Update 9 November 2018 the General Court has now annulled the Commission’s Regulation.
I reported at the time on the General Court‘s decision in Dyson. The CJEU yesterday in Case -44/16P agreed, albeit in less prosaic terms than my earlier post, that the Court’s reasoning was wanting. The case now goes back to the General Court to reconsider those pleas made by Dyson which the Court considers to have been insufficiently answered.
Of most interest to readers of this blog is the argument re proof, science and procedure (at 72 ff): According to the Commission, Dyson does not explain in what way the development of a test with a loaded receptacle would have been more proportionate. The Commission submits that it was not obliged to show that no better test method could be developed, and that it was on the contrary for Dyson to prove that a more appropriate test method existed, which in the view of the General Court it failed to do.
The Court of Justice agrees that the General Court’s entertainment of this question is wanting – the particular parameter was required under the delegating Directive, alleged absence of a reliable test is not enough to ignore it. That is not to say, that upon reconsideration the eventual General Court’s answer may not be the same.
Thank you Alison Frankel at Reuters for bringing to my attention Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch. An immigration case which triggered a delightfully written judgment by Gorsuch CJ on the delegation of power to agencies. In particular the founding fathers’ intention, against the background of separation of powers, with agencies room for statutory interpretation.
Both Ms Frankel’s article and judge Gorsuch’s pieces do much more justice to the debate than I can do in a blog post so I will leave readers first of all to read both. Judge Gorsuch, referring to precedent (Chevron in particular), notes
‘There’s an elephant in the room with us today. We have studiously attempted to work our way around it and even left it unremarked. But the fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.’
Ms Frankel notes that Chevron directed courts defer to executive-branch agencies in the interpretation of ambiguous statutes. Justice Gorsuch reviews what exactly was intended by Chevron and points to the difficulty in excessive deferring to agencies’ interpretation of statutes.
I would summarise his views as ‘Congress meant trias, not quattuor politica.’
My knowledge of US civil procedure does not stretch to understanding what impact Gorsuch CJ’s views have on current US administrative /public law. Anyone out there who can tell me please do. At any rate, the judgment is great material for comparative constitutional law classes, the CJEU’s ECB (C-270/12) case being an obvious port of call.