the different language versions of the Regulation).

Then to the real question. With respect to the annulment of the (gift) agreement, the object and purpose of plaintiff’s action is not the establishment or confirmation of an erga omnes right in rem. Rather, the confirmation of voidness of an agreement transferring such right, due to incapacity. That this will have erga omnes consequences if successful, is not to the point given the long-established need to apply Article 24 restrictively. In this respect this case is akin to C-294/92 Webb and Webb.

The analysis is different however, the AG suggests, for the request to delete the entry in the land register. This does aim directly at erga omnes consequences under Austrian law.

Ms Kokott subsequently rejects the notion that as a result of part of the suit being subject to Article 24, this should drag the remainder into the exclusive bath with it: at 48: if only because if one were to accept this, forum shopping would be facilitated. Including in its suit a procedure covered by Article 24 would enable plaintiff to draw in a whole range of other issues between the parties.

Finally, the AG suggests joinder of the contractual claim (the nullity of the gift) to the right in rem claim, is possible under Article 8(4) and rejects that national rules of civil procedure should or even can play a role in this respect. This part of the Opinion may be optimistically short. For if the joinder route of Article 8(4) may lead to the same result as the one the AG had just rejected, one assumes there ought to be discretion for the national courts to reject it. Not, as the AG rightly suggests, by reference to national civil procedure rules (that would lead to unequal application) but rather by reference to the (probably) EU inspired rule that abuse of Article 8 be avoided.

The Court will probably not answer all the questions the case raises, particularly on Article 8. Expect this to return.

Geert.

 

 

 

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

Universal Music: The CJEU distinguishes Kolassa but just won’t give up on Bier.

Uppdate 4 October 2017 for the eventual Dutch judgment (Hoge Raad) see here. Thank you Michiel Poesen for flagging. UM had not invoked other factual elements linking the case to The Netherlands, than the payment of the settlement from a Dutch bank account.

As I had feared /as was to be expected, the CJEU did not follow Szpunar AG’s lead in formally letting go of Case 21/76 Bier‘s Erfolgort /Handlungsort distinction, even if it did accept the AG’s rejection in the case at issue, of the mere presence of a bank account triggering jurisdiction for tort under (now) Article 7(2) Brussels I Recast.

Kolassa upheld jurisdiction in favour of the courts for the place of domicile of the applicant by virtue of where the damage occurred, if that damage materialises directly in the applicant’s bank account held with a bank established within the area of jurisdiction of those courts. In Universal Music the CJEU distinguished Kolassa: for in the latter case there where ‘circumstances contributing to attributing jurisdiction to those courts.’ In general, the Court held in Universal Music, ‘purely financial damage which occurs directly in the applicant’s bank account cannot, in itself, be qualified as a ‘relevant connecting factor’‘ (at 38) . ‘ It is only where the other circumstances specific to the case also contribute to attributing jurisdiction to the courts for the place where a purely financial damage occurred, that such damage could, justifiably, entitle the applicant to bring the proceedings before the courts for that place.‘ (at 39).

The Court at 38 flags a rather interesting and relevant argument for dismissing pure presence of  a bank account as a determining connecting factor (a student of mine, Tony Claes, had made the same argument earlier this ac. year): a company such as Universal Music may have had the choice of several bank accounts from which to pay the settlement amount, so that the place where that account is situated does not necessarily constitute a reliable connecting factor. What the Court is essentially saying is that in such circumstance the applicant can manipulate jurisdiction and hence shop for a forum: which is not part of the jurisdictional rule for tort.

Crucially of course we are left having to ponder what exactly ‘other circumstances’ than location of bank account may imply.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Headings 2.2.11.2, 2.2.11.2.7

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

%d bloggers like this: