Klifa v Slater. Post Brexit, a forum non challenge (for the courts of France) rejected ia on the basis of costs recovery.

In Klifa v Slater & Anor [2022] EWHC 427 (QB), concerning a ski accident in Courchevel, France, the Claim Form was issued on 14 January 2021, just within the three year limitation period of England and Wales but just after the Brexit “Exit Day” also know as IP day (Brexit implementation day) (of 31 December 2020). Defendants take advantage of that to argue a forum non conveniens defence (which readers will know would have been impossible under Brussels Ia). France is suggested to be the ‘most appropriate forum’.

The skiing accident took place on 27 January 2018 and when (and as still is the case) the Claimant was domiciled and resident and habitually resident in France, the First Defendant was domiciled and resident (they being on holiday) in England & Wales, and the Second Defendant (the insurance company) was domiciled in England & Wales. Under Rome II, French law is the applicable law, other than for procedural law, including as to recovery of legal and other costs of the litigation, which is subject to English law, lex fori.

That latter element returns (with reference to ia Wall v Mutuelle de Poitiers) [25] as part of the forum non conveniens assessment, seeing as (Dagnall M) ‘in consequence of the difference in their methods of adducing expert evidence, the English & Welsh jurisdiction procedural approach is likely to be considerably more expensive than that in France, and which is reflected in the costs rules and approach of each country.’

At [40] Master Dagnall sums up the many issues leading to the case being very ‘French’ in nature, deciding on balance however [42] that the defendants have not met the (high hurdle) of proving that France is “distinctly” or “clearly” the more appropriate forum.

At [44] ff he holds obiter that even if they had met that test, a stay in favour of proceedings in France would not assist with “achieving the ends of justice”L the second part of the forum non test. At [48] two factors are singled out: enforcement will have to take place in England; and a lot of work prior to the claim form being issued was carried out prior to IP day, when forum non was not an issue. Recovering those costs would be impossible in France.

The point has been made ad nauseam by many and this case is a good illustration: post Brexit, forum non is back with a vengeance and it is a time-consuming and costly business.

Geert.

High Court refuses capped cost order for English corporate defendant in Malawi sexual exploitation case, emphasising access to justice. Noli sequitur forum non arguments dress up as cost application.

Update 25 February 2022 Lord Justice Coulson today refused permission to appeal:  [2022] EWCA Civ 233.

Cavanagh J (unusually assisted by Brown J, who has extensive experience in cost orders) last week in Thomas & Ors v PGI Group Ltd [2021] EWHC 2776 (QB) refused to grant a ‘Capped Cost Order’, ‘Cost Capping Order’ or CCO (these also exist for judicial review proceedings and in arbitration). This application for a CCO was reportedly the first made under CPR 3.19.

In the case, brought before Brexit date under Article 4 Brussels Ia, a group of Malawi claimants are suing tea company Lujeri’s English parent company PGI alleging complicity in exploitation and abuse, including sexual abuse.  Claimants allege the Defendant owed a duty of care to them on the basis that it promulgated relevant policies, standards and guidelines, that it exercised supervision and control over Lujeri, and/or that it held itself out as exercising such supervision and control. The Claimants further allege that the Defendant breached that duty of care and that they suffered loss and damage as a result.

English proceedings against Lujeri were dropped following claimants’ admission that they were unlikely to meet a jurisdiction challenge against same on the basis of Malawi being the natural forum for that claim [14]. The defendant does not resist A4 jurisdiction, acknowledges the UK is the natural forum for the claims against it, that there is no abuse of process (neither in my view have any place in A4 jurisdiction) and that the case is at least arguable.

Had the CCO been granted, it would have the effect of limiting the future costs recoverable by the Claimants, should they ultimately be successful, to £150,000 (or thereabouts). It would not impact the recoverable costs of the defendants if they are successful, although [25] they are unlikely to be able to recover any. As the judge notes [13] even if the core claim is successful, compensation will be far below parties’ legal costs in the case. The non-financial, ‘vindication’ [13] objectives are more important.

Despite defendants’ acknowledgment that a jurisdiction challenge is effectively impossible under A4 (A33-34 do not seem engaged), their arguments for a CCO [28 ff] are forum non via the backdoor:

Whilst not disputing that the Claimants are entitled to bring these proceedings against the Defendant in England, the Defendant submits that it is still open to the Claimants to bring proceedings in Malawi against Lujeri, their former, or, in some cases, their current, employer, and, indeed, against the Defendant. The Defendant submits that it would be more appropriate for the Claimants to bring their claims against Lujeri, in Malawi, especially as such claims would be advanced on the simple and straightforward basis of vicarious liability, rather than on the basis of a more complicated claim against the UK-domiciled parent company.

At 43 claimants make the obvious point that this is a ‘(lightly) disguised attempt to strike out these proceedings on the basis that they are an abuse of process, or that England is a forum non conveniens’.

At 72 the judge holds that claimants are right that it would not be appropriate, having regard to the CPR required principle of proportionality [‘the overriding objective [of the CCO, GAVC] of enabling the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost’] to cap the costs at a figure that is less than the minimum costs that are required for them to litigate their claims effectively in the High Court. Costs in other words cannot be disproportionately incurred if they are below the amount that is required by the party to litigate its claims effectively, unless [74] parties’ costs are out of proportion to the potential benefits to the Claimant of the litigation’ – quod non in casu: [79]: ‘The sums that are likely to be recoverable, though small by English standards, are very significant for poor Malawian plantation workers, and they may indeed be life-changing. I accept the Claimants’ submission that in any event, the Claimants’ objectives in bringing these proceedings are not entirely, or even principally, about money.’

At 82-83 the resurrected forum non arguments feature again,  with the judge holding

In any event, in the present case, one of the parties, the Defendant, is domiciled in England. It is a matter of public importance in this country whether a company that is domiciled here is in breach of a duty of care to workers on plantations in Malawi, owned by a subsidiary company. CPR 44.3(5)(e) states that the extent to which a claim is in the public interest is a matter to be taken into account when considering proportionality.

That is an important consideration for future CCOs, outside the Brussels Ia context and indeed an argument that would feed into an A33-34 analysis, too.

At 91 ff the judge reinforces his findings on the basis of access to justice:

‘I think that it is highly significant, in this regard, that the imposition of a CCO would almost certainly have the effect of forcing the Claimants to abandon their claims…

this is not a case in which a wealthy Claimant is deliberately pursuing a low-value claim, at great expense, in order to harass the Defendant, or to cause as much unnecessary cost to the Defendant as possible. Rather, this is a case in which extremely poor Claimants are pursuing a relatively low-value claim for a number of legitimate reasons, only one of which is the prospect of damages.

This is an important finding, both under A4 Brussels Ia and beyond it, under residual English conflicts rules.

Geert.

European Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Chapter 7.

Airbus v Generali et al: The Court of Appeal on the intensity of review of choice of court under Article 25. Clear echoes of Turner v Grovit and West Tankers.

Update 17 October 2019 for a related issue in a German case, awarding the German party costs for having to defend a US procedure in spite of parties’ agreement to litigate in Germany, see the German federal court, BGH , Urteil vom 17.10.2019 – III ZR 42/19, as flagged by Tobias Lutzi (and discussed by Giesela Ruhl here).
(Apologies for the odd formatting in this post: I tried to debug this but failed. I am not wasting too much time trying, for I assume most of you do not visit the blog to enjoy its design qualities).
In [2019] EWCA Civ 805 Airbus v Generali et al CJEU authority in West Tankers clearly echoes. I had hoped to review the case much sooner after my Tweet reporting it a few days after the judgment came out. That delay does have the advantage that Clyde & Co in the meantime have analysis to which I am happy to refer.

The claimant in this action and the respondent to the appeal, Airbus, claims declarations (1) that it is not liable to the defendant insurers for losses incurred in relation to an incident which occurred on 29 September 2013 in which an aircraft which it had manufactured sustained damage when landing in Rome and (2) that proceedings commenced against it by the defendants in Italy have been commenced contrary to the terms of an English exclusive jurisdiction clause. The clause in question is contained in an Airframe Warranties Agreement dated 8 July 2010 (“the Warranties Agreement”) concluded between (among others) Airbus and the defendants’ insured, the Italian airline company Alitalia. The issue on this appeal is whether the English court has jurisdiction over these claims by virtue of the jurisdiction clause. Moulder J held that it does and the defendant insurers (henceforth “the appellants”) now appeal.

Appellants contend, in outline, that the jurisdiction clause is of limited scope and does not extend to Airbus’s claims in this action, that the claim for a negative declaration falls within an arbitration clause in a different agreement, a Purchase Agreement dated 31 October 2005 which provides for ICC arbitration in Geneva, and that their own proceedings in Italy under articles of the Italian Civil Code are not within the scope of either clause. They say in addition that they cannot be in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause to which, as insurers, they were never parties and that, regardless of the true construction of the clause, there is no basis on which the English court can make a declaration against them (essentially, per Turner v Grovit and West Tankers).

Males LJ at 49: The standard of proof to be applied in determining whether the English court has jurisdiction under Article 25 of the Brussels Recast Regulation is that of a good arguable case. Kaifer Aislimentos was discussed as relevant authority. However, at 52: ‘sometimes it will be sensible, when a question of law arises on an application to challenge jurisdiction, for the court to decide it rather than merely deciding whether it is sufficiently arguable.’  Discussion of the contractual construction of the choice of court clause then follows at 62 ff and concludes in favour of a wide application in casu.

At 77 ff: The question whether the appellants’ claim in Italy falls within the scope of the English jurisdiction clause. Males LJ notes correctly that this depends on the nature of the claim brought in Italy, not on the defences which may be or have in fact been raised by Alitalia. At 82 he fairly swiftly concludes that even though the Italian claim is for breach of non-contractual obligations under articles of the Italian Civil Code, it is sufficiently connected to the Warranties Agreement to be within the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction clause. At 83 therefore: the commencement and pursuit of the Italian proceedings was contrary to the terms of that clause and that the English court has jurisdiction to determine that claim.

That then brings us to the discussion of what the English courts might potentially do to assist the party relying on the choice of court clause – given the unavailability of anti-suit per West Tankers. Noteworthy is that the new lis alibi pendens rule protecting choice of court following Brussels Ia, seemingly was not deployed or discussed in the Italian proceedings – at any rate there is no reference to any such discussion in the Court of Appeal judgment (other than perhaps at 84 which seems to suggest that amendment of claims brought the issue to the surface and this may not yet have been the case at the time of the discussion of the Italian proceedings).

A statement by the English courts finding infringement of the clause, would not just have an impact on cost rulings but would also ground a delictual claim. At 97 Males LJ settles the discussion whether such a declaration might be possible: ‘I can see no valid basis on which West Tankers can be distinguished. If it is held that commencement of the Italian proceedings by Alitalia would have been a breach of the jurisdiction clause in the Warranties Agreement, it follows that their commencement by the appellant insurers is a breach of an equivalent obligation in equity which Airbus is entitled to enforce and that the English court has jurisdiction to grant a declaration to say so.’

Interesting and highly relevant authority.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Heading 2.2.2.10.2.,  Heading 2.2.9, Heading 2.2.9.4.

 

Pretty pennies and exclusive choice of court. BDO Cayman v Argyle Funds

In BDO Cayman v Argyle Funds, reported  by Harneys, the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands followed English and Australian authority in having an anti-suit injunction followed by a cost order against the party that had infringed choice of court. Costs including not just the domestic proceedings (that would be obvious) but also the foreign proceedings (here: in the US).

It is this type of measure which makes jurisdictions stand out and be noticed in civil procedure regulatory competition – not, as I flagged earlier, half-baked attempts to add some gloss via international business courts.

Geert.

 

Eli Lilly v Genentech: When does a patent infringement case turn into questions of validity? – and its impact on cost findings.

I explained the issue in [2017] EWHC 3104 (Pat) Eli Lily v Genentech in my posting on Chugai v UCB. A defendant in a patent infringement case often tries to make the case that the suit is about patent invalidity really: for this obliges the court per GAT v Luk to refer (only the) invalidity issue to the court with exclusive jurisdiction under Article 24(4) Brussels I Recast.

Here, Eli Lily seek a declaration of non infringement of a bundle of European patents held by Genentech, a US-incorporated firm.

Birss J in the case summarises all relevant precedent, including Chugai, to reach the conclusion that the suit can stay in the UK.

Of note is his holding on costs. The English courts do not just review whether the case is currently about validity but also what the likelihood is that it will become one on validity. For if it does later on, Birss J suggests ‘this entire exercise will have been something of a charade‘ (at 84). (Which is not quite the case: even if the validity issue needs to be temporarily outsourced to different courts, the infringement issue may later return to the courts of England).

On this point, Eli Lilly refuse to disclose whether they may seek a ruling on the validity of the patents: they would rather wait to see Genentech’s defence. Not an unacceptable position, but one, High Court does warn, which will have an impact on costs. At 87: ‘I am satisfied that these unusual circumstances mean that it would not be fair to pre-empt what each party may decide to do. There are sufficient uncertainties that the right thing to do is wait and see what happens. However in my firm but necessarily provisional view that wait should be at Lilly’s risk as to costs. If Genentech does counterclaim for infringement, and validity of the non-UK patents is put in issue (here or abroad) in response, then it is very likely that Lilly should bear the whole costs of this application even if they win it in its form today.

That latter point is interesting. It’s twice now this week that judgments come to my attention where jurisdictional considerations are clothed in costs implications.

Geert.

(Handbook of ) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.7.

 

Aarhus and costs recovery. The impact of the EIA Directive and the Convention post consent in Alyson Austin

Reminiscent of an earlier posting on costs, the High Court recently had to consider the impact of the EIA Directive on cost orders. Mrs Austin lives close to an opencast mining and reclamation site in Wales. She complains of noise from heavy machinery and dust, affecting her home and preventing her family from sleeping. Planning consent had been granted in 2005.  Mrs Austin’s current action is based on private nuisance proceedings, based inter alia on the allegation that some of the conditions attached to the consent have not been complied with. The claim therefore is related to post-EIA compliance and the order sought by Mrs Austin is one to limit her costs.

Milwyn Jarman QC held – upon assist by James Pereira and Jack Connah) – that direct applicability of the Aarhus Convention in the UK is limited to those parts which have been incorporated in the EU’s EIA Directive  [‘otherwise, it remains a matter to be taken into account (…) in resolving ambiguities or in exercising discretions’ – a narrow view perhaps, albeit supported by UK precedent, on the impact of the Convention in the UK’s legal order] and that the Directive itself, as far as its impact on costs is concerned, sees upon judicial review proceedings in the process of EIA-based consent only, not an action in private nuisance post such consent.

Leave to appeal was granted and shall be heard end of June. The Aarhus Committee itself is also considering the issue and will proceed with findings in 2014.

This issue has exercised various courts and officials in the UK for some time. The 2014 developments are eagerly awaited.

Geert.

Is justice what you can afford to be done? ECJ turns to Aarhus Convention to apply ‘not prohibitively expensive’ in the EIA Directive.

In Edwards, the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) turned to the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, to interpret the provision ‘not prohibitively expensive’ in the European Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment (‘EIA’). These provide that members of the public (with sufficient interest) must have access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law to challenge the substantive or procedural legality of decisions, acts or omissions subject to the public participation provisions of the Directive. Any such procedure must be, in the words of the Directive, ‘fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive.’

The House of Lords had affirmed a Court of Appeal’s decision to dismiss the appeal of Ms Pallikaropoulos and, on 18 July 2008, ordered her to pay the respondents’ (including the Environment Agency) costs of the appeal, the amount of which, in the event of disagreement between the parties, was to be fixed by the Clerk of the Parliaments. The respondents submitted two bills for recoverable costs in the amounts of GBP 55 810 and GBP 32 290. The jurisdiction of the House of Lords was transferred to the newly-established Supreme Court and the detailed assessment of the costs was carried out by two costs officers appointed by the President of the Supreme Court. In that context, Ms Pallikaropoulos relied on Directives 85/337 and 96/61 to challenge the costs order that had been made against her.

The Supreme Court asked the ECJ inter alia

– whether the question whether the cost of the litigation is or is not “prohibitively expensive” within the meaning of Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention as implemented by [those] directives be decided on an objective basis (by reference, for example, to the ability of an “ordinary” member of the public to meet the potential liability for costs), or should it be decided on a subjective basis (by reference to the means of the particular claimant) or upon some combination of these two bases?, and whether

– in considering whether proceedings are, or are not, “prohibitively expensive”, is it relevant that the claimant has not in fact been deterred from bringing or continuing with the proceedings?

In 2003, the EIA Directive had been amended and specific reference had been made to the Aaurhus Convention with which, the Directive said, the EIA Directive had to be ‘properly aligned’.

The ECJ held that the cost of proceedings must neither exceed the financial resources of the person concerned nor appear, in any event, to be objectively unreasonable.  As regards the analysis of the financial situation of the person concerned, the assessment which must be carried out by the national court cannot be based exclusively on the estimated financial resources of an ‘average’ applicant, since such information may have little connection with the situation of the person concerned. The national court may also take into account the situation of the parties concerned, whether the claimant has a reasonable prospect of success, the importance of what is at stake for the claimant and for the protection of the environment, the complexity of the relevant law and procedure and the potentially frivolous nature of the claim at its various stages. That the claimant has not been deterred, in practice, from asserting his or her claim is not in itself sufficient to establish that the proceedings are not, as far as that claimant is concerned, prohibitively expensive.

Plenty of criteria therefore for the Supreme Court to consider, altogether a (slight but important) dent in Member States’ national civil procedure rules.

Geert.

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