Posts Tagged Comity
For background to the Microsoft Ireland case under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), see here. The issue is essentially whether the US Justice Department may force Microsoft to grant access to e-mails stored on Irish servers.
With a group of EU data protection and conflicts lawyers, we have filed an amicus curiae brief in the case at the United States Supreme Court last week, arguing that the Court should interpret the SCA to apply only to data stored within the United States, leaving to Congress the decision whether and under what circumstances to authorize the collection of data stored in other countries.
There is not much point in me rehashing the arguments here: happy reading.
Interestingly enough the issue of inclusion of foreign victims in class action suits came up in conversation around our dining room the other day. (Our youngest daughter, 15, is showing encouraging signs of an interest in a legal career). In 2017 ONCA 792 Airia Brands Inc v Air Canada is reviewed excellently by Dentons here and I am happy to refer. (See also here for Norton Rose reporting on related cases – prior to the CA’s decision in Airia Brands).
The jurisdiction and ‘real and substantial connection’ analysis referred to Van Breda (which recently also featured mutatis mutandis in the forum necessitatis analysis in Cook).
Certification of global classes was part of the classic analysis of developments in international class action suits, which hit us a few years back when many EU states started introducing it. Airia Brands shows that the concerns are far from settled.
Expect a series of blog postings in the next few weeks on developments which occurred a few weeks or even months back. I have been squirreling away a series of judgments and other developments, with a view to exam season. Some of them I did use in my exam papers – some of them I did not.
Update 24 January 2018 Imamura et al. v General Electric Company and ‘Does 1-100’ employs the same jurisdictioal opening to forum shop in the US. See here for background.
nCooper v. Tokyo Electric Power [plaintiffs in the case are a group of service members in the U.S. Navy who were deployed to Operation Tomodachi, a relief effort in the immediate aftermath of the massive earthquake and tsunami; they allege they were exposed to radiation during the deployment] by the US Court of Appeals, ninth circuit, is a direct (and rare in its directness) example of how jurisdictional rules are used to help co-ordinate a country’s diplomatic efforts. In this particular case, the Court gives direct support to the State Department’s view that in order for others to be encouraged to accede to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (“CSC”), its main jurisdictional rule (granting exclusive jurisdiction to the country of the locus delicti commissi) must not be achievable via an application of comity in the US courts. For further background and overview see Elina Teplinsky, and Meghan Claire Hammond here.
That plaintiffs are US citisens plays a major role in the court ruling out forum non conveniens.
In some of the corporate social responsibility /alien tort statute cases that I have reported on in the blog (particularly, Rio Tinto), foreign policy openly plays a role, too, and in Kiobel itself, in the lower courts, the impact of jurisdiction on US foreign policy was debated, too. It is always refreshing to see courts highlight the issue openly. For in many jurisdictions, such obvious impacts are brushed under the carpet.
End of exam season (sadly not yet of marking marathon). In the next few weeks I shall be posting on judgments issued a little or longer while ago, which I was pondering to use in exams. (I did for some of them).
In  EWHC 1216 (Pat) Chugai Pharmaceutical v UCB the issue at stake was to what degree a suit seeking to establish absence of liability under a patent license, in reality provokes argument on the validity of the patent. Carr J has excellent review of precedent, much of which has passed in one way or another on this blog. Please do refer to judgment for proper reading.
Claimant (“Chugai”) seeks a declaration against the Defendants (collectively “UCB”) that it is not obliged to continue to pay royalties under a patent licence (“the Licence”) granted by the First Defendant (“UCB Pharma”). UCB Pharma is a Belgian company with an English branch which entered into the Licence with Chugai in respect of a portfolio of patents. Chugai claims that its products, which are, in part, manufactured and sold in the USA, fall outside the scope of the claims of the Patent concerned. Accordingly, Chugai seeks a declaration that it owes no royalties for the manufacture and sale of these drugs manufactured after a certain date.
UCB alleges that, although framed as a claim for a declaration relating to a contract, a part of these proceedings, in substance, concerns not only the scope but also the validity of the Patent. UCB submits that the validity of a US patent is non-justiciable, since the English court has no power to determine the validity of a foreign patent. Accordingly, it submits that those parts of Chugai’s pleading which are said to raise issues of invalidity fall outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the English court.
European private international law as readers will know lays greats emphasis on exclusive jurisdiction in the case of validity of patents. The CJEU’s holding in C-4/03 Gat v Luk that nullity actions against a national part of a certain European patent can only be conducted in the jurisdiction for which that patent was registered, regardless of whether the nullity argument is raised in the suit or by way of defence, is now included verbatim in Article 24(4) Brussels I Recast. The EU’s take is rooted in the idea that the grant of a national patent is “an exercise of national sovereignty” (Jenard Report on the Brussels Convention (OJ 1979 C59, pp 1, 36)). The rule therefore engages the Act of State doctrine, and suggests that comity requires the courts of States other than the State of issue, to keep their hands off the case.
Particularly in cases where defendant is accused of having infringed a patent, this rule gives it a great possibility to stall proceedings. Where the action is ‘passive’, with plaintiff aiming to establish no infringement, the argument that the suit really involves validity of patent is less easily made.
The possibility of ‘torpedo’ abuse, coupled with less deference to the jurisdictional consequences of the Act of State doctrine [particularly its contested extension to intellectual property rights], means the English courts in particular are becoming less impressed with the exclusivity. (Albeit Carr J on balance decides per curiam (at 73-74) that direct challenges to the validity of foreign patents should not be justiciable in the English courts). Where the EU Regulation applies, they do not have much choice. Carr J refers to  EWHC 1722 (Pat) Anan where claimant sought to carve out issues of validity by seeking a declaration that the defendant’s acts infringed a German patent “if the German designation is invalid (which is to be determined by the German courts)“. EU law meant this attempt could not be honoured. Carr J however suggests that EU rules have no direct application in the present case because the Patent at stake is a United States patent. That is spot on, on the facts of the case: choice of court having been made in favour of the English courts, the case does not fall under the amended lis alibi pendens rule of the Brussels I Recast. In Article 33 juncto recital 24, reflexive effect is suggested for the Regulation’s exclusive jurisdictional rules, leaving a Member State court in a position (not: under an obligation) to give way to pending litigation in third countries, if its own jurisdiction is based on a non-exlusive jurisdictional rule (Articles 4, 7, 8 or 9) and not within the context of the protected categories.
Allow me to lean on 20 Essex Street’s conclusion in their review of the case: Carr J held that the case before him was not a direct challenge to validity. He accepted Chugai’s submissions that its claim was contractual. Disputed parts of the patent were incidental to the essential nature of its claim, which was a claim for determination of its royalty obligations. In his view, this claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction clause, in favour of the English courts, which parties had agreed.
Essential reading for IP litigators.
Forget Facebook and Safe Harbour. CJEU in Weltimmo confirms wide prescriptive but finds limited executive jurisdiction in EU data protection.
A lot of attention last week went to the CJEU’s annulment of the EC’s ‘Safe Harbour’ decision in Schrems v Facebook (aka Austrian student takes on internet giant). I will not detail that finding for I assume, for once, that readers will be au fait with that judgment. For those who are not: please refer to Steve Peers for excellent analysis as per usual. It is noteworthy though that the CJEU’s finding in Schrems is based in the main on a finding of ultra vires: often easily remedied, as those with a background in public law will know.
Schrems (held 6 October) confirmed the Court’s approach to the EU’s prescriptive jurisdiction in data protection laws, as in Google Spain. However the Thursday before, on 1 October, the Court took a more restrictive view on ‘executive’ or ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction in Case C-230/14 Weltimmo. Lorna Woods has the general context and findings over at EU Law analysis. The essence in my view is that the Court insists on internal limitations to enforcement. It discussed the scope of national supervisory authority’s power in the context of Directive 95/4, the same directive which was at issue in Google Spain. The Court held
Where the supervisory authority of a Member State, to which complaints have been submitted in accordance with Article 28(4) of Directive 95/46, reaches the conclusion that the law applicable to the processing of the personal data concerned is not the law of that Member State, but the law of another Member State, Article 28(1), (3) and (6) of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that that supervisory authority will be able to exercise the effective powers of intervention conferred on it in accordance with Article 28(3) of that directive only within the territory of its own Member State. Accordingly, it cannot impose penalties on the basis of the law of that Member State on the controller with respect to the processing of those data who is not established in that territory, but should, in accordance with Article 28(6) of that directive, request the supervisory authority within the Member State whose law is applicable to act.
In other words, the supervisory authority in a Member State can examine the complaints it receives even if the law that applies to the data processing is the law of another Member State. However the scope of its sanctioning power is limited by its national borders.
This finding (I appreciate there are caveats) has important implications for the discussion on the territorial reach of the so-called ‘righ to be forgotten’. It supports in my view, the argument that the EU cannot extend its right to be forgotten rule to websites outside the EU’s domain. I have a paper forthcoming which discusses the various jurisdictional issues at stake here and the impact of Weltimmo on same.