Tag: common law

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Harris ea v Environment Agency. The remedy for an Agency’s breach of statutory obligations, with lessons for climate litigation remedies.

Harris ea v Environment Agency [2022] EWHC 2606 (Admin) I fear is another case I let slip on the blog. It is a judgment which discusses to right to an effective remedy following the earlier finding in Harris & Anor v Environment Agency [2022] EWHC 2264 (Admin) that the Agency’s allowing water extraction in three Sites of Special Scientific Interest was in breach of retained EU law, namely Article 6(2) Habitats Directive (measures designed to prevent the deterioration of habitats and species) and of the equally retained EU law precautionary principle.

The issue at stake in current case is the appropriate remedy, a classic challenge in judicial review cases in instances where the authorities have been found in breach of an obligation of effort rather than one of result. Those of us involved in climate litigation will appreciate the difficulty.

The Agency suggests the finding that there was a breach is enough of a remedy. Claimants disagree, seeking an order in the nature of [2018] EWHC 315 (Admin) which the Agency says must be distinguished on the grounds that the regulatory requirements relevant to that order, they argue, is more prescriptive.

Johnson J holds [7] that ‘the claimants have not just a presumptive common law right to a remedy, but also a statutory right’, given Article 19(1) TEU’s right to an effective remedy. A mandatory order that the Environment Agency must formulate a plan is issued [10], a plan which must be produced within 8 weeks [13]; that deadline has passed at the time of posting], disclose that plan to claimants [17] and with the precise formulation of the order [26] being

“The defendant shall, by 4pm on 7 December 2022, provide to the claimants details of the measures it intends to take to comply with its duties under Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive (“Art 6(2)”) in respect of The Broads Special Area of Conservation. The details shall include an indication as to the time by which the defendant intends to have completed those measures. It shall also include, so far as practicable, the scientific and technical basis for the defendant’s assessment of the measures that are necessary to comply with Art 6(2).”

More on the nature of the kind of orders judges may give to authorities is currently discussed in a wide range of environmental law, including climate law litigation. It is an interesting application of the nature of judicial review and trias politica..

Geert.

Monash University, Law 5478 Strategic and Public Interest Litigation.

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Bao v Qu; Tian (No 2). A reminder of the principles of enforcement and the common law in Australia.

Update 26 May 2020 Michael Douglas has abnalysis here.

Update 20 MAy 2020 see in the meantime also review by Jie (Jeanne) Huang, here.

Thank you Michael Douglas for alerting me to Bao v Qu; Tian (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 588 at the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The judgment does not require an extensive post. I report it because it is a solid application of the recognition and enforcement principles of foreign judgments under the common law of Australia. Hence good material for the comparative conflicts folder.

Geert.

 

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Lenkor Energy: Textbook application of the (common law of) recognition and assessment of ordre public. (Re: Dubai judgment).

Update 4 June 2020 decision upheld on appeal, [2020] EWHC 1432 (QB).

In [2020] EWHC 75 (QB) Lenkor Energy Trading v Irfan Iqbal Puri, Davison M rejected the ordre public arguments made by claimant against recognition of a money judgment of the Dubai First Instance Court.

Reflecting global understanding of ordre public, it is the judgment and not the underlying transaction upon which the judgment is based which must offend (here: English) public policy. That English law would or might have arrived at a different conclusion is not the point (Walker J in Omnium De Traitement Et De Valorisation v Hilmarton [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 222).

The ordre public arguments made, were (1) illegality, (2) impermissible piercing of the corporate veil and (3) penalty.

Re (1), the argument is that the underlying transaction is illegal. Master Davison acknowledged there are circumstances where an English court might enquire into the underlying transactions which gave rise to the judgment. However such court must do so with extreme caution and in the case at issue, defendant’s familiarity with Dubai and its laws argued against much intervention by the English courts.

On (2), the veil issue, submission was that defendant was being made personally liable for the debts of IPC Dubai, which was the relevant party (as guarantor) to the Tripartite Agreement and the holder of the account upon which the cheques were drawn. The cheques had not been presented or had been presented out of time – or there was at least an issue about that. The combination of these matters was, it was suggested, to impose an exorbitant liability on Mr Puri for sums which he had not agreed to guarantee – in contravention of established principles of English law.

Here, too, Davison M emphasised defendant’s familiarity with Dubai law. The case against Mr Puri in Dubai was resolved according to the rules which the laws of Dubai apply to Dubai companies and to individuals who write cheques on Dubai accounts. Dubai law may be different than English law on this point, but not repugnantly so.

Finally on (3) the sums in particular the interest charged were suggested to be exorbitant hence a form of unenforceable punitive damages. However, 9% interest is only 1% higher than the judgment debt rate in England and only ¼% higher than the current rate under the Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998. (At 31) ‘In the light of this, to characterise the interest rate of 9% as amounting to a penalty is unrealistic.’

Geert.

 

 

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Rahmatullah and Ali v MOD and FCO. The High Court on the law applicable in (allegedly) irregular rendition cases.

Update 24 February 2021 Rahmatullah is discussed at length in Husayn ( Zubaydah) v The Foreign And Commonwealth Office & Ors [2021] EWHC 331 (QB) with counsel for claimant arguing that Turner J’s suggestion of displacement as a result of forum shopping (not present he held in Rahmatullah) is present in the case at issue. (Claimant was captured in Pakistan and moved to Thailand, Poland, the United States’ base at Guantanamo Bay, Morocco, Lithuania and Afghanistan). Lane J however disagrees and holds for the mosaic of the six countries’ laws.

In [2019] EWHC 3172 (QB) Rahmatullah and Ali v Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office claimants argue on the basis of the torts of negligence and misfeasance in public office. They are Pakistani nationals both of whom allege that they were captured by British forces in Iraq in February 2004. They contend that they were subsequently handed over to United States’ control and, thereafter, taken to Afghanistan where they were subjected to prolonged detention, torture and mistreatment.

At issue in this civil case is whether the English PIL rule of locus damni (for personal injury cases) needs to be displaced in favour of English law, by virtue of the exceptions to this rule including, all else failing, ordre public. (For the relevant text, see the judgment).

Rome II does not apply given the case clearly is one of acta iure imperii. Note that this does not, in England and Wales, displace the residual rules of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995.

Turner J keeps the discussion very to the point, holding that there is no reason to displace the general rule: the law of Iraq applies to the claims prior to the claimants’ rendition from Iraq to Afghanistan and that of Afghanistan thereafter. His clear application of the precedents is much enjoyable.

One particularly interesting point is raised at 34:

The claimants make the further point that transferring a detainee from one country to another in breach of Article 49 [of the Fourth Geneva Convention, GAVC] would legitimise forum shopping by illegal rendition. The defendants accepted during the course of oral submissions that circumstances could arise in which this was a legitimate concern where, for example, a detainee had been relocated in a rogue state selected for its lack of adequate legal protection for those within its geographical and jurisdictional boundaries. However, in this case there is no evidence to suggest that any consideration of the putative advantages of the application of Afghan jurisprudence lay behind the rendition decision or indeed to the effect that Afghan law would provide, as a matter of fact, a particularly suitable environment within which to achieve any such darker purpose.

Of note is also, at 29, claimants’

‘point that those in senior positions who are to be held accountable for the alleged failures under the return claim were based in England and were acting (or failing to act) in the exercise of state authority.’

An argument which, Turner J finds, has been found to be relevant in the authorities, however not striking with sufficient force in casu to meet the very high burden of proof for displacing the standard rule.

Geert.

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SRCL LIMITED. Citing academics in the common law.

Update 1 May 2020 see Australia’s Chief Justice Susan Kiefel’s paper on the issues in the Melbourne Uni Law Review here.

Update 27 March 2019 Michael Douglas has excellent analysis in the UNSW Law Journal Forum here , of judges’ scholarly writing as a source of law – referring i.a to SRCL.

[2018] EWHC 1985 (TCC) SRCL Limited is a procurement case and therefore generally outside the remit of this blog. However it is a useful reminder of the common law’s approach to citing academic authority:

Fraser J discusses it at 180 ff: ‘The historic common law convention was that academic views could only be cited as authority in courts if the author was dead, and if the work in question had achieved a level of respectability in any event. There was also, perhaps, a third requirement (although it could be seen as a subset of the second) that the author themselves had to have been either a judge or practitioner. Professor Arrowsmith is very much alive, and has a high reputation as an academic in the field of procurement law.’

Reference is made to Lord Neuberger’s 2012 lecture “Judges and Professors – Ships passing in the night?”, including discussion of what may have been a compelling reason for the rule or convention: at 181: ‘A dead author cannot change their mind. Although Lord Neuberger was not convinced that this was a good reason, it does have the merit of certainty.’

At 182: ‘The conclusion of Lord Neuberger is clear however – the convention has now been eroded, and there is a dialogue between judges and academics to the benefit of all. Textbooks of living authors are regularly cited in court – they do not have the same status as judgments under the doctrine of stare decisis, but they are persuasive and the views of an academic such as Professor Arrowsmith do have weight in this arena.’

When I earlier shared the judgment on Linked-in, one of my contacts justifiably mentioned that the love (lost) between academia and the courts in the UK might be mutual: the suggestion was that too much scholarly analysis disregards practice implications too readily.

By way of conclusion, as professor Arrowsmith herself noted, ‘The fact that I am, fortunately, still alive, was just one of the important issues discussed in a recent High Court case on procurement. …For the record, it was decided that my views are highly persuasive – but not as important as they might be if I were dead.’

Geert.

 

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Spring v MOD and Evangelisches Krankenhaus Bielefeld. Joinder (based on Article 8(1) Bru I Recast) ultimately fails given limitation period in the lex causae.

[2017] EWHC 3012 (QB) Spring v MDO and Evengelisches Krankenhaus Bielefeld is unreported as far as I can tell (and I have checked repeatedly). Thank you Max Archer for flagging the case and for sending me copy of judgment a few months back. (I am still chipping away at that queue).

In 1997, Claimant was stationed in Germany with the British Army. The Claimant very seriously fractured his right leg and ankle whilst off duty in Germany (the off duty element evidently having an impact – on duty injuries arguably might not have been ‘civil and commercial’). He was then treated at the Second Defendant’s hospital under an established arrangement for the treatment of UK service personnel between the First (the Ministry of Defence) and Second Defendants (the German hospital). Various complications later led to amputation.

The Brussels I Recast Regulation applies for claimant did not introduce the claim against the second defendant until after its entry into force: 18 years in fact after the surgery. This was the result of medical reports not suggesting until after July 2015 that the German hospital’s treatment has been substandard. Rome II ratione temporis does not apply given the timing of the events (alleged wrongful treatment leading to damage).

Yoxall M held that Article 8(1)’s conditions for anchoring /joinder were fulfilled, because of the risk of irreconcilable judgments (at 35). Even if the claim against the First Defendant is a claim based on employer’s liability whereas the claim against the Hospital is based on clinical negligence. Should the proceedings be separate there is a risk of the English and German courts reaching irreconcilable judgments on causation of loss. At 35: ‘It would be expedient for the claims to be heard together – so that all the factual evidence and expert evidence is heard by one court. In this way the real risk of irreconcilable judgments can be avoided.’

With reference to precedent, Master Yoxall emphasised that ‘in considering Article 8(1) and irreconcilable judgments a broad common sense approach is justified rather than an over-sophisticated analysis’ (at 36).

Yoxal M is entirely correct when he states at 37 that Article 8(1) does not include a requirement that the action brought against the different defendants have identical legal bases. For decisions to be regarded as contradictory the divergence must arise in the context of the same situation of law and fact (reference is made to C-98/06 Freeport).

Next however the court considers as a preliminary issue, the limitation period applying between claimant and the German defendant and holds that the Hospital have an arguable case that the claim is statute barred in German law (German expert evidence on the issue being divided). The latter is the lex causae for the material dispute (on  the basis of English residual private international law), extending to limitation periods per Section 1(3) of the Foreign Limitations Period Act 1984 (nota bene partially as a result of the 1980 input by the Law Commission, and not entirely in line with traditional (or indeed US) interpretations of same). This ultmately sinks the joinder.

As a way forward for plaintiff, the Court suggests [2005] EWCA Civ 1436 Masri. In this case the Court of Appeal essentially held that joinder on the basis of Article 8(1) may proceed even if litigation against the England-based defendants are not the same proceedings, but rather take place in separate action. Masri has not been backed up as far as I know, by European precedent: Clarke MR held it on the basis of the spirit of C-189/87 Kalfelis, not its letter. Moreover, how the German limitation periods would then apply is not an obvious issue, either.

An interesting case and I am pleased Max signalled it.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12.1.

 

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Bestolov v Povarenkin. On the determination of domicile (and yes, Owusu strikes again).

Many thanks to Andrew Savage and Nick Payne for flagging [2017] EWHC 1968 (Comm) Bestolov v Povarenkin a little while ago, and for sending me copy of the judgment at the time. Apologies for late reporting: frustratingly even at gavclaw we cannot always devote the amount of time to the blog we would wish. Dr Maganaris in the meantime also has summary here.

As readers no doubt are aware, the Brussels I Recast Regulation (Article 62) does not define ‘domicile’: it defers to national private international law on the issue. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001 establishes that a person is domiciled in England for the purpose of the Brussels Regulation (recast) if: the person is “resident” in England; and (cumulatively) the person has a “substantial connection” to England. Bryan DJ takes us through the relevant (and often colourful) precedent and notes, importantly, at 28 that the consequence of the English rules is that the same person can be resident in two different jurisdictions at the same time. At 44, he summarises with a list of criteria, and decides on the facts of the case that Mr Povarenkin is indeed domiciled in England (the substantial connection test having been more easy to determine than that of residence).

Subsequently the High Court reviews at length whether there was a valid choice of court agreement under Article 25 of the Regulation – which at this jurisdictional stage of the proceedings Bryan DJ decides there was not (choice of law for the relevant contracts being English law, was justifiably not considered definitive in this respect), at least not clearly. Obiter, the judge reviews forum non conveniens, at lenght in fact (and in a very clear way with a keen eye on relevant precedent as well as court practice in England) however he holds both before and after the obiter that evidently given Owusu, forum non conveniens has no calling.

A well written judgment, the approach of which on domicile evidently goes beyond having relevance merely for the English courts: for under the Regulation, courts in other Member States, too, may have to consider whether parties are domiciled in an EU Member State other than their own including, for the time being, the United Kingdom.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.3, Heading 2.2.14.5.

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Prof Hess on Brexit and Lugano.

A concise note (I am currently tied up mostly in writing research grants. And and and… I hope to return to the blog in earnest later in the week) to signal prof Hess’ excellent short paper on Brexit and judicial co-operation. Prof Hess focuses on the possibility to use the Lugano Convention. (See here for a draft of Michiel Poesen’s overview). I agree that Lugano would not be a good route if one’s intention is to safeguard as much as possible co-ordination between the  UK’s common law approach to private international law, and the EU’s. Neither evidently if one aims to facilitate smooth cross-border proceedings.

Prof Hess has an interesting side consideration on schemes of arrangements. (Including reference to Apcoa). Again I agree that the English courts’ approach to same is not entirely without question marks (particularly jurisdictional issues in the event of opposing creditors: see here). I do not though believe that they would justify hesitation at the recognition and enforcement stage in continental Europe – even after Brexit. At least: not in all Member States. For of course post Brexit, UK judgments become those of a ‘third country’, for which, subject to progress at The Hague, we have no unified approach.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 5.

 

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Shenzhen CTS v Dajiang International Investment: ‘in limine’ can’t be early enough.

Another posting for the ‘comparative conflicts /dispute resolution’ binder. In order not to be found to have voluntary appeared (‘submitted to jurisdiction’), civil procedure rules worldwide require defendants to flag their opposition to jurisdiction early on in the proceedings. Indeed at the threshold of the litigation: in limine litis.

In EU law, the Court of Justice ruled in Elefanten Schuh that where civil procedure of the Member States requires a defence on the merits at the very earliest opportunity, such defence does not jeopardise objection to jurisdiction made at the same occasion. (Case-law now reflected in the wording of the Brussels I Regulation and its Recast successor).

There is as yet however no CJEU case-law on what level of interaction with the courts leads to submission.

In England, Zumaz Nigeria v First City [2016] EWCA Civ 567 recently held that application for disclosure does not entail submission: for one may need those very documents to contest jurisdiction.

Thank you RPC for now flagging Shenzhen CTS International Logistics Co Ltd v Dajiang International Investment Co Ltd. The court found that by applying to strike out the claim and seeking security for costs (to include the period after the hearing of the stay application), defendant had invoked the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts. As always of course the decision was based on factual merit which RPC’s David Smyth and Hannah Fletcher  summarise very well in the posting hyperlinked above.

Beware before you engage with the courts, if you do not wish to be seen as having submitted.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.7.

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Consenting to choice of court under the common law. The Privy Council in Vizcaya v Picard.

In Vizcaya v Picard, the Privy Council considered the issue of consent to a choice of court clause in the event no such choice has been made verbatim. It was alleged that choice of court had been made implicitly but clearly by reference to an applicable law agreement in the underlying contract. RPC have a review of the case on their blog and I am grateful to them for bringing it to my attention.

The case is a fall-out of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme, carried out through Mr Madoff’s company Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”), a New York corporation. After Madoff’s fraud came to light in 2008, Irving Picard (“the trustee”) was appointed as trustee in BLMIS’s liquidation in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (“the New York BankruptcyCourt”). The trustee commenced proceedings under the anti-avoidance provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code against investors who had been repaid before the fraud was discovered, including the appellant, Vizcaya Partners Limited (“Vizcaya”), a BVI (British Virgin Islands) company which carried on business as an investment fund, and which invested about US$328m with BLMIS between January 2002 and December 2008, but was repaid US$180m before the fraud was discovered.

The Appeal before the Privy Council concerns primarily the content and scope of the rule in common law that a foreign default judgment is enforceable against a judgment debtor who has made a prior submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign court (as distinct from a submission by appearance in the proceedings).  Brussels I or the Recast was not applicable to the case. In that Regulation (Article 25), the expression of consent with choice of court must take one of thee forms: essentially: written (or oral but confirmed by written agreement); in accordance with lex mercatoria; or in accordance with established business practice simply between the parties.

The question in the case at issue is whether the agreement to submit must be express, or can also be implied or inferred. The Privy Council settled the uncertainty which would seem to have existed for some time in the common law, in favour of an answer in the affirmative. Consent to jurisdiction can be implied. What needs to be shown though is real ‘agreement’, or ‘consent’ (in European private international law with respect to the similar discussion re choice of law (Rome I) I would say the test is one of ‘clearly established’), quod non in casu. Choice of law (here: in favour of New York law) can be a factor but not a solely determinant one. Moreover, choice of court viz one’s business transactions does not imply automatic extension to insolvency proceedings.

Crucial precedent, it would seem. Geert.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9

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