Posts Tagged Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York

OHADA law and arbitration at the Paris Court of appeal. A tale of overriding mandatory laws /lois de police and ordres publics.

Thank you Thomas Kendra and Thibaud Roujou de Boubée for signalling 16/25484 Cameroon v Projet Pilote Garoubé at the Paris Court of Appeal end of December 2018. The essence of the case is the Court confirming an arbitral award applying OHADA law. OHADA stands for ‘Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires’ – ie the Organisation for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa.

Thomas and Thibaud analyse excellently – of note for this blog are the issue of non-State law as lex contractus (compare with Rome I), the recognition of same as trumping Cameronese law essentially as overriding mandatory law, and the rejection of the Cameronese argument that its wildlife laws qualify themselves as lois de police /overriding mandatory law and that the lack of recognition of same violates ordre public.

Interesting arbitration /conflicts material.

Geert.

 

, , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

T v O: Unamar, Ingmar and ordre public /overriding mandatory law in Austria.

Tobias Gosch and Venus Valentina Wong have excellent overview of T v O (why o why do States feel the need the hide the identity of companies in commercial litigation) in which the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) ruled on whether potential claims under the Austrian Commercial Agents Act (Handelsvertretergesetz) can be brought before an Austrian court even if the underlying agency agreement contains an arbitration clause and is governed by the laws of New York.

The contested part of the litigation, as Tobias writes, concerns the following: the Agent conducted the procurement of sea freight business in Austria and other countries of the European Union for the Principal. Whilst the territorial scope of the Agent’s activities complies with the conditions for the international overriding mandatory applicability of the compensation provisions of the Directive as set out by the ECJ in Ingmar, the procurement of business is not covered by the relevant definition in the Directive, which only refers to the sale or purchase of goods. Including the procurement of business therefore is a form of gold-plating and the national law’s decision to do so does not uncontestedly fall under the protection of overriding mandatory law. In other words it does not necessarily override parties’ choice of law and ensuing choice of court.

The judgment refers inter alia to Unamar to justify its direction. Rather like, as I reported at the time, the Belgian Supreme Court, the Austrian Supreme Court, too, fails properly to assess whether the Austrian legislator intended the Austrian provisions to be of overriding mandatory law character per Rome I: “1. Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.

The European Court of Justice’s general statement in Unamar that gold-plated provisions may fall under overriding mandatory law, looks set by national courts to be turned into a matter of fact priority.  That surely at some point ought to be disciplined by the CJEU.

As Valentina points out, the judgment betrays lack of confidence in commercial arbitration. ‘It is arguable whether the arbitration agreement is really ineffective or inoperable (under Article II(3) NYC or section 584 ACCP respectively) just because it provides for arbitration in New York and New York law as applicable substantive law. A prudent arbitral tribunal seated in New York may very well be able to decide a matter in compliance with (mandatory) EU or national law on commercial agents, in particular if the future award will have to be enforced in a EU member state.’

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.8.3.

 

 

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

A little pousse-cafe. Gaz de France v STS: annulment of arbitral award on grounds of ordre public.

Something to digest quietly, to start this new year: in Gaz de France v STS the French Conseil d’Etat annuled an arbitral award for breach of ordre public. The Conseil objected in particular to the panel’s denial of mandatory French (administrative) law. Reed Smith have analysis here, including of the issue on jurisdiction (Conseil d’Etat or Court de Cassation).

Upon reading the judgment, my question is this (just putting it in the group, as it were): does the Conseil have terminology right where it seems to classify breach of mandatory law as a violation of ordre public (it is the latter only which justifies annulment under the New York Convention)? Incidentally (at 5) it also refers to the possibility of mandatory EU law being part of this interpretation of ordre public. This structure is clearly inspired by the Rome I Regulation where, as I have noted before, the presence of mandatory law, overriding mandatory law, and ordre public, is causing confusion.

Happy New Year, happy reading, Geert.

 

, , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

Gazprom, arbitral Antisuit Injunctions and the Judgments Regulation: Wathelet AG gets one or two things off his chest

Wathelet AG opined yesterday in Gazprom, Case C-536/13, re the fate of arbitral anti-suit injunctions. (See my posting on the application, for context). He takes the opportunity to add to the chorus of criticism of the ECJ’s West Tankers ruling, at considerable length; and to review the ‘new’ regime under the Brussels I recast, in light of recital 12 of that Regulation.

His review of the ‘new’ regime of the Brussels I recast, and the contrasting positions of the EC and a number of Member States, support my proposition that the recast, by incorporating a summary of previous case-law in its recitals, has certainly not clarified things beyond discussion. Wathelet in fact suggest that the recitals do rebuke the ECJ and return application of the Regulation to the Rich scenario – however I am not convinced that Rich itself necessarily clarifies things. (It, too, like Van Uden and like the current recital, uses a confusing variety of criteria. I have a paper forthcoming on the Brussels I recast (already in a Dutch version should readers be interested) which looks into this).

At any rate, the lengthy review of the position under the recast evidently is outside the scope of the preliminary review, since the recast does not apply to it, and the ECJ is certain not to entertain the AG’s review of the recast and his rebuke of West Tankers at all. (Although his critical views are not likely to endear him to the Court).

Returning to the actual questions, the AG suggests the Court reply that that the Brussels I Regulation is not applicable in the present case (it falling exclusively within the scope of the 1958 New York Convention) and that, in any event, (what is effectively) an anti-suit injunction issued by an arbitration tribunal is not contrary to that Regulation. Finally, that under the New York Convention, a Member State cannot classify Brussels I’s jurisdictional regime as being ‘ordre public’ and hence capable of leading to refusal of recognition of an arbitral award.

The AG decisively supports arbitration in this opinion, however the ECJ is bound to be much shorter (and perhaps less sympathetic) in its judgment. To be continued….

Geert.

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

Yukos v Tomskneft: Ireland rejects ‘parochial’ jurisdiction in enforcement of arbitral awards

Postscript 26 April 2016: the PCIA Yukos Arbitral award which I refer to below, was later squashed for lack of jurisdiction – that judgment is currently under appeal.

When should a court being asked to apply the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958)  – the ‘New York Convention‘, look mercifully on forum shopping with a view to the smooth enforcement of such award? That, in essence, was the issue in Yukos v Tomskneft at the Irish High Court. Both Yukos Capital and Tomskneft were originally part of the Yukos group – of PCIA Yukos arbitral award fame. Tomskneft was later transferred to Rosneft. Arbitral proceedings had taken place in Switzerland, Yukos’ attempts at enforcement in Russia failed, as they did in France. Singapore attempts are underway.

The Irish courts involvement at first view looks odd. There are no Tomskneft assets in Ireland, neither corporate domicile of any Tomskneft affiliates. As Kelly J noted, the Irish proceedings effectively would serve as a jack for proceedings in other jurisdictions where Tomskneft does hold assets. Waving a successful enforcement order (even if it were in practice nugatory, given the lack of assets) obtained in a ‘respectable’ jurisdiction, would assist with enforcement proceedings elsewhere.

The New York Convention has a pro-enforcement bias however the Irish (and other, especially common law countries’) arbitration act in enforcement of the Convention, runs alongside the application of Irish civil procedure rules ‘out of the jurisdiction’, being against a foreign defendant: Kelly J (at 59): ‘In implementing the Convention as it did, the legislature did not attempt to dispense with the necessity to obtain leave to serve out of the jurisdiction in a case where the respondent is not normally resident within it.

US law, too, requires that preliminary to recognising and enforcing a foreign award, in personam jurisdiction must be established. Decision on such remains subject to lex fori. A jurisdiction which all too happily entertains such cases is then said to employ ‘parochial’ or ‘exorbitant’ jurisdictional rules.

In the case at issue, after referencing prior case-law both in Ireland and elsewhere, Kelly J rejected applicant’s request (at 141):  ‘It is a case with no connection with Ireland. There are no assets within this jurisdiction. There is no real likelihood of assets coming into this jurisdiction. This is the fourth attempt on the part of the applicant to enforce this award. There is little to demonstrate any “solid practical benefit” to be gained by the applicant. The desire or entitlement to obtain an award from a “respectable” court has already been exercised in the courts of France and is underway in the courts of Singapore.

Note therefore that the court is not unsympathetic to the attempt at employing successful (even if hollow) enforcement in one jurisdiction as a lever in the real target jurisdiction (the one with the assets). Except, in the case at issue, similar attempts had already been or still were underway elsewhere.

The case is a very good illustration of the attraction (and uncertainty) of forum shopping, in particular at the enforcement stage. As well as a powerful reminder of the in personam jurisdictional rules of the common law.

Geert.

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

Does the EU need an arbitration Regulation?

the existence of parallel arbitration and judicial proceedings (lis pendens issues; see also here); and the circulation of arbitral awards and arbitration-related judgments, including the issue of the conclusive and preclusive effects of prior arbitral awards in relation to conflicting judgments (res judicata issues: including whether the priority which the Brussels I-Regulation concedes to the New York Convention, means that a court in a Member State can or indeed must give priority to a conflicting arbitral award over a judgment of the court of another EU Member State).

A great kick-off to a continuing debate. Geert.

 

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a comment

%d bloggers like this: