Posts Tagged Directive 2008/98
Thank you Paul Davies for signalling the recent French decree on end of waste – EoW criteria. Such national initiatives are seen by some as being a sign of the failure of relevant provisions of EU Waste law (which suggest the EU should be developing such criteria). An alternative reading may suggest that national initiatives may be better places to read the technical and environmental and pubic health safety requirements at the local level, potentially preparing the way for EU criteria. Relevant procedures under EU law arguably are not the most efficient for the initial development of this type of detailed instrument, as the example of plastics and REACH also shows.
Handbook of EU Waste law, 2nd ed. 2015, OUP, 1.166 ff and 1.189 ff.
I have review of Shell at the CJEU here, and final judgment in Rotterdam here. Next Thursday the hearing takes places in C-624/17 Tronex which echoes many of the issues in Shell. When, if at all, is the definition of waste triggered in a reverse logistics chain: with a focus on the relationships between the various professional parties in the chain (that the consumer is not handling waste when returning a product in these circumstances is now fairly established).
Questions referred are below.
Handbook of EU Waste law, 2nd ed. 2015, OUP, 1.166 ff and 1.189 ff.
1. (a) Is a retailer which sends back an object returned by a consumer, or an object in its product range that has become redundant, to its supplier (namely the importer, wholesaler, distributor, producer or anyone else from whom it has obtained the object) pursuant to the agreement between the retailer and its supplier to be regarded as a holder which discards the object, within the meaning of Article 3.1 of the Framework Directive? 1
(b) Would the answer to Question 1.(1) be different if the object is one which has an easily repairable fault or defect?
(c) Would the answer to Question 1.(1) be different if the object is one which has a fault or defect of such extent or severity that it is, as a result, no longer suitable or usable for its original purpose?
2. (a) Is a retailer or supplier which sells on an object returned by a consumer, or an object in its product range which has become redundant, to a buyer (of residual consignments) to be regarded as a holder which discards the object, within the meaning of Article 3.1 of the Framework Directive?
(b) Is the answer to Question 2.(1) affected by the amount of the purchase price to be paid by the buyer to the retailer or supplier?
(c) Would the answer to Question 2.(1) be different if the object is one which has an easily repairable fault or defect?
(d) Would the answer to Question 2.(1) be different if the object is one which has a fault or defect of such extent or severity that it is, as a result, no longer suitable or usable for its original purpose?
3. (a) Is the buyer which sells on to a (foreign) third party a large consignment of goods bought from retailers and suppliers and returned by consumers, and/or goods that have become redundant, to be regarded as a holder which discards a consignment of goods, within the meaning of Article 3.1 of the Framework Directive?
(b) Is the answer to Question 3.(1) affected by the amount of the purchase price to be paid by the third party to the buyer?
(c) Would the answer to Question 3.(1) be different if the consignment of goods also contains some goods which have an easily repairable fault or defect?
(d) Would the answer to Question 3.(1) be different if the consignment of goods also contains some goods which have a fault or defect of such extent or severity that the object in question is no longer, as a result, suitable or usable for its original purpose?
(e) Is the answer to Questions 3.(3) or 3.(4) affected by the percentage of the whole consignment of the goods sold on to the third party that is made up of defective goods? If so, what percentage is the tipping point?
Case C-60/18 AS Tallinna Vesi could have been, as Advocate General Kokott noted yesterday, about much more. In particular about the exact scope of the Waste Framework Directive’s exclusion for sewage sludge and the relation between the WFD, the waste water Directive and the sewage sludge Directive. However the referring court at least for the time being sees no issue there (the AG’s comments may trigger the applicant into making it an issue, one imagines) and the AG therefore does not entertain it.
Instead the case focusses on whether waste may no longer be regarded as such only if and after it has been recovered as a product which complies with the general standards laid down as being applicable to it? And on whether, alternatively, a waste holder be permitted to request that the competent authorities decide, on a case-by-case basis and irrespective of whether any product standards are in place, whether waste is no longer to be regarded as such.
Ms Kokott emphasises the wide margin of discretion which the Member States have in implementing the Directive. End of waste (‘EoW’) criteria at the national level (in the absence of EU criteria) may not always be warranted particularly in the context of sewage sludge which is often hazardous. However precisely that need for ad hoc assessment should be mirrored by the existence of a procedure for waste operators to apply ad hoc for clarification on end of waste status.
Handbook of EU Waste law, 2nd ed. 2015, OUP, 1.166 ff and 1.189 ff.
Mirror entries in EU (hazardous) waste law. Campos Sánchez-Bordona AG in Verlezza et al. I.a. a useful reminder of the true meaning of precaution.
Joined Cases C-487/C-489/17 Alfonso Verlezza et al, in which Campos Sánchez-Bordona AG opined last week, (no version in English available) is one of those rather technical EU environmental law cases which for that reason risks being overlooked by many. This is even more the case in EU waste law. Many of its provisions are subject to criminal law sanctions, hence encouraging defendants to take its application to the most intricate of corners so as to avoid a criminal conviction.
Verlezza et al concerns the implementation by Italy of a notoriously tricky part of EU waste law: the determination of wastes as being ‘hazardous’. Clearly, these wastes are subject to a range of stricter measures than ordinary wastes. Interestingly, while these wastes are more dangerous than ordinary wastes, they are often also more attractive to waste industries: for as secondary raw materials they may have high value (one can think of cartridges, batteries, heavy metals).
Protracted to and fro at the time between the European Commission and the Member States plus Parliament (which I explain in relevant chapter of my Handbook of EU Waste law; which I am pleased to note the AG refers to), eventually led to a regime with two or if one likes three categories: wastes considered per se hazardous; and wastes which may be considered hazardous or not, depending on whether or not they display hazardous properties in the case at issue (hence three categories: hazardous per se; non-hazardous and hazardous in concreto). This latter category are the so-called ‘mirror entries’: wastes originating from the same source which depending on the specifics of the case, may be hazardous or not.
Wastes produced by households (‘domestic waste’) are not considered hazardous. However the AG emphasises correctly that this exemption from the hazardous waste regime (via Article 20 of the waste framework Directive, 2008/98) does not apply to the case at issue, given that the ‘domestic’ wastes concerned have already been mechanically sorted. It is the qualification of the waste residues following sorting that needs to be resolved.
The mirror entries are the result of heated debate between the Institutions. The EC was hesitant to provide a binding list given the need for individual assessment; Council and EP were looking for regulatory certainty. In the end, Member States may (indeed have to) consider waste as hazardous when the material displays one or more of the hazardous properties listed in Annex to the EU list of waste. This also requires the Member States to issue a procedure which guides this assessment. It is the specifics of the Italian procedure (producers have to classify specific streams of waste as either hazardous or not; they have to carry out the necessary scientific tests; they are bound by the precautionary principle) which have triggered the case at issue.
At 19 the AG refers to the discussion in Italian scholarship: one part among others on the basis of the precautionary principle defends a reversal of the burden of proof: waste in the mirror entries is considered hazardous unless industry proves its non-hazardous characteristics; the other part proposes that scientific analysis needs to determine hazardousness in each specific case (quoting the sustainable development of the sector in support).
The AG opines that the Italian modus operandi needs to be given the green light, among others referring to the recent April 2018 EC guidance on wastes classification and the criteria defined in the Directive, which render a waste hazardous: producers of waste are perfectly capable indeed in the Directive’s set-up have to assess the hazardous character of the waste and the Italian regulations are a capable way of ensuring this.
The defendants’ ultimate argument that the precautionary principle should allow them to consider waste as hazardous even without such assessment, also fails: scientific assessment is able to determine a substance’s hazardous characteristics. Defendants’ approach would lead to all mirror entries being defined as hazardous. The Directive’s principle of cost benefit analysis ensures this does not lead to excessive testing- proportionate testing for properties will do the job. (It may be surprising that the defendants make this argument; but remember: in a criminal procedure all arguments are useful to try and torpedo national law or practice upon which a prosecution is based; without a valid law,, no prosecution).
This latter part of the Opinion, related to the precautionary principle, is a useful reminder to its opponents (who came out in force following this summer’s mutagenesis ruling; for excellent review of which see KJ Garnett here), of the principle’ true meaning.
Handbook of EU Waste law, 2nd ed. 2015, OUP, Chapter 2, Heading 2. ff (to which the AG refers).
Protreat: The end of Waste status of Waste lubricating oil; the waste hierarchy; and the absence of duty for Member States to issue regulatory guidance.
Does a Member State have any obligation at all, either generally or in case-specific circumstances, to provide guidance as to when a product derived from Waste lubricating oil – ‘WLO’ has or has not achieved end-of-waste status through either re-refining or reprocessing? And in the case at issue, was the UK’s Environment Agency correct in its classification of the treated WLO as still being waste, specifically: did the Agency unfairly favour waste oils recovery over material recycling? These were the issues in  EWHC 1983 (Admin) Protreat v Environment Agency in which Williams J evidently looked primarily to EU Waste law, the Waste Framework Directive 2008/98 in particular.
Among the many points of factual discussion is a review of the Member States’ duties under the Waste hierarchy: Protreat argue (at 67) that the Environment Agency, ‘as an emanation of the State, is under a duty proactively to direct its resources and use its powers to seek to ensure the result required by the Waste Directive. It is submitted, too, that the result required includes “the management of waste in accordance with the waste hierarchy set out in Article 4 of the Waste Directive”. According to the Claimant, this requires the Defendant to perform its functions, so far as possible, to ensure that waste oil treatments higher in the waste hierarchy “are more attractive than treatments lower in the hierarchy”‘.
Williams J is entirely correct at para 71 ff to hold that the hierarchy does not imply that its strict application in all circumstances is not always justified: indeed the hierarchy instruct first and foremost the best environmental outcome in specific circumstances.
That in and of itself makes regulatory guidance difficult to issue – and EU law in general does not impose any obligation to do so: at 81: ‘the terms of Article 6 and, in particular, paragraph 4 thereof, do not support the contention that the Directive imposes upon Member States a specific obligation to provide end-of-waste guidance whether in relation to the products of re-refining or the products of any other process of conversion of waste. The power to decide end-of-waste status “case by case in accordance with the case-law” would, no doubt, permit a regulator to issue guidance. I am not persuaded, however, that this language can be the vehicle for the creation of a specific obligation to issue guidance.’ (Sir Wyn also referred to Article 4 and Article 21 to support that analysis).
Reference to Luxembourg was requested but declined.
It is too readily assumed by many that general Member States’ obligations under the EU’s environmental laws are context only, and not really legally binding. In my Handbook of EU Waste law however I report on a number of cases where the European Court of Justice has rebuked Member States for having failed to take measures to attain some of these general objectives. These cases relate to waste law, evidently, however in other cases the Court’s case-law extends this to EU environmental law generally.
One can now add C-153/16 EC v Slovenia to this list. Slovenia had attempted to address the continuation of waste tyres storage and processing at an abandoned quarry, in contravention of an expired environmental permit. The company dug in its heels, ia via prolonged litigation, with storage and processing continuing.
The Court of Justice found that Slovenia had infringed the general duty of care provisions, as well as enforcement obligations of the landfill Directive and the waste framework Directive. (On the related issues with respect to hazardous waste, the Court found the Commission’s infringement proceedings wanting).
Not all that glitters is gold, of course. The direct effect of these general duty of care provisions remains an issue, as does the absence, arguably, in EU law of a duty of care directly imposed upon waste holders and processors. For that, citisens need to pass via national law wich as current case shows, is not always up to scratch.
The CJEU’s finding in Shell, was applied by the Court of first instance at Antwerp in a judgment from October last, which has just reached me. (I have not yet found it in relevant databases (not uncommon for Belgian case-law), but I do have a copy for those interested). The case concerned debunkered off-spec fuel, off the ship Else Maria Theresa (her engines apparently having been affected by the oil being off-spec), blended into /with a much larger amount of bunker oil.
The court applied the Shell /Carens criteria, leading to a finding of waste. In brief, the blending in the case at issue was not, the court held, standing practice in the bunkering /debunkering business, and /or a commercially driven, readily available preparation of off-spec for purchase by eager buyers. Rather, a quick-fix solution to get rid off unwanted fuel.
The judgment (which is being appealed I imagine) emphasises the case-by-case approach needed for the determination of ‘waste’. It relies heavily on (the absence of) evidence on market consultation and signals from interested buyers for the off-spec fuel.